


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PREFATORY NOTE

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boyhood home was near by; Plutarch tells us¹ he used often of an evening to ramble past its fields, and muse upon the greatness of spirit which, after three triumphs, found in them ample occupation. It was a humble, mean house, this home of the conqueror of Pyrrhus; and coarse as plentiful its fare. No Roman ever tired of telling how a Samnite bribe found Manius Curius roasting turnips in the dusk of his chimney corner: *Malo in fictilibus meis esse, eis qui aurum habent imperare!* The words stuck. When, years afterward, the struggle against Eastern luxury came to its crisis, the moral bias of the ancient episode gave it increased prominence in the minds of old-school Romans, and continued to mould the characters of their descendants through many generations — a homely aroma pervading, as it were, the whole course of Roman ethics, as unmistakable in every writer who catches their true spirit, as it is incapable of confusion with that asceticism which took its place.²

“Ancient Rome,” said the great historian of morals in Europe, “produced many heroes, but no saint.”³ And he goes on to point out that the type of character which the Romans chiefly held up to admiration, was self-consecrated, not to that abstract of virtue enjoined by religion, but to a concrete purpose — the material prosperity of their Commonwealth. Here as elsewhere, the natural attitude of the practical race was sustained. Whether such devotion lacked much of the spirituality of a quest for the soul’s salvation, may perhaps with some justice be questioned.⁴ I do not, however, intend to

¹ *Cato Maior*, 2.

² Our Lord’s birth in a manger, the homeless wanderings by Galilee, are familiar illustrations of the instances by which Christianity seeks to exalt lowliness.

³ W. E. H. Lecky, *History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne*, New York, 1876, vol. 1 (= chaps. 1-3 = pp. xviii + 498), p. 177.

⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, 1, pp. 212, 186 f.: “. . . The spirit of patriotism has this peculiar characteristic, that while it has evoked acts of heroism which are both very numerous and very sublime, it has done so without presenting any prospect of personal immortality as a reward. Of all the forms of human heroism, it is probably the most unselfish. The Spartan and the Roman died for his country because he loved it. The martyr’s ecstasy of hope had no place in his dying hour. He gave up all he had, he closed his eyes, as he believed, for ever, and he asked for no reward in this world or in the next. Even the hope of posthumous fame — the most refined and supersensual of all that can be called reward — could exist only for the most conspicuous leaders. It was examples of this nature that formed the culmi-

raise the point here. In these pages I would call attention less to the subtler influences from which the several virtues spring, than to the effectual attainment of moral worth itself; less to the motives which produced great moral character, more to the validity of such excellence achieved. Of this, a special aspect only will be treated. Given the ideal virtues, founded on a practical basis of patriotic motive, we have to ask: How had the Roman moral teachers, in seeking to inculcate them, been supplying the want which Christianity later satisfied by the inspiration of the lives of Jesus of Nazareth and of His saints? If we find, as surely we shall find, that the age which produced an *Imitatio Christi* was yet, if anything, less given to reliance upon moral instances than was that which preceded it, we shall naturally seek some explanation of their prominence in the Roman ethical system. What were the leading qualities, we shall inquire, chosen to be thus enforced? Who constituted the Examples adopted? Was their range limited, as with the saints of the mediaeval Church, by a formal canon; and if so, how was this established? Did moral teachers at Rome own allegiance to an authoritative Book of Exem-

nations or ideals of ancient systems of virtue, and they naturally led men to draw a very clear and deep distinction between the notions of interest and of duty. . . ."

Again, the prototype of sainthood may be sought in the Stoic sage, according to E. Nourry ("P. Saintyves"), *Les Saints Successeurs des Dieux*, 1907, pp. 407 ff. For the culmination of this pagan development under Alexander Severus, see J. Réville, *La Religion à Rome sous les Sévères*, 1886, chap. 9, *La Réforme Eclectique: Le Culte des Saints*, p. 276: ". . . Le trait caractéristique de cet éclectisme synchrétiste, c'est qu'il confond dans une même adoration mystique les dieux et les hommes, pour autant que ces derniers ont eu une nature spirituelle supérieure à celle du commun des mortels; c'est avant tout un culte des hommes divins, des héros, non pas des héros dans l'ordre politique ou militaire, mais de ceux qui se sont distingués parmi tous les autres par leur piété, leur élévation de sentiment, leur grandeur d'âme. Le syncrétisme tel que le conçoit et pratique Alexandre Sévère, c'est avant tout le culte des saints du paganisme." Cf. Lampridius, *Vita Alexandri Severi* (*Hist. Aug.* 18), 29, 2 and 31, 4 f.: ". . . Matutinis horis in larario suo, in quo et divos principes, sed optimos, electos et animas sanctiores, in quibus Apollonium et, quantum scriptor suorum temporum dicit, Christum, Abraham, et Orfeum et huiusce <modi ce> teros habebat ac maiorum effigies, rem divinam faciebat. . . . Vergilium autem Platonem poetarum vocabat eiusque imaginem cum Ciceronis simulacro in secundo larario habuit, ubi et Achillis et magnorum virorum, Alexandrum vero Magnum inter optimos et divos in larario maiore consecravat."

pla? — or did they seek for their ideals any sanction other than that of intrinsic worth? How did the influence of succeeding authors and movements of thought affect the situation? Can the idealization of a given character be traced as a development, and causes assigned? How did this development close? With the ascendancy of Christianity, the ancient models will naturally yield place to those of saints and martyrs: parallel with the fall of the gods of paganism is to be followed that of the objects of devotion consecrated in its ethical creed.¹

An age which makes Morality elder sister to Religion,² might be expected, perhaps, to give no smaller measure of regard to deities whose worship, in Seneca's phrase, proceeds *non ture nec sertis, sed sudore et sanguine*,³ than to the gods of the temples. Such, however, proves not to be the case. Scattered and desultory references in the more comprehensive works on Roman society, a cursory but emphatic notice in the *History of European Morals*,⁴ isolated studies of the post-

¹ This article presents conclusions reached in a Latin doctor's dissertation and summarized in *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, 22 (1911), pp. 181 f. Its subject was suggested by Professor Clifford H. Moore, to whose friendly counsel my treatment is deeply indebted.

² Cf. the well-known definition of Matthew Arnold; also E. Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, 1908, vol. 2, pp. 695 f.; W. Warde Fowler, *Social Life at Rome in the Age of Cicero*, 1910, pp. 339 ff., and *The Religious Experience of the Roman People*, 1911, pp. 226 ff. (see below, pp. 17 ff.).

³ *Ep.* 67, 12; see below, pp. 21 f.

⁴ Lecky, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 182 ff.: “. . . The circumstances of the Roman people tended inevitably to the production of a certain type of character, which, in its essential characteristics, was the type of Stoicism. . . . This fact derives a great importance from the large place which the biographical element occupied in ancient ethical teaching. Among Christians the ideals have commonly been either supernatural beings or men who were in constant connection with supernatural beings, and these men have usually been either Jews or saints, whose lives had been of such a nature as to isolate them from most human sympathies, and to efface as far as possible the national type. Among the Greeks and Romans the examples of virtue were usually their own fellow-countrymen; men who had lived in the same moral atmosphere, struggled for the same ends, acquired their reputation in the same spheres, exhibited in all their intensity the same national characteristics as their admirers. History had assumed a didactic character it has now almost wholly lost. One of the first tasks of every moralist was to collect traits of character illustrating the precepts he enforced. Valerius Maximus represented faithfully

humorous fame of a given historical figure¹ — scholarship mediaeval and modern affords no more.² Hopeless indeed is the quest, if one would look for the slightest recognition of this phase of Roman religion in technical treatises on the subject.³ Modern research seems rather to vie with the pontifices in exhausting itself upon the nomenclature and attributes of lesser divinity — a thousand pages elucidating Vervactor, Imporcitor, Subruncinator, Panda Cela, Mutunus Tutunus, and their fellows, against one which recognizes the import of the personalities of Fabricius or Marius. In the almost always invaluable revision of Pauly, the investigator discovers under the caption *Exempla* only a reference to the book-trade.

A chief reason of modern writers' neglect may be recognized in the fact that no express definition or catalogue of the *exempla virtutis* has come down to us from the Romans themselves. So, it would seem, the term eluded notice. The fact of its currency is established by the briefest survey of their literature.

the method of the teachers of antiquity when he wrote his book giving a catalogue of different moral qualities, and illustrating each by a profusion of examples derived from the history of his own or of foreign nations. 'Whenever,' said Plutarch, 'we begin an enterprise, or take possession of a charge, or experience a calamity, we place before our eyes the example of the greatest men of our own or of bygone ages, and we ask ourselves how Plato or Epaminondas, Lycurgus or Agesilaus, would have acted. Looking into these personages as into a faithful mirror, we can remedy our defects in word or deed. . . . Whenever any perplexity arrives, or any passion disturbs the mind, the student of philosophy pictures to himself some of those who have been celebrated for their virtue, and the recollection sustains his tottering steps and prevents his fall.' Passages of this kind continually occur in the ancient moralists. . . ."

¹ E. g., the valuable articles by Münzer and others in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie*, s. vv. *Atilius*, *Curius*, *Fabricius*, etc.

² On the mediaeval exempla, see *The Exempla or Illustrative Stories from the Sermones Vulgares of Jacques de Vitry*, ed. T. F. Crane, London, 1890, preface, pp. 17-21, 70, 85 ff., 98 ff., and *passim*.

³ Many students must, I cannot but think, have shared with me a keen disappointment and sense of lack in the most able discussions by scholars during the last twenty-five years. May the day come, and speedily, when such a treatment as that of the invaluable series on Roman religion and philosophy in Müller's *Handbuch*, without methodical recognition of a life beyond death or of deity as a power making for righteousness, shall be unthinkable!

Cicero is strikingly fond of appealing to the *exemplum*,¹ and more than once makes it his proud boast that he has himself by one or other of his achievements merited the title.²

The first to use the term *exempla* in a technical sense, as the designation of a recognized category, is, I think, Seneca, writing to Lucilius, in this case with special reference to the *exempla virtutum*:³ "Dic tibi, ex istis, quae terribilia videntur, nihil est invictum. Singula vicere iam multi: ignem Mucius, crucem Regulus, venenum Socrates, exilium Rutilius, mortem ferro adactam Cato; et nos vincamus aliquid! Rursus ista, quae ut speciosa et felicia trahunt volgum, a multis et saepe contempta sunt: Fabricius divitias imperator reiecit, censor notavit. Tubero paupertatem et se dignam et Capitolio iudicavit, cum fictilibus in publica cena usus ostendit debere iis hominem esse contentum quibus di etiam nunc uterentur. Honores reppulit pater Sextius, qui ita natus ut rem publicam deberet capessere, latum clavum divo Iulio dante non recepit; intellegebat enim quod dari posset, et eripi posse. Nos quoque aliquid et ipsi faciamus animose: simus inter exempla. Quare deficimus? quare desperamus? quicquid fieri potuit, potest. . . ."

¹ Or *exemplar*; but I fail to find a plural used of the class: cf. Cic. *Mur.* 66; *Sest.* 49; *Off.* 3, 16; *Tim.* 6; Sen. *Dial.* 2, 2, 1; 2, 7, 1. See below, n. 2.

² E. g., *Sest.* 48-50: "Denique, cum omnia semper ad dignitatem rettulissem nec sine ea quicquam expetendum esse homini in vita putassem, mortem, quam etiam virgines Athenis regis, opinor, Erechthei filiae pro patria contempsisse dicuntur, ego vir consularis tantis rebus gestis timerem? praesertim cum eius essem civitatis ex qua C. Mucius solus in castra Porsennae venisset eumque interficere proposita sibi morte conatus esset; ex qua P. Decius primum pater, post aliquot annos patria virtute praeditus filius se ac vitam suam instructa acie pro salute populi Romani victoriaque devovisset; ex qua innumerabiles alii partim adipiscendae laudis, partim vitandae turpitudinis causa mortem in variis bellis aequissimis animis oppetissent; in qua civitate ipse meminisset patrem huius M. Crassi, fortissimum virum, ne videret victorem vivus inimicum, eadem sibi manu vitam exhausisse qua mortem saepe hostibus optulisset. Haec ego et multa alia cogitans hoc videbam, si causam publicam mea mors peremisset, neminem umquam fore qui auderet suscipere contra improbos civis salutem rei publicae. Itaque, non solum si vi interissem, sed etiam si morbo extinctus essem, fore putabam ut exemplum rei publicae conservandae mecum simul interiret. . . . In qua quidem nunc me restituto vivit mecum simul exemplum fidei publicae. . . ." Cf. *Planc.* 90.

³ *Ep.* 98, 12 ff.

From Seneca's time on, the expression seems to have been well established in Latin usage.¹ There is, however, to my knowledge, no passage in which the unmodified term *exempla* can be interpreted as referring specifically to *exempla virtutis*, except by inference from a context. Nor does it appear in the titles of the several books of *exempla* which have come down to us.² None of these, furthermore, concerns itself exclusively with moral examples, or even establishes any methodical, well marked division of contents in which they hold a separate and conspicuous place.³

¹ Cf. e.g. Manil. 5, 450 ff.:

Sed regione means Cepheus umentis aquari
non dabit in lusum mores; facit ora severae
frontis et ad vultus componit pondere mentes.
Pascentur curis veterumque exempla revolvant,
semper et antiqui laudabunt verba Catonis. . . .

Sen. *Suas.* 6, 2: ". . . M. Cato, solus maximum vivendi moriendique exemplum, mori maluit quam rogare — nec erat Antonium rogaturus — et illas usque ad ultimum diem puras a civili sanguine manus in pectus sacerrimum armavit . . ." and *ibid.*, 7, 14 (see below, p. 67, n. 1); Solin. 1, 74: ". . . Pomponium poetam consularem virum numquam ructuassee habetur inter exempla; Antoniam Drusi non spuisse percelebre est . . ."; Aug. *Civ. Dei*, 5, 16 (rubric): "De mercede sanctorum civium civitatis aeternae, quibus utilia sunt Romanorum exempla virtutum"; Paul. Petr. *Vit. Mart.* 4 (61, 1038 D Migne):

. . . Dicite, qui sprete calcantes gaudia mundi
abiecto vitam voluistis quaerere censu,
quis nudum proprio textit nudatus amictu?
quis quod ferre alium doluit, non ipse refugit?
quis miser esse volens miserum miserando refecit?
Vicisti veterum, Martine, exempla virorum,
tuque ipsum: mirandus eras tum paupere tecto,
vel cum divisae remaneret portio vestis;
cede tibi! antiquam geminasti hoc munere palmam. . . .

See also Donatus, cited below, p. 65, n. 5.

² E. g., Valerius Maximus' title, *Factorum et Dictorum Memorabilium libri ix*; cf. however those of Nepos and Hyginus, below, p. 62, and Gell. 10, 18, 7: "Hyginus in Exemplis refert. . . ."

³ Lecky (above, p. 4, n. 4) gives a wrong impression of the composition of Valerius Maximus' book as a whole; see e.g. the opening chapters of Book 7: "De felicitate; sapienter dicta aut facta; vafre dicta aut facta; strategemata; de repulsis; de necessitate; de testamentis quae scissa sunt. . . ." Solinus, 1, 87-127, catalogues striking instances of *mensura*, *pernicitas*, *visus*, *fortitudo*, *memoria*, *mores*, *eloquentia*, *prudentia*, *pietas*, *puclitia*, *felicitas*. Mutations of fortune, e.g., are especially likely to be lumped with genuine *exempla virtutis* by the ancient compilers.

Hence, in dealing with the *exempla virtutum moralium*¹ as a distinctive class, we are given no *a priori* definitions on which to rely. We have, therefore, independently to construct our own categories, first of the *virtutes morales*, then of the series of *exempla virtutum* itself. For these purposes what shall be our materials and methods of approach?

Among the systems of virtue current at Rome in antiquity, most familiar and significant, surely, is that of the Stoics, with the traditional heads *prudentia* (*sapientia*), *iustitia*, *fortitudo*, and *temperantia* (*modestia*).² Adoption of this as a standard *par excellence* for the purposes of the *exempla*, would perhaps be defensible.³ Practically, however, I have found it a more satisfactory method to review carefully the passages of Latin authors in which ethical models are cited, and on that basis to determine which of the several virtues enforced by such citation should be classed as distinctively moral, and what relations exist between these.

It cannot, I think, be matter for much hesitation to decide that swift and impressive changes from high to low estate, or the reverse, as in the cases of Marius, Pompey, Lepidus, Antony, Agrippa, and others, however strong may have been their appeal to the ancient compilers as material for the citation of striking particular instances, have no claim on our consideration here, except in so far as they help to display attributes quite independent of them — the fortitude of Marius, the ill requited virtue of Pompey, the inconstancy of Antony. A glance at a case which does not involve such qualities, that of Lepidus, will help to convince one of this. On the other hand, modern prejudice may for a moment deter us from giving due weight to the disregard of omens by Claudius Pulcher, Flaminius, Terentius Varro; remembering we are to judge by Roman standards, and adjusting ourselves to the Roman point of view, we shall see such instances in

¹ For this word cf. Cic. *Fal.* 1: “. . . Quia pertinet ad mores, quod ἦθος illi vocant, nos eam partem philosophiae *de moribus* appellare solemus, sed decet augentem linguam Latinam nominare *moralem*.” I use it to eliminate the wider application of *virtus*, which might otherwise be taken to include *prudentia*, etc., or even physical excellence.

² For variant subdivisions, see Cic. *Inv.* 2, 157 ff.; *Off.* 1, 15 ff.; Aug. *Divers. Quaest.* 31, 1 (40, 20 Migne) ff.

³ Cf. Lecky, *op. cit.*, above, p. 4, n. 4, and *passim*.

their true light as violations of *religio*, — of *pietas* toward the Gods and the Commonwealth.

It is harder to discriminate conclusively between the abstract *prudentia* (*sapientia*) and that distinctively moral excellence which displays itself in the individual's acts: ¹ in the case of Laelius, for example, just how far shall the epithet *Sapiens* be taken to connote moral virtue? I have made the distinction as well as I could, while conscious of its inadequacy; disregarding Stoic predications of the inclusiveness of *sapientia*, I have given full weight to those passages only in which the *sapiens* is definitely credited with some particular moral quality or with moral excellence in general. The defects of this method are obvious; practically, however, I have not found much difficulty in its application.

Of the distinctively moral virtues, those most often enforced by exemplary citation appear to be: ² *iustitia* (*aequitas*); *fides*; *pietas erga deos, patriam, parentes, ceteros*; ³ *severitas* (*disciplina militaris*); *fortitudo*; *constantia* (*et in morte propinquorum*) = *patientia*; *continentia*; *paupertas* × *luxuria*; *clementia*; *moderatio* × *ambitio* (*petulantia*) — with their opposites, the less obvious of which I have indicated. Less frequently cited are *amicitia* (*concordia*); *gratia*; *observantia*; *gravitas*; *munificentia* (*liberalitas*) × *avaritia*. Some one of these qualities, and of these only, forms the theme of nearly every appeal to the *exemplum* in Latin authors. ⁴

This is not a place to attempt the thankless task of establishing the order of their precedence — of determining, that is, which of several conflicting duties might claim a Roman's first allegiance. Of immense practical import, this question is seldom to be decided on general principles and without reference to the particular circumstances of a given case. ⁵ I shall here simply note, as bearing peculiarly upon our

¹ Cf. Cic. *Off.* I, 15-17.

² These categories are, of course, not mutually exclusive. They stand approximately in the order of Cicero's classification (*l. c.*, *Off.* I, 15 ff.).

³ Cf. Warde Fowler, *The Religious Experience of the Roman People*, p. 412, and *passim*.

⁴ See table, below, pp. 28 ff. All the *maiora* show *pietas* or *impietas erga patriam*.

⁵ On the "conflict of duties" see Cic. *Off.* I, 152-161. Panaetius, whose book was the source of much of the *De Officiis*, had, according to Cicero, left this depart-

present inquiry, the great preponderance in Latin exemplary citation of the characteristically Roman appeal to patriotism.¹

The power in republican and imperial Rome of the patriotic motive may, perhaps, often have been underestimated; the fact of its existence seems never to have been denied. It made a chief ground of the reproaches brought by the Fathers of the early Church against the pagan dispensation.² With the passing of feudalism, it became the inspiration and ideal of peoples who found in their own antecedents no impulse of like authority.³ Nor are its causes far to seek. ". . . Character," says Lecky,⁴ "usually determines opinion; it is not less true that character is itself in a great measure governed by national circumstances. . . . A great nation engaged in perpetual wars in an age when success in warfare depended neither upon wealth nor upon mechanical genius, but upon the constant energy of patriotic enthusiasm, and upon the unflinching maintenance of military discipline, the whole force of the national character tended to the production of a single definite type. . . . Patriotism and military honor were indissolubly connected in the Roman mind. They were the two sources of national enthusiasm, the chief ingredients of the national conception of greatness. . . . These influences were developed in Roman life to a degree which can now never be reproduced. War, for the reasons I have stated, was far more than at present the school of heroic virtues. Patriotism, in the absence of any strong theological passion, had assumed a transcendent power. . . . The state

ment of his subject untouched. Posidonius did something for it, and Cicero no doubt availed himself of his master's work. In a general way Cicero puts the claims of *iustitia* (social duty) first, above those of *fortitudo* and, with some exceptions, of *decorum*. For his gradation of social duties, see below, pp. 11 f.

¹ On patriotism at Rome, see Lecky, *op. cit.*, 1, ch. 2, esp. pp. 176 f., 181 ff., 186 f., 210 ff., 235 ff., 252 f.; M. Schneidewin, *Die antike Humanität*, 1897, pp. 209 ff., esp. 223 ff.; Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, 2, 175-179; J. B. Carter, *The Religious Life of Ancient Rome*, pp. 24 ff., 59.

In touching upon the general considerations preliminary to my subject, such as patriotism at Rome, the morality of the Roman gods, and the like, I have not attempted an exhaustive bibliography of these much discussed topics, but have aimed simply to suggest representative treatments.

² See below, p. 68, with n. 5.

³ Cf. Westermarck, *op. cit.*, pp. 179 ff.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 181-212, *passim*.

occupied in antiquity a prominence in the thoughts of men, which it has never attained in modern times. The influence of patriotism thrilled through every fibre of moral and intellectual life. . . . Patriotism almost always occupied a prominence in the scale of duties, which forms a striking contrast to the neglect or discredit into which it has fallen among modern teachers. We do indeed read of an Anaxagoras pointing to Heaven as to his true country, and pronouncing exile to be no evil, as the descent to the infernal regions is the same from every land; but such sentiments, though not unknown among the Epicureans¹ and the Cynics, were diametrically opposed to the prevailing tone. Patriotism was represented as a moral duty, and a duty of the highest order. Cicero only echoed the common opinion of antiquity in that noble passage, in which he asserts that the love we owe our country is even holier and more profound than that we owe our nearest kinsman, and that he can have no claim to the title of a good man who even hesitates to die in its behalf.²

"A necessary consequence of this prominence of patriotism was the practical character of most ancient ethics."

We shall later have occasion to revert, in a particular connection, to the pre-eminence over other moral duties of that of patriotism.³ Already that pre-eminence meets us, clear and fully articulate, in Lucilius' characterization of *virtus* — 'true worth':⁴

. . . True worth, Albinus,
Shall reckon eke our Country's welfare first,
A parent's next, and third and last, thine own.

So Cicero, in the passage glanced at above,⁵ and again: ". . . In ipsa autem communitate sunt gradus officiorum, ex quibus, quid

¹ Cf. below, p. 12, with n. 3.

² *Off.* 1, 57; see below, n. 5.

³ Below, pp. 37 ff., 55.

⁴ *Lucil. fr. incert.* 1326-1338 Marx (cf. his notes *ad loc.*, pp. 425 ff.):

. . . Virtus est homini . . .
commoda praeterea patriae prima putare,
deinde parentum, tertia iam postremaque nostra.

⁵ *Off.* 1, 57 f. (above, p. 11): ". . . Omnium societatum nulla est gravior, nulla carior quam ea quae cum re publica est uni cuique nostrum. Cari sunt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui, familiares, sed omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est, pro qua quis bonus dubitet mortem oppetere, si ei sit profuturus? Quo est detestabilior istorum inmanitas qui lacerarunt omni scelere patriam et in ea fundi-

cuique praestet, intellegi possit, ut prima dis immortalibus, secunda patriae, tertia parentibus, deinceps gradatim reliquis debeantur.”¹

A different point of view is interestingly indicated by the program of Epicureanism which Cicero puts in the mouth of Piso:² “Laudabat homo doctus philosophos nescio quos . . . qui dicuntur praeter ceteros esse auctores et laudatores voluptatis . . . eosdemque praeclare dicere aiebat sapientis omnia sua causa facere, rem publicam capessere hominem bene sanum non oportere, nihil esse praestabilius otiosa vita plena et conferta voluptatibus; eos autem qui dicerent dignitati esse serviendum, rei publicae consulendum, officii rationem in omni vita, non commodi esse ducendam, adeunda pro patria pericula, volnera excipienda, mortem oppetendam, vaticinari atque insanire dicebat.” In general it may be noted that the philosopher’s independence of country and home tended to minimize for him the patriotic impulse; most markedly — as Cicero makes plain — in the case of the Epicureans: Lucretius shows himself of all Roman poets least sensible to the martial glories of Rome.³

tus delenda occupati et sunt et fuerunt. Sed si contentio quaedam et comparatio fiat, quibus plurimum tribuendum sit officii, principes sint patria et parentes, quorum beneficiis maximis obligati sumus, proximi liberi totaque domus, quae spectat in nos solos neque aliud ullum potest habere perfugium, deinceps bene convenientes propinqui, quibuscum communis etiam fortuna plerumque est. . . .”

¹ *Ibid.* 1, 160; cf. 3, 28, and *Somn. Scip.* 9, 2-3 (*Rep.* 6, 29 Müller): “Sunt autem optimae curae de salute patriae,” and Macr. *ad loc.*, *Comm.* 2, 17.

² *Sest.* 23; cf. on the other hand Verg. *Ecl.* 4, 26 ff.:

At simul heroum laudes et facta parentis
iam legere et quae sit poteris cognoscere virtus,
molli paulatim flavescet campus arista. . . .

³ Cf. J. S. Reid, *Lucretiana*, in *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, 22 (1911), p. 1, on *Lucr.* 1, 28: “. . . Of all schools of ancient thought, the Epicurean alone was untouched by the glamour of war. Cicero makes it a reproach to the disciples of Epicurus that their discourses were not embellished by references to the warriors of old. And Lucretius is the one Roman poet whose soul is wholly unstirred by the martial history of his own country. . . .” Lucretius’ sole allusion to the Heroes appears in 3, 1025 ff.:

. . . Lumina sis oculis etiam bonus Ancus reliquit,
qui multis melior quam tu fuit, improbe, rebus. . . .
Scipiades, belli fulmen, Carthaginis horror,
ossa dedit terrae, proinde ac famul infimus esset. . . .

The standard of cosmopolitanism ¹ raised by philosophy was taken up by Christianity,² to find its noblest expression after ten centuries in Sapia's reply to Dante witnessing the punishment of Envy in the second terrace of the purgatory:³

"Ditemi, chè mi fia grazioso e caro,
S'anima è qui tra voi che sia latina;
E forse a lei sarà buon, s'io l'apparo." —
"O frate mio, ciascuna è cittadina
D'una vera città; ma tu vuoi dire
Che vivesse in Italia peregrina."

Yet amid polemic and detraction, amid material corruption and disaster, for centuries the ancient cult of patriotism subsisted. Vainly did philosophy convict it of illogical altruism, vainly did Christianity seek to pale the glories of the terrestrial by depicting those of the heavenly fatherland. In the last century of the Western Empire appears in the pages of Claudian the most precise statement of the "conflict of duties," the clearest practical application of Cicero's principle, to be found — I venture to say — in the entire range of Roman literature. The proud distinction of Honorius is, says Clau-

¹ For this movement at Rome, cf. S. Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*, 1905, pp. 326 ff.; Westermarck, *op. cit.*, 2, 176-179; Carter, *The Religious Life of Ancient Rome*, pp. 78 ff.; R. D. Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean*, 1910, pp. 140 ff.

² Cf. e.g. Lactantius' criticism of the precept of Lucilius, *Inst.* 6, 18 ff.: "*Commoda praeterea patriae prima putare* sublata hominum discordia nihil est omnino. Quae sunt enim patriae commoda nisi alterius civitatis aut gentis incommoda, id est, fines propagare aliis violenter ereptos, augere imperium, vectigalia facere maiora? quae omnia non utique virtutes, sed virtutum sunt eversiones. . . . Verum est enim Ciceronis illud . . . nam quomodo potest iustus esse qui nocet, qui odit, qui spoliatur, qui occidit? quae omnia faciunt qui patriae prodesse nituntur. . . . Ergo . . . iis qui iusti habiti sunt, adempta iustitia est. . . ." Lactantius, citing Cicero, has reference to *Off.* 3, 28: ". . . Qui autem civium rationem dicunt habendam, externorum negant, ii dirimunt communem humani generis societatem; qua sublata beneficentia, liberalitas, bonitas, iustitia funditus tollitur; quae qui tollunt, etiam adversus deos immortales impii iudicandi sunt. Ab iis enim constitutam inter homines societatem evertunt, cuius societatis artissimum vinculum est magis arbitrari esse contra naturam hominem homini detrudere sui commodi causa quam omnia incommoda subire. . . ." See also Ausonius, p. 21, 1 Peiper (below, p. 14, n. 3, *ad fin.*).

³ *Purg.* 13, 91 ff.

dian,¹ that unlike Augustus, his vengeance for his parent wrought no misfortune, but rather benefit, to his country:

Ense Thyestiadae poenas exegit Orestes,
sed mixtum pietate nefas, dubitandaque caedis
gloria, materno laudem cum crimine pensat;
pavit Iuleos invisio sanguine manes
Augustus, sed falsa pii praeconia sumpsit
in luctum patriae civili strage parentans:
at tibi causa patris rerum coniuncta saluti
bellorum duplicat laurus, isdemque tropaeis
reddita libertas orbi, vindicta parenti.

A singular coincidence had made the most definite enforcement of the patriotic canon almost its last. "With the fall of the Western Empire," says Westermarck,² "patriotism died out in Europe, and remained extinct for centuries."³

¹ 28, 113 ff.

² *Op. cit.*, 2, p. 179 (above, p. 13, n. 1).

³ For some interesting indications as to the rank in the scale of social duties accorded to patriotism by public opinion among the Greeks, see Pyth. *Carm. Aur.* 1 ff.:

Ἀθανάτους μὲν πρῶτα θεούς, νόμῳ ὡς διάκεινται,
τίμα, καὶ σέβου ὄρκον, ἔπειθ' ἥρωας ἀγανούς,
τοὺς τε καταχθονίους σέβει δαίμονας ἔννομα ῥέζων,
τοὺς τε γονεῖς τίμα, τοὺς τ' ἄγχι στ' ἐκγεγαῶτας.
τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἀρετῇ ποιεῖ φίλον, ὅστις ἄριστος.

Eur. fr. 853 Nauck² (p. 638, *incertarum*), cited among other important passages by Marx on Lucilius, 1904, p. 427:

Τρεῖς εἰσὶν ἀρεταὶ τὰς χρεῶν σ' ἀσκεῖν, τέκνον,
θεοὺς τε τιμᾶν τοὺς τε φύσαντας γονεῖς
νομοὺς τε κοινούς Ἑλλάδος καὶ ταῦτα δρῶν
κάλλιστον ἔξεις στέφανον εὐκλείας ἀεί.

Stob. *Anthologium*, ed. Wachsmuth and Hense, 1909, 4, 25, *passim*, esp. 45: Ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστοξένου Πυθαγορικῶν ἀποφάσεων. Μετὰ τὸ θεῖον καὶ δαιμόνιον πλείστον ποιεῖσθαι λόγον γονέων τε καὶ νόμων μὴ πλαστῶς, ἀλλὰ πεπιστευμένως ἑαυτὸν πρὸς ταῦτα παρασκευάζοντα. τὸ μένειν <ἐν> τοῖς πατρίοις ἔθει τε καὶ νόμοις ἐδοκίμαζον, εἰ καὶ μικρῇ χεῖρῳ τῶν ἑτέρων εἴη. Contrast the following, from a late Imperial writer, *ibid.*, 53: Ἱεροκλέους ἐκ τοῦ Πῶς χρηστέον τοῖς γονεῦσιν. Μετὰ τὸν περὶ θεῶν καὶ πατρίδος λόγον τίνος μᾶλλον ἂν προσώπου μνησθεῖ τις πρῶτον ἢ γονέων; ὅθεν λεκτέον περὶ τούτων, οὐδ' δευτέρους καὶ ἐπιγείους τινὰς θεοὺς εἰπὼν οὐκ <ἂν> ἁμάρτοι τις ἕνεκά γε τῆς ἐγγύτητος, εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν, καὶ θεῶν ἡμῖν τιμωτέρους. Cf. for the reverse change of emphasis Phaedr. app. 6, p. 127 Hau.:

"Audite gentes Delii monitus dei:
pietatem colite, vota superis reddite,
patriam, parentes, natos, castas coniuges
defendite armis. . . ."

Among the *exempla virtutis* cited by Roman writers we shall naturally, in the light of the facts just set forth, expect those conspicuous for devotion to country to be most stressed.¹ And as naturally we shall expect most of these examples to be native Romans. To a study of the significance of this class of moral instances, as the most vital and interesting, I shall in the following pages, from considerations of space, limit the discussion.² Not that the later Romans, at least, showed themselves incapable of appreciating the achievements of the men of Marathon, of such patriots as Codrus, Menoeceus, Pericles, Epaminondas. Quite otherwise.³ In urging Romans to self-sacrifice

with Auson. *Epicedion in Patrem*, p. 21, 1 Peiper: "Post deum semper patrem colui secundamque reverentiam genitori meo debui. Sequitur ergo hanc summi dei venerationem epicedion patris mei. . . ." See also R. Heinze, *Virgils Epische Technik*, 1903, p. 473, with n. 1: ". . . Achill wünscht statt des schmähhlichen Todes im Wasser den von der Hand des tapfersten Mannes; der Imitator der Odyssee sagt vergrößernd τῷ κ' ἑλαχον κτερέων καὶ μεν κλέος ἦγον Ἀχαιοί. Aus Aeneas' Worten quis ante ora patrum Troiae sub moenibus altis contigit oppetere hört jeder das dulce et decorum est pro patria mori heraus, das in dem αὐτὸς τὸν ὄλοντο Τροίῃ ἐν εὐρείῃ der Odyssee nicht liegen kann."

¹ Above, p. 9, n. 4.

² I include distinguished *hostes*, as exempla virtually "national" for the Roman; see below, pp. 25 f.

³ Cf. Cicero, cited below, p. 27. The narrow Roman pride manifests itself, naturally, in this connection as elsewhere: cf. *ibid.*, cited below, p. 47; Liv. *praef.* 10 f.: "Hoc illud est praecipue in cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te exempli documenta in inlustri posita monumento intueri, inde tibi tuaeque rei publicae quod imitere capias, inde foedum inceptu, foedum exitu quod vites. Ceterum aut me amor negotii suscepti fallit, aut nulla umquam res publica nec maior nec sanctior nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit, nec in quam civitatem tam serae avaritia luxuriaque immigraverint, nec ubi tantus ac tam diu paupertati ac parsimoniae honos fuerit; adeo quanto rerum minus, tanto minus cupiditatis erat." So Plin. *H.N.* 7, 40: ". . . Gentium in toto orbe praestantissima una omnium virtute haud dubie Romana exstitit. Felicitas cui praecipua fuerit homini non est humani iudicii. . . ." Quint. *Inst.* 12, 2, 30: "Antiquitus dicta et facta praeclare . . . nusquam plura maioraque quam in nostrae civitatis monumentis reperientur. An fortitudinem, iustitiam, fidem, continentiam, frugalitatem, contemptum doloris ac mortis melius alii docebunt quam Fabricii, Curii, Reguli, Decii, Mucii, alique innumerabiles? quantum enim Graeci praeceptis valent, tantum Romani — quod est maius — exemplis." Florus, *de Qualitate Vitae*, 43, 417, *ap.* Bähr. *P L M* 4, 347:

"Sperne mores transmarinos, mille habent officia.
Cive Romano per orbem nemo vivit rectius;
quippe malim unum Catonem quam trecentos Socratas."

for Rome, the most potent arguments, naturally, will have been instances of devotion to the same cause. A further reason, moreover, for the greater prevalence of native exempla in Roman as compared with modern ethics, must be sought in the character of the Roman religion.

The sources of moral instances appear to be threefold. God in human likeness may be clothed with moral attributes, and an approach to His excellence may be enjoined upon mankind. "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect."¹ Or the instance may take rise, if not in deity itself, in some being to whom a greater or less degree of divinity is ascribed, whether by informal consensus or by decree of church or state.² The divine nature accredited to such ideals would seemingly tend to remove them beyond the sphere of imitation; as a matter of fact, the great majority of writers appear unconscious of such a restriction.³

There is probably no more perilous topic for dogmatic assertion than that which raises the question of the morality or unmorality of the Roman gods.⁴ Conceptions of these were manifold and changing

Macrob. *Comm.* 2, 17, 8 f.: ". . . Romulus nobis in primo genere ponatur, cuius vita virtutes numquam deseruit, semper exercuit; in secundo Pythagoras, qui agendi nescius fuit, artifex disserendi, et solas doctrinae et conscientiae virtutes secutus est; sit in tertio ac mixto genere apud Graecos Lycurgus et Solon, inter Romanos Numa, Catones ambo, multique alii, qui et philosophiam hauserunt altius, et firmamentum rei publicae praestiterunt: soli enim sapientiae otio deditos ut abunde Graecia tulit, ita Roma nescivit. Quoniam igitur Africanus noster, quem modo avus praeceptor instituit, ex illo genere est quod et de doctrina vivendi regulam mutuatur et statum publicum virtutibus fulcit, ideo ei perfectionis geminae praecepta mandantur." On a chief conceit of the Romans', that of their national *fides*, see Westermarck, *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, 2, p. 96, with Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, 5, 311, there cited.

For a similar — and perhaps a more pronounced — attitude among the Greeks, cf. Tacitus, cited below, p. 60.

¹ Matt. 5, 48.

² Heracles, Aeneas, Romulus, Jesus, Augustus and succeeding emperors, are familiar cases.

³ Cf. below, pp. 24, 48 f.

⁴ On this point see Lecky, *op. cit.*, 1, 169-180 and 357-360; C. Martha, *Les Moralistes sous l'Empire romain*, 1866², pp. 1 f.; Westermarck, *op. cit.*, 2, 713-717, 731 ff.; Warde Fowler, *Religious Experience*, pp. 7, 226-228 (with notes), 357-379; T. G. Tucker, *Life in the Roman World of Nero and Saint Paul*, 1910, pp. 377 ff. For the general topic, see W. Wundt, *Ethik*, 1903³, part 1, ch. 2.

— for the Romans themselves, deeply coloured by Greek notions. Naturally the question centres, for the historical period, upon the religion of the State. “At Rome,” says Warde Fowler,¹ “though the earliest traces and traditions of law show a certain consecration of morality, inasmuch as the criminal is made over as a kind of propitiatory sacrifice to the deity whom he has offended, yet in the ordinary course of life, so far as I can discern, the individual was left very much where he was, before the State arose, in his relation to the Divine. In no other ancient State that we know of did the citizen so entirely resign the regulation of all his dealings with the State’s gods to the constituted authorities set over him. . . . It would be

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 226–471, *passim*; cf. Lecky, *op. cit.*, I, 169–359, *passim*: “One of the first facts that must strike a student who examines the ethical teaching of the ancient civilisations is how imperfectly that teaching was represented, and how feebly it was influenced by the popular creed. The moral ideals had at no time been sought in the actions of the gods, and long before the triumph of Christianity, polytheism had ceased to have any great influence upon the more cultivated intellects of mankind. . . . The Roman religion, even in its best days, though an admirable system of moral discipline, was never an independent source of moral enthusiasm. It was the creature of the State, and derived its inspiration from political feeling. The Roman gods were not, like those of the Greeks, the creations of an unbridled and irreverent fancy, nor, like those of the Egyptians, representations of the forces of nature [*sic*]; they were for the most part simple allegories, frigid personifications of different virtues, or presiding spirits imagined for the protection of different departments of industry. . . . Juxtaposition of many forms of worship effected what could not have been effected by the most sceptical literature or the most audacious philosophy. The moral influence of religion was completely annihilated. . . . The idea of sanctity was so far removed from the popular divinities, that it became a continual complaint that prayers were offered which the most depraved would blush to pronounce aloud. Amid the corruption of the empire, we meet with many noble efforts of reform made by philosophers or by emperors, but we find not a trace of the moral influence of the old religion. The apotheosis of the emperors consummated its degradation. The foreign gods were identified with those of Rome, and all their immoral legends associated with the national creed. . . . Except perhaps among the peasants in the country districts, the Roman religion, in the last years of the republic, and in the first century of the empire, scarcely existed, except in the state of a superstition, and he who would examine the true moral influences of the time must turn to the great schools of philosophy which had been imported from Greece. . . . In the stoical period of the Roman Empire, the positive religion had come to be regarded as merely an art for obtaining preternatural assistance in the affairs of life, and the moral amelioration of mankind was deemed altogether external to its sphere. . . .”

an interesting inquiry, if the material for an answer were available, to try and discover how this gradual absorption of religion (or rather religious duties) by the State and its authorities affected the morality of the individual Roman. . . . Religion and morality are really elemental instincts of human nature, primarily undistinguishable from each other; and if that be so, then the over-elaboration of either the moral or religious law, or of the two combined, will tend to weaken the binding force of both. If, as at Rome, the citizen is made perfectly comfortable in his relations with the Power manifesting itself in the universe, owing to the complete mastery of the *ius divinum* by the State and its officials, there will assuredly be a tendency to paralyse the elemental religious impulse, and with it, if I am not mistaken, the elemental sense of right and wrong. . . . The farthest we can go in ascribing a moral influence to the State religion is in giving it credit for helping to maintain that sense of law and order which served to keep the life of the family sound and wholesome. . . . When the craving did at last come upon the Roman, which in times of doubt and peril has come upon individuals and communities in all ages, for support and comfort from the Unseen, it had to be satisfied by giving him new gods to worship in new ways — aliens with whom he had nothing in common, who had no home in his patriotic feeling, no place in his religious experience. . . . He was destitute in regard to his sense of duty, which had been largely dependent on religion, both in the family and in the State. . . . Much more was wanted than a bond sanctioned by civil and religious law; there was needed a sense of duty to the family, the slave, the provincials, the poor and unfortunate. There was no spring of moral action, no religious consecration of morality, no stimulus to moral endeavour. . . . For the Roman's destitution in regard to God Epicurism could find no remedy, and as a consequence it could provide no religious sanction for his conduct in life. . . . There had been nothing in the religion of Rome, or any other city-state, to make it inevitable, reasonable, that man should worship the Power, except tradition and self-interest, involved in the tradition and self-interest of the family and the city. . . . The idea of conforming his life to the will of any of these *numina* would, of course, be absolutely strange to him — the expression would have no meaning whatever for him. The help which he sought

from them was not moral help, but material. . . . In the religious system we have been occupied with, religion can only be reckoned as one of the factors in the growth of morality; it supplied the sanction for some acts of righteousness, but (in historical times at least) by no means for all." Again:¹ "It is characteristic of the Roman that he should think . . . rather of the law of his State than of the morality of the individual, as emanating from that Right Reason to which he might give the name of Jupiter: I have been unable to find a passage in which Cicero attributes to this deity the sanction for individual goodness, though there are many that assert the belief that justice and the whole system of social life depend on the gods and our belief in them. But the Roman had never been conscious of individual duty, except in relation to his State, or to the family, which was a living cell in the organism of the State."² In his eyes law was rather the source of morality than morality the cause and the reason of law; and as his religion was a part of the law of his State, and thus had but an indirect connection with morality, it would not naturally occur to him that even the great Jupiter himself, thus glorified as the Reason in the universe, could really help him in the conduct of his life *qua* individual. It is only as the source of legalised morality that we can think of Varro's Jupiter as 'making for righteousness.' "

That the Romans, throughout the historical period, recognized and strove hard to remedy a defect innate in their ancestral religious system, is evidenced on every hand. The ancient divinities were made to denounce the moral vices, and themselves endowed, more or less successfully, with moral attributes. The creation of supplementary deities, purely moral, Fides, Concordia, Pudicitia, and the like — a phenomenon too familiar to need more than passing mention — is perhaps testimony at once to the original incompetency in this respect of the elder divinities, and to the inadequate success of the Roman state in their reformation.³

¹ *Social Life*, pp. 340 f.

² For individualism at Rome, see Warde Fowler, *Religious Experience*, pp. 340 ff., 411 f.; Carter, *The Religious Life of Ancient Rome*, pp. 72 ff., 82 ff.; C. H. Moore, *Individualism and Religion in the Early Roman Empire*, in *The Harvard Theological Review*, 2 (1909), pp. 221 ff.

³ Plin. *H. N.* 2, 7, 14 f.: ". . . Quapropter effigiem dei formamque quaerere inbecillitatis humanae reor. Quisquis est deus, si modo est alius [*sc.* praeter solem],

The stress laid on the *Exempla* themselves was thus pretty certainly the result of a further attempt, at first perhaps largely unconscious, in the same direction.¹ Their function, however, was sooner or later

et quacumque in parte, totus est sensus, totus visus, totus auditus, totus animae, totus animi, totus sui. Innumeros quidem credere atque etiam ex vitiis hominum, ut Pudicitiam Concordiam Mentem Spem Honorem Clementiam Fidem aut (ut Democrito placuit) duos omnino Poenam et Beneficium maiorem ad socordiam accedit. Fragilis et laboriosa mortalitas in partes ista digessit infirmitatis suae memor, ut portionibus coleret quisque quo maxime indigeret. . . ." See Warde Fowler, *op. cit.*, p. 285, with notes; H. L. Axtell, *The Deification of Abstract Ideas in Roman Literature and Inscriptions*, 1907, esp. pp. 62 ff., with 80, n. Cf. Aug. *Civ. Dei*, 4, 20, *De Virtute et Fide, quas pagani templis et sacris honoraverunt praetermittentes alia bona, quae similiter colenda fuerunt, si recte illis divinitas tribuebatur*: ". . . Cur temperantia dea esse non meruit, cum eius nomine nonnulli Romani principes non parvam gloriam compararint? Cur denique fortitudo dea non est, quae adfuit Mucio, cum dexteram porrexit in flammam; quae adfuit Curtio, cum se pro patria in abruptam terram praecipitem dedit; quae adfuit Decio patri et Decio filio, cum pro exercitu se voverunt? Si tamen his omnibus vera inerat fortitudo, unde modo non agitur. Quare prudentia, quare sapientia nulla numinum loca meruerunt? An quia in nomine generali ipsius virtutis omnes coluntur? Sic ergo posset et unus Deus coli, cuius partes ceteri dii putantur. Sed in illa una virtute et fides est et pudicitia, quae tamen extra in aedibus propriis altaria meruerunt."

¹ Cf. Warde Fowler, *Social Life*, p. 331: ". . . The doctrine of Lucretius . . . apart from its literary greatness . . . has incidentally a lasting value for all students of religious history, as showing better than anything else that has survived from that age the need of a real consecration of morality by the life and example of a Divine man. . . ." So Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*, p. 621: ". . . The world needed more than a great physical force to assuage its cravings; it demanded a moral God, Who could raise before the eyes of men a moral ideal, and support them in striving to attain it. . . ." *Ibid.*, pp. 404 ff.: ". . . We can imagine Plutarch looking down the quiet street in the still vacant noontide, as he sat trying to revive the ancient glories of his race, and to match them with their conquerors, while he reminded the lords of the world, who, in Plutarch's early youth, seemed to be wildly squandering their heritage, of the stern, simple virtue by which it had been won. For in the Lives of great Greeks and Romans, the moral interest is the most prominent. . . . Plutarch was before all else a moralist, with a genius for religion. His ethical treatises deserve to be thoroughly explored, and as sympathetically expounded, for the light which they throw on the moral aspirations of the age. . . . Of high moral ideals, sincere piety, and absorbing interest in the fate of human character . . . what nobler task could a man set himself than to attempt to give some practical guidance to a generation conscious of moral weakness, and distracted between new

thoroughly realized, and its continued importance — in spite of all that Roman priestcraft could devise — is recognized by so late a writer, for example, as the younger Seneca.¹ At the close of a long passage notable for disparagement of the Gods and extravagant laudation of the Exempla, “Sunt quaedam tristes,” he exclaims,² “vultus bona. Sunt quaedam vota quae non gratulantium coetu, sed adorantium venerantiumque celebrantur. Ita tu non putas Regulum optasse ut

spiritual ideals and the mythologies of the past? The urgent need for moral culture and reform of character, for a guiding force in conduct, was profoundly felt by all the great serious minds of the Flavian age, by Pliny and Tacitus, by Juvenal and Quintilian. But Plutarch probably felt it more acutely than any, and took endless pains to satisfy it. . . .” Warde Fowler, *Religious Experience*, p. 466, thus comments on the contribution of Christianity to Roman ethics: “Whereas the connection between religion and morality has so far been a loose one, — at Rome, indeed, so loose, that many have refused to believe in its existence, — the new religion was itself morality, but morality consecrated and raised to a higher power than it had ever yet reached. It becomes active instead of passive; mere good nature is replaced by a doctrine of universal love; *pietas*, the sense of duty in outward things, becomes an enthusiasm embracing all humanity, consecrated by such an appeal to the conscience as there never had been in the world before — the appeal to the life and death of the divine Master. . . .” The whole passage should be read in this connection, with careful attention to the notes. Cf. Wundt, *Ethik*, part 1, ch. 2, 2a, pp. 68 f., and 2d, pp. 83 ff.; C. B. Gulick, *The Rendering of the Homeric Hymns*, in *Anniversary Papers by Colleagues and Pupils of George Lyman Kittredge*, 1913, p. 162.

¹ Contemporary pronouncements might be multiplied, as well from pagan as from Christian writers, illustrating the unmorality of the Gods. I will cite only such as bear directly on their use as exempla.

² *Ep.* 67, 11 ff.; cf. *ibid.*, 11, 8 ff.: “Iam clausulam epistula poscit. Accipe, <et>quidem utilem ac salutarem, quam te adfigere animo volo: ‘Aliquis vir bonus nobis eligendus est, ac semper ante oculos habendus, ut sic tamquam illo spectante vivamus, et omnia tamquam illo vidente faciamus.’ Hoc, mi Lucili, Epicurus praecepit. Custodem nobis et paedagogum dedit, nec inmerito; magna pars peccatorum tollitur, si peccaturis testis adsistit. Aliquem habeat animus quem vereatur, cuius auctoritate etiam secretum suum sanctius faciat. O felicem illum, qui non praesens tantum sed etiam cogitatus emendat! O felicem, qui sic aliquem vereri potest ut ad memoriam quoque eius se componat atque ordinet! qui sic aliquem vereri potest, cito erit verendus. Elige itaque Catonem; si hic tibi videtur nimis rigidus, elige remissioris animi virum Laelium. Elige eum cuius tibi placuit et vita et oratio et ipse animum ante [se] ferens vultus; illum tibi semper ostende vel custodem vel exemplum. Opus est, inquam, aliquo ad quem mores nostri se ipsi exigant; nisi ad regulam prava non corriges.” See Martha, *Les Moralistes*, pp. 44 ff.; W. L. Davidson, *The Stoic Creed*, 1907, pp. 184 ff.

ad Poenos perveniret? Indue magni viri animum et ab opinionibus volgi secede paulisper! Cape, quantam debes, virtutis pulcherrimae ac magnificentissimae speciem, quae nobis non ture nec sertis, sed sudore et sanguine colenda est. Adspice M. Catonem. . . .”¹ On this point St. Augustine not unnaturally puts yet greater stress. One of the letters has a severe arraignment of acts of immorality ascribed by the Romans to the ancient divinities. If the Gods are guilty of immoral acts, runs the argument, of what avail against such practices are prohibitions issued in their name? *Si Catonem maluisset imitari quam Iovem!* — ‘It is safer to imitate Cato than Jupiter. . . . Wherefore also not without prudence did the wise rulers of the Republic or earthly State, after they were assured of its present welfare, provide as follows for its preservation and maintenance. They set before its younger members for imitation, not their Gods, but men, pre-eminent as they thought in respect of virtue, and worthy of all praise. Whereas concerning the Gods their testimony is to this effect unanimous, that bad men are made the worse for imitation of them; so unmistakable are their vices and immoralities.’²

¹ Cf. Ambros. *Ep.* 1, 18, 7 ff. (16, 973 B Migne): “. . . Roma . . . aliis . . . eos interpellat vocibus: ‘Quid me casso quotidie gregis innoxii sanguine cruentatis? Non in fibris pecudum, sed in viribus bellatorum tropaea victoriae sunt. Aliis ego disciplinis orbem subegi. Militabat Camillus, qui sublata Capitolio signa, caesis Tarpeiae rupis triumphatoribus, reportavit: stravit virtus quos religio non removet. Quid de Atilio loquar, qui militiam etiam mortis impendit? Africanus non inter Capitolii aras, sed inter Hannibalis acies triumphum invenit. Quid mihi veterum exempla profertis? odi ritus Neronum. . . .’” So Prud. *c. Symm.* 2, 553 ff.:

“ . . . Detrahit invictis legionibus et sua Romae
praemia diminuit, qui, quidquid fortiter actum est,
adscribit Veneri, palmam victoribus aufert.
Frustra igitur currus summo miramur in arcu
quadriugos stantesque duces in curribus altis
Fabricios, Curios, hinc Drusos, inde Camillos . . .
si Brennum, Antiochum, Persen, Pyrrhum, Mithridatem
Flora, Matuta, Ceres, et Larentina subegit. . . .
Quid sibi vult virtus, quid gloria, si Corvinum
corvus Apollineae penna vel gutture iuivit?
. . . Video quae te moveant exempla vetustae
virtutis. . . .”

On the moral inefficacy of Stoicism, see Warde Fowler, *Religious Experience*, pp. 372 f.

² *Ep.* 91, 4-5 (33, 314-315 Migne): “. . . Denique illi doctissimi viri qui rem publicam civitateque terrenam, qualis eis esse debere videbatur, magis domesticis

With due allowance for the vehemence of polemic, it is, nevertheless, perhaps clear that Roman moralists lacked the fund of purely divine examples which a modern writer enjoys. The frequency of their appeal to examples of human origin will, therefore, be correspondingly increased. Now modern literatures, in their use of this class of examples, are influenced by a state of affairs which finds little or no counterpart in ancient Rome, even under the Empire. With them, the presence of religious faiths not native to the soil has made natural, and almost obligatory, the use of instances imported from a foreign society. "Among Christians the ideals have commonly been either supernatural beings or men who were in constant connection with supernatural beings, and these men have usually been either Jews or saints, whose lives had been of such a nature as to isolate them from most human sympathies, and to efface as far as possible the national type."¹ In a society which exalts Washington and all but deifies

disputationibus requirebant, vel etiam describebant, quam publicis actionibus instituere atque formare, egregios atque laudabiles, quos putabant, homines potius quam deos suos imitandos proponebant erudiendae indoli iuventutis. Et revera Terentianus ille adulescens (*Eun.* 583 ff.) qui spectans tabulam pictam in pariete, ubi pictura inerat de adulterio regis deorum, libidinem qua rapiebatur stimulis etiam tantae auctoritatis accendit, nullo modo in illud flagitium vel concupiscendo laboratur vel perpetrando immergeretur, si Catonem maluisset imitari quam Iovem; sed quo pacto id faceret, cum in templis adorare cogeretur Iovem potius quam Catonem? Verum haec ex comoedia, quibus impiorum luxur et sacrilega superstitio convinceretur, proferre forsitan non debemus. Lege vel recole, in eisdem libris quam prudenter disseratur nullo modo potuisse scriptiones et actiones recipi comoediarum, nisi mores recipientium consonarent; ita clarissimorum virorum in re publica excellentium et de re publica disputantium auctoritate firmatur nequissimos homines fieri deorum imitatione peiores, non sane verorum, sed falsorum atque fictorum. . . . Quaeso te, siccine caecum est humanum genus adversus veritatem ut tam aperta et manifesta non sentiat? tot locis pingitur funditur tunditur sculpsitur scribitur legitur agitur cantatur saltatur Iuppiter adulteria tanta committens; quantum erat ut in suo saltem Capitolio ista prohibens legeretur? . . ." Cf. *Civ. Dei*, I, 32: ". . . Advertite, qui adversus liberatorem a talibus dominis murmuratis: ludi scaenici, spectacula turpitudinum et licentia vanitatum, non hominum vitiis, sed deorum vestrorum iussis Romae instituti sunt. Tolerabilis divinos honores deferretis illi Scipioni quam deos huius modi coleretis. Neque enim erant illi dii suo pontifice meliores. . . ." See further *ibid.*, 2, 4 ff., esp. 7, 12, and 22.

¹ Lecky, *op. cit.*, I, p. 183 (above, p. 4, n. 4). Contrast the widely different spirit motivating the proud assertions that 'Rome is rich in examples'; above, p. 15, n. 3.

Lincoln, the casuist is yet trained almost instinctively to ask himself, not "What would Washington or Lincoln do in the given situation?" but "What would Jesus do? or St. Paul?" This will doubtless be even more the case under other than republican governments, which seem to be the natural nursery of exempla.¹ Quite different were conditions at Rome. There, on the other hand, even in Imperial times, the influx of cults not native brought with it instances few or none. We have described the old religion as unmoral: the character of the new cults, with few exceptions,² was even less calculated to propagate exempla original to themselves. Such rivals of the national Examples as arose from time to time henceforth — one thinks of Socrates³ — were introduced through the medium of history and of philosophy.

The number of the national Exempla, and the frequency of their mention, will compel me in the space of the present article to proceed by a combination of conspectus with illustration, such as can do little more than give an intimation of the further details of the subject, on which much more work needs to be done. The nature of these I shall endeavor to suggest by some comments on a list of national exempla, and by discussing with some fulness several typical instances. A memorandum of the cases in which men of the Imperial period, both private citizens and emperors — notably Augustus, are named as belonging to the Exempla, will then give evidence that even the less commonly cited instances are almost exclusively ante-imperial; some of the influences which led to the closing of what is, therefore, virtually an exemplary canon, I shall seek to discover. Among these, books of exempla and representative writers will claim most of our attention.

In attempting to make plain the significance of a given *exemplum*, a mere lump estimate of his importance, without indication of the creed and moral bias of the authors who mention him, is at best but

¹ Cf. the comparative status of the Roman Republic and Empire, below, pp. 53 ff.

² And was there a tendency rather to Romanize these? Cf. the identification of Greek and Persian with like Italian divinities. So, I am told, the Mithraists of Rome substituted for the Persian originals of their cult their own national heroes.

³ Cf. the sneer of Florus, above, p. 15, n. 3, *ad fin.*

an unsatisfactory method; its most adequate apology is suggested by a consideration of the preponderance in Roman morals of the Stoic attitude.¹ For the purposes of a general catalogue of exempla I have found it obligatory in some instances to distinguish the Christian from the pagan standard; for the rest, I must ask the reader to take my judgment on faith. It is based on careful examination of the literature through Claudian, with some reference to Greek and to the later Latin literature. Some significant passages may well have escaped my notice. But I believe that as a whole the results summarized may be accepted as reasonably complete.

In estimating the relative weight of the various kinds of passages in which persons are mentioned as notable for virtue or vice, I have borne in mind certain general principles. I have not reckoned as genuine cases of exemplary citation either narrative mention by historians in the chronological sequence of their account, or a laudatory epigram which has for its subject a single individual, or contemporary references; but have employed these three classes for purposes of illustration and comparison only. Nearly contemporary references — references, that is, to a given *exemplum* in the works of an author born in his lifetime — I have regarded as of inferior importance, and so also mention for irrelevant causes: when, for example, the motive which prompts allusion to the virtue is an impressive change of fortune, an unworthy son, or the writer's desire to set before an emperor an example drawn from the case of another emperor.

I have throughout had less regard to the references — often perfunctory merely — in books of exempla, than to the great body of Latin literature. Accordingly, the list of exempla below takes no account whatever of references in such books to persons mentioned there only as instances.² On the other hand, the great "enemies" — Pyrrhus, Hannibal, Spartacus, and the like — are included as virtu-

¹ Cf. Lecky, *op. cit.*, above, p. 4, n. 4, and *passim*; Warde Fowler, *Religious Experience*, pp. 362 ff.

² Hence the omission, e.g., of Sex. Tempanius, one of Livy's favorite heroes (cf. Teuffel-Schwabe, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur*, 1910⁶, § 257, 4). The reader who desires a complete list of the exempla placed by the handbooks at a declaimer's disposal, may easily glean such supplementary matter from the historians and from the books of exempla, — most conveniently from the classified lists of Valerius Maximus.

ally national, having derived their chief significance from a relation to the Roman state.¹

For a list of national *exempla virtutis*² cited by Roman writers through Claudian, see pages 28-35.

The application of all this will be made clearer by illustration.³ Let us trace in some detail the legend of a typical *exemplum maius*,

¹ Leaving out of account the "expatriates" — notably Sp. Cassius, Maelius, Catiline, Sertorius — I find most frequently mentioned Antiochus, Brennus, Mettus Fufetius, Hannibal, Hasdrubal, Jugurtha, Mithridates, Perses, Porsenna, Spartacus, Syphax, Tigranes. Cf. e.g. Prudentius, cited above, p. 22, n. 1, and Sall. *Hist.* 1, 55, 3 f. (Maurenbrecher): "... Praeclara Brutorum atque Aemiliorum et Lutatorum proles, geniti ad ea quae maiores virtute peperere subvertenda! Nam quid a Pyrrho Hannibale Philipppoque et Antiocho defensum est aliud quam libertas et suae cuique sedes, neu cui nisi legibus pareremus? ..." The availability of these as *exempla vili* naturally decreases in direct proportion to the growth of cosmopolitanism; cf. Lecky, *op. cit.*, pp. 239 ff.

² The exempla are arranged alphabetically, with reference first to *nomina*, next to *cognomina*, next to *praenomina*, and thereafter chronologically. Emperors are placed with reference to the name by which they are commonly known.

Four grades of prominence are distinguished, indicated respectively by capitals, full face Roman, italics, and ordinary Roman type. The determination of these must, of course, be largely subjective. I have borne in mind that an *exemplum pauperlati* or *castilitati* will naturally be represented by fewer citations than an *exemplum fortitudinis*, and so forth; hence Claudia, Cincinnatus, and Serranus are rated above Marcellus. Furthermore, I have had regard to permanence of fame; hence the low rating of Coruncanius (cf. below, p. 50). Omissions (cf. above, p. 25) will naturally be most likely to occur in the lowest grade.

Names of exempla who lived under the Empire are preceded by an obelisk †. Those marked (†) lived also under the Republic.

A sign * indicates citation as an example of the given virtue directly beneath which the sign stands; a sign —, of the corresponding vice; a sign *i*, of the given virtue exhibited especially in a military connection; a sign *m*, *constantia in morte propinquorum*. Citations of comparatively slight importance are enclosed in parentheses. The addition of a sign *c* denotes that the citations in question are by Christian writers only; of the same sign in parentheses (*c*), that the citations are in part by Christians. The *virtutes* — which, once more, no conspectus can present with more than approximate accuracy — are of course not meant to be taken as mutually exclusive; the principle is simply that an *exemplum* which cannot be readily identified with the more particular shall be entered under the more general head. A conflict of duties is noted X.

Citations of an emperor as an example for another emperor are not included; for these, see below, p. 55, n. 4.

³ Throughout the following pages, in references to patristic writers, figures en-

the facts of whose life are familiar — Lucius Junius Brutus. The moralists found their material in his interpretation of the Delphic oracle; the part which he took in avenging Lucretia, in expelling Superbus and his sons, and establishing the Commonwealth; lastly the acts of his consulship — the banishment *favente populo* of his colleague, his order for the execution of his sons, his heroic death in combat with Arruns.¹ The typical patriot, the *vir iustus et fortis*, his memory was invoked more rarely as an example of *prudentia* and a defender of woman's honour.

His authority is appealed to first and most comprehensively by Cicero, who is never weary of sounding his praise: “. . . Homines Graeci, quos antea nominavi, inique a suis civibus damnati atque expulsi tamen, quia bene sunt de suis civitatibus meriti, tanta hodie gloria sunt non in Graecia solum, sed etiam apud nos atque in ceteris terris, ut eos a quibus illi oppressi sint, nemo nominet, horum calamitatem dominationi illorum omnes anteponant. Quis Carthaginensium pluris fuit Hannibale consilio, virtute, rebus gestis, qui unus cum tot imperatoribus nostris per tot annos de imperio et de gloria decertavit? hunc sui cives e civitate eiecerunt; nos etiam hostem litteris nostris et memoria videmus esse celebratum. Quare imitemur nostros Brutos, Camillos, Ahalas, Decios, Curios, Fabricios, Maximos, Scipiones, Lentulos, Aemilios, innumerabiles alios, qui hanc rem publicam stabiliverunt; quos equidem in deorum immortalium coetu ac numero repono. Amemus patriam, pareamus senatui, consulamus bonis; praesentis fructus neglegamus, posteritatis gloriae serviamus, id esse optimum putemus quod erit rectissimum, speremus quae volumus sed quod acciderit feramus, cogitemus denique corpus virorum fortium magnorumque hominum esse mortale, animi vero motus et virtutis gloriam sempiternam, neque, hanc opinionem si in illo sanctissimo Hercule consecratam videmus, cuius corpore ambusto vitam eius et virtutem immortalitas excepisse dicatur, minus existimemus eos qui hanc tantam rem publicam suis consiliis aut laboribus aut auxerint aut defenderint aut servarint, esse immortalem gloriam consecutos.”² He is *par excellence* the Liberator: “An me censetis,

closed by parentheses indicate volume and column of Migne. References to the *Scriptores Historiae Augustae* are to the edition of Peter, 1884.

¹ Pauly, *Real-Encyclopädie*, s. v. *Iunii*, I, 2.

² *Sest.* 142 f.

NATIONAL EXEMPLA VIRTUTIS CITED BY ROMAN WRITERS THROUGH CLAUDIAN

	virtus	aequitas	fides	pietas erga				severitas	fortitudo	constantia	continentia	pauperitas	pudicitia	clementia	moderatio
				deos	patriam	parentes	ceteros								
Q. Aelius Paetus cos. 167.	*
Q. Aelius Tubero Pauli gener.	*
M. Aemilius Lepidus cos. I 187.	*		*
Q. Aemilius Papus cos. I 282.	*		*	*
L. Aemilius Paulus cos. I 219.	*	
L. Aemilius Paulus cos. I 182.	* ₂		m	*	*
M. Aemilius Scaurus cos. I 115.	*		*m
Aeneas	×		..	*	*-c	*	-c	-c	..
Aeserninus.
Ancus Marcius	*		*	*	..	*
†L. Annaeus Seneca.	*	
T. Annius Milo.
†Antoninus Pius.	*	..
M. Antonius cos. 99.	(*) ₂	
M. Antonius triumvir.	(i)-		m
L. Appuleius Saturninus tr. pl. 100.
M'. Aquilius cos. 101.	*
†Arria maior.
Atia Octavi.	*	
A. Atilius Calatinus cos. I 258.	*	
M. ATILIUS REGULUS.	*
C (?). ATILIUS SERRANUS.	*		*
Cn. Aufidius praet. 108.	m
(†)Augustus.	*X ₂		(*)	m	(*)	..

[illegible]

NATIONAL EXEMPLA VIRTUTIS CITED BY ROMAN WRITERS THROUGH CLAUDIAN (continued)

	virtus	aquilas	fides	pietas erga				severitas	fortitudo	constantia	continentia	pauperitas	pudicitia	clementia	moderatio
				deos	patriam	parentes	ceteros								
C. Cornelius Cethegus Catilinae socius	—														
L. Cornelius Cinna cos. I 87	—				(*)										
A. Cornelius Cossus tr. mil. 426										m					
Cornelius Gallus	*				*										
Lentuli															
L. Cornelius Lentulus Lupus cos. 156	—														
Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus cos. 222	*i				*				*			*	*	— c	
L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus cos. 190	i				*				*		*	*	*		
P. Cornelius Scipio cos. 218	*i	*			*				*	m	*	*	*		gravitas
P. CORNELIUS SCIPIO AFRICANUS MAIOR	*i				*				*		*	*	*	*	concordia comitas gravitas
P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum cos. 162	*								*		*	*	*	*	
P. CORNELIUS SCIPIO AFRICANUS MINOR	*i	*						i	*	m	*	*	*	*	avaritia
P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio cos. 138	*				*				*		*	*	*	*	aleator
P. CORNELIUS SULLA FELIX	(*)	—			(*)				*		*	*	*	*	
Ti. Cornucanius cos. 280	*								*		*	*	*	*	
M'. CURIUS DENTATUS	*i		*					*	*		*	*	*	*	
Q. Curius									*		*	*	*	*	
M. CURTIUS	—								*		*	*	*	*	
DECI									*		*	*	*	*	
T. Didius T. F. cos. 98	*i								*		*	*	*	*	
C. Duilius cos. 260	*i								*		*	*	*	*	
Fabii CCC									*		*	*	*	*	

	<i>gravitas</i> <i>magnanimus</i>	<i>indecorus</i>	<i>magnanimus</i> <i>comitas</i>	<i>munificus</i>
Q. Fabius Maximus Rull(ian)us cos. I 322.	{			
Q. Fabius Maximus Gurgus cos. I 292.	*			
Q. FABIVS MAXIMVS CUNCTATOR.	*			
Q. Fabius Maximus Eburnus cos. 116.	*			
C. FABRICIVS LUSCINVS.	*			
C. Flaminius cos. I 223.	*			
Metellus Fufetius.				
M. Fulvius Nobilior cos. 189.				
M. FURIUS CAMILLVS.				
L. Furius Philus cos. 136.				
A. Gabinus cos. 59.				
P. Gallonius praeco.				
(†) M. Gavius Apicius.				
HANNIBAL <i>hostis</i>				
Horatia P (M). F.				
Horatii III.				
M (P). Horatius P (M). F.				
M (P). HORATIUS COCLES.				
M. Horatius Pulvillus cos. 509.				
C. Hostilius Mancinus cos. 137.				
L. Hostilius Tubulus praet. 142.				
Iuba.				
C. IULIVS CAESAR DICTATOR.				
†C. Caesar Agrippae F.				
†Julius C(K)an(i)us.				
(†) C. Iulius Licinus.				
L. IUNIUS BRUTVS.				
M. Iunius Brutus Caesaris interfector.				
L. Iunius Pullus cos. 249.				

[illegible]

[illegible]

patres conscripti, quod vos inviti secuti estis, decretum fuisse . . . ut decernerentur supplicationes mortuo ? nihil dico cui. Fuerit ille Brutus, qui et ipse dominatu regio rem publicam liberavit et ad similem virtutem et simile factum stirpem iam prope in quingentesimum annum propagavit; adduci tamen non possem ut quemquam mortuum coniungerem cum deorum immortalium religione.”¹ And again:² “. . . Vita atque factis inlustrata sunt summorum virorum haec quae verbis subtilius quam satis est, disputari videntur. Quaero enim a vobis num ullam cogitationem habuisse videantur ii qui hanc rem publicam tam praeclare fundatam nobis reliquerunt, aut argenti ad avaritiam aut amoenitatum ad delectationem aut supellectilis ad delicias aut epularum ad voluptates. Ponite ante oculos unum quemque veterum. Voltis a Romulo ? Voltis post liberam civitatem ab iis ipsis qui liberaverunt ? Quibus tandem gradibus Romulus escendit in caelum ? iisne quae isti bona appellant, an rebus gestis atque virtutibus ? Quid ? a Numa Pompilio minusne gratas dis immortalibus capudines ac fictiles urnulas fuisse quam felicitas Saliorum pateras arbitramur ? Omitto reliquos; sunt enim omnes pares inter se praeter Superbum. Brutum si qui roget quid egerit in patria liberanda, si quis item reliquos eiusdem consili socios quid spectaverint, quid secuti sint, num quis existat cui voluptas, cui divitiae, cui denique praeter officium fortis et magni viri quicquam aliud propositum fuisse videatur ? Quae res ad necem Porsennae C. Mucium inpulit sine ulla spe salutis suae ? Quae vis Coclitem contra omnes hostium copias tenuit in ponte solum ? Quae patrem Decium, quae filium devota vita inmisit in armatas hostium copias ? Quid continentia C. Fabrici, quid tenuitas victus M'. Curi sequebatur ? Quid duo propugnacula belli Punici, Cn. et P. Scipiones, qui Carthaginiensium adventum corporibus suis intercludendum putaverunt ? quid Africanus maior, <quid minor> ? quid inter horum aetates interiectus Cato ? quid innumerabiles alii — nam domesticis exemplis abundamus — cogitassene quicquam in vita sibi esse expetendum nisi quod laudabile esset et praeclarum, videntur ? Veniant igitur isti inrisores huius orationis ac sententiae et iam vel ipsi iudicent utrum se horum aliqui qui marmoreis tectis ebore et auro fulgentibus, qui signis, qui tabulis, qui caelato auro et argento, qui Corinthiis operibus abundant,

¹ *Phil.* I, 13.² *Parad.* 10 ff.

an C. Fabrici, qui nihil habuit eorum, nihil habere voluit, similes malint." He is the type of *fortitudo*: "... Ego ne Torquatum quidem illum qui hoc cognomen invenit, iratum existimo Gallo torquem detraxisse, nec Marcellum apud Clastidium ideo fortem fuisse quia fuerit iratus. De Africano quidem, quia notior est nobis propter recentem memoriam, vel iurare possum non illum iracundia tum inflammatum fuisse cum in acie M. Allienium Paelignum scuto protexerit gladiumque hosti in pectus infixerit. De L. Bruto fortasse dubitarim, an propter infinitum odium tyranni ecfrenatius in Arruntem invaserit; video enim utrumque *comminus ictu cecidisse contrario*. Quid igitur huc adhibetis iram? an fortitudo, nisi insanire coepit, impetus suos non habet?"¹

In the case of no other *exemplum* is the "conflict of duties" more clearly and interestingly illustrated, and the shift of emphasis from one to another virtue shown.² In Brutus' punishment of his sons, were the claims of fatherhood and of mercy rightly outweighed by those of strict justice (*severitas*) and the interest of the State? In the affair of Collatinus, should duty to the State or to his colleague have prevailed?

On the first question Cicero has nothing to say; most instructive is his ruling on the latter: "Incidunt multae saepe causae quae conturbent animos utilitatis specie, non cum hoc deliberetur, relinquendane sit honestas propter utilitatis magnitudinem — nam id quidem improbum est — sed illud, possitne id quod utile videatur, fieri non turpiter. Cum Collatino collegae Brutus imperium abrogabat, poterat videri facere id iniuste; fuerat enim in regibus expellendis socius Bruti consiliorum et adiutor. Cum autem consilium hoc principes cepissent, cognitionem Superbi nomenque Tarquiniorum et memoriam regni esse tollendam, quod erat utile, patriae consulere, id erat ita honestum ut etiam ipsi Collatino placere deberet. Itaque utilitas valuit propter honestatem, sine qua ne utilitas quidem esse potuisset. At in eo rege qui urbem condidit non item; species enim utilitatis animum pepulit eius; cui cum visum esset utilius solum quam cum altero regnare, fratrem interemit. Omisit hic et pietatem et humanitatem, ut id quod utile videbatur neque erat, assequi posset, et tamen

¹ *Tusc.* 4, 49 f.

² On the conflict of duties, see also below, p. 55, with n. 1.

muri causam opposuit, speciem honestatis nec probabilem nec sane idoneam. Peccavit igitur, pace vel Quirini vel Romuli dixerim.”¹ With Cicero discussion of this conflict practically disappears from Roman literature. Augustine’s treatment destroys the conflict by denying the *utilitas*.²

Virgil, unlike Cicero, has no express allusion to Collatinus; Anchises tells Aeneas only of the execution of the sons:

“ Vis et Tarquinius reges animamque superbam
ultoris Bruti fascesque videre receptos ?
Consulis imperium hic primus saevasque secures
accipiet, natosque pater nova bella moventes
ad poenam pulchra pro libertate vocabit,
infelix. Utcumque ferent ea facta minores,
vincet amor patriae laudumque immensa cupido.
Quin Decios Drususque procul saevumque securi
aspice Torquatum et referentem signa Camillum.”³

Virgil’s silence is perhaps responsible for the almost complete disregard by later writers of Collatinus’ exile and of the circumstances of Brutus’ death. The punishment of the sons remained a *locus classicus* with declaimers in the schools; it afforded a ready defence for severity on the part of a father: “ Animadvertit Manlius in filium et victorem, animadvertit Brutus in liberos non factos hostes sed futuros; vide an sub his exemplis patri fortius tantum loqui liceat.”⁴ Quintilian finds material for an illustration of the *dissimile*: “ Brutus occidit liberos prodicionem molientis, Manlius virtutem filii morte multavit.”⁵

¹ *Off.* 3, 40 f. Of this work the entire third book is devoted to a discussion of conflicts between the *honestum* and the *utile*.

² *Civ. Dei*, 3, 16: “ Etiamne ista est gloria, Iunii Bruti detestanda iniquitas et nihilo utilis rei publicae ? Etiamne ad hanc perpetranda

vicit amor patriae laudumque immensa cupido ?

Iam expulso utique Tarquinio tyranno consul cum Bruto creatus est maritus Lucretiae L. Tarquinius Collatinus. Quam iuste populus mores in cive, non nomen attendit! Quam impie Brutus collegam primae ac novae illius potestatis, quem posset, si hoc offendebatur, nomine tantum privare, et patria privavit et honore! ” The violence of this mention is rather surprising in an author who has withal something of a weakness for the pagan exempla.

³ *Aen.* 6, 817 ff. The whole passage, from 752 on, should be read in this connection.

⁴ *Sen. Contr.* 10, 3, 8.

⁵ *Inst.* 5, 11, 7.

A similar conflict is instanced, as these passages suggest, by Manlius Torquatus' command for the execution of a son just before the battle of the Vesperis.¹ The consuls' order against skirmishing was strict; the son accepted the challenge of a knight of Tusculum and slew him in single combat. So extreme a case wins nevertheless universal commendation² from pre-Christian casuists, saving only a declaimer's charge of *impotentia* against the commander "cui non nocuit et filium et victorem occidere."³

Christian writers, on the other hand, are quite as unanimous in silence or censure. Their horror of Torquatus' inhumanity, joined with the customary animus against pagan heroes, effectually prevents them from according recognition to any of his achievements. To the stock reproaches of worldliness and vainglory already brought by Augustine⁴ without reference to the conflict, Dracontius⁵ adds a repetition of the declaimer's specious plea:⁶

. . . Nato pro laude periculum
intulit, ostendens quae sit censura parentis.
Nam neque culpa fuit. Patriae pugnando triumphum
vulneribus dedit ille suis. . . .
Quis, rogo, dux poenas unquam est victoribus ausus? . . .

and so on, through thirty-four hexameter lines of — I venture to hope — the worst fustian in Latin literature. The change in the Roman ethical standard wrought by Christianity could not be more strikingly shown, however, than by the attitude of Augustine's *a Christi nomine*

¹ B. C. 340; cf. below, p. 46.

² See e.g. Val. Max. 2, 7, 6: "Nostra urbs, quae omni genere mirificorum explorum totum terrarum orbem replevit, imperatorum proprio sanguine manantes secures [habet], ne turbato militiae ordine vindicta deesset, ex castris publice speciosas, privatim lugubres duplici vultu recepit, incerta gratulandi prius an adloquendi officio fungeretur. Igitur ego quoque haesitante animo vos, bellicarum rerum severissimi custodes, Postumi Tuberte et Manli Torquate, memoria ac relatione conplector, qui <a> animadverto fore ut pondere laudis quam meruistis, obrutus magis inbecillitatem ingenii mei detegam quam vestram virtutem, sicut par est, repraesentem. . . ." Cf. *ibid.* 5, 8, 3.

³ Sen. *Contr.* 9, 2, 19.

⁴ *Civ. Dei*, 5, 18; cf. below, pp. 41 f.

⁵ *De Deo*, 3, 352 ff.; cf. below, p. 41.

⁶ Sen., *l. c.*

alienus, who thus recounts the advice given to the future Emperor Honorius by his father:

“ Interea Musis animus, dum mollior, instet
et quae mox imitere legat; nec desinat umquam
tecum Graia loqui, tecum Romana vetustas.
Antiquos evolve duces, adsuesce futurae
militiae, Latium retro te confer in aevum.
Libertas quaesita placet ? mirabere Brutum.
Perfidiam damnas ? Metti satiabere poenis.
Triste rigor nimius ? Torquati despice mores.
Mors impensa bonum ? Decios venerare ruentes.
Vel solus quid fortis agat, te ponte soluto
oppositus Cocles, Muci te flamma docebit;
quid mora perfringat, Fabius; quid rebus in artis
dux gerat, ostendet Gallorum strage Camillus.
Discitur hinc nullos meritis obsistere casus:
prorogat aeternam feritas tibi Punica famam,
Regule; successus superant adversa Catonis.
Discitur hinc quantum paupertas sobria possit:
pauper erat Curius, reges cum vinceret armis,
pauper Fabricius, Pyrrhi cum sperneret aurum;
sordida dictator flexit Serranus aratra,
lustratae lictore casae fascesque salignis
postibus adfixi, collectae consule messes
et sulcata diu trabeato rura colono.”¹

¹ Claud. 8, 401 ff.; cf. the same writer's indignant protest against the elevation of Eutropius, 18, 452:

Per te perque tuos obtestor Roma triumphos,
nesciat hoc Thybris, numquam poscentibus olim
qui dare Dentatis annos Fabiisque solebat.
Martius eunuchi repetet suffragia campus ?
Aemilios inter servatoresque Camillos
Eutropius ? Iam Chrysogonis tua, Brute, potestas
Narcissisque datur ? Natos hoc dedere poenae
profuit et misero civem praeponere patri ?
Hoc mihi Ianiculo positis Etruria castris
quaesiit et tantum fluvio Porsenna remotus ?
Hoc meruit vel ponte Cocles vel Mucius igne ?
Visceribus frustra castum Lucretia ferrum
mersit et attonitum tranavit Cloelia Thybrim ?
Eutropio fasces adservabantur adempti
Tarquiniis ? Quemcumque meae vexere curules,
laxato veniat socium aversatus Averno.
Impensi sacris Decii prorumpite bustis
Torquatique truces animosaeque pauperis umbra
Fabricii tuque o, si forte inferna piorum

With Brutus, the conflict of duties naturally gives rise to somewhat less severe comment on the part of the Fathers, if we except the virulence of Cyprian's great attack on the Heroes: ". . . Est et gradus summus in Romanis honoribus consulatus. Sic consulatum coepisse videmus ut regnum; filios interficit Brutus ut crescat de suffragio sceleris commendatio dignitatis. . . ." ¹ The unreasoning petulance of this onslaught, like that of Dracontius' invective against Torquatus, ² hardly deserves mention, perhaps, as a serious contribution to the adjustment of a conflict of duties. The same is true of what Dracontius has to say of Brutus; though here the criticism — still centring on the punishment of the sons — is milder, and a better type of the usual Christian attitude:

Historias currant Danaum gentisque Quirinae.
Qua pro laude sua, vel qua pro regno alieno,
mentibus infectis animosae cladis amore,
ausi omnes scelerare manus de morte suorum,
aut certe de strage sua. . . .
Quae Romanus amor patres implere coegit,
dicere si valeam, vero sermone probabo.
Optima nam vindex exempla ac pessima Brutus,
horror amorque novus, civis pius, impius auctor,
iure pater patriae, natis et regibus hostis,
atque pudicitiae laesae castissimus ultor
post regale nefas, quod castae gessit adulter. . . .
Dulcis amor patriae, qui patrem fecit amarum,
aut fecit non esse patrem iam prole perempta;
pro quibus arma tulit, hoc se qui pignore privat! ³

Augustine's chief purpose in his most extended mention of Brutus is an exaltation of a better than the earthly fatherland: ". . . Quid

iugera et Elysias scindis, Serrane, novales.
Poeni Scipiadae, Poeno praeclare Lutati,
Sicania Marcelle ferox, gens Claudia surgas
et Curii veteres; et, qui sub iure negasti
vivere Caesareo, parvo procede sepulcro
Eutropium passure Cato; remeate tenebris,
agmina Brutorum Corvinorumque catervae.
Eunuchi vestros habitus, insignia sumunt
ambigui Romana mares; rapuere tremendas
Hannibali Pyrrhoque togas; flabella perosi
adspirant trabeis; iam non umbracula gestant
virginibus, Latias ausi vibrare secures!

¹ *Idol. Van.* 5 (4, 572 A).

² Above, p. 39.

³ *De Deo* 3, 314 ff.

ergo magnum est pro illa aeterna caelestique patria cuncta saeculi huius quamlibet iucunda blandimenta contemnere, si pro hac temporali atque terrena filios Brutus potuit et occidere, quod illa facere neminem cogit? . . . Haec sunt duo illa, libertas et cupiditas laudis humanae, quae ad facta compulit miranda Romanos. Si ergo pro libertate moriturorum et cupiditate laudum quae a mortalibus expetuntur, occidi filii a patre potuerunt, quid magnum est si pro vera libertate, quae nos ab iniquitatis et mortis et diaboli dominatu liberos facit, nec cupiditate humanarum laudum, sed caritate liberandorum hominum, non a Tarquinio rege, sed a daemonibus et daemonum principe, non filii occiduntur, sed Christi pauperes inter filios computantur? ”¹

It is clear that the Christian casuists, in adjusting this conflict, adhere closely to well-known principles of their faith. With single devotion to the heavenly country, they depreciate correspondingly the earthly fatherland. Hence duty to that fatherland, they hold, cannot maintain itself for a moment against the claims of parenthood. The more violent partisans press the charge of vainglory.

Similar reproaches are brought by Christian writers against the wider fame of Brutus, independent of any conflict: we shall later have occasion to consider more fully such attacks, as best instanced in the case of Scaevola.² Equally pronounced in Brutus' praise are the champions of the old order.³ In the last age of the Empire, the splendid tributes of Claudian⁴ reflect undiminished the glory which had survived nine centuries.

In sharp contrast with the fame of the elder Brutus is that of Marcus, the tyrannicide, as regards both its distinction and its character. Here, too, the conflict is of *pietas*, — of the duty to country, once more, against that to a benefactor and friend. The case is complicated, furthermore, by the close connection of that benefactor with the reigning house, and by a genuine doubt concerning the utility of the tyrannicide.⁵ I have been interested in comparing the few

¹ *Civ. Dei* 5, 18.

² Below, pp. 67 ff.

³ See below, p. 44, n. 8.

⁴ 8, 401; 17, 163; 18, 440 (and 460?); 22, 322 and 383; 24, 192. Cf. 20, 141 and 28, 642. See below, p. 44, n. 8.

⁵ That is, there is here a conflict of *utilitas* as well as of *honestum*. Cf. Cic. *Off.* 2, *passim*.

Book of *Exempla par excellence*: Ampelius, however, reckons him¹ among the *viri in toga illustres*, and so the author *De Viris Illustribus*.² Marcus Aurelius³ ranks him with Thræsea, Helvidius, Cato, and Dio as a Stoic sage whose memory he holds precious. St. Jerome harks back, as often, to Seneca: “. . . Quid referam Catonis filiam, Bruti coniugem, cuius virtus facit ne patris maritique constantiam tantopere miremur?”⁴ These are all the literature of the Empire has to offer.⁵

Yet the character of the younger Brutus had been conspicuous in a corrupt age⁶ for probity no less genuine, if less ostentatiously displayed, than that of either Cato. His virtues, as well as those of Cato of Utica, were rendered the more illustrious by the precedent of a famous ancestor. He sought death, if from less high motives than Cato, yet with equal resolve. His only notable failing was one at all times leniently regarded by the Roman, inhumanity in the form of avarice; of this both Catos were guilty, though in a less marked degree.⁷ Yet appeals to the authority of both these as *exempla* are innumerable; in the case of Brutus, barely a dozen, and those for the most part questionable, can be found — a singular chance indeed, and one hardly to be accounted for except as a cumulative effect: Brutus' virtue was less ostentatious than Cato's, his chief faults more striking; his offence against the founder of the imperial line more direct, and aggravated by ingratitude; he met death only after having survived liberty.⁸

¹ 19, 5.

² *Add.* 82.

³ 1, 14.

⁴ *Comm. Sophon.*, *ap.* Migne 25 (6), 673.

⁵ See also below, n. 8 *fin.*, with p. 45.

⁶ Cf. Lecky, *op. cit.*, 1, 238 f.

⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, 1, 203 f.

⁸ L. Brutus is cited as an *exemplum virtutis* in the following passages only: Cic. *Brut.* 53; *Sest.* 143; *Planc.* 60; *Phil.* 1, 13; 2, 26 and 114; 3, 9 and 11; *Octav.* 10; *Tusc.* 1, 89; 4, 50; *Off.* 3, 40; *Sen.* 74; *Parad.* 12; *Auct. Her.* 4, 66; *Verg. Aen.* 6, 818; *Liv.* 8, 34, 3; *Sen. Contr.* 9, 2, 9; 10, 3, 8; *Prop.* 4, 1, 45; *Manil.* 1, 785; *Val. Max.* 5, 6, 1 and 8, 1; 7, 3, 2; *Sen. Dial.* 6, 16, 2; fr. 79 Haase; *Oct.* 294; *Sil.* 8, 361; 11, 95; 13, 721; *Pers.* 5, 85; *Quint. Inst.* 5, 11, 7; *Decl.* 268, p. 93, 24; *Luc.* 5, 207; 6, 792; 7, 440; *Mart.* 11, 16, 10; *Stat. Silv.* 1, 4, 41; *Juv.* 4, 103; *Plin. Pan.* 55, 6; *Ampel.* 18, 1; *Cypr. Idol. Van.* 5 (4, 572 A); *de Vir. Ill.* 10; *Hier. Iovin.* 1, 49 (23 = 2, 320); *Aug. Civ. Dei* 2, 17; 5, 18; *Ep.* 138, 2, 10 (33,

It is however not Brutus the tyrannicide, but Cassius, whom absence makes truly conspicuous among the Instances. I need not do more than quote the only passages in which even an approach to exemplary citation is found:—

Tacitus, *Annals*, 4, 34 f.: “Cremutius Cordus postulatur . . . quod editis annalibus laudatoque M. Bruto C. Cassium Romanorum ultimum dixisset. . . .”

Juvenal, 5, 33 ff.:

. . . Cras bibet . . .
quale coronati Thræsea Helvidiusque bibebant
Brutorum et Cassi natalibus. . . .

Pliny, *Epist.* 1, 17, 3: “Est omnino Capitoni in usu claros viros colere; mirum est qua religione, quo studio imagines Brutorum, Cassiorum, Catonum domi ubi potest habeat.”

Apparently the admonition given authors by the punishment of Cremutius, was pretty effectual, so far as literary mention goes. Certainly this fails signally to reflect the cult attested by Juvenal and Pliny.¹

Enough of the conflicts of *pietas*. Let us now, for a concluding illustration, pass to unvexed instances of some cardinal virtue. Perhaps the characteristically Roman *fortitudo* will best meet our purpose.

529); Claud. 8, 401; 17, 163; 18, 440; 22, 322 and 383; 24, 192; Oros. 2, 5, 1; Dracont. *de Deo* 3, 314; Boëth. *Cons.* 2, m. 7; Panegyr. Bähr. 12, 20, p. 289, 9.

Either Brutus may be the subject of the citation in Mart. 11, 5, 9; either or both, of those in Plin. *Ep.* 1, 17, 3; Hier. *Ep.* 60, 5 (22, 335); Claud. 18, 460. Apparently Pliny has reference to Marcus (see below, p. 37), Martial and Claudian to Lucius. Claudian has mentioned Lucius already, 440; a similar negligence (?) may be observed in his double mention of Dentatus, 437 and 457. Marcus and either Lucius or Decimus are intended by Juv. 5, 37 (see below, p. 45).

In addition to the genuine citations, reference should be had to the notices of L. Brutus in Cic. *de Or.* 1, 37 and 225; *Brut.* 130; *Phil.* 5, 17; *Fin.* 2, 66; *Tusc.* 4, 2; *Rep.* 2, 46; Sall. *Hist.* 1, 55, 3 (Maurenbrecher); Hor. *Sat.* 1, 7, 33; Liv. 1, 56, 7-2, 7, 4; Ov. *Fast.* 2, 717; Plin. *H. N.* 34, 13, 28; Tac. *Ann.* 1, 1; Flor. 1, 9, 5; Lact. *Inst.* 7, 15, 14 and 16; Aug. *Civ. Dei*, 3, 16; Claud. 20, 141; 28, 642; Oros. 2, 5, 1; Panegyr. Bähr. 11, 30, p. 268, 29; Dante *Inf.* 4, 127: and of M. Brutus in Cic. *Or.* 34; *Octav.* 10; Sen. *Suas.* 6, 14; Vell. 2, 69, 6 and 72, 1 f.; Flor. 4, 7, 1; Amm. 27, 9, 10; Dante *Inf.* 34, 65; *Par.* 6, 74.

¹ Cf. Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*, p. 38.

If in Roman ears the name of Brutus had come to be synonymous with Liberty, yet more clearly and closely identified with intrepid self-sacrifice for the welfare of the State, was that of Decius. I shall here touch only incidentally upon the question of its historicity — our concern is with popular belief; no one, I suppose, doubts that by Romans of the later Republic and of the Empire, the double, if not the threefold, sacrifice was unchallenged.

As at the beginning of the Republic the war with Porsenna gave to the Instances three of their most striking exploits, those of Cocles, Scaevola, and Cloelia, — products, doubtless, of a fertility of Roman invention calculated to counterbalance a real military disaster, — so in the first Latin war the great battle of the Veseris, B.C. 340, was signalized by a double contribution. It opened with the consul 'Torquatus' order for his son's execution. Its fate was decided by the self-devotion of his colleague; Decius and Torquatus, warned severally by a dream that Terra Mater and the Di Manes claimed from the one side an army, from the other a commander, had agreed that the consul whose troops first weakened, should immolate himself.¹

At Sentinum, in the Third Samnite War, B.C. 295, the younger Decius, then consul, commanded against the Gallic allies, and retrieved impending defeat by imitating his father's course.² The sacrifice of the grandson — still according to the legend — inspired the stubborn resistance of the legions against Pyrrhus at Ausculum in 279.³

The third Decius is expressly cited as an *exemplum* only by Cicero:⁴ "Fortes viri voluptatumne calculis subductis proelium ineunt, sanguinem pro patria profundunt, an quodam animi ardore atque impetu concitati? Utrum tandem censes, Torquate, Imperiosum illum, si nostra verba audiret, tuamne de se orationem libentius auditurum fuisse an meam, cum ego dicerem nihil eum fecisse sua causa omniaque rei publicae, tu contra nihil nisi sua? Si vero id etiam explanare velles apertiusque diceres nihil eum fecisse nisi voluptatis causa, quo

¹ Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie*, s. v. *Decius*, 15; Liv. 8, 6, 8 ff. and 9, 1 ff.

² Pauly-Wissowa, s. v. *Decius*, 16.

³ *Ibid.*, s. v. *Decius*, 17.

⁴ *Fin.* 2, 60 ff.

modo eum tandem laturum fuisse existimas? Esto, fecerit, si ita vis, Torquatus propter suas utilitates — malo enim dicere quam voluptates, in tanto praesertim viro; num etiam eius collega P. Decius, princeps in ea familia consulatus, cum se devoverat et equo admisso in mediam aciem Latinorum irruebat, aliquid de voluptatibus suis cogitabat? Ubi ut eam caperet aut quando? cum sciret confestim esse moriendum eamque mortem ardentiore studio peteret quam Epicurus voluptatem petendam putat. Quod quidem eius factum nisi esset iure laudatum, non esset imitatus quarto consulatu suo filius, neque porro ex eo natus cum Pyrrho bellum gerens consul cecidisset in proelio seque e continenti genere tertiam victimam rei publicae prae buisset. Contineo me ab exemplis. Graecis hoc modicum est: Leonidas, Epaminondas, tres aliqui aut quattuor; ego si nostros colligere coepero, perficiam illud quidem, ut se virtuti tradat constringendam voluptas — sed dies me deficit. . . .” Again:¹ “Quotiens non modo ductores nostri, sed universi etiam exercitus ad non dubiam mortem concurrerunt! Quae quidem si timeretur, non L. Brutus arcens eum reditu tyrannum quem ipse expulerat, in proelio concidisset, non cum Latinis decertans pater Decius, cum Etruscis filius, cum Pyrrho nepos se hostium telis obiecissent, non uno bello pro patria cadentis Scipiones Hispania vidisset, Paulum et Geminum Cannae, Venusia Marcellum, Litana Albinum, Lucani Gracchum. Num quis horum miser hodie? ne tum quidem post spiritum extremum; nec enim potest esse miser quisquam sensu perempto. . . .” A general and loosely phrased appeal to “the Decii” is, of course, common enough; notable is that of Cicero, once more, seeking to justify virtue as an end in itself: “. . . Nemo est igitur quin hanc affectionem animi probet atque laudet qua non modo utilitas nulla quaeritur, sed contra utilitatem etiam conservatur fides. Talibus exemplis non fictae solum fabulae, verum etiam historiae refertae sunt, et quidem maxime nostrae. Nos enim ad sacra Idaea accipienda optimum virum delegimus, nos tutores regibus misimus, nostri imperatores pro salute patriae sua capita voverunt, nostri consules regem inimicissimum moenibus iam appropinquantem monuerunt a veneno ut caveret, nostra in republica et quae per vim oblatum stuprum voluntaria morte lueret inventa est et qui filiam interficeret,

¹ *Tusc.* i, 89.

ne stupraretur; quae quidem omnia et innumerabilia praeterea quis est quin intellegat et eos qui fecerint dignitatis splendore ductos immemores fuisse utilitatum suarum nosque, cum ea laudemus, nulla alia re nisi honestate duci? ”¹

Both father and son are invoked together, all mention of the grandson omitted;² the father sometimes alone,³ or with a loose reference to another Decius, the son never.⁴

We have already raised a question as to the availability of divine beings as objects of imitation.⁵ It is interesting to note that seven *divi* (if I may extend somewhat the traditional application of this term) appear among the exempla cited as models for private citizens — several of them with considerable frequency: Aeneas, Romulus, Julius Caesar, Augustus, Trajan, Antoninus Pius, and Marcus Aurelius. It would seem, then, that here also the prevailing attitude of Roman ethics coincided with that of the Stoics, in whose view “the issue of human enterprises and the disposition of the gifts of fortune were recognized as under the control of Providence; but man was master of his own feelings, and was capable of attaining such excellence that

¹ *Fin.* 5, 63 f.; cf. above, pp. 27, 38, 40 with n. 1.

² Above, p. 36; below, p. 68.

³ Auct. Herenn. 4, 57; Hor. *Sat.* 1, 6, 20; Prop. 3, 11, 62; 4, 1, 45; Sen. *Ben.* 4, 27, 2; Luc. 2, 308; Claud. 26, 126; P L M Bähr. 5, 397. Cf. Val. Max. 1, 7, 3.

⁴ The Christian attitude toward an *exemplum fortitudinis* uncomplicated by any “conflict of duties,” may best be seen in the case of Scaevola, below, pp. 67 ff.

I add a full list of exemplary citations of the Decii: Cic. *Dom.* 64; *Sest.* 48 and 143; *Rab. Post.* 2; *Phil.* 5, 48; *Octav.* 10; *Fin.* 2, 61; 5, 64; *Tusc.* 1, 89; 2, 59; *Off.* 1, 61; 3, 16; *Sen.* 75; *Parad.* 12; Auct. Herenn. 4, 57; Verg. *Georg.* 2, 169; *Aen.* 6, 824; *Cul.* 359; Hor. *Sat.* 1, 6, 20; Sen. *Contr.* 9, 2, 9; 10, 2, 3; Prop. 3, 11, 62; 4, 1, 45; Manil. 1, 789; 4, 86; Val. Max. 5, 6, 5 f.; Sen. *Ben.* 4, 27, 2; 6, 36, 2; *Ep.* 67, 9; Sil. 15, 43; Quint. *Inst.* 12, 2, 30; *Decl.* 268, p. 93, 22; Luc. 2, 308; 6, 785; 7, 359; Stat. *Silv.* 5, 2, 53; Juv. 8, 254; 14, 239; Ampel. 20, 6; *Hist. Aug.* 26, 42, 6 (on the emperor Decius); Lact. *Inst.* 3, 12, 22; *Vir. Ill.* 26 f.; Amm. 16, 10, 3 and 23, 5, 19 (both on the emperor); Hier. *Ephes.* 1 (26, 553); Aug. *Civ. Dei*, 4, 20; 5, 14 and 18; Claud. 1, 147; 8, 404; 18, 451; 26, 126; P L M Bähr. 5, 397. In addition to the genuine citations, reference should be had also to the notices in Cic. *Phil.* 11, 13; 13, 27; *D. N.* 3, 15; *Div.* 1, 51; Liv. 8, 6, 8 ff. and 9, 1 ff.; 10, 28, 12 ff.; Val. Max. 1, 7, 3; Flor. 1, 14 and 17, 7; Min. Fel. 7, 3; Aur. Vict. *Caes.* 29, 5 (on the emperor); Eutr. 2, 13, 4; Oros. 3, 9, 1 ff. and 21, 4; Dante *Par.* 6, 47.

⁵ Above, p. 16.

he might even challenge comparison with the gods. Audacious as such sentiments may now appear, they were common to most schools of Roman moralists. . . . Commonly . . . virtue is represented as a human act imitating God."¹

Again, the essential humanity of the Roman *divi* is a thesis often insisted on by Christian apologists; Lactantius quotes Cicero to prove his point: " . . . Atque in plerisque civitatibus intellegi potest acuendae virtutis gratia aut quo libentius rei publicae causa periculum adiret optimus quisque, virorum fortium memoriam honore deorum immortalium consecratam.' Hac scilicet ratione Romani Caesares suos consecraverunt et Mauri suos reges." ² We might well, perhaps, incline to distrust the partisan statements of Lactantius and of Augustine;³ this passage shows Cicero did not think of the *divi* as other than human — an increasingly large proportion of his fellow-countrymen were doubtless equally free from illusion on the point.

Not less interesting, as regards their handling of the Exempla, than the stresses of the Roman moralists, are their silences, — which often take us unawares. An instance of these we have already noted in the case of Cassius and the younger Brutus.⁴ Equally surprising is the unimportance — for example — of Appius Claudius Caecus, Coruncanius, Manlius Acidinus, Menenius Agrippa, Coriolanus, Tanaquil, Tarpeia, Tarquin, Tullia Superbi, and Virginia.⁵ It is a curious study to trace the development or decline of a given instance's legend.

¹ Lecky, *op. cit.*, I, 206 ff.; see the whole passage, also Cic. *N. D.* 3, 50, and *passim*; Min. Fel. 21, 9; Wundt, *Ethik*, part I, ch. 2, 2b, p. 75. But cf. below, p. 61, and for the general idea, Sen. *Ep.* 70, 22: "Quoniam coepi sordidis uti exemplis, perseverabo. . . . Catones Scipionesque et alios, quos audire cum admiratione consuevimus, supra imitationem positos putamus."

² *Inst.* I, 15, 6.

³ *Civ. Dei* 18, 24: "Mortuum Romulum, cum et ipse non conparuisset, in deos, quod et vulgo notissimum est, rettulere Romani; quod usque adeo fieri iam desiderat (nec postea nisi adulando, non errando, factum est temporibus Caesarum), ut Cicero magnis Romuli laudibus tribuat quod non rudibus et indoctis temporibus, quando facile homines fallebantur, sed iam expolitis et eruditis meruerit hos honores, quamvis nondum efferbuerat ac pullulaverat philosophorum subtilis et acuta loquacitas. Sed etiamsi posteriora tempora deos homines mortuos non instituerunt, tamen ab antiquis institutos colere ut deos et habere non destiterunt. . . ." Cf. *ibid.*, 22, 10.

⁴ Above, pp. 42 ff.

⁵ See above, pp. 28 ff., s. vv.

Sometimes we can discern, or seem to discern, the influences which led to its disuse. Tiberius Coruncanius,¹ the first plebeian pontifex, is repeatedly cited by Cicero in the same breath with Dentatus and Fabricius, scarcely falling below them in significance as an exemplar of old-fashioned simplicity and unassuming worth; his fame lingers desultorily through several centuries, and at length vanishes completely. I may be wrong in attributing this falling off in some degree to that metrical disability which he shared with a certain Apulian hamlet "quod versu dicere non est," *Cōruncānius* being admissible to hexameters in his vocative and genitive only, and these cases affording, it would seem, an insufficient vehicle for the transmission of a reputation to posterity!²

Again, a given instance may be modified by the disregard of one or other of contradictory attributes. Such modification is naturally most likely to occur, and also most effective, when aided by antithesis, as in the case of Marius and Sulla.³ The proscriptions of

¹ Cf. above, p. 30, s. v.

² Coruncanius is cited as an *exemplum virtutis* by Cic. *D. N.* 2, 165; *Lael.* 18 and 39; *Sen. Contr.* 2, 1, 18; *Sen. Dial.* 7, 21, 3; *Panegy.* Bähr. 12, 9, p. 279, 11. In addition to these genuine citations, reference should be had also to the notices in Cic. *De Or.* 3, 56 and 134; *Sulla*, 23; *Dom.* 139; *Planc.* 20; *D. N.* 1, 115; 3, 5; *Sen.* 27 and 43; *Gell.* 1, 10, 1.

³ Cf. Val. Max. 2, 8, 7: "L. Cinna et C. Marius hauserant quidem avidi civilem sanguinem, sed non protinus ad templa deorum et aras tetenderunt. Iam L. Sulla, qui plurima bella civilia confecit, cuius crudelissimi et insolentissimi successus fuerunt, . . . civium Romanorum nullum oppidum vexit." *Ibid.*, 9, 2, 1 f.: "L. Sulla, quem neque laudare neque vituperare quisquam satis digne potest, quia, dum quaerit victorias, Scipionem se populo Romano, dum exercet, Hannibalem repraesentavit, . . . C. Marii, cuius, etsi postea hostis, quaestor tamen aliquando fuerat, erutos cineres in Anienis alveum sparsit. En quibus actis felicitatis nomen adserendum putavit! Cuius tamen crudelitatis C. Marius invidiam levat; nam et ille nimia cupiditate persequendi inimicos iram suam nefarie destrinxit. . . . Paene tanti victoriae eius non fuerunt, quarum oblitus plus criminis domi quam laudis in militia meruit. . . ." See also Aug. *Civ. Dei*, 2, 22: ". . . Dii custodes eius (sc. rei publicae Romanae) populo cultori suo dare praecipue vitae ac morum praecepta debuerunt. . . . Si dederunt, proferatur ostendatur legatur quas deorum leges illi civitati datas contempserint Gracchi, ut seditionibus cuncta turbarent, quas Marius et Cinna et Carbo, ut in bella etiam progredierentur civilia causis iniquissimis suscepta et crudeliter gesta crudeliusque finita, quas denique Sulla ipse, cuius vitam mores facta describente Sallustio aliisque scriptoribus historiae quis non exhorreat? . . ."

Marius, the laws and victories of Sulla, will for the purposes of the Exempla be nearly or quite forgotten. Marius becomes a pure patriot, Sulla an unqualified enemy to the Republic; no praise can be extravagant as applied to the one, no denunciation too bitter as applied to the other.¹ For example, St. Augustine, a student of Roman history more careful than the majority of his contemporaries, when it suits his mood, does not fail to recognize and proclaim the inhumanity of Marius;² nevertheless even Augustine, by a casual mention of Marius among stock examples of the good ruler (as opposed to examples of the reverse — Caligula and others), betrays the regard in which the Second Camillus was in Augustine's time generally held: ". . . Ipse (*sc.* Deus) etiam regnum dedit sine cultu eorum per quorum cultum se isti (*sc.* Romani) regnasse crediderunt. Sic etiam hominibus: qui Mario, ipse Gaio Caesari; qui Augusto. ipse et Neroni; qui Vespasianis, vel patri vel filio, suavissimis imperatoribus, ipse et Domitiano crudelissimo. . . ." ³ Firmicus, on the other hand, before conversion has for Marius nothing but praise, with hatred unalloyed for Sulla: ". . . Quis deus aut exulem Marium aut felicem fecerat Sullam? . . . Et tamen postea iudicio Fortunae ille exul factus est, ille felix. . . ." ⁴

¹ For a singularly favorable judgment on Sulla, see Luc. 6, 787; cf. Aug. *ibid.*, 3, 7.

² *Civ. Dei*, 2, 22 f.; 5, 26.

³ *Ibid.*, 5, 21.

⁴ *Math.* 1, 7, 37.

I add a full list of exemplary citations of Marius and Sulla; Marius is cited as an *exemplum virtutis* by Cic. *Verr.* 2, 3, 209; 5, 14; 25; 181; *Font.* 43; *Manil.* 60; *Rab. Perd.* 27 ff.; *Cat.* 1, 4; 3, 15; 4, 21; *Mur.* 17; *Sulla.* 23; *Red. Sen.* 38; *Red. Quir.* 7; 10; 19; *Balb.* 46; 49; *Pis.* 43; *Planc.* 88; *Fin.* 2, 105; *Tusc.* 2, 53 (cf. 35); *Rep.* 1, 6; *Off.* 1, 76; *Parad.* 16; *Att.* 9, 10, 3; Verg. *Georg.* 2, 169; Hor. *Epod.* 9, 24; *Sen. Contr.* 1, 6, 4; *Vell.* 2, 128, 3; *Val. Max.* 5, 2, 8; 6, 1, 12; 8, 2, 3; *Sil.* 13, 853; *Juv.* 8, 245; *Ampel.* 18, 15; *Hist. Aug.* 6, 3, 8; 11, 11, 3 and 12, 1; *Firm. Math.* 1, 7, 37; *Aus. Grat. Act.* p. 362, 231 Peiper; *Vir. Ill.* 67; *Julian. Caes.* 323 A; *Hier. Ep.* 60, 5 (22, 335: or should *Marcios* be read?); 66, 7 (*ibid.*, col. 398); *Prud. c. Symm.* 1, 524; *Aug. Civ. Dei.* 5, 21; *Claud.* 21, 371; 24, 35; 26, 126; *P L M Bähr.* 5, 399: as an *exemplum viti* by Cic. *Phil.* 11, 1; *Tusc.* 5, 56; *D. N.* 3, 80 f.; *Off.* 3, 79 ff.; *Val. Max.* 3, 6, 6; 5, 6, 4; 9, 2, 2; *Sen. Dial.* 4, 2, 3; *Ben.* 5, 16, 2; *Ep.* 94, 66; *Plin. H. N.* 33, 150; *Luc.* 2, 546; 4, 822; 6, 794; 9, 204; *Tac. Hist.* 2, 38; *Hist. Aug.* 11, 6, 4; *Aur. Vict. Caes.* 39, 6; *Epit.* 48, 12; *Aug. Civ. Dei.* 2, 22 f.; 5, 26; *Dracont. ap. P L M Bähr.* 5, 145; *Panegy. Bähr.* 12, 46 (p. 313, 7). Cf.

A process somewhat similar to the above may, in the case of exempla of like name, sacrifice a narrower reputation to a wider, obliterating almost or quite completely the less known. A striking instance is that of Claudius Nero,¹ who with Livius commanded against Hasdrubal at the Metaurus — according to Creasy, the most brilliant and momentous exploit of Roman military history. "To this victory of Nero's," says Lord Byron, "it might be owing that his im-

also Plut. *Vit.* In addition to the genuine citations, reference should be had also to the notices in Cic. *De Or.* 3, 8; *Cat.* 3, 24; *Har.* 54; *Sest.* 37 ff.; 50; 116; *Prov. Cons.* 32; *Mil.* 8; 83; *Phil.* 8, 7; *Acad.* 2, 13; *Div.* 2, 140; *Att.* 9, 10, 3; Liv. *Epit.* 80 *fin.*; 66–80 *passim*; Sen. *Contr.* 1, 1, 3 and 5; 7, 2, 6; Ov. *Pont.* 4, 3, 44; Manil. 4, 45; Vell. 2, 11, 1 f.; 22, 1 ff.; 128, 3; Val. Max. 1, 3, 4; Nep. 2, 2, 3; 3, 1; 8, 7; 3, 1, 2 and 8, 5; 4, 3, 14; 6, 9, 14; 7, 6, 4; 8, 9, 2 and 15, 7; 9, 12, 4 and 15, 1; Sen. *Dial.* 10, 17, 6; Luc. 2, 90 and *passim*; 8, 269; Juv. 10, 278; Flor. 3, 21, 2 and 19; Ampel. 42, 1 f.; 47, 4; Amm. 30, 8, 9; Symm. *Laud. Val.* 1, p. 319, 26; *Ep.* 9, 115, p. 266, 31; Aug. *Civ. Dei.* 3, 27 ff.; Claud. 15, 92; 26, 646; Oros. 5, 15, 8; 17, 3; 19, 8–23 *passim*; 20, 1; 22, 5 ff.; 6, 2, 9; P L M Bähr. 4, 66; 6, 360.

Sulla is cited as an *exemplum virtutis* by Cic. *Att.* 9, 10, 3; Val. Max. 5, 2, 9; 6, 5, 7; Sen. *Dial.* 6, 12, 6; Sil. 13, 855; Luc. 2, 582; 6, 787; Mart. 11, 5, 9; Ampel. 18, 16; *Vir. Ill.* 75; Amm. 16, 5, 1 and 12, 41: as an *exemplum viti* by Cic. *Lig.* 12; *Phil.* 11, 1; *Fin.* 3, 75; *Off.* 1, 43 and 109; 2, 27; *Att.* 7, 7, 7; 9, 11, 3; 10, 7, 1; Caes. *ibid.*, 9, 7 C, 1; Sen. *Contr.* 2, 4, 4; 9, 2, 19; *Suas.* 6, 3; Val. Max. 1, 2, 3 Par.; 3, 6, 3; 5, 6, 4; 9, 2, 1 and 3, 8; Sen. *Dial.* 3, 20, 4; 4, 2, 3 and 34, 3; 5, 18, 1; *Ben.* 5, 16, 3; *Clem.* 1, 12, 1 f.; Sil. 13, 855; Luc. 2, 221 ff.; 4, 822; 9, 204; Tac. *Hist.* 2, 38; Juv. 2, 28; *Hist. Aug.* 7, 8, 1; 11, 6, 4; 13, 2, 2; 4, 10; 5, 4; Firm. *Math.* 1, 7, 34 ff.; Aur. Vict. *Caes. Epit.* 48, 12; Aug. *Civ. Dei.* 2, 22 ff.; 5, 26; Claud. 3, 253; Dracont. *ap. P L M Bähr.* 5, 145; Panegyr. Bähr. 9, 20 (p. 208, 18); 12, 7 (p. 277, 13); 12, 46 (p. 313, 7). Cf. also Plut. *Vit.* In addition to these genuine citations, reference should be had also to the notices in Cic. *Verr.* 2, 3, 81; Manil. 8; Cluent. 151; *Leg. Agr.* 2, 81; *Cat.* 3, 9 and 24; *Mur.* 32; *Har.* 54; *Phil.* 8, 7; *Att.* 9, 10, 2 f.; Liv. *Epit.* 66; 75–90 *passim*; Vell. 2, 22, 1; 25, 1 ff.; 28, 2 ff.; 66, 1; Val. Max. 2, 8, 7 and 10, 6; 3, 1, 2; 5, 2, 9; 6, 4, 4; 5, 7; 8, 2; 9, 6; 7, 6, 4; 8, 14, 4; 9, 2, 1 and 15, 5; Plin. *H. N.* 7, 137 f.; 33, 134; Luc. 1, 326; Mart. 9, 43, 10; 11, 5, 9; Stat. *Silv.* 4, 6, 107; Flor. 3, 21, 2 and 19; Ampel. 42; 47, 4; Tert. *Apol.* 11 (1, 337 A); Solin. 1, 127; Arn. 5, 38 (5, 1153 B); Aus. *Grat. Act.* p. 363, 249 Peiper; Eutr. 4, 27, 4; Amm. 16, 5, 1; Prud. *c. Symm.* 2, 562; Aug. *Civ. Dei.* 3, 7, 27 ff.; Claud. 21, 370; 28, 383; Oros. 5, 21, 1 ff.; 22, 5–18 *passim*; P L M Bähr. 6, 360.

¹ Cited as an *exemplum* only by Manil. 1, 791 and Sil. 8, 413; irrelevantly motivated are Hor. *Carm.* 4, 4, 37 ff. and Suet. *Tib.* 2. For the emperor, see below, p. 55, with n. 4.

perial namesake reigned at all. But the infamy of the one has eclipsed the glory of the other. When the name of Nero is heard, who thinks of the consul! But such are human things." ¹

Most significant in the development of the Exempla seems to me a striking limitation of their range in point of time; that is, of the historical period from whose content they were drawn. In the table above I have distinguished by an obelisk † the names of persons whose deaths occurred later than the battle of Actium.² Let us briefly review them, in order approximately chronological, with reference to a conspectus of the passages in which they are cited as instances: —

A. Private citizens of the Imperial period

I. Who lived under both Republic and Empire:

1. Q. Sextius, Sen. *Ep.* 98, 13. Cf.³ *ibid.* 73, 12-15; *Dial.* 5, 36, 1.
2. M. Vipsanius Agrippa, Manil. 1, 798; Val. Max. 4, 7, 7; Sen. *Ben.* 3, 32, 4; *Ep.* 94, 46. Cf. Sen. *Contr.* 2, 4, 12-13; Solin. 1, 66.
3. C. Cilnius Maecenas, Sen. *Ep.* 120, 19; Mart. 10, 73, 4.
4. M. Gavius Apicius, Sen. *Dial.* 7, 11, 4; *Ep.* 120, 19; Mart. 10, 73, 3; Juv. 4, 23; 11, 3; *Hist. Aug.* 17, 18, 4.⁴
5. L. Cassius Nomentanus, Sen. *Dial.* 7, 11, 4.
6. C. Iulius Licinus, Varr. *Atac. ap.* Bährens, *Poetae Latini Minores*, 4, 64; Sen. *Ep.* 119, 9; 120, 19; Pers. 2, 36; Juv. 1, 109; 14, 306.
7. Octavia soror Augusti, Sen. *Dial.* 6, 2, 3 ff.
8. Livia Augusti, *ibid.*

¹ Cited by Creasy, *The Battle of the Metaurus*, *init.*

² Above, p. 26, n. 2, *med.*

³ Passages to which attention is thus called are not cases of genuine exemplary citation.

⁴ Quoting Heliogabalus.

II. Who lived only under the Empire:

1. C. Caesar Agrippae filius, Sen. *Dial.* 11, 15, 4.
2. Nero Claudius Drusus Germanicus Tiberi frater, Val. Max. 4, 3, 3; Aus. *Grat. Act.* 373, 511;¹ Prud. *c. Symm.* 1, 279. Cf. Claud. 8, 455; 21, 193.
3. Iulius Kanus,² Sen. *Dial.* 9, 14, 4-10; Boëth. *Consol.* 1, *pr.* 3.
4. Pallas divi Claudii libertus, Juv. 1, 109.
5. L. Annaeus Seneca, Boëth. *Consol.* 1, *pr.* 3. Cf. *ibid.* 3, *pr.* 5.
6. Servilius Barea Soranus, *ibid.* 1, *pr.* 3, *l. c.*
7. Arria maior, Plin. *Ep.* 6, 24, 5. Cf. *ibid.* 3, 16; Mart. 1, 13.
8. Sexx. Quintilii Condianus et Maximus, Amm. 28, 4, 21. Cf. for the similar case of the brothers Scribonii, Tac. *Hist.* 4, 41.

B. Emperors:

I. Augustus,³ for

- (a) *virtus imperatoria pro patria exercita*, Val. Max. 2, 1, 10;⁴ Juv. 8, 242;⁵ Ampel. 18, 21; *Hist. Aug.*

¹ Perhaps Germanicus the nephew of Tiberius is meant.

² Also *Canus* and *Canius*.

³ Cf. Vell. 2, 61, 3 f.; 66, 1 f.; 71, 1; 79, 3; 80, 2 ff.; 83, 2; 85, 4 ff.; 89, 90, 3 f.; 110, 6; 123, 2; 124, 3; 126, 1; Val. Max. 1, 7, 1 f.; 4, 3, 3 and 7, 7; 7, 6, 6 and 7, 3 f.; 9, 15, 2 and 5 ff.; Sen. *Ben.* 3, 27 and 32, 5; Plin. *H. N.* 7, 147 ff.; Tac. *Ann.* 1, 1; 3, 28; Flor. 4, 12, 64 ff.; Antonin. 4, 33; 8, 5; Ampel. 40, 4; 47, 7; Solin. 1, 48 f.; *Hist. Aug.* 30, 3, 1; Eutr. 7, 8, 4 ff.; 8, 5, 3; Aug. *Civ. Dei.* 3, 30; 22, 10; *Cons. Ev.* 1, 23, 32 (32, 1056); Oros. 3, 8, 3 ff.; 6, 1, 6 f. and 22, 3 f.; 7, 6, 5; Dante, *Inf.* 1, 71; *Purg.* 29, 116; *Par.* 6, 73. Augustus is cited as an example for another emperor by Sen. *Contr.* 2, 4, 13; *Hist. Aug.* 6, 11, 6; 25, 2, 3; Aug. *Civ. Dei.* 5, 21.

⁴ Among other emperors, not expressly mentioned; cf. below, p. 67, with n. 2.

⁵ Where Juvenal cites Augustus only to contrast him unfavorably with Cicero:

Hic novus Arpinas, ignobilis et modo Romae
municipalis eques, galeatum ponit ubique
praesidium attonitis et in omni monte laborat.
Tantum igitur muros intra toga contulit illi
nominis ac tituli, quantum vi Leucade, quantum
Thessaliae campis Octavius abstulit udo
caedibus adsiduis gladio, sed Roma parentem,
Roma patrem patriae Ciceronem libera dicit.

10, 21, 2; "Aur. Vict." *Vir. Ill. add.* 79; Symm. *Laud. Val.* 1, p. 322, 11; Claud. 18, 218; *incert. ap. Bährens P L M* 5, 400.

(b) *pietas* × *impietas*, Claud. 28, 117.¹

(c) *constantia in morte propinquorum*, Sen. *Dial.* 6, 15, 2; 11, 15, 3.

(d) *clementia*, Dracont. *Gunth.* 180.²

II. Later Emperors

(a) Cited together with Republican exempla, Val. Max. 2, 1, 10;³ *Hist. Aug.* 10, 21, 3 ff.; 13, 2, 2; Ambros. *Ep.* 1, 18, 7 (16, 973B); Symm. *Laud. Val.* 1, p. 322, 12 ff.; Claud. 8, 313 ff.

1. Tiberius, thrice.

2. Nero, thrice.

3. Trajan, once.

4. Antoninus Pius, twice.

5. Marcus Aurelius, twice.

(b) Cited without Republican exempla:⁴ only Nero, Antonin. 3, 16; Aug. *Civ. Dei*, 5, 19; Boëth. *Consol.* 2, m. 6; 3, m. 4.

To men of any but the first century of the Empire, then, the Roman instances were, it appears, everything but modern, opening far

¹ See above, pp. 13 f.

² Cf. below, p. 56, n. 2, *ad init.*

³ See below, p. 67, with n. 2.

⁴ In the great mass of references to these later emperors which the literature of the Imperial period presents, I cannot be sure that my collection of independent citations is as exhaustive as that of the citations in connection with Republican exempla; though I believe I have missed very few of either class. I have not gathered by any means all the citations of an emperor as an example for other emperors. The passages which I have noted — *Hist. Aug.* 4, 28, 10; 6, 11, 6; 17, 1, 1 and 33, 1; 25, 2, 3; 26, 42, 6; 27, 6, 4; 30, 3, 2; Aus. *Grat. Act.* p. 373, 511; Amm. 21, 16, 8; Ambros. *Obit. Theod.* 50 (16, 1403 A); Symm. *Ep.* 1, 13, p. 9, 17; Prud. c. Symm. 1, 278 f.; Claud. 8, 316; 20, 61: cf. Boëth. *Cons.* 3, pr. 5 — contain express citations of Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, Vitellius, Titus, Domitian, Nerva, Trajan, Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius, Commodus, Septimius (? see Prud. l. c.) Severus, and Heliogabalus. On the omission of Hadrian, cf. *Hist. Aug.* 10, 21, 3.

back in the legendary period, and closing, as the series seems to have done, abruptly in full splendour with the fall of the Republic: Marius, Sulla, Pompey, Catiline, Cato, Julius Caesar ¹ — then a silence, where even the name of Augustus is almost unheard; so sharp is the line of demarcation.² Before it has been set, any act as it might seem of

¹ Together with a multitude of minor instances; see above, pp. 28 ff.

² The younger Cato is of all the Instances perhaps the most frequently cited. Julius Caesar is cited as an *exemplum virtutis* by Verg. *Aen.* 6, 789; 826; Hor. *Carm.* 1, 12, 47; Sen. *Contr.* 10, 3, 1 and 5; Prop. 3, 18, 34; Val. Max. 2, 1, 10; 3, 2, 19; 4, 5, 6; 5, 1, 10; Sen. *Dial.* 4, 23, 4; 6, 14, 3; Plin. *H. N.* 7, 91 ff. and 99; Sil. 13, 864; Quint. *Decl.* 379, p. 423, 27; Mart. 6, 32, 5; 11, 5, 11; Antonin. 8, 3; Ampel. 18, 20; Solin. 1, 106 f.; *Hist. Aug.* 6, 11, 6; 10, 21, 1; 18, 62, 3; 21, 7, 7; Firm. *Math.* 1, 7, 41; *Vir. Ill. add.* 78; Amm. 28, 4, 18; 29, 2, 18; Prud. *Perist.* 2, 14; Aug. *Civ. Dei.* 5, 12; Claud. 28, 400; Dracont. *Gunth.* 175; P L M Bähr. 5, 400; Panegy. Bähr. 9, 15, p. 204, 16: as an *exemplum viti* by Cic. *Off.* 1, 26 f. and 43; 2, 23 f.; 27; 84; 3, 19 and 82 f.; fr. B. & K. 39, II, 4; Sen. *Ben.* 5, 16, 5; *Ep.* 94, 65; Dracont. *ap. P L M* Bähr. 5, 145; Panegy. Bähr. 12, 46, p. 313, 8. Cf. also Plut. *Vit.* In addition to the genuine citations, reference should be had also to the notices in Cic. *Marc.* 28; *Phil.* 1, 35; 2, 110; *Att.* 15, 20, 2; *Fam.* 13, 8, 2; Liv. *Epit.* 103-116 *passim*; Manil. 4, 57; Vell. 2, 41, 1 f.; 50, 1; 52, 4 ff.; 55, 2; 56 f.; Val. Max. 1, 6, 13; 8, 8 and 10; 2, 10, 7; 3, 2, 23; 4, 5, 5; 5, 7, 2; 6, 2, 11 and 6, 15; 7, 6, 5; 8, 9, 3 and 11, 2; 9, 8, 2; 15, 1 and 5; Sen. *N. Q.* 5, 18, 4; Petron. 120, l. 64; Sil. 13, 864; Stat. *Silv.* 1, 1, 23; Tac. *Ann.* 1, 1; 3, 28; Juv. 10, 108; Flor. 4, 2, 90 ff.; Antonin. 3, 3; Ampel. 40, 3; 47, 6; *Hist. Aug.* 19, 18, 2; Lact. *Inst.* 1, 15, 28; 3, 18, 12; 6, 18, 34; Eutr. 6, 25; "Hege-sippus" *de Bell. Iud.* 1, 27 (15, 1986 C); Amm. 21, 16, 13; Aug. *Civ. Dei.* 3, 30; 5, 12; 9, 5; *Cons. Ev.* 1, 23, 32 (32, 1056); *Ep.* 138, 2, 9 (33, 529); Claud. 8, 311; 15, 49; Oros. 6, 17, 1; 7, 2, 14; P L M Bähr. 5, 403; Empor. *ap. R L M* Halm 567 ff.; Dante, *Inf.* 4, 123; *Purg.* 18, 101; 26, 77; *Par.* 6, 57; 16, 10.

This difference in treatment of Julius and of Augustus is curiously illustrated in the catalogues of Heroes as framed by Virgil and by Manilius. In *Aeneid* 6, Anchises names first the Latin kings of Alba, then Romulus, then Julius Caesar and Augustus (789 ff.), then without notice returns from the divine descendants of Aeneas to the series of exempla — Numa and his successors, Brutus and the rest, among them (826 ff.) Pompey and Julius Caesar, and so on through Fabius Maximus. The double mention of Julius both among the *divi* and, at greater length, among the exempla, has against all MS. authority been avoided by the transpositions of some editors. The place of Augustus in the series is identical with that given him by Manilius, who, closing his catalogue of the Exempla with Cato of Utica and Agrippa, proceeds (1, 798 ff.; cf. Breiter *ad loc.*):

. . . Venerisque ab origine proles
Iulia descendit caelo caelumque replevit,
quod regit Augustus socio per signa tonante,

purely local significance may, given favorable conditions and reflected in the mirror of Roman greatness, win for the doer a place in the first order of the Exempla — such are the credentials of Cloelia, of Fabricius, of Serranus; under the Empire, no event, however far-reaching its consequences, leaves trace among them. Men like Germanicus,¹ Agricola, Verginius Rufus, who rejected opportunities of self-advancement reducing in comparison those of Fabricius to the scale of a country village, are never cited.² The emperors, even so good material as Nero, are cited very rarely indeed,³ in connection with the Republican instances still more rarely; as a rule, they are made objects of imitation for other emperors only, not for private individuals. The fourth century private citizen does not say to his son, "Marcus Aurelius was a good man, let us imitate him"; but Theodosius will say to Honorius, "The office of emperor has been well filled by Marcus Aurelius; his rule should be our model; avoid the precedents of Domitian."

cernit et in coetu divum Magnum atque Quirinum
altius aetherii quam candet circulus orbis.
Illa deum sedes, haec illis proxima, divum
qui virtute sua similes vestigia tangunt.

¹ But cf. above, p. 54, n. 1.

² Very rarely the great Stoics of the first century; Caecina Paetus, Thrasea, and Helvidius never. Cf. Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*, pp. 65, 143-145 especially, and 147 ff.; *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*, 1905², pp. 116, 163 f.

³ Cf. above, pp. 54 f., with notes, and *Hist. Aug.* 11, 11, 3 ff.: ". . . Idem (sc. Pescennius) in contione iuravit se, quamdiu in expeditionibus fuisset essetque adhuc futurus, non aliter egisse acturumque esse quam militem, Marium ante oculos habentem et duces tales. Nec alias fabulas umquam habuit nisi <de> Annibale ceterisque talibus. Denique cum imperatori facto quidam panegyricum recitare vellet, dixit ei: 'Scribe laudes Marii vel Annibalis <vel> cuiusvis ducis optimi vita functi et dic quid ille fecerit, ut eum nos imitemur. Nam viventes laudare inisio est, maxime imperatores, a quibus speratur, qui timentur, qui praestare publice possunt, qui possunt necare, qui proscribere.' Se autem vivum placere velle, mortuum etiam laudari. Amavit de principibus Augustum, Vespasianum, Titum, Traianum, Pium, Marcum, reliquos feneos vel venenatos vocans; maxime tamen in historiis Marium et Camillum et Quinctium <et> Marcium Coriolanum dilexit. Interrogatus autem quid de Scipionibus sentiret, dixisse fertur felices illos fuisse magis quam fortes; idque probare domesticam vitam et iuventutem, quae in utroque minus speciosa domi fuisset."

But, one may query, is the Romans' failure to employ examples drawn from Imperial times sufficiently established by the fact of slight reference in the literature? Contemporary and nearly contemporary citations are discounted:¹ is not the tone of the later Imperial literature prevailingly Christian? and will there not be a natural reluctance on the part of Christian writers to use heathen examples from the Imperial period, when they conceive the good man as necessarily a Christian? Let us glance at the nature and scope of our evidence, with a view to determining, if possible, whether in completeness and validity it justifies our first conclusions.

The claim of Scipio Aemilianus to a place among the Examples would be sustained by the citations in the Republican literature alone. The fame of the younger Cato need not have survived the reign of Claudius to assure him similar rank. The hero, then, it appears, may through citation not dictated by social or political bias attain unquestioned status as an *exemplum* within one hundred years from his death. That is, the great historical personages of the first three generations of our era might have attained such standing more than a century before the persecution of Diocletian.

Even from the period after the official recognition of Christianity by the State, a considerable body of non-Christian citations of exempla have reached us.² A far greater proportion, undoubtedly, of the pagan than of the Christian literature of this period has perished, notably of that class of pagan literature which was more than any other given to citing of examples — the products of the declaimers' schools. A glimpse at the character of these for the later period comes from the Manichæan Secundinus' polemic against Augustine:

¹ Above, p. 25.

² I subjoin a list of the authors in whose works I have found exemplary citations, beginning roughly with the second century A. D. and italicising the names of Christians: Martial, Statius, Tacitus, Juvenal, Pliny, Florus, Calpurnius Flaccus, Suetonius, Fronto, *Minucius Felix*, Appuleius, Antoninus, Gellius, Ampelius, *Tertullian*, *Cyprian*, Solinus, *Arnobius*, *Scriptores Historiæ Augustæ*, *Lactantius*, *Firmicus* (a late convert), *Ausonius* (Christian by convention), Aurelius Victor, *Scriptor de Viris Illustribus*, Festus, Eutropius, Obsequens, Julian, "*Hegesippus*" de Bello Iudaico, Ammianus, *Hieronymus*, *Ambrosius*, Symmachus, *Prudentius*, *Augustine*, Claudian, Macrobius, Rutilius Namatianus, *Orosius*, *Paulus Petricordensis*, *Dracontius*, Boëthius. Claudian alone has a great many; cf. above, pp. 39 f., with notes, and 42, n. 4.

" . . . Visus enim mihi es, et pro certo sic est, et numquam fuisse Manichaeum nec eius te potuisse arcana incognita secreti cognoscere, atque sub Manichaei nomine persequi te Hannibalem atque Mithridatem. Ego namque fateor non tali diligentia nec tanta industria Anicianae domus micare marmora quanta tua scripta perlucent eloquentia. . . ." ¹ This bit of testimony may point the way to a method of obtaining more. We shall not expect to find Christian apologists citing with approval heathen examples from the Imperial period. We shall expect to find them, and as a matter of fact have found them, ² attacking at least the greater heathen examples adduced by disputants on the other side: examples from the Empire are not among these.

Our literary evidence, then, while incomplete, may be taken to be fairly representative. It would be absurd to deny that the declaimers and apologists of the Empire ever made use of the many available examples drawn from the Imperial period no citations of whom have come down to us; equally clear is it that none of these possible Imperial examples attained a currency at all commensurate with that of the great majority of Republican eligibles. ³

For this difference in attitude toward men of Imperial times, the range of possible causes is too wide to allow more than a very brief treatment here. It seems right to distinguish those which may be supposed to have led to the rejection of the private citizen from the greater number of considerations which enter into the case of an emperor.

The Republic may have seemed to men of later time, even more than we now apprehend, an heroic or "golden" age ⁴ distinct from their own; here not less than in Greek tragedy's restriction of its subjects, we may recognize "today's unwillingness to idealize the men of yesterday." Such a motive is, I believe, of not uncommon appearance in Roman thought. ⁵ A striking parallel to this phase of

¹ *Ep. ad Aug.*, *ap.* Migne, 42, 574; cf. *Juv.* 10, 167.

² Above, pp. 39 ff.; cf. below, 67 ff.

³ Cf. below, p. 61, n. 3.

⁴ Cf. Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*, pp. 144 and 312.

⁵ Dill, *op. cit.*, p. 537: ". . . The cheerless negation of Epicurus, and the equally withering theology of the Stoics, could not weaken in Roman hearts the spell of ancestral pieties which clustered round the vault near the grey old country

its operation is the similar distinction of periods within the Empire itself noticed by Symmachus writing to Ausonius: “. . . Bonus Nerva, Traianus strenuus, Pius innocens, Marcus plenus officii temporibus adiuti sunt, quae tunc mores alios nesciebant; hic in laude est natura principis (*sc.* Gratiani), ibi priscae munus aetatis. Cur verso ordine ista optimarum artium putemus exempla et illa de saeculo priore vestigia ? . . .”¹ The exact application of Symmachus’ pronouns here is to me far from plain; but his general purport, I think, cannot be mistaken. Tacitus, on the other hand, in his notice of Arminius suggests a division coincident in time with that which we have to make; he has here, seemingly, no thought of the Instances: “. . . Dolo propinquorum cecidit, liberator haud dubie Germaniae, et qui non primordia populi Romani, sicut alii reges ducesque, sed florentissimum imperium lacessierit, proeliis ambiguus, bello non victus. Septem et triginta annos vitae, duodecim potentiae explevit, caniturque adhuc barbaras apud gentes, Graecorum annalibus ignotus, qui sua tantum mirantur, Romanis haud perinde celebris, dum vetera extollimus, recentium incuriosi. . . .”²

house of the race, looking down on the Tyrrhene sea, or the awe of ancient grove or spring sacred to Silvanus and the Nymphs, or the calm, chastened joy in a ritual in which every act was dictated by a love of ceremonial cleanness and exactness, and redolent of an immemorial past.” Cf. *Prud. c. Symm.* 2, 298 ff.:

. . . Ipsa casas fragili texat gens Romula culmo.
Sic tradunt habitasse Remum: regalia faeno
fulcra supersternant, aut pelle Libystidis ursae
compositam chlamydem villosa corpore gestent! . . .
Roma antiqua sibi non constat, versa per aevum,
et mutata sacris, ornatu, legibus, armis;
multa colit quae non coluit sub rege Quirino;
instituit quaedam melius, nonnulla refugit. . . .

¹ *Ep.* 1, 13, p. 9. Cf. what he writes to his father comparing the latter’s task in composing his *Hexasticha* (see below, p. 63) with the similar undertaking of Varro, *ibid.*, 1, 4, p. 5: “. . . Ille pauperem Curium, sed divitibus imperantem; ille severos Catones, gentem Fabiam, decora Scipionum, totumque illum triumphalem senatum parca laude perstrinxit: tu rutuvam proximae aetatis inluminas. Difficile factu est ut honor angustis rebus addatur. . . .”

² *Ann.* 2, 88 *fin.* See Dill, *op. cit.*, pp. 58 f.: “Both Juvenal and Tacitus are united in a passionate admiration for the old Roman character. Their standards and ideals are drawn from the half-mythical ages of the simple warriors and farmer-statesmen of the old Republic.” Cf. *ibid.*, p. 29.

No subject of an emperor could possibly rival the claim of the emperor himself to recognition among the Instances;¹ but even in the emperor's case, servility toward the reigning *princeps* might prevent that recognition. Furthermore, every emperor who might possibly have become an *exemplum virtutis*, was upon his decease forthwith by the Senate declared divine.² If we were right in ascribing the relative infrequency of national examples in Christian literatures partly to the relatively greater availability of Divine examples which they enjoy, we cannot now, — especially with the cases of Romulus and Julius Caesar in mind, — argue that the emperors were altogether excluded from the Exempla by the supposed fact of their divine nature;³ but it is of course evident at the same time that to minds less thoroughly pervaded by the Stoic doctrine of the dignity of human nature,⁴ an act or personality must become less valid as an example to mankind just in proportion as its pre-eminence was conditioned on the possession of attributes superhuman, not shared by the individual to whom it might be addressed.⁵ So, I have heard, the example of Jesus was by the early Church cited almost exclusively; as the doctrines of His divine nature and differentiation from humanity gained general acceptance, St. Paul became the most frequently cited example.

¹ For the Emperors as examples, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 31 and 144.

² Later, in the case of Constantine the Great, consecration by the Senate and canonization by the Church go hand in hand; cf. J. Langen, *Geschichte der römischen Kirche*, vol. I, 1881, p. 9.

³ Any absolute categorical limitation of the Exempla would be as false as it would be senseless. General tendencies, it seems, must rather be sought, alike in questioning the availability of the *divi* and of Imperial examples, and in assuming that the *hostis* is likely to be an *exemplum viti*.

⁴ Cf. above, pp. 16 and 48 f.

⁵ The emperors *damnatae memoriae* are, indeed, somewhat more frequently cited than the *divi*. I do not suppose that this fact has any bearing on the point here at issue. The exalted station of the *principes*, whether or not *damnatae memoriae*, as heads of what was in men's thought long before it was in name "The Holy Roman Empire" (cf. Friedländer, *Sittengeschichte*, I, pp. 43, 75 f.; Dill, *Last Century*, p. 10; Carter, *Religious Life*, pp. 66 ff.), would perhaps in any case raise them above the level of mere humanity. Against their adoption as *exempla viti*, as against that of the private citizen of the Empire, the feeling for the "golden age" might still operate, greater weight attaching to the example of the "hoary sinner"! Cf. *Hist. Aug.* II, II, 3 ff. (above, p. 57, n. 3).

These are some of the causes which may have contributed to the discontinuance of the series of Roman national exempla with the end of the Republic. I do not believe, however, that we have yet touched, save incidentally, on the greatest influence responsible for the refusal of the Exemplary canon (as we may now fairly call it) to admit additions to its number, and for its further crystallizing through the elimination of certain of its former members and the reduction of others to a simplified or uniform type. That influence was, I feel sure, a literary influence — an influence proceeding from and through some form or forms of literature. At first I supposed we might look for it in a generally received, standard Book of Moral Examples. Let us glance for a moment at the scope and character of the Roman works of this sort, notice of which has come down to us:¹ —

- *1. M. Terentius Varro Reatinus, *Imaginum* vel *Hebdomadum* libri xv.^{2 3} A popular edition, *Epitome*, in four books was published by Varro himself.
- *2. Cornelius Nepos, *Exemplorum* libri v (+ ?).² Cf. Gell. 6, 18, 11: "Cornelius Nepos in libro Exemplorum quinto . . . litteris mandavit."
- *3. C. Iulius Hyginus, *De Vita Rebusque Inlustrium Virorum* libri vi (+ ?).² Cf. Ascon. ad Cic. *Pis.* p. 13 Or., 12 K-S: "Varronem tradere . . . Iulius Hyginus dicit in libro priore de viris claris"; Gell. 1, 14, 1: "Iulius Hyginus dicit in libro de vita rebusque inlustrium virorum sexto." Is Asconius' reference to an *Epitome*?
- 4. Valerius Maximus, *Factorum et Dictorum Memorabilium* libri ix.
- 5. C. Plinius Secundus, *Naturalis Historiae* libri xxxvii; especially 7, also 33-34.⁴

¹ Works not extant are noted by an asterisk.

Cf. Ausonius, *Monosticha et Tetrasticha de Caesaribus*, pp. 183-193 Peiper; the last emperor included is Heliogabalus. The books of Santra and Suetonius, Jerome and Gennadius, *De Viris Illustribus*, dealt only with the biography of men of letters. See on the first two, Hier. *Vir. Ill.*, *praef.*, ap. Migne, 2, 821; on Jerome and Gennadius, Teuffel-Schwabe, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur*, 1913⁶, §§ 434, 6d and 469, 12.

² See M. Schanz, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur*, s. v.

³ See above, p. 60, n. 1.

⁴ See F. Münzer, *Beiträge zur Quellenkritik der Naturgeschichte des Plinius*, Berlin, 1897, pp. 324 ff.

6. L. Ampelius, *Liber Memorialis*.¹
- *7. Alfius Avitus, (*Rerum*) *Excellentium libri ii* (+ ?).¹
8. C. Iulius Solinus, *Collectanea Rerum Memorabilium*.¹
9. Incertus, *De Viris Illustribus Urbis Romae* capita lxxxvi (including a supplement).¹ This is usually incorporated with the *Caesares* of Sex. Aurelius Victor and a later *Origo Gentis Romanae*.
- *10. L. Aurelius Avianus Symmachus (pater Q. Symmachi oratoris), *de viris illustribus Hexasticha*.^{1 2}
11. Incertus, *De Viris Illustribus Hexasticha*.³

For the more important of these books, questions of sources, inter-relationships, content, arrangement, preservation, and the like, have been pretty carefully worked out.⁴ There seems to be no indication that any one of them dealt exclusively or distinctively with *exempla virtutis*, to say nothing of a restriction to national exempla alone.⁵ Among the extant books, those which make the nearest approach to such a classification appear to be the anonymous writings (9 and 11) *de viris illustribus*; their registers coincide to a considerable degree with the *exempla maiora* of my list. The author of the *Hexasticha*, however, admits no heroines.

May we not, nevertheless, discover certain trace of another Book of Examples, notice of which might conceivably have failed to reach us? One method of establishing the existence of such a manual might make use of unmistakable repetitions of phrase by several authors in dealing with a given instance. Suppose the manual were drawn up toward the close of the Republic; we might find its phraseology perpetuated by, say Livy, Seneca, Lucan, Gellius, Arnobius, and Claudian, as well as by some of the professed books of exempla.

¹ See Schanz, *op. cit.*, s. v.

² See above, p. 60, with n. 1.

³ *Aph. Bähr. P L M* 5, 396 ff.; Riese, *Anthologia Latina*, 1906, 831 ff. Cf. Teuffel-Schwabe, *op. cit.*, § 425, 1, *fin*.

⁴ See, e.g., B. Krieger, *Quibus fontibus Valerius Maximus usus sit in eis exemplis enarrandis quae ad priora rerum Romanarum tempora pertinent*, Berlin, 1888; L. Traube, *Untersuchungen zur Ueberlieferungsgeschichte römischer Schriftsteller*: 1. Zu Valerius Maximus, in *Sitzungsberichte der kaiserlichen bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu München*, 1891, pp. 387 ff. Cf. above, p. 62, n. 4, and p. 5, n. 2.

⁵ Cf. above, p. 7, with n. 3. Treatment of national heroes, either exclusively or as a class, is familiar enough; e.g., Plutarch's *Lives*, and *Vir. Ill.*, above, 9.

A partial illustration of this process is afforded in the legend of Cloelia; Silius Italicus writes:¹

. . . Facta virum sileo; rege haec et foedere et annis
et fluvio spretis, *mirantem* interrita Thybrim
tranavit frangens undam puerilibus ulnis. . . .

Claudian, inveighing against Eutropius, seemingly harks back to Silius' allusion, and puts it one better:²

Martius eunuchi repetet suffragia campus ? . . .
Visceribus frustra castum Lucretia ferrum
mersit, et *attonitum* tranavit Cloelia Thybrim ?

Such references illustrate admirably, also, the precariousness of a method fraught with all the perils of "the deadly parallel passage," augmented tenfold by the practical necessity of establishing, in effect, that the passages adduced are too like to be independent, yet too unlike to be the result of direct imitation. Happily we are relieved from such responsibility by the lack of any disproportionate frequency of coincidence, any religious jealousy of phrase, which would indicate the pre-existence of an especially revered Book of Instances. Notice of such a Book could, indeed, hardly have failed altogether to reach us.

The true Book of Instances, for the Roman, as for the Hebrew moral teacher, is surely a larger thing; is to be sought, in fact, undoubtedly, in the authority of a somewhat indefinite canon of great writers, historians and others, from the best period of the nation's literature.

We cannot now but underestimate the ascendancy of what must have been for the later Republic and for the early Empire the first great book of the series, a book which as a source of moral examples — I suppose — came nearer than anything else in Roman literature to the historical books of the Hebrew Old Testament — the *Annals* of Ennius. We can judge only by his eulogies of Dentatus —

quem nemo ferro potuit superare nec auro

— and of Fabius the Delayer.³ The direct influence of the *Annals* on exemplary citation was, for the earlier Empire, I feel sure, stronger

¹ 10, 492.

² 18, 447; cf. above, p. 40, n. 1.

³ Cf. the currency attained by such phrases as "The sword of the Lord and of Gideon"; "Thou leddest Thy people like a flock, by the hand of Moses and Aaron."

than that of any prose historical work, excepting possibly that of Livy.¹ Their indirect influence is beyond calculation; for they were the inspiration of Cicero and of Virgil.²

The temper of Cicero, intensely patriotic and reverent of antiquity, — according to many, the glory which he himself coveted, has made the appeal to precedent a distinctive characteristic of his writing. Fame, granting him rank the reverse of conspicuous among the Examples,³ has yet exceeded his highest aspiration in their regard: to him it was given to be a principal gate by which others should pass into the Temple. One could hardly expect that all his most cherished ideals would win like recognition at the hands of posterity;⁴ I was surprised to find, on the other hand, that among the greatest examples of my list, two only, and those the least frequently cited by later writers — Cloelia and Curtius, are not mentioned by him. Of scarcely less moment is the influence of Virgil, who has, however, nothing to say of Lucretia, Cincinnatus, Fabricius, Regulus, Hannibal, Claudia, or Sulla; he sets a fashion in Roman literature for later poets by converting the Homeric motives of *νεκρία* and pictured shield to a glorification of the Heroes.⁵ Similar passages are accorded a conspicuous place by Horace,⁶ Manilius,⁷ Lucan, and Silius Italicus.⁸

¹ For Livy, cf. above, p. 15, n. 3; H. Taine, *Essai sur Tite Live*, 1860², p. 15, and *passim*; Teuffel-Schwabe, *op. cit.*, § 257, 4.

² For Lucretius, cf. above, p. 12, with n. 3.

³ See above, p. 6, with n. 2.

⁴ E.g., see above, p. 50, with n. 2.

⁵ *Aen.* 6, 756 ff.; 8, 626 ff. Cf. R. Heinze, *Virgils epische Technik*, 1903, pp. 472 ff.; E. Norden's edition of *Aen.* 6, 1903, p. 353, *ad fin.*, and *passim*; Dill, *op. cit.*, pp. 491, 494; Warde Fowler, *Religious Experience*, p. 391; Donatus, on *Aen.* 6, 841 ff.: "Omnes isti diversis artibus, meritis quoque et virtute floruerunt; quos Vergilius ex persona Anchisis dicit non esse praetermittendos, et propter exempla optima tradendos memoriae posterorum." For Virgil's purpose in the *Aeneid* as a whole, see Warde Fowler, *op. cit.*, pp. 409 ff., esp. 418.

⁶ E.g., *Carm.* 1, 12, 33 ff.

⁷ A close copy of Virgil; 1, 777 ff.

⁸ Cf. 14, 680 ff.:

. . . Aemulus ipse (sc. Marcellus)
ingenii superum, servando condidit urbem;
ergo exstat saeculis stabitque insigne trophaeum,
et dabit antiquos ductorum noscere mores.

Statius' work is mostly on Greek subjects.

Interesting are the glimpses at colloquial use of exempla given by Petronius, who makes Eumolpus ask, "Quae autem hic insidiae sunt, aut quis nobiscum Hannibal navigat?"¹ Of all first century writers, however, the most untiring devotee is Seneca; who sees in Cato of Utica the "perfect man" of Stoic theory: ". . . Habes, Serene, perfectum illum virum, humanis divinisque virtutibus plenum, nihil perdere. . . . Non est quod dicas ista, ut soles, hunc sapientem nostrum nusquam inveniri. . . . Qualem confirmamus, exhibuimus et exhibebimus, raro forsitan magnisque aetatum intervallis unum. Neque enim magna et excedentia solitum ac vulgarem modum crebro gignuntur. Ceterum hic ipse M. Cato, a cuius mentione haec disputatio processit, vereor ne supra nostrum exemplar sit."²

¹ 101, 4 (Bücheler). Hannibal has become the type of perfidy, — unlike Jonah! See also 9, 5: ". . . Accucurrit coepitque mihi velle pudorem extorquere. Cum ego proclamarem, gladium strinxit, et 'Si Lucretia es,' inquit, 'Tarquinius invenisti'. . . ." And again, 132, 15:

Quid me constricta spectatis fronte Catones,
damnatique novae simplicitatis opus?

² *Dial.* 2, 6, 8 ff.; see above, p. 20, n. 1, *init.* and *fin.* Seneca's whole attitude toward Cato is one of wilful blindness to his faults, in the perhaps praiseworthy determination to create a perfect ideal, like that of Christ, for the redemption of society. See Martha, *Les Moralistes*, pp. 44 f. Cf. *Ep.* 67, 13 (above, p. 4) and *Dial.* 2, 2, 1 f.: "Respondi . . . Catonem autem certius exemplar sapientis viri nobis deos immortales dedisse quam Ulixen et Herculem prioribus saeculis. . . . Cato non cum feris manus contulit . . . adversus vitia civitatis degenerantis et pessum sua mole sidentis stetit solus et cadentem rem publicam, quantum modo una retrahi manu poterat, tenuit, donec vel abreptus vel abstractus comitem se diu sustentatae ruinae dedit simulque extincta sunt quae nefas erat dividi. Neque enim Cato post libertatem vixit nec libertas post Catonem." So *ibid.*, 1, 3, 4-14, *passim*: ". . . Fortuna fortissimos sibi pares quaerit, quosdam fastidio transit, contumacissimum quemque et rectissimum adgreditur, adversus quem vim suam intendat: ignem experitur in Mucio, paupertatem in Fabricio, exilium in Rutilio, tormenta in Regulo, venenum in Socrate, mortem in Catone. Magnum exemplum nisi mala fortuna non invenit. . . . Quod ad Catonem pertinet, satis dictum est summamque illi felicitatem contigisse consensus hominum fatebitur. Quem sibi rerum natura delegit cum quo metuenda collideret. 'Inimicitiae potentium graves sunt: opponatur simul Pompeio, Caesari, Crasso. Grave est a deterioribus honore anteiri: Vatinio postferatur. Grave est civilibus bellis interesse: toto terrarum orbe pro causa bona tam infelicer quam pertinaciter militet. Grave est sibi manus adferre: faciat. Quid per haec consequar? ut omnes sciant non esse haec mala, quibus ego dignum Catonem putavi.'" Again, *Ep.* 51, 12: ". . . Habitaturum tu putas umquam fuisse in mica Catonem, ut

The work of the elder Seneca, with other extant writings of the same sort, makes plain that first century eloquence followed faithfully the Ciceronian tradition of precedents. Yet clearer testimony than any thus preserved are the handbooks of exempla made for the declaimers' use,¹ notably that of Valerius Maximus. This is a courtly book, bearing all the earmarks of an age when "dedications to the prince" were in fashion.² The influence of the declamatory school appears in Juvenal nowhere more conspicuously than in his appeals to the Instances, which are always direct, fervent, and in good faith.³ Martial shows a disposition not to take them too seriously. In a jesting vein which reminds one of a Greek's attitude towards deity, he protests against their tiresome rectitude.

Downright attack on the Examples, however, began with Christianity. Its mildest form manifests itself in a depreciation of their pretensions by contrast with Jewish or Christian models; so, as an example of compassion, Moses is preferred to Fabricius by St. Ambrose:⁴ "Memorable ferunt rhetores quod dux Romanorum, cum ad eum adversarii regis medicus venisset, pollicens daturum se regi venenum, vinctum eum ad hostem remisit. Et revera praeclarum. . . . Redeamus ad nostrum Moysen, atque ad superiora revertamur, ut quanto praestantiora, tanto antiquiora promamus. . . ." Elsewhere a stronger animus against the Roman heroes becomes apparent,

praenavigantes adulteras dinumeraret et tot genera cymbarum variis coloribus picta et fluitantem toto lacu rosam, ut audiret canentium nocturna convicia? nonne manere ille intra vallum maluisset, quod in unam noctem manu sua ipse duxisset? Quidni mallet, quisquis vir est, somnum suum classico quam symphonia rumpi? . . ." Cf. *Dial.* 9, 16; and above, p. 7, n. 1.

On the other greatest moral teacher of the first century, Plutarch, see above, p. 20, n. 1, *med.*

¹ These contain material of the nature suggested by Sen. *Suas.* 7, 14 *fin.*, p. 583, 11 (Müller): ". . . Alteram rem (*sc. fatuam fatuorum amabilissimus Gargonius*) dixit, cum exempla referret eorum qui fortiter perierant: 'Iuba et Petreius mutuis vulneribus concucurrerunt et mortes faeneraverunt.' . . ." Cf. Victorinus on Cic. *Rhet.* 2, 26, *ap. R L M* Halm p. 284, 8: "*Relatio criminis est cum reus id quod arguitur confessus alterius se inductum peccato iure fecisse demonstrat. . . . Quae constitutio tunc est cum alterius peccato se fecisse reus dicit quidquid admisit; huius exemplum subiecit Horati, qui sororem suam flentem interfecit. . . .*"

² E.g., 2, 1, 10; 6, 1 *praef.* and 4, 5; and *passim*.

³ Cf. above, p. 60, n. 2; and for Juvenal, Dill, *op. cit.*, pp. 63 ff.

⁴ *De Officiis Ministrorum*, 3, 15, 91 (16, 171 A).

and a systematic campaign of disparagement is instituted, proceeding by four distinct methods. All these are well illustrated in the case of Scaevola.

The controversialist's first point of attack is, naturally, any characteristic weakness exhibited by the Instance in question — some trait, oftentimes, equally offensive to Roman and to Christian. This is seized upon, aggravated — in many cases to a ridiculous degree, and relentlessly pressed home. Or the exploit on which rests the hero's title to fame, is minimized: “. . . Eant Romani,” exclaims Lactantius, “et Mucio glorientur aut Regulo, quorum alter necandum se hostibus tradidit, quod captivum pudit vivere, alter ab hostibus deprehensus, cum videret mortem se vitare non posse, manum foco iniecit, ut pro facinore suo satisfaceret hosti quem voluit occidere, eaque poena veniam quam non meruerat accepit. . . .”¹ Special charges failing, the stock reproaches can always be brought.

Desire for renown among posterity, “the last infirmity of noble minds,” is scored against Scaevola by Tertullian:² “Mucius manum suam dexteram in ara cremavit ut hoc factum eius fama haberet.” So Lactantius, of Curtius and the Decii:³ “. . . Illi qui pro salute civium voluntariae se neci optulerunt, sicut Thebis Menoeceus, Athenis Codrus, Romae Curtius et Mures duo, numquam mortem vitae commodis praetulissent nisi se immortalitatem opinione civium consequi putavissent. . . .” Cyprian does not hesitate to make vainglory Brutus' motive for the slaying of his sons.⁴

Patriotism, again, should in the Christian view yield to thoughts of the Heavenly country. The same charges of worldliness are brought by Augustine and Dracontius against Scaevola as against Brutus.⁵

Lastly, the efficacy of pagan *virtus* itself is denied. The Heroes wrought under a misapprehension, their efforts were misdirected, hence they could not attain true virtue, which is conditioned upon, and inseparable from, true piety (*vera pietas, vera religio*). Refusal

¹ *Inst.* 5, 13, 13. Cf. above, p. 38, with n. 2.

² *Mart.* 4 (1, 625 B). Cf. above, *l. c.*

³ *Inst.* 3, 12, 22. Cf. *Aug. Civ. Dei*, 5, 13 f. and 18-20; 22, 10; Dante, *Purg.* 7, 85 ff.

⁴ Above, p. 41.

⁵ Above, pp. 41 f. Cf. Dante, *Purg.* 7, 18.

to accept this principle was a chief heresy of Pelagius, vigorously combated by Augustine:¹ “. . . Acerbissimi gratiae huius inimici exempla nobis opponitis impiorum quos dicitis ‘ alienos a fide abundare virtutibus, in quibus sine adiutorio gratiae solum est naturae bonum, licet superstitionibus mancipatum; qui solis libertatis ingenitae viribus et misericordes crebro et modesti et casti inveniuntur et sobrii.’ . . . Sed absit ut sit in aliquo vera virtus nisi fuerit iustus. Absit autem ut sit iustus vere nisi vivat ex fide: *Iustus enim ex fide vivit*.² Quis porro eorum qui se Christianos haberi volunt, nisi soli Pelagiani, aut in ipsis etiam forte tu solus, iustum dixerit infidelem, iustum dixerit impium, iustum dixerit diabolo mancipatum? sit licet ille Fabricius, sit licet Fabius, sit licet Scipio, sit licet Regulus, quorum me nominibus, tanquam in antiqua Romana curia loqueremur, putasti esse terrendum. . . . Ad hoc eos in die iudicii cogitationes suae defendent,³ ut tolerabilius puniantur, quia naturaliter quae legis sunt utcumque fecerunt, scriptum habentes in cordibus opus legis hactenus ut aliis non facerent quod perpeti nollent; hoc tamen peccantes, quod homines sine fide non ad eum finem ista opera retulerunt ad quem referre debuerunt. Minus enim Fabricius quam Catilina punietur, non quia iste bonus, sed quia ille magis malus; et minus impius quam Catilina Fabricius, non veras virtutes habendo, sed a veris virtutibus non plurimum deviando. An forte et istis qui exhibuerunt terrenae patriae Babyloniam dilectionem, et virtute civili, non vera, sed veri simili, daemonibus vel humanae gloriae servierunt, Fabriciis videlicet et Regulis et Fabiis et Scipionibus et Camillis ceterisque talibus, sicut infantibus qui sine baptismo moriuntur, provisuri estis aliquem locum inter damnationem regnumque caelorum, ubi non sint in miseria, sed in beatitudine sempiterna, qui Deo non placuerunt, cui sine fide placere impossibile est, quam nec in operibus nec in cordibus habuerunt? non opinor perditionem vestram usque ad istam posse impudentiam prosilire. ‘ Erunt ergo,’ inquis, ‘ in damnatione sempiterna in quibus erat vera iustitia?’ O

¹ *Contra Iulianum Pelagianum*, 4, 3, 16–26 (44, 744 ff.); cf. *Civ. Dei*, 19, 24 fin. and 25; *Ep.* 138, 3, 17 (33, 533); Pelagius, *Ad Demetriadem Ep.* 3, ap. Migne, 30, 18 C–D.

² *Rom.* 1, 17.

³ *Ibid.*, 2, 14 ff.

vocem impudentia maiore praecipitem! non erat, inquam, in eis vera iustitia; quia non actibus, sed finibus, pensantur officia. . . .”

The pagan exempla are withal seldom referred to by Cyprian, Arnobius, Ambrose,¹ and — save in a single passage² — Dracontius. More frequent are the allusions of Minucius Felix, Tertullian, Lactantius, and Prudentius.³ Jerome⁴ and Augustine⁵ dwell on the familiar names not without something of that lingering affection which marked the renunciation of their beloved classics. Non-committal are the rare allusions of Boëthius.

Yet the last century of Roman sovereignty did not lack for defenders of the old order. As numbers waned, the more was devotion intensified. In the Middle Empire a season of lukewarmness had set in. Now as the hostile faiths flooded in upon the wreck of paganism, as provinces crumbled and fell successive prey to the barbarian, men turned with a pathetic yearning to the glorious ideals of the Augustans, and drew from the remembrance of them consolation, if little hope. The splendor of the Heroes’ cult was never more than at its setting. In the last days of the Western Empire, while the tides threatening momentarily to engulf the remnant of paganism, slackened and receded for a little, the *γλωσσήματα* of Marcus Aurelius⁶ shine with rekindling brightness in the pages of Symmachus⁷ and of Claudian.⁸

Opportunity is not without its compensations. The reader will often have been reminded of these in following the present study. Our search has led us beyond the beaten tracks of ancient religious science, into a region uncharted by the Romans themselves. No decree of magistrate or assembly has methodized the cult of the Heroes, no Varro defined their place in the scheme of Roman religious thought. Yet we may not slight them. There is surely, it has seemed

¹ Cf. *Off. Min.* 3, 15, 91 (16, 171 A: above, p. 67); *Ep.* 1, 18, 7 ff. (16, 973 B).

² *De Deo* 3, 312 ff. (above, pp. 39 ff., *passim*).

³ *C. Symm.* 2, 553 ff.

⁴ Cf., e.g., *Iovin.* 2, 11 (23 = 2, 341).

⁵ Cf., e.g., *Ep.* 138, 3, 17 (33, 533).

⁶ 4, 33.

⁷ Cf. above, p. 60.

⁸ Cf. above, p. 58, n. 2, *fin.*

to me, but the one course — to face with determination the difficulties of the moral problem — for him who would gain a true perspective of Roman spiritual life; to fail to do so is to make the great refusal. The stake is worth the hazard: if I am right, he who accepts such a challenge will find himself taking a wider view, presently, of modern, not less than of ancient conditions. May future service of the Instances prove as fruitful of instruction to their minister as I have found it!

MEDICAL ALLUSIONS IN THE WORKS OF ST. JEROME

BY ARTHUR STANLEY PEASE

IN the eighth volume of the *Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur*,¹ is to be found a valuable article by Harnack upon the history of medicine and surgery among the early Christians. The limits of his discussion hardly include Jerome, and it has seemed to me worth while to bring together some of the abundant references to this subject found in Jerome's writings. The reasons for their frequency I shall later suggest; suffice it here to say that a large proportion of the allusions are in the form of similes or metaphors derived from the different fields of the medical profession. Casual mention of such figures is made by Harendza,² who, however, gives no hint as to their frequency; Lammert³ recognizes them as common, yet cites but a few examples limited to the *Letters*; but other references by modern scholars I have not discovered. In the collection which I have made there has been no attempt to distinguish sharply between historical or scientific references to medicine and mere metaphorical allusions, for the latter, to be comprehensible and cogent, must be based fairly closely upon actual practice, and though my concern has been mainly with the figurative uses, it has seemed desirable, for greater completeness, to include the literal cases as well.⁴ In the

¹ Heft 4 (1892), pp. 37-152: *Medicinisches aus der ältesten Kirchengeschichte*.

² *De oratorio genere dicendi quo Hieronymus in epistulis usus sit*. Diss., Breslau, 1905, pp. 29, 31, 36.

³ *De Hieronymo Donati Discipulo* (*Comm. Phil. Ienenses*, IX, 2 (1912), p. 10).

⁴ I cannot pretend to exhaustiveness in this collection, since the field from which the illustrations are drawn is so extensive. Essentially all Jerome's extant works, however, except his translations and writings mainly lexicographical (such as the *De Nom. Hebr.*) have been drawn upon. The citations are given with the page numbering of Vallarsi (as reprinted by Migne) except for the first part of the *Letters* and for the commentary on Jeremiah, where the editions of Hilberg and Reiter respectively (*C. S. E. L.*, vols. LIV, LV, LIX) have been used. For the homiletical works citations are of course drawn from the edition by Morin in the third volume of the *Anecdota Maredsolana*. Certain spurious letters (Nos. 5 and 6

figurative examples, as will be readily understood, the comparison involved is the time-honored one between disease and sin.¹ A rough and not altogether satisfactory classification of the instances may be made under the main headings of the Physician, the Patient, and the Disease.

The Physician.² In more than one place Jerome attacks the medical practitioners gathering around the shrines of Aesculapius, in which the custom of incubation was still in vogue,³ and ridicules the supposed restoration to life of Virbius by the alleged god of healing⁴ who does not cure but destroy men's souls.⁵ Of course this is the reflection of that great struggle of the second and third centuries between the cult of Aesculapius, the pagan Savior, and the worship of Jesus, in the accounts of whose life physical healing had played a noteworthy part, a struggle of which the work of Origen *Against Celsus* is so important an evidence.⁶ Not alone, then, to the general attitude of Christians and to what might be called commonplaces of Christian argument, but in particular to Jerome's much-admired and frequently-used source Origen may we be led to trace not a little of what we shall find in the later writer. Offset to the pagan Savior is the Christian Great Physician, the *verus medicus*,⁷ *solus medicus*,⁸ *ipse et medicus*

in Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, XXX, pp. 61-104) contain many medical allusions, but are naturally not here included.

¹ A comparison not limited to Christianity, but found in various pagan philosophies and notably in Stoicism (Harnack, *op. cit.*, p. 129; Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, p. 286). Numerous references of a figurative nature to physicians, diseases, and cures may be found in such Stoic works as Seneca's *De Ira*.

² I shall not here list the physicians of whom Jerome makes mention in the *De Viris Illustribus* and elsewhere, for of them Harnack gives an account (*op. cit.*, pp. 37-50).

³ *Comm. in Is.*, xviii, p. 774.

⁴ *Comm. in Eph.*, ii, p. 619.

⁵ *Vit. Hilar.*, 21.

⁶ See especially Harnack, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-132.

⁷ *Vit. Hilar.*, 15; *adv. Ruf.*, i, 26; *in Hierem.*, iii, 77; cf. Weyman, in *Woch. f. kl. Phil.*, xxxi (1914), Sp. 413; *in Naum.*, p. 567; *in Eph.*, ii, p. 619; *Tract. in Is. (Anecd. Mared.*, III, iii, 97, 7 and note); cf. Aug., *C. D.*, iv, 16. And so in the Scriptures, according to *Ep.* 118, 1, 3, *vulnerum vera medicina est, . . . dolorum certa remedia*.

⁸ *Tract. in Ps.* 90 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, iii, 68, 8); cf. *Comm. in Amos*, iii, p. 325.

et medicamentum,¹ *verus archiater*,² *quasi spiritualis Hippocrates*.³ By an extension of the figure, not only Christ but also the apostles⁴ and even the prophets and great men of the Old Testament⁵ appear endowed with similar healing power, and we need not be surprised to find that to the prophets the term *ἰατροί* had been already applied by Origen.⁶ With such divine and ecclesiastical support it was but natural that Jerome should look upon the medical profession and refer to it as one of dignity. Among the details of the physician's work mentioned by him are the visitation of patients⁷ and diagnosis (in which the examination of the pulse is especially noted).⁸ To the physician the patients must tell their symptoms if they expect a

¹ *Tract. in Marc. 1* (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 338, 3-4).

² *Id.*, 337, 14-15. Cf. Origen, *Hom. 1 in Ps. 37* (Migne, *Patr. Gr.*, XII, 1369), where Christ is the *archiatros* of the medical art.

³ *C. Ioan. Hier.*, 38. In chapter 39 of the same work Isidorus is called the *Hippocrates Christianorum*. In the Latin translation of Origen, *Hom. in Levit. 8*, 1 (Migne, *Patr. Gr.*, XII, 492), we read: *Medicum dici in scripturis divinis Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum*. And a little later: *veni nunc ad Iesum caelestem medicum*. Cf. also Origen, *in Exodum*, p. 114 (Migne, *Patr. Gr.*, XII, 269): *ἰατρός ἐστι ψυχῆς ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ*, κτλ.; Origen, *in Hierem.*, *homil. 11*, init. (Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, XXV, p. 839 Vall.).

⁴ Not only Luke (*Ep.*, 53, 9, 4; *in Philem.*, p. 763), but also Paul (*Ep.*, 22, 8, 3, on 1 *Tim.*, 5, 23).

⁵ *Tract. in Marc. 1* (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 337, 15-16): *Medicus Moyses, medicus Esaias, medici omnes sancti; sed iste (sc. Dominus) archiater est*. In *Ep.*, 40, 1, 2-3, Jeremiah, Ezechiel, and Amos are called *chirurgici spirituales secantes vitia peccatorum*. Cf. *Comm. in Malach.*, p. 980; *Hom. in Is.* (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, iii, 97, 4; 97, 13; 101, 18-19).

⁶ *Hom. in Hierem.*, 14, 1: . . . διὰ τὸ καὶ τοὺς προφῆτας οἷον εἶναι ἰατροὺς ψυχῶν, κτλ.; *id.*, 14, 2: ὁ λαὸς τοῖνυν ἐκείνος, εἰ καὶ ποικίλοι νόσοι ἦσαν ἐν τῷ λαῷ τῷ χρηματίζαντι τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἐπεμπεν αὐτοῖς ἰατροὺς ὁ Θεὸς τοὺς προφῆτας. εἰς τῶν ἰατρῶν καὶ Ἱερεμίας ἦν, κτλ.

⁷ *Ep.*, 52, 15, 2: *nos, quibus animarum medicina commissa est, omnium Christianorum domos debemus amare quasi proprias*; in *Ezech.*, iii, p. 92; v, p. 169; in *Is.*, viii, p. 337.

⁸ *Commentariol. in Ps. 8* (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, i, 21, 9; on the ability of the skilful physician to diagnose); *Tract. in Marc. 1* (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 337, 16): *Novit diligenter venas tangere (sc. Iesus) et morborum arcana scrutari*; cf. III, ii, 338, 3. Note also Origen, *Hom. 1 in Luc.* (translated by Jerome, in Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, XXVI, pp. 249-250 Vall.): *ut . . . aestus febrium in pulsum venarum sentiam*; and cf. Aug., *C. D.*, xxii, 30.

cure.¹ A regimen of diet² and appropriate drugs are prescribed.³ Those who do not follow the advice of the physician are suitably rebuked by him upon his later visits.⁴ The physicians had also their shops (*tabernae*), which appear in two of Jerome's *Letters*⁵ as synonymous with places of idle gossip, like the barbers' shops of antiquity and the present day. In the cenobitic establishments of Egypt Jerome tells us⁶ that a sick brother was taken to a more spacious apartment where he was attended by older brothers with such care that he need not miss the luxuries of the city or the affection of his mother. Of public hospitals (*νοσοκόμια*) his friend Fabiola had established the first — at least the first of which he knew — and he relates with great fulness⁷ the devotion with which she collected the sick from the public squares of the city and nursed the most distressing cases of misery with her own hands. In another letter⁸ he speaks of equal interest, but perhaps a trifle less personal service on the part of the wealthy Paula.

More interesting and striking, for purposes of figurative comparison, is the life of the surgeon, and numerous are the cases of sins demanding from the spiritual healer methods as direct and often as brusque as those employed by the physical practitioner.⁹ Cutting¹⁰

¹ *Comm. in Eccl.*, p. 474; *Tract. in Ps.* 141 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 275, 9-11).

² *Adv. Pelag.*, iii, 11: *castigatis vivamus cibis*. In the *Comm. in Is.*, xiv (on ch. 52, 20), p. 598, he explains *beta semicocta* as *aegrotantium cibis*. In the *Comm. in Sophon.*, p. 686, he mentions *ptisanae* or barley-water as given by physicians and prepared with mortar and pestle; elsewhere the giving of cold water to fever patients (in *Abacuc*, i, p. 591-592), and the use of wine for the stomach (*Ep.*, 22, 8, 3; cf. *1 Tim.*, 5, 23) are discussed. And compare what Galen is quoted (*Ep.* 54, 9, 4) as saying upon the subject of diet.

³ For these drugs see p. 80, notes 1 ff., *infra*.

⁴ In *Matt.*, ii, pp. 133-134: *sed quod in similitudinem medici, si aegrotum videat contra sua praecepta se gerere, dicat usquequo accedam ad domum tuam, quousque artis perdam industriam, me aliud iubente et te aliud perpetrante?* Cf. *Commentariol. in Ps.* 2 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, i, 8, 1).

⁵ 50, 5, 1; 52, 5, 4.

⁶ *Ep.*, 22, 35, 7.

⁷ *Ep.*, 77, 6, 1-2. This account is followed by one of rather a modern tone in which he describes others who practise *huiusce modi misericordiam per aliena ministeria et clementes esse pecunia, non manu*.

⁸ 108, 5, 1-2.

⁹ Cf. p. 75, n. 5, *supra*.

¹⁰ *Tract. in Ps.* 119 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 226, 25-29): *Si quando in corpore vulnus est, et in ipso vulnere iam putridae carnes sunt, et cancer est, et fuerit pus in-*

and cauterizing¹ are the two most frequent methods. These, with their variations, occur in Jerome's figures abundantly, and, as will be seen by reference to the instances cited, are often mentioned together. Indeed, this connection of the two, as was shown by Welcker in an article entitled "*Schneiden und Brennen*,"² extends, with a good deal of frequency, through all posthomeric literature. For the period later than that treated by Welcker there are some facts collected by Harnack,³ to which may be added two references in Origen.⁴ Obstetrical allusions are also not altogether absent.⁵ The instruments of the surgeon appear in a few instances,⁶ but too vaguely to teach much; in two passages bandages and their use are described.⁷ The methods of the surgeon are often rough but their apparent cruelty is regularly explained as due to kindness and necessary for a permanent cure.⁸

trinsecus: nisi apertum fuerit, non egreditur pus. Et si egressum fuerit pus, nisi cauterium fuerit, rursum renascitur pus. Cf. *Ep.*, 40, 2, 1; 52, 6, 1; 55, 5, 5; 109, 2, 4; 117, 2, 1; in *Hierem.*, vi, 7, 7; in *Ezech.*, vii, p. 276; in *Mich.*, ii, pp. 524-525; in *Sophon.*, p. 689; in *Gal.*, iii, p. 489; *Tract. in Ps.* 140 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 271, 11-14; 272, 22 ff.). Also in *Is.*, viii, p. 337; in *Osee*, p. 63; in *Naum*, p. 567; in *Malach.*, p. 980; and the amputation of diseased parts mentioned in *Ep.*, 60, 17, 3.

¹ *Ep.*, 15, 3, 2; 52, 6, 1; 55, 5, 5; 117, 2, 2; *Vit. Malch.*, 3; *adv. Ruf.*, iii, 20; in *Is.*, viii, p. 337; ix, p. 384; in *Hierem.*, vi, 7, 7; in *Ezech.*, vii, p. 276; in *Mich.*, i, p. 461; ii, pp. 484-485, 524-525; in *Osee*, pp. 42, 63; *Tract. in Ps.* 119 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 226, 28 ff.); in *Ps.* 140 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 271, 13); *Tract. in Is.*, 1 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, iii, 101, 8-9). The three references in *adv. Iovin.*, i, 5; in *Zach.*, ii, p. 871; and in *Eph.*, iii, p. 646, are based upon 1 *Tim.*, 4, 2.

² *Kl. Schriften*, III, pp. 209-217. And cf. Harnack, *op. cit.*, p. 130 and n. 1.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 137 ff.

⁴ *Hom. 1 in Luc.* (translated by Jerome, in *Migne, Patr. Lat.*, XXVI, pp. 249-250 Vall.); *Hom. in Hierem.*, 14, 1, *fin.*

⁵ For an especially important passage on childbirth see in *Ezech.*, iv, p. 147. Other references may be found in the commentary in *Eccl.*, p. 482; in *Zach.*, iii, p. 932. Cf. the details in *Ep.*, 98, 19, 2 (letter of Theophilus).

⁶ *Ferrum* (*Ep.*, 40, 1, 1; 55, 5, 5; in *Is.*, xvii, p. 758); *scalpellus* (in *Osee*, p. 63; in *Sophon.*, p. 689). And cf. *Ep.*, 112, 13, 3.

⁷ In *Is.*, i, p. 16 (suggested by a lemma from *Is.*, 1, 6); in *Osee*, p. 61.

⁸ *Ep.*, 40, 1; 55, 5, 5; in *Is.*, ix, p. 384; in *Ezech.*, i, p. 8; ii, p. 64: *non parcit ut parcat, non miseretur ut magis misereatur*; vii, p. 277; in *Osee*, pp. 42, 61; in *Mich.*, ii, pp. 484-485, 515, 524-525; in *Abacuc*, i, pp. 591-592; in *Matt.*, ii, p. 116; *Tract. in Ps.* 140 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 271, 11-14). This commonplace is found in many writers, e. g., Sen., *Dial.*, i, 3, 2; cf. ii, 1, 1; iii, 6, 2; Tertull., *De Poenit.*, 10 (cited by Harnack); Origen, in *Matt.*, xv, 11: "καὶ ὡς ἰατροῦμαι." εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὺς

The Patient. Not all patients (sinners) in their illness realize their malady, and several of Jerome's comparisons deal with their attitude towards their physician (the Savior). Some disobey his orders;¹ some are unwilling to be cured;² others suspect that they are in danger of death³ and experience a depression of mind that doubles the effect of their physical infirmity;⁴ still more fear the physician or surgeon and the rigor of his methods.⁵ In dealing with this last set the skilful surgeon may hide his sharp knife, lest he unduly alarm the patient before he has had a chance to treat him,⁶ and he may also resort to justifiable falsehoods as to the patient's condition.⁷ The effects of the worldly station of the sick man are also noted; for illness has a certain degree of consolation if there be money to support it and furnish it with luxuries, but the combination of physical pain and poverty is doubly intolerable.⁸ Yet the illness of the childless rich, surrounded by dissimulating parasites who watch the sick man's every motion, is described in terms almost worthy of a Juvenal.⁹ The importance in sickness of a cheerful mind, by which the weakness of the body can be supported, is also recognized.¹⁰

The Disease. Important lists of common diseases are given by Jerome in two or three places,¹¹ and scattering references to single ones are frequent. Thus we find mention of fevers of different kinds and in different stages.¹² Poisons and their antidotes¹³ easily lend

ἀλγεῖν ποιεῖ, ἰστέον ὅτι πολλάκις καὶ ἰατρὸς ἀλγεῖν ποιεῖ· ποιήσας δὲ ἀλγεῖν ὁ Θεὸς πάλιν ἀποκαθίστησιν. Also in *Exod.*, p. 125; *Hom. in Hierem.*, xiv, 1, *fin.*; and cf. *Clem., Strom.*, i, 27.

¹ Cf. p. 76, n. 4, *supra*. ² *Tract. in Is. (Anecd. Mared., III, iii, 97, 6).*

³ *Tract. in Ps. 119 (Anecd. Mared., III, ii, 228, 9).* ⁴ *In Is.*, i, p. 15.

⁵ *In Is.*, ix, p. 384; *in Ezech.*, iii, p. 92; *in Matt.*, ii, p. 128.

⁶ *In Is.*, xvii, p. 758; cf. *Sen., Dial.*, v, 39, 4. ⁷ *Adv. Ruf.*, i, 18.

⁸ *Hom. in Luc. (Anecd. Mared., III, ii, 378, 5-6).* For the combination of illness and old age cf. *Tract. in Ps. 119 (Anecd. Mared., III, ii, 228, 19-20).*

⁹ *Ep.*, 52, 6, 4-5.

¹⁰ *Tract. in Is. (Anecd. Mared., III, iii, 101, 26 ff.).*

¹¹ *Ep.*, 77, 6, 2-3; *adv. Pelag.*, iii, 4; *in Eph.*, iii, p. 658.

¹² *Ep.*, 38, 2, 1; 39, 1, 4 (these describing the fever of Blesilla); 3, 3, 1; *Vit. Hilar.*, 14 (semiterian ague); *adv. Pelag.*, iii, 11; *in Mich.*, ii, pp. 484-485; *Tract. in Ps. 119 (Anecd. Mared., III, ii, 228, 8-9); Tract. in Marc. 1 (Anecd. Mared., III, ii, 337, 9 ff.).* Especially good in their description are *Comm. in Abacuc*, i, pp. 591-592; *in Matt.*, i, p. 45; *in Eph.*, iii, p. 644.

¹³ *Ep.*, 10, 3, 2; 117, 2, 1; *adv. Ruf.*, ii, 34; iii, 8; *adv. Iovin.*, i, 4.

themselves to figurative adaptations, as do wounds of varied sorts.¹ In the latter case it is often the healing over of the wound or perhaps some attempt to disturb the scab which is made the subject of remark. Gout,² perhaps rheumatism,³ and tumors⁴ are mentioned as though known to the writer by observation; the allusions which I have noted to leprosy,⁵ on the other hand, are mainly influenced directly by Biblical passages and show no first-hand acquaintance with the disease. Paralysis,⁶ headache,⁷ vertigo,⁸ perhaps insanity,⁹ and possession,¹⁰ dropsy¹¹ and humors,¹² nausea,¹³ jaundice,¹⁴ and various digestive troubles¹⁵ and pains of the eyes¹⁶ and ears¹⁷ are among the

¹ *Ep.*, I, 14; 3, 3, 2; 66, I, 1: *Sanato vulnere et in cicatricem superinductae culi si medicina colorem reddere voluerit, dum pulchritudinem corporis quaerit, plagam doloris instaurat*; 69, I, 2; 77, 5, I ff.; 79, 10, 1; 112, 13, 3; 118, 1, 3; 147, 9; *adv. Ruf.*, iii, 17; in *Is.*, xvi, p. 693; in *Ezech.*, i, *prol.*; *Tract. in Ps.* 84 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, iii, 44, 6-8); *Tract. in Is.* (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, iii, 102, 16-17).

² *Adv. Iovin.*, ii, 12; in *Eccl.*, p. 491; in *Eph.*, iii, p. 653.

³ *Ep.*, 77, 6, 2; in *Eccl.*, p. 491.

⁴ *Tract. in Ps.* 133 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 256, 20), and some of the references in n. 1, *supra*. Cf. also *Ep.*, 94, 1, 2 (which should probably not be included, being a letter of Dionysius to Theophilus).

⁵ *Ep.*, 94, 1, 2 (see n. 4, *supra*); in *Mich.*, ii, p. 524 (influenced by *Levit.*, 13); in *Sophon.*, p. 690 (influenced by *Levit.*, 14); *Tract. in Marc.* (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 367, 5 ff.; suggested by a lemma from *Mark*, 14, 3).

⁶ *Tract. in Ps.* 97 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 144, 18, referring to Christ's miracles); *Tract. in Marc.* (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 341, 6, with allusion to Christ).

⁷ In *Is.*, i, p. 15.

⁸ *Ep.*, 121, *praef.*

⁹ *Ep.*, 109, 2, 4.

¹⁰ *Ep.*, 42, 1, 3.

¹¹ *Vit. Hilar.*, 37 (a miraculous cure by Hilarion).

¹² *Ep.*, 78, 7, 4; *adv. Pelag.*, iii, 11. *Phlegmata pulmonis* are mentioned in *Ep.*, 52, 6, 4; *scrofula* in *Ep.*, 40, 2, 1.

¹³ *Ep.*, 121 *praef.*; c. *Ioan. Hier.*, 39; in *Is.*, ix, p. 376; xiv, p. 596: *Solent medici amarissimam antidotum, quae ex gustu nomen accepit, dare stomacho nausienti, ut noxios humores exomat, et possit coctos cibos atque digestos in alveum transmittere quos phlegmatum magnitudo non sinebat, etc.*

¹⁴ *Ep.*, 77, 6, 2; *adv. Pelag.*, iii, 11; on its cure in *Is.*, xi, p. 475.

¹⁵ *Ep.*, 33, 8, 3 (on 1 *Tim.*, 5, 23); 52, 6, 4; 68, 1, 4; 77, 6, 2; in *Iob*, 3 (Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, XXVI, p. 626 D), describing the disease called *bolimiodes* (*bulimodes*?), *quae infirmitas talem habere dicitur poenam, ut ante cibum torqueatur aegrotus et sint ei post cibum inadnescentes dolores*; *adv. Pelag.*, iii, 4: *non torminibus et urinae difficultatibus torqueatur*; cf. *adv. Iovin.*, ii, 6; *adv. Pelag.*, iii, 11; in *Is.*, xviii, *prol.*: *ubi cibis sequuntur et morbi; ubi morbi adhibendus est medicus; ubi medici frequenter interitus.*

¹⁶ Cf. p. 80, n. 7; p. 83, nn. 5 and 6, *infra*.

¹⁷ *Adv. Iovin.*, ii, 6.

maladies receiving notice, many of them in the form of similes or metaphors. The drugs mentioned as their cures include styptics,¹ (especially in the form of a powder),² poultices,³ and plasters.⁴ The latter were of different sorts, appropriate to the different kinds of wounds,⁵ hence the proverb, occurring in the letter of Ignatius to Polycarp,⁶ "Not every wound is cured by the same kind of plaster." In Jerome the same thought appears also in a different form, substituting for 'plaster' *collyrium*, or eye-salve.⁷ Ointments for wounds,⁸ cathartics,⁹ medicines to ease the throat,¹⁰ and antidotes for poisons,¹¹ are enumerated, but the most varied and interesting list is that found in the work *Against Jovinian*,¹² a passage discussed by Harnack,¹³ and too long to be here quoted. Many of the remedies there set forth bear more likeness to those described by Cato than to the less pic-

¹ *Tract. in Ps.* 127 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 238, 28: *vinum stypticum*). Hellebore also was apparently so used, or possibly as a purgative (*in Mich.*, ii, pp. 524-525).

² *In Hierem.*, vi, 7, 7; *in Mich.*, i, p. 461: *medici . . . urunt cauterio vel pulvere καυστικῷ*; *Tract. in Is.* 1 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, iii, 101, 8-9); *in Gal.*, ii, p. 468: *mordaciori pulvere*; cf. Tertull., *De Poenit.*, 10: *pulveris alicuius mordacitate cruciari*; Harnack, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

³ Of figs: *in Is.*, xi, p. 475.

⁴ *Adv. Ruf.*, iii, 14; *c. Ioan. Hier.*, 39; *in Ezech.*, iv, p. 161; *in Ionam*, p. 416; *in Gal.*, ii, p. 468; *Tract. in Ps.* 119 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 226, 14); *Tract. in Is.* 1 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, iii, 101, 9-10, 16); *Hom. de Nativ. Dom.* (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 394, 17-18); and see especially Harnack's note upon this figure (*op. cit.*, p. 137, n. 1).

⁵ *Tract. in Ps.* 137 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 265, 20-21): *Qualia sunt vulnera, tale et inplastrum*; cf. *Comm. in Matt.*, ii, p. 93; *Ep.*, 84, 4, 3.

⁶ Ch. 2: οὐ πᾶν τραῦμα τῇ αὐτῇ ἐμπλάστρῳ θεραπεύεται. Compare also *Hier.*, *Ep.*, 84, 4, 3; Harnack, *l. c.*

⁷ *In Eph.*, prol., p. 540: *nec ad instar imperiti medici uno collyrio omnium oculos vult curare*; *c. Ioan. Hier.*, 5; Otto, *Sprichwörter*, p. 89. Another reference to *collyria* is found in the work *c. Ioan. Hier.*, 38. Not only the disease but also the person must be considered, according to *Ep.*, 57, 1, 2: *pro diversitate personarum diversa de scripturis adhibenda medicina*. Cf. Clem. Alex., *Protrept.*, 1, 8, 2.

⁸ *Tract. in Marc.* 1 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 338, 15).

⁹ *In Hierem.*, v, 14, 3; *in Ezech.*, vii, p. 269.

¹⁰ *In Eph.*, iii, p. 562.

¹¹ Cf. p. 78, n. 13. *supra*.

¹² ii, 6.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 57-58.

turesque ones of a more modern *materia medica*.¹ The abuse of poisonous drugs intended by medicine for curative purposes is compared by Jerome² to the abuse of the Law.

I am, of course, aware that the passages thus far cited may be paralleled in other writers, and that the figurative use made by Jerome of these different medical features may seldom be original, yet the great abundance of such allusions in a non-medical writer seems worthy of comment, and an attempt to account for them not unreasonable.

In the first place it is clear that Jerome had himself read more or less in medical books. For not only are vague references to such made,³ but on the subject of animal and vegetable remedies he invites⁴ the reader to consult the works of Aristotle, Theophrastus, Marcellus Sidetes (author of a work called *ιατρικά*), and 'our Flavius';⁵ also Pliny, Dioscorides, and others, both scientists⁶ and medical writers. Yet these are not his medical favorites, for it is to Hippocrates as the type of the physician that he likens Christian healers.⁷ The oath which Hippocrates exacted from his pupils,⁸ his allopathic principles,⁹ and his physical theories,¹⁰ are known to Jerome,

¹ For other remedies see also *Comm. in Zach.*, iii, p. 932.

² *Ep.*, 121, 8 (p. 871 Vall.). For poisons given for medicinal purposes we should perhaps compare *adv. Ruf.*, i, 1, but the text is as yet too uncertain to allow its use as evidence.

³ *Tract. in Ps.* 15 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, iii, 22, 13 ff.): *Nam quantum in memoria mea est, nec apud philosophorum quempiam nec apud rhetorum, nec apud poetas, nec apud quidem medicos, qui naturae corporum scientiam repromittunt, umquam legisse me novi, renes pro intellectibus et profunda cogitatione positos.* Cf. *adv. Iovin.*, ii, 6: *omnes medicorum declarant libri; quos si legeris, videbis, etc.*

⁴ *Adv. Iovin.*, ii, 6.

⁵ On whom see Harnack, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

⁶ *Physicos.*

⁷ *C. Ioan. Hier.*, 38: *quasi spiritualis Hippocrates*; in the same work, ch. 39, Isidorus is called 'the Hippocrates of the Christians.' His name is also used as a type of the physician in *Ep.*, 125, 16.

⁸ *Ep.*, 52, 15, 2.

⁹ *Ep.*, 121, *praef.*: *iuxta Hippocratem, contrariorum contraria esse remedia*; probably cited, as Lübeck, *Hieronymus quos noverit scriptores et ex quibus hauserit*, p. 103, thinks, from Galen. Cf. the figurative use made of this same doctrine in *Sen., Dial.*, xii, 2, 2.

¹⁰ *In Ezech.*, i, p. 11.

and a long extract from his *Aphorisms* is given in the tractate *Against Iovinian*,¹ though, as Lübeck recognizes,² through the medium of Galen, of whose προτρεπτικός λόγος ἐπὶ τὰς τέχνας (*Exhortatio medicinae*),³ περὶ διαγνώσεως καὶ θεραπείας,⁴ περὶ κρίσιμων ἡμερῶν,⁵ Ἱπποκράτους ἀφορισμοὶ καὶ Γαλήνου εἰς αὐτοὺς ὑπομνήματα,⁶ πρὸς Θρασύβουλον,⁷ περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀπλῶν φαρμάκων κράσεως καὶ δυνάμεως,⁸ and ὑγιεινῶν λόγοι,⁹ he makes direct and very important use. The passages in Galen which have been collected by Lübeck,¹⁰ need not here detain us.

Doubtless from such sources as these he had derived his information that medicine is divided into three parts: δόγμα, μέθοδος, ἐμπειρία.¹¹ Whatever may be the theories,¹² the empirical side of medicine is of value, — *non spernendam esse medicinam quae usu constet et experimento: quia et hanc fecerit Deus*.¹³ Items of physiological¹⁴ and psycho-

¹ ii, 11.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 99. Another reference, not noted by Lübeck, is perhaps to be seen in *Ep.*, 84, 7, 5: *aiunt et medici grandes morbos non esse curandos, sed dimittendos naturae, ne medella languorem exasperet*, with which compare the rather similar view attributed by Augustine (*C. D.*, xxii, 8, p. 600, 15 Hoffmann) to Hippocrates.

³ *Adv. Iovin.*, ii, 11.

⁴ *Ep.*, 102, 2, 1.

⁵ *In Amos*, ii, p. 283.

⁶ *Adv. Iovin.*, ii, 11.

⁷ *Ep.*, 52, 11, 4. The quotation is here of a verse from Attic comedy (Kock, III, p. 613, fr. 1234), but Jerome's direct use of Attic comedy is very slight (see Lübeck, pp. 18-19), so that Lübeck is doubtless right (p. 103, n. 1) in here finding Jerome's source in Galen.

⁸ *Adv. Iovin.*, ii, 6.

⁹ *Ep.*, 54, 9, 4; 121, *praef.* (cf. p. 81, n. 9, *supra*).

¹⁰ Pp. 100-104.

¹¹ *Adv. Pelag.*, i, 21. Cf. the translation by Rufinus of Origen, in *Ep. ad Rom.*, v, 4: *ille dicitur medicus qui usum ac studium ac disciplinam habet medendi*. And cf. n. 13, *infra*.

¹² The comparative uselessness of mere theoretical knowledge of medicine is expressed by Origen, in a work translated by Jerome himself, *Hom. in Luc.* 1 (Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, XXVI, pp. 222 C-223 A): *Scientia geometriae finem habet ipsam tantum scientiam atque doctrinam. Alia vero scientia est, cuius finis opus exigit: velut in medicina oportet me rationem et dogmata scire medicinae, non ut tantummodo noverim quid debeam facere, sed ut faciam, id est, ut secum vulnera, victum moderatum castigatumque disponam, etc. . . . Quae si quis tantum scierit, et non opere fuerit subsecutus, cassa erit eius scientia*.

¹³ *In Is.*, xi, p. 475.

¹⁴ For example the passage on the physiology of the digestion (in *Matt.*, ii, p. 114), and that on the symptoms of pregnancy (*Ep.*, 98, 19, 2).

logical¹ knowledge at times crop out, and in general his attitude towards medicine and cures is a fairly scientific one.² A prominent exception must be made in regard to the miraculous cures ascribed to Hilarion in his life of that saint,³ but the nature and probable purpose of that biography are, of course, decidedly different from those of most of his other writings.⁴

A second important factor in his interest in medicine is, I believe, to be found in his personal experiences and those of his friends. His own life seems to have been one of much illness, though aside from several references to troubles with his eyes,⁵ brought on, as he says, by excessive reading,⁶ he is in most cases not very definite as to its causes or nature. In 373 he writes⁷ of his journey through Thrace, Pontus, Bithynia, Galatia (or Cappadocia), and Cilicia, amid great heat, finally ending in Syria, where, he says, "I suffered all the diseases that there could be."⁸ In the sixth letter,⁹ written between 374 and 379, he mentions "uninterrupted sickness, both of body and soul;" in 386-387¹⁰ on account of weakness of his eyes and of his whole body he cannot write with his own hand; later, in 398,¹¹ by reason of long continued illness he has been prevented from the writing of a commentary requested by a friend; in 406,¹² after a very severe illness, he is again unable to endure the toil of writing with his own hand; and,

¹ *Tract. in Ps. 15* (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, iii, 22, 13-17), on the seat of intelligence; also *Tract. in Is. 1* (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, iii, 102, 5 ff.); in *Ezech.*, vii, p. 245: *naturale est enim ut timore cogente vesica laxetur.*

² Yet physicians labor in vain without the aid of the Lord (*in Is.*, viii, p. 352), and recovery is assisted by the prayers of friends (*in Is.*, xiv, *prol.*).

³ Ch. 13 ff.

⁴ Cf. Reitzenstein, *Hellenistische Wundererzählungen*, pp. 80-83.

⁵ *Ep.*, 21, 42; in *Gal.*, iii, p. 485.

⁶ *Prol.* to translation of Origen's *Homilies on Jeremiah* (Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, XXV, p. 584), written, according to Grützmacher, *Hieronymus*, as early as 379-381. Grützmacher's table of dates (Vol. I, pp. 99-102) I have followed in this part of my discussion.

⁷ *Ep.*, 3, 3, 1; cf. 3, 1, 2; 3, 2, 3; 4, 1, 2; 4, 2, 2. Pronberger, *Beiträge zur Chronologie des hl. Hier.* (Amberg, 1913), dates *Ep.* 3 and 4 in 374.

⁸ *Quicquid morborum esse poterat expertus.*

⁹ 6, 1, 2. Pronberger, *op. cit.*, dates this letter in 375.

¹⁰ In *Gal.*, iii, p. 485.

¹¹ In *Matth.*, *prol.*, p. 8.

¹² In *Amos*, iii, *prol.*, pp. 309-310.

finally, in the *Commentary on Isaiah* ¹ he tells of his recovery from an illness, aided by the prayers of Eustochium.² Such a series of references, extending over many years, will make one realize that physical weakness and pain was for Jerome a very vivid experience,³ and will, I believe, help much in accounting for the medical bent of his mind. It is interesting to note that Jerome himself, in a somewhat similar way, seeks to explain⁴ certain references to physical weakness by St. Paul, by supposing an illness of Paul at his first coming among the Galatians, mentioning a tradition that Paul frequently suffered from severe headache. Doubtless the sicknesses and deaths of his friends, of whose *epitaphia* the *Letters* contain so noteworthy a series,⁵ also contributed something to these experiences of Jerome.

A final and very important factor in accounting for these references is that which I have already mentioned, namely, the inheritance, from various sources,⁶ but probably especially from Origen,⁷ of certain traditional medical similes and metaphors. The subject in its earlier aspects has been so skilfully handled by Harnack ⁸ that further treatment is unnecessary; one comparison, however, which seems not without interest, I may be allowed to suggest.

If one examine a large bulk of Greek and Latin literature, from its earliest period onward, he will be likely to notice the very natural

¹ xiv, *prol.*, dated by Grützmacher before 398.

² A reference to illness which prevented his preaching is found in the *Tract. in Ps.* 7 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 17, 16), of uncertain date.

³ *Si non aliquis aegrotat, nescit quantum valet sanitas*, says Jerome (*Tract. in Ps.* 136 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 262, 22)).

⁴ *In Gal.*, ii, p. 460.

⁵ 23 (on Lea), 24 (Asella), 39 (Blesilla), 60 (Nepotianus), 66 (Paulina), 75 (Lucinus), 77 (Fabiola), 108 (Paula), 127 (Marcella).

⁶ A striking passage from Cyprian (*De Lapsis*, 14, quoted by Harnack, pp. 137-138), an author not infrequently mentioned by Jerome with great respect, contains many points of likeness to some of the passages which we have discussed. It should be noted that Jerome's medical figures in their precise form are, in large measure, not taken from the healing miracles of Christ or from the New Testament at all, but are traceable to classical or patristic sources.

⁷ A more thorough examination of Origen than I have made would probably reveal, in a much more striking manner, the dependence of certain of Jerome's figures upon him and upon earlier writers through him.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, especially pp. 129 ff.

frequency of figures of speech drawn from the life and activities of the principal trades and professions, such as those of the general, the farmer, the sailor, and (despite the low esteem in which he was early held at Rome), the physician. References to the mariner are in Jerome very frequent and have received insufficient notice;¹ they concern themselves chiefly with storm and shipwreck,² and the safe arrival in port,³ with some on other features of the life of the sea.⁴ May not Jerome's own journeys, in an age when any voyage was likely to be uncomfortable if not perilous, have stimulated his interest in such figures which were already well established as recognized literary ornaments? Yet here also, as in the matter of medical figures, we may seek, not perhaps for models, but for suggestions, in the New Testament, the forms of thought of which so pervade all Jerome's works. As various incidents in the life of Jesus readily and inseparably associated themselves with the art of healing, so not a few others — and some striking ones among them — were closely connected with the life, activities, and perils of those who go down to the sea in ships. Of St. Paul's allusions to shipwreck it is hardly necessary to speak.⁵ A study of the various metaphors and similes connected with the

¹ Harendza, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-35.

² *Ep.*, i, 2, 2 (an elaborate account); 14, 6, 2-3; 22, 38, 1; 57, 12, 2; 77, 6, 1; 108, 27, 1; 123, 16; 125, 2; 127, 11; *adv. Iovin.*, i, 36; *c. Ioan. Hier.*, 30, 37; *adv. Ruf.*, ii, 15; *adv. Pelag.*, i, 12; iii, 11; *in Eccl.*, pp. 393, 419; *in Is.*, vi, pp. 245, 246; vii, p. 285; xiii, p. 561; xiv, pp. 577-578; *in Ezech.*, viii, p. 308; xi, p. 456; xii, p. 499; xiv, p. 602; *in Amos*, i, p. 224; *in Ionam*, pp. 396-397; *in Naum*, p. 549; *in Malach.*, p. 967; *in Gal.*, i, p. 375; *in Eph.*, ii, p. 617; *in Tit.*, p. 716; *Tract. in Ps.* 93 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 132, 23); *in Ps.* 92 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, iii, 79, 26 f.). See n. 4, *infra*. For the phrase *in portu naufragium* cf. Otto, *Sprichwörter*, p. 284. The proverb *post naufragium tabula* is a favorite: *Ep.*, 84, 6, 3; 117, 3, 2 (cf. 122, 4); 130, 9 (cf. 147, 3); *in Is.*, ii, p. 56; cf. *in Hierem.*, iii, 60, 3; iv, 32, 3; *in Ezech.*, v, p. 183; *Tract. in Ps.* 95 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 134, 10); *in Ps.* 95 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, iii, 87, 14), and Tertullian's phrase (*De Poenit.*, 12): *planca post naufragium*.

³ *Ep.*, i, 2, 2; 2, 1, 4; 3, 3, 1; 43, 3, 1; *in Osee*, iii, *prol.*, pp. 109-110; *in Mich.*, i, p. 443.

⁴ *Ep.*, 3, 2, 3; 10, 3, 3; 14, 10, 1; 15, 2, 2; 53, 11, 2; 64, 22, 2; 82, 1, 2; 117, 3, 3; 123, 3; 123, 14; 125, 3; 128, 3; *in Is.*, vii, p. 285; xiii, pp. 534-535. Some of the examples in this note and in n. 2, *supra* might well be subdivided to illustrate certain proverbial forms.

⁵ Yet cf. p. 84, n. 6, *supra*.

sea and its life in early Christian literature, from the time of the Gospels, showing the application of those figures to the vicissitudes of moral and religious experience, would be not without interest.

In any event, it appears to me certain that Jerome found these two groups of figures, each well established in classical literature, approved by Gospel example, and made vivid by personal experience, and each in itself involving crises and contrasts of storm and calm, especially significant for the description and illustration of spiritual truths.¹

¹ Other medical allusions not hitherto noted are the following: *Ep.*, i, 14; 3, 5, 1; 60, 15, 1; 77, 5, 1-2; 98, 23, 2, and 98, 24, 1-3 (in the letter of Theophilus); 118, 1, 3; 119, 10, 2; 122, 1; 125, 14; *adv. Ruf.*, i, 18; ii, 4; *in Eccl.*, pp. 444, 445; *in Is.*, i, p. 14; *in Hierem.*, ii, 31, 1; ii, 55, 2; iii, 50; vi, 7, 7; *in Ezech.*, v, p. 171; x, p. 397; xii, p. 492; *in Dan.*, p. 676; *in Osee*, pp. 42, 129; *in Mich.*, ii, p. 525; *in Gal.*, *prol.*, pp. 367-368; iii, p. 519; *Tract. in Ps.* 1 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 7, 1); *in Ps.* 15 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, iii, 27, 7); *in Ps.* 93 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, iii, 85, 15); *in Ps.* 96 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, iii, 92, 10); *in Ps.* 108 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 187, 9); *in Ps.* 133 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 257, 10); *in Ps.*, 136 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, ii, 263, 7); *Tract. in Is.* 1 (*Anecd. Mared.*, III, iii, 100, 21).

MEDIAEVAL VERSIONS OF THE POSTERIOR ANALYTICS

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IN the intellectual history of the Middle Ages one of the most fundamental facts is the persistent and pervasive influence of the writings of Aristotle. Always considerable, this influence grew and spread as new groups of the master's works became available to the scholars of western Europe, and it can be measured and defined only as we can ascertain accurately the date, the character, and the diffusion of the different Latin versions of each portion of the Aristotelian *corpus*. In a general way it is well understood that the *Categories* and the *De interpretatione* were accessible throughout the Middle Ages in the translations of Boethius; that the other logical works were quite unknown to the earlier period and came to be used only in the second quarter of the twelfth century, whence they were called the *New Logic*; that the *Physics*, *Metaphysics*, and *Parva Naturalia* reached the West about 1200; and that the *Rhetoric*, *Ethics*, and *Politics* make their appearance in the course of the next two generations.¹ There are, however, many obscure and doubtful points in this process, and the doubt and obscurity are greatest with reference to the period of the twelfth century. Thus we know nothing of the channels by which the *Metaphysics* suddenly reached Paris at the beginning of the thirteenth century, and we are ignorant of the date and authorship of the two versions, one from the Greek and one from the Arabic, through which it was thereafter known. With regard to the *Physics*, it is

¹ See in general Jourdain, *Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote*² (Paris, 1843); and on the translations from the Arabic especially Steinschneider, *Die europäischen Uebersetzungen aus dem Arabischen*, in Vienna *Sitzungsberichte* (1904-05), phil-hist. Klasse, CXLIX, iv, CLI, i. On the general aspects of the movement see Sandys, *History of Classical Scholarship*², I, especially pp. 527, 567-569, 587 f.; and for the best summary of the present state of our knowledge, Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant*² (Louvain, 1911), pp. 9-15. "La storia dell' aristotelismo è ancora da farsi," says Marchesi, *L'Etica Nicomachea nella tradizione latina medievale* (Messina, 1904), p. 1.

still necessary, not only to determine the exact time when the version from the Arabic reached Latin Europe,¹ but also to investigate the problem of possible earlier translations from the Greek. An incomplete copy in the Vatican which cannot be later than the very beginning of the thirteenth century establishes the existence of a version of the *De physico auditu* made from the Greek but differing from the Greco-Latin version later current,² and reasons have been advanced

¹ In the translation of Gerard of Cremona; cf. the text in MS. Lat. VI, 37 of St. Mark's (Valentinelli, *Bibliotheca Manuscripta*, V, 9): secundum translationem Gerardi. On the dates when these treatises reached Paris, see *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, XX, 86; Mandonnet, *loc. cit.*, pp. 13-15. It is dangerous to use catalogues of manuscripts as evidence of such dates. Thus MS. 221 of Avranches, containing the *Physics*, which is ascribed by Delisle to the twelfth century, is more probably of the thirteenth, as is clearly MS. 428 of the Biblioteca Antoniana at Padua. So MS. 421 of the Antoniana, containing the *Metaphysics* and likewise placed in the twelfth century by the printed catalogues, is clearly of the fourteenth. A copy of the *Meteorologica* in the Laurentian (MS. Strozzi 22), also attributed to the twelfth century, is plainly of the thirteenth. For similar mistakes with respect to manuscripts of the *New Logic*, see below, p. 96, n. 3.

² MS. Regina 1885, ff. 89-94 v; cf. *Harvard Studies*, XXIII, 164. Although my former attribution of this MS. to the twelfth century was confirmed by excellent palaeographical authority, further examination shows that it cannot with certainty be placed earlier than the opening years of the thirteenth century. I have found no other copy of this version, which begins as follows: *Aristotilis physice acroaseos*. A. Quoniam agnoscere et scire circa methodos omnes accidit quarum sunt principia vel causę vel elementa, ex eorum cognitione tunc enim unumquodque cognoscere putabimur cum causas agnoverimus primas et principia prima et usque ad elementa; palam quia et de natura scientię temptandum est diffinire primum quę circa principia sunt. Apta vero a notioribus nobis via et manifestioribus ad manifestiora natura et notiora. Non enim eadem nobis nota et simpliciter. Ideoque hoc modo procedere et necesse de inmanifestioribus quidem natura nobis vero manifestioribus ad manifestiora natura et notiora. Sunt autem nobis primum aperta et manifesta confusa magis, posterius autem ex his fiunt nota elementa et principia dividunt ea. Quapropter ab universalibus ad singularia oportet progredi. . . . Ergo quia sunt principia et que et quot numero determinatum sit nobis ita. Rursum aliud incoantes principium dicimus. *Aristotilis physice acroaseos*. A. *explicit*. Book II begins as follows on f. 94, but breaks off abruptly on the verso: Entium alia quidem sunt natura alia causas propter alias. Natura vero dicimus esse animalia et eorum partes atque plantas ac alia corporum ut terram ignem et aerem atque aquam; hæc enim et similia natura dicimus esse. . . . For specimens of the current translations from the Greek and the Arabic, see Jourdain, pp. 405-407. The version of MS. Reg. 1885 is probably of south-Italian or Sicilian

for thinking that the treatise was known, at least indirectly, to the school of Chartres half a century earlier.¹ Certainly the current rendering of the fourth book of the *Meteorologica* was made from the Greek by Henricus Aristippus in Sicily before 1162;² there is evidence that the Greek text of the *De caelo* was known there in the same period;³ and further research may quite possibly carry back other works of which versions from the Greek are known in manuscripts of the thirteenth century.⁴

The place of the *New Logic* in the thought of the twelfth century is better known, but there are intricate and perplexing problems connected with it, and fresh evidence is much needed. The history of the *Posterior Analytics* offers the greatest difficulty, yet it cannot be considered apart from the other members of this group of treatises, and any new light which may be shed upon it will make correspondingly clear some points connected with the *Prior Analytics*, the *Topics*, and the *Elenchi*. Moreover, since it was considered the most advanced and the most difficult of these works, its diffusion and assimilation serve to measure the range and depth of Aristotelian studies throughout the period.

origin, and should perhaps be connected with the occurrence of a Greek MS. of the first book of the *Physics* in the oldest catalogues of the papal library, the Greek part of which collection was probably derived from the library of the Sicilian kings. For the MS. see the catalogue of 1295 in *Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters*, I, p. 41, no. 442; and the catalogue of 1311 in Ehrle, *Historia Bibliothecae Romanorum Pontificum*, I, p. 97, no. 610. For the origin of the Greek MSS. of the papal library see Heiberg, *Les premiers MSS. grecs de la bibliothèque papale*, in *Overview of the Danish Academy*, 1891, pp. 315-318; *id.*, in *Hermes*, XLV, p. 66, XLVI, p. 215; Ehrle, *Nachträge zur Geschichte der drei ältesten päpstlichen Bibliotheken*, in *Festgabe Anton de Waal* (Rome and Freiburg, 1913), pp. 348-351.

¹ Duhem, *Du temps où la scolastique latine a connu la physique d'Aristote*, in *Revue de philosophie* (1909), XV, pp. 163 ff.

² Rose, in *Hermes*, I, p. 385. The explicit statement concerning the authors of the translation of the *Meteorologica* will also be found in MS. 1428, f. 171, and MS. 9726, f. 58 v, of the Biblioteca Nacional at Madrid.

³ *Harvard Studies*, XXI, pp. 82, 99. Cf. Heiberg, in *Hermes*, XLVI, p. 210; Mortet, in *Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Chartes*, LXXIV, p. 364.

⁴ See particularly Baeumker, *Die Stellung des Alfred von Sareshel*, in *Munich Sitzungsberichte*, 1913, no. 9, especially pp. 33 ff., where evidence is given of early translations of the *De anima* and the *Parva naturalia* from the Greek.

The reception of the *New Logic* was the privilege of the generation living between 1121 and 1158.¹ When Abelard wrote his *Dialectic*, ca. 1121, the Latin world knew none of the logical works of Aristotle except the *Categories* and the *De interpretatione*.² In 1132 Adam du Petit-Pont makes use of the *Prior Analytics*, to which his contemporary Gilbert de la Porrée likewise refers his readers. Otto of Freising, a student at Paris ca. 1130 and in close touch with philosophical developments in France and Italy until his death in 1158, became acquainted with all parts of the *New Logic*, which he was the first to introduce into Germany. His master, Thierry of Chartres, who lived until 1155, or shortly before, but taught at Paris for some years before 1141,³ reproduces the whole *Organum*, save only the *Posterior Analytics* and the second book of the *Priora*; while the *Posteriora*, cited in Sicily in the same period, comes to its own in the north in the analysis given by Thierry's pupil John of Salisbury in his *Metalogicus* in 1159. The later emergence of the *Posterior Analytics* does not necessarily indicate a reception distinct from the allied works, but is rather to be explained by its difficulty, *paucis ingeniis pervia*, and the corruption of the Latin text;⁴ and it is altogether likely that the arrival of the *New*

¹ On these questions see Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*², II, pp. 98 ff.; Grabmann, *Geschichte der scholastischen Methode* (Freiburg, 1909-11), I, pp. 149-151, II, pp. 66-81; Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant*², pp. 9 f.; Schmidlin, *Die Philosophie Ottos von Freising*, in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* (1905), XVIII, pp. 160-175; Hofmeister, *Studien zu Otto von Freising*, in *Neues Archiv* (1911), XXXVII, especially pp. 654-681; Webb, *Ioannis Saresberiensis Policraticus*, I, pp. xxiii-xxvii.

² Aristotelis enim duos tantum, predicamentorum scilicet et Periermenias, libros usus adhuc Latinorum cognovit. Cousin, *Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard*, p. 228. There is, however, a citation of the *Prior Analytics* on p. 305, which doubtless represents a later addition to the original form of the work. The history of the *Analytics* in the earlier Middle Ages might appear in a new light if we could explain a passage in John the Scot which cites the *Analytics* where the *Metaphysics* is probably meant. Rand, *Johannes Scottus* (Munich, 1906), pp. 6, 42.

³ I agree with Hofmeister in denying the force of the argument of Clerval (*Les écoles de Chartres*, p. 245) for dating the *Heptateuchon* of Thierry before 1141.

⁴ John of Salisbury, *Metalogicus*, 4, 6, in Migne, *Patrologia*, CXCIX, col. 919: Posteriorum vero Analyticorum subtilis quidem scientia est et paucis ingeniis pervia, quod quidem ex causis pluribus evenire perspicuum est. Continet enim artem demonstrandi, que pre ceteris rationibus disserendi ardua est. Deinde hec utentium raritate iam fere in desuetudinem abiit, eo quod demonstrationis usus vix apud solos mathematicos est, et in his fere apud geometras duntaxat; sed et

Logic is to be placed in the earlier, rather than in the later, years of the period with which we are dealing. In any case its sudden appearance in the logical and philosophical literature of the second quarter of the twelfth century should be brought into relation to a much-discussed notice of the year 1128. Under that year we read in the chronicle of Robert of Torigni, abbot of Mont-Saint-Michel: ¹

Iacobus clericus de Venecia transtulit de greco in latinum quosdam libros Aristotilis et commentatus est. scilicet Topica, Analyticos Priores et Posteriores, et Elencos, quamvis antiquior translatio super eosdem libros haberetur.

This entry is not found in the earliest redaction of the chronicle, completed in 1156-57, but appears in the redactions of 1169 and 1182, for the latter of which we have the author's own copy, and there can be no doubt that it emanated from Robert himself, who was by no means ignorant of what went on in Italy and who on more than one occasion takes the opportunity of mentioning significant facts of literary history.² Although the entry is not strictly contemporary, it is by a well-informed contemporary writer, and while the date may not be absolutely exact, it falls within a few years of the only other known reference to James of Venice, which mentions him at Constantinople in 1136.³ In the passage of Robert two important points stand

huius quoque discipline non est celebris usus apud nos, nisi forte in tractu Ibero vel confinio Africe. Etenim gentes iste astronomie causa geometriam exercent pre ceteris, similiter Egyptus et nonnullae gentes Arabie. Ad hec liber quo demonstrativa traditur disciplina ceteris longe turbatior est, et transpositione sermonum traiectione litterarum desuetudine exemplorum que a diversis disciplinis mutuata sunt. Et postremo, quod non attingit auctorem, adeo scriptorum depravatus est vitio ut fere quot capita tot obstacula habeat, et bene quidem ubi non sunt obstacula capitibus plura. Unde a plerisque in interpretem difficultatis culpa refunditur, asserentibus librum ad nos non recte translatum pervenisse.

¹ Ed. Delisle, Société de l'Histoire de Normandie, I, p. 177; also in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores*, VI, p. 489.

² See the well-informed notices of Gratian (I, p. 183), Master Vacarius (I, p. 250), Burgundio of Pisa (I, p. 270; II, p. 109), and Gilbert de la Porrée (I, p. 288).

³ Anselm of Havelberg, *Dialogi*, 2, 1, in d'Achery, *Spicilegium* (Paris, 1723), I, p. 172 (= Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, CLXXXVIII, col. 1163): Aderant quoque non pauci Latini, inter quos fuerunt tres viri sapientes in utraque lingua periti et litterarum doctissimi, Iacobus nomine Veneticus natione, Burgundio nomine Pisanus natione, tertius inter alios precipue grecarum et latinarum litterarum doctrina apud utramque gentem clarissimus Moyses nomine Italus natione ex civitate Per-

out: the existence of an earlier version of the *Topics*, *Analytics*, and *Elenchi*, and the new rendering, with its accompanying commentary. Nothing is said respecting the author of the earlier translation, but in the absence of any other known version it has generally been identified with that of Boethius. We have then to explain the main problem in the Aristotelian tradition of the early Middle Ages, namely why, if these works were translated by Boethius, they remained unknown from the sixth to the twelfth centuries, only to come to light at the very moment when they were also translated by James of Venice. Recently a solution has been sought, first by denying that any such translations were made by Boethius¹ or, at least, that they survived, and then by maintaining that the versions current in the later Middle Ages under his name were really the work of James of Venice, in whose time they first emerge.² James of Venice is himself a riddle. His learning, his knowledge of Greek, and his opportunity of access to Greek texts of Aristotle³ are known to us from Anselm of Havelberg's account of the disputation at Constantinople in 1136,⁴ but he is mentioned by no other chronicler, and no translations have been found

gamo; iste ab universis electus est, ut utrimque fidus esset interpres. On Moses of Bergamo see Haskins, in *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* (1914), XXIII, pp. 133-144. On Burgundio see [Fabroni], *Memorie istoriche di piu uomini illustri Pisani* (Pisa, 1790), I, pp. 71-104; Savigny, *Geschichte des römischen Rechts im Mittelalter*², IV, pp. 394 ff.; Buonamici, *Burgundio Pisano*, in *Annali delle Università Toscane*, XXIV; Ghellinck, *Les oeuvres de Jean de Damas en occident au 12^e siècle*, in *Revue des questions historiques* (1910), LXXXVIII, pp. 140-160; *id.*, *Le mouvement théologique du xii^e siècle* (Paris, 1914), pp. 245 ff.

¹ In view of the explicit statements of Boethius on this point (*In Topica Ciceronis*, Migne, LXIV, coll. 1051, 1052; *De differentiis topicis*, *ib.*, coll. 1173, 1184, 1193, 1216), this denial of authorship (Schmidlin, p. 169; Grabmann, II, p. 71) cannot be taken seriously. Cf. Brandt, *Entstehungszeit und zeitliche Folge der Werke von Boethius*, in *Philologus*, LXII, pp. 250, 261; Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant*², p. 8.

² This attribution to James was suggested by Rose, in *Hermes* (1866), I, pp. 381 f. Schmidlin and Grabmann succeed in convincing themselves that it has really been proved. Hofmeister (*Neues Archiv*, XXXVII, pp. 657, 659, 663) is more cautious on this point, while denying positively the Boethian authorship of the current version.

³ On Aristotelian studies at Constantinople in the eleventh and twelfth centuries see Grabmann, II, pp. 74 f., and the literature there cited.

⁴ *Supra*, p. 91, n. 3.

in his name. With the field thus free for conjecture, some have cast doubt upon the statement of Robert of Torigni,¹ while others have made of James the chief intermediary in the transmission of the *New Logic* to Latin Europe. Neither of these views seems to me a sound interpretation of existing evidence, and both are invalidated by a new source of information.

In the library of the chapter of Toledo there is preserved a manuscript of the thirteenth century² containing three translations of the *Posterior Analytics* and a version of the commentary of Themistius. One of the translations is the mediaeval version from the Greek commonly attributed to Boethius, another the ordinary version from the Arabic. The third³ contains a text which I have not succeeded in finding elsewhere, accompanied by a preface of exceptional interest:

[V]allatum multis occupationibus me dilectio vestra compulit ut Posteriores Analecticos Aristotelis de greco in latinum transferrem. Quod eo

¹ So Jourdain, p. 59.

² MS. 17-14, containing seventy-seven folii in different hands of the thirteenth century. The title of the volume at the top of f. 1 has been cut off. The MS. begins with the preface to the unknown translation discussed in this article, this translation ending on f. 11 v. Ff. 13-28 v have *Translatio Posteriorum Analyticorum Aristotelis* [secundum] with a letter effaced, *i. e.*, the version current under the name of Boethius. F. 29, *Translatio Posteriorum Analyticorum Aristotelis secundum Thom.* Omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina cogitativa non fit nisi ex cognitione . . . (= the ordinary version from the Arabic; see Jourdain, p. 404). F. 54, *Explicit liber Posteriorum Analyticorum Aristotelis secundum translationem Th.* Incipit commentum Themistii super eandem translationem *Posteriorum Analyticorum*. Scio quod si intendo . . . (Jourdain, p. 405; see below, p. 102). The treatise breaks off abruptly at the bottom of f. 77 v.

MS. 17-14 is not described by José Octavio de Toledo, *Catálogo de la librería del cabildo toledano*, supplement to *Revista de Archivos*, VIII and IX, and separately, Madrid, 1903. This catalogue, made in the library at the time of the revolution of 1869, has been printed without verification or completion and without any indication of the important MSS. at that time transferred to the Biblioteca Nacional at Madrid, where they still are. I examined MS. 17-14 at Toledo during the hour when the library was open May 2 and 14, 1913, but repeated efforts of friends to secure collations on the spot have been met with the statement that the MS. has been misplaced and can no longer be found. It will doubtless appear in due time, when the problems left open can be determined by certain collations, but this uncertain prospect does not seem to justify further delay in printing the conclusions which have been reached upon the basis of the accessible material.

³ F. 1.

affectuosius aggressus sum quod cognoscebam librum illum multos in se sciencie fructus continere et certum erat noticiam eius nostris temporibus latinis non patere. Nam translatio Boecii apud nos integra non invenitur, et id ipsum quod de ea reperitur vitio corruptionis obfuscatur. Translationem vero Iacobi obscuritatis tenebris involvi silentio suo peribent Francie magistri, qui quamvis illam translationem et commentarios ab eodem Iacobo translatos¹ habeant, tamen noticiam illius libri non audent profiteri. Eapropter siquid utilitatis ex mea translatione sibi noverit latinitas provenire, postulationi vestre debebit imputare. Non enim spe lucri aut inanis glorie ad transferendum accessi, sed ut aliquid² conferens latinitati vestre morem gererem voluntati. Ceterum si in aliquo visus fuero rationis tramitem excessisse, vestra vel aliorum doctorum ammonitione non erubescam emendare.

Here at last is a new bit of evidence regarding James of Venice: his translation included both the *Posterior Analytics* and commentaries thereon; it has reached the centres of learning in France, but, apparently because they have not conquered its difficulties, the masters make no public use of it. This disposes at once of the theory that the version of James is apocryphal, while it also makes clear that this version was not the basis of the revival of the *Analytics*, and also renders it unlikely that it passed into general use and can thus be identified with the current translation. Robert of Torigni is also confirmed at another point, namely in his assertion, which some have sought to explain away,³ that there was an older version already in existence. This our preface ascribes to Boethius, thus adding one more to the number of those who in the twelfth century accepted this attribution.⁴ An explanation is also suggested why the Boethian translation came but slowly into use: it is incomplete, and the text is corrupt. This agrees exactly with John of Salisbury, who says of the current version, *adeo scriptorum depravatus est vitio ut fere quot capita tot obstacula habeat, et bene quidem ubi non sunt obstacula capitibus plura*;⁵ and the statement is amply confirmed by existing manuscripts, where to take only the instances where a Greek word was left standing in the Latin, we find in some cases merely *grecum*, while in others the word has become hopelessly corrupt.⁶ Thus in 1, 2 (Bekker, p. 71, l. 18), where

¹ So corrected in margin from *translationem*. ² Or *aliud*? MS. a'd.

³ Schaarschmidt, *Johannes Saresberiensis*, p. 122; Hofmeister, in *Neues Archiv*, XXXVII, pp. 658 f.

⁴ See below, p. 95.

⁵ *Metaphysicus*, 4, 6, supra, p. 90, n. 4.

⁶ MS. Avranches 227 commonly has *grecum* in the passages cited in the text.

ἐπιστημονικόν was carried over and explained as *facientem scire*, we find in MS. R. 55 sup. of the Ambrosian (f. 194) *grecum* corrected to *apiteticon* in the first instance and in the second instance *ginitopikoli*, while MS. H. IX, 2 of Siena (f. 130 v) has what seems intended for *epinuorikon*. In 1, 4 (Bekker, p. 73, l. 40) *ισόπλευρον καὶ ἑτερόμηκες* becomes in the Siena MS. (f. 132 v) *jjodniyipor* quod est equilaterum *kHedorinke* id est altera parte longius; in the Ambrosian (f. 195 v) *gyodtinkipo* quod est isopleros equilaterum *gkθuθcdeli*; in MS. VIII, 168 of St. Mark's (f. 94), *iodnapor* and *kaisodeorrylie*. In 1, 5 (Bekker, p. 74, l. 27) *ισόπλευρον* becomes *iodHaaqoH* and *kaiodpaapor* in the Siena MS. (ff. 133 v, 134), and *ortoniegobon* in the Ambrosian (f. 196 v), while *σκαληνές* is represented respectively by *kokaajyon* and *okaanor*. In 1, 7, the Greek text reads (Bekker, p. 75, l. 15): *οἷον τὰ ὀπτικά πρὸς γεωμετρίαν καὶ τὰ ἁρμονικά πρὸς ἀριθμητικὴν*. This becomes in the Siena MS. (f. 135): ut *onti kay* perspectiva ad geometriam *kaaita apiHoyka* id est consonativa ad arimeticam. The Ambrosian MS. (f. 197 v) has *kagroapinopika*; MS. 557 of the Biblioteca Antoniana at Padua has *Rait^a apruopil'ia*.

The existence of these passages does not, of course, prove that the translation in which they occur was the work of Boethius, but the whole trend of the available evidence seems to me to lead to that conclusion. Boethius tells us specifically that he translated both *Analytics* as well as the *Topics*.¹ These, however, pass out of use in the early Middle Ages, and as late as the time of Sigibert of Gembloux, who died in 1112, he is known as the translator of the *Categories* and the *De interpretatione* only.² Then comes the revival of the *New Logic* in the second quarter of the twelfth century, and at once men begin to ascribe its Latin form to Boethius. Our translator is clear on this point; Otto of Freising evidently held the same view;³ the anonymous poet on the seven liberal arts in an Alençon manuscript is quite explicit.⁴ It is certainly significant that the generation which first possessed the *New Logic* considered Boethius to have been its trans-

¹ In *Topica Ciceronis*, Migne, LXIV, col. 1051; *De differentiis topicis*, *ib.*, col. 1184. See above, p. 92, n. 1.

² Migne, CLX, col. 555.

³ *Chronicon*, 5, 1 (ed. Hofmeister, p. 230).

⁴ MS. 10, in Ravaissou, *Rapports sur les bibliothèques de l'Ouest* (Paris, 1841), p. 406: *Transtulit hanc resolvendo binis analeticis*. Cf. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik*², II, p. 105; Hofmeister, in *Neues Archiv*, XXXVII, p. 672.

lator. Moreover, when writers of this period quote passages from Aristotle they use the current version which in later manuscripts is regularly attributed to Boethius. This is notably true of Otto of Freising¹ and of John of Salisbury.² While in these cases the Latin text is not cited as being the work of Boethius, neither is it ascribed to any one else, and in the absence of twelfth-century manuscripts of the *New Logic*³ further evidence is not at hand. While later copies frequently mentioned Boethius as the translator, none refer to James of Venice, who after the three contemporary notices which have been cited disappears — *obscuritatis tenebris involvitur*. We know furthermore that the current version cannot be that of our anonymous translator, which is quite different, nor can it be the *nova translatio* cited by John of Salisbury,⁴ who distinguishes the two. Until some definite evidence is produced to the contrary, we are justified in regarding the current mediaeval version as the work of Boethius.⁵

It has indeed been urged by Grabmann⁶ that Boethius could not have been the author of the translation of the *New Logic* because its

¹ This is shown by Schmidlin, pp. 172-175, by means of a collation of MSS. Thierry of Chartres seems to use a different version of the *Prior Analytics*: Webb, *Ioannis Saresberiensis Policraticus*, I, p. xxv.

² Jourdain, pp. 254-256.

³ Assertions of the catalogues to the contrary are without foundation in the case of Cod. Lat. Monacensis 16123 and MS. 401 of the Biblioteca Antoniana, both of which are of the fourteenth century. I have verified Grabmann's statement (II, p. 78) that there are in Paris no MSS. of the *New Logic* anterior to the thirteenth century, and have searched in vain for such MSS. elsewhere. For mention of Aristotle in contemporary catalogues of the twelfth century see Manitius, *Geschichte der lateinischen Litteratur des Mittelalters*, I, p. 30; Grabmann, II, p. 78. Except for the occasional occurrence of the translation from the Arabic, the MSS. of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries give regularly the Boethian versions. Delisle is in error in saying that MSS. 224 and 227 of Avranches (*Catalogue des MSS. des départements*, X, pp. 103, 106) contain a different version.

⁴ See below, p. 100.

⁵ The citations of Aristotle by Boethius are too few to serve as a basis for identifying the translation, but it is noteworthy that the definition quoted in the *περὶ Ἑρμηνείας*, 2, 6 (ed. Meiser, II, p. 122), from the beginning of the *Prior Analytics* (Propositio ergo est . . .) corresponds exactly with the current version.

⁶ II, p. 71: Ein Schriftsteller nun, dem solche Qualitäten als Stilisten und Latinisten von berufenster Seite zugesprochen werden, kann doch unmöglich die Latinität, die uns in den Aristoteleszitatzen des Otto von Freising und in den Analytiken, der Logik und der Elenchik der scholastischen Schullogik entgegentritt,

Latinity is unworthy of so accomplished a stylist. The defect of this argument of course lies, apart from the ignorance of Boethius which it betrays, in overlooking the difference between translation and independent composition. Boethius translated like a schoolboy because to him, as to the Middle Ages after him, faithful translation must be absolutely literal (*verbum verbo expressum comparatumque*), its purpose being *non luculentae orationis lepos sed incorrupta veritas*.¹ Hence the much more frequent occurrence of Grecisms in the translations than in his other works. Statistical comparisons, it is true, show stylistic variations among the several Boethian translations, as for example between the *Prior* and the *Posterior Analytics*;² but these do not go so far as to indicate difference of authorship and cannot be safely used when made upon the uncertain basis of the present printed text. In any event a writer who can create a genitive of comparison to render a passage in Aristotle's *Categories*³ cannot be deprived of the version of the *Elenchi* because he sees fit to render *μικρότατον* by *parvissimum*.⁴ If the argument proved anything, it would prove too much, for it would compel us to give up Boethius as a translator.

There remains still the problem why, with the translation of Boethius in existence, the *New Logic* was neglected until the twelfth century, and why it was so suddenly revived.⁵ For an answer we have at present only guesses. One may easily suppose that in an age which had use for only elementary logic, as it had for only the slenderest of

hervorgebracht und sich etwa grammatische Verstösse wie *parvissimum* geleistet haben.

¹ Boethius, *In Isagogen Porphyrii*, 1 (ed. Brandt, p. 135).

² See McKinlay's careful investigation in *Harvard Studies*, XVIII, pp. 123-156.

³ Migne, LXIV, col. 210; cf. McKinlay, p. 125.

⁴ 2, 9, as quoted by Otto of Freising, *Chronicon*, 2, 8 (ed. Hofmeister, p. 76). There is, of course, classical authority (*e. g.*, Lucretius, 1, 615, 621; 3, 199) for the *parvissimum* which shocks Grabmann. The retouching of the mediaeval version in the printed text (Migne, LXIV, col. 1040) is well illustrated in this whole passage.

⁵ There is also the problem as to what became of the Boethian commentaries on these works; cf. Brandt in *Philologus*, LXII, p. 250. Schmidlin (p. 169) uses the absence of such commentaries as an argument against the Boethian authorship of the translations, but similar reasoning might be used against his attribution of the translations to James of Venice, for we are expressly told that the version of James was accompanied by a commentary. See above, p. 94.

lawbooks, the advanced treatises fell into neglect and the manuscript tradition was correspondingly attenuated. In the revival of dialectic in the twelfth century men begin to seek additions to the store of logical writings and they discover the Boethian text. It is incomplete and corrupt, and attempts are made, at least two in number, to provide a better rendering. None of these attempts, however, succeeds in passing into general use, and the old translation, completed and perhaps improved but still in spots unintelligible, becomes the received version upon which mediaeval knowledge of the higher logic depends.

The character of the version of the Toledo manuscript will be clearer when it is seen beside the text of the current, or Boethian, version which is given below in the second column. The first book begins:

Omnis didasalia et omnis disciplina deliberativa¹ ex preexistenti fit cognitione. Manifestum autem hoc contemplantibus in cunctis. Etenim mathematice discipline per hunc modum veniunt et aliarum unaqueque artium. Similiter autem et circa orationes et que per sillogismos et que per inductionem; etenim utraque per precognita faciunt didascaliam, hee quidem accipientes ut ab intellectis, ille autem monstrantes universale per hoc quod manifestum est singulare. Similiter autem et rethorici persuadent, aut enim per exemplum,² quod est inductio, aut per enthymemata, quod est sillogismus. . . .

Book II begins and ends:

Quesita sunt equalia numero quot scimus. Querimus autem quatuor: quod, propter quod, an est, quid est. Etenim quando prius quidem hoc aut hoc querimus in numerum ponentes, sicut utrum deficit sol aut non.

.

Omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina intellectiva ex preexistenti fit cognitione. Manifestum est autem hoc speculantibus in omnes. Mathematice enim scientiarum per hunc modum fiunt et aliarum unaqueque artium. Similiter autem et circa orationes que per sillogismos et que per inductionem fiunt; utraque enim per prius nota faciunt doctrinam, he autem incipientes tanquam a notis, ille vero demonstrantes universale per id quod manifestum est singulare. Similiter autem et rhetorice persuadent, aut enim per exemplum, quod est inductio, aut per entimema, quod vere est sillogismus. . . .

Questiones sunt equales numero his quaecumque vere scimus. Querimus autem quatuor: quod est, propter quod est, si est, quid est. Cum quidem enim utrum hoc aut hoc sit querimus in numerum ponentes, ut utrum sol deficiat aut non, ipsum quod querimus.

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¹ MS. *delibatā*.

² Gloss: *vel exempla*.

Si igitur nullum aliud preter scientiam genus habemus verum, intellectus sit scientie principium, et hoc quidem principium principii sit. Hoc autem omne similiter se habet ad <omnem> rem.

Si igitur nullum aliud genus preter scientiam habemus verum, intellectus utique scientie erit et hoc quidem principium principii utique erit. Hoc autem omne similiter se habet ad omne rerum genus.

Both renderings have the extreme literalness characteristic of mediaeval translations from the Greek, but the Toledo text is distinctly the closer of the two, as seen in the omission of the predicate and the carrying over of such words as *didascalía*. Other characteristics of this version are the use of *autem* instead of *vero* for *ὁτι*, the insertion of a superfluous relative to represent the article in an attributive phrase,¹ and the rendering of the optative with *ἄν* by the subjunctive in cases where Boethius uses *utique* with the future indicative.² Though he had Boethius before him, the author still shows some independence, judged by mediaeval standards; his work is not that of an unskilled hand; and the fact that the preface contains no suggestion of ignorance or inexperience, such as is frequent in such prologues, makes it probable that this was not his first labor of translation.

No clew is given to the name of the translator or the friend to whom his work is dedicated, but the preface must have been written between the appearance of the translation of James of Venice in 1128 and the close of the twelfth century, when a new version had been made from the Arabic by Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187), and when the *Posterior Analytics* had begun to influence the teaching of logic at the University of Paris.³ Moreover, in all probability it is anterior to 1159, when the *Metaphysics* of John of Salisbury shows that the knowledge of the *Posteriora* was already "open to the Latin world," and can thus be placed in the generation which first received the *New Logic*. The author is in touch with the teaching of the French schools, yet he speaks of their masters (*Francie magistri*) in a way which implies that he was not a Frenchman; and his knowledge of Greek and access to the Greek text would imply that, if not an Italian, he was at least for the time being resident in Italy. We know that two of the Italian

¹ Thus τὸδε τὸ ἐν τῷ ἡμικυκλίῳ τρίγωνον (Bekker, p. 71, l. 20) becomes hic qui in semicirculo triangulus.

² Cf. also the translation of the *Almagest*, *Harvard Studies*, XXI, p. 83, n. 3.

³ See below, p. 103.

translators of this period were acquainted with the *Posteriora*, the Pisan Burgundio, whom John of Salisbury cites in the *Metalogicus*¹ as an authority for a statement concerning Aristotle, and the Sicilian Henricus Aristippus, who in the preface to his version of the *Phaedo*, written in 1156, singles out the *Apodiptica* as one of the notable works to which scholars have access in Sicily;² but both of these are excluded from the authorship of the Toledo preface by its style and by the familiarity it betrays with French learning. Aristippus, it is true, has, on the basis of the passage just cited, been set down as a translator of the *Posteriora*, and further conjecture has made him the source of John of Salisbury's acquaintance with this treatise and the author of the *nova translatio* which John cites in a passage of the *Metalogicus*.³ There is, however, no reason for believing that Aristippus translated all the Greek writings which he cites in his prefaces, nor is there the least basis for identifying him with the *grecus interpres* with whom John of Salisbury studied in Apulia and from whom he is, without any warrant, supposed to have obtained the *nova translatio*. John's

¹ 4, 7 (Migne, CXCIX, col. 920): Fuit autem apud Peripateticos tante auctoritatis scientia demonstrandi ut Aristoteles, qui alios fere omnes et fere in omnibus philosophos superabat, hinc commune nomen sibi quodam proprietatis iure vindicaret quod demonstrativam tradiderat disciplinam. Ideo enim, ut aiunt, in ipso nomen philosophi sedit. Si mihi non crèditur, audiat vel Burgundio Pisanus, a quo istud accepi. The passage does not show personal familiarity with the *Posteriora* on the part of Burgundio but merely knowledge of the Byzantine tradition, such as he doubtless acquired in the course of his visits to Constantinople. On Burgundio see the references above, p. 91, n. 3.

² *Hermes*, I, p. 388: Habes de scientiarum principiis Aristotiles Apodicticen, in qua supra naturam et sensum de axiomatis a natura et sensu sumptis disceptat. On Aristippus see Haskins and Lockwood, *The Sicilian Translators of the Twelfth Century and the First Latin Version of Ptolemy's Almagest*, in *Harvard Studies*, XXI, especially pp. 80 f., 86-89, 97.

³ 2, 20 (Migne, col. 885): Gaudeant, inquit Aristoteles (*Anal. Post.*, I, 22, Bekker, p. 83, l. 33), species; monstra enim sunt, vel secundum novam translationem cicadationes enim sunt; aut si sunt, nihil ad rationem. Cf. Rose, in *Hermes*, I, p. 381 ff. The identification of Aristippus with the *grecus interpres* and the author of the *nova translatio* was first advanced by Rose on the basis of an ingenious combination of conjectures. It has been accepted without indicating its conjectural character by Grabmann and Schmidlin, and by Baeumker, in *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie (Die Kultur der Gegenwart)*, I, 5, p. 313; Hofmeister and Mandonnet are more cautious. Webb gives a sober résumé of this *quaestio difficillima*. What is most needed is more facts.

familiarity with the *Posteriora*, which he is one of the first northern authors to cite,¹ may well have been the result of his frequent journeys to Italy, perhaps even of his sojourns in Apulia, but he quotes the "new translation" only once, and his steady reliance is on the current version. When the Toledo manuscript again becomes accessible to scholars, it will be easy to determine whether it contains the rendering of *τεπερίσματα* by *cicadationes* which earmarks the *nova translatio* of the *Metalogicus*. Meanwhile, since in this period we hear of a text of the *Posteriora* in Sicily only, it would seem that the home of the Toledo version should be sought there, while its author's acquaintance with the French schools points to one of the scholars from beyond the Alps who are found not infrequently as visitors to the southern kingdom.

The collation of another passage may very likely determine the relation of the Toledo version to still another translation from the Greek, cited as the work of a certain John by Albertus Magnus, who in one instance prefers it to the Boethian rendering.² The conjecture that the name is an error for James³ is not supported by the manuscripts, and the identification with John of Basingstoke⁴ has to explain the silence of Grosseteste, who, if a translation by his friend Basingstoke had been in existence, would certainly have made use of it in his commentary on the *Logic*. Another John who was concerned with the *Posterior Analytics* is John of Cornwall, under whose name a series of *Questiones* is preserved in a manuscript of Magdalen College, Oxford.⁵ Inasmuch, however, as this work con-

¹ He is usually considered the first, but the *Posteriora* seems to have been used, in a translation which requires investigation, by the author of the *De intellectibus*, which belongs to the school of Abelard. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik*², II, p. 104, n. 19.

² *In Analytica Posteriora*, I, 4, 9; 2, 2, 5; *Opera* (Lyons, 1651), I, pp. 579, 624. See Jourdain, p. 310.

³ Jourdain, p. 59. I have collated MS. Vat. Lat. 2118, f. 140; and MS. Lat. 16080, f. 101 v, of the Bibliothèque Nationale.

⁴ Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik*, III, p. 5.

⁵ MS. 162, ff. 183-245 v; cf. Coxe, *Catalogus*, II, p. 75. The treatise begins and ends: Scire autem opinamur unumquodque cum causam recognoscamus . . . licet alia non cognoscatur nisi tantum in universali. Then follow Tituli questionum Cornubiensis to the number of forty-seven, with this explicit: Expliciunt questiones et tituli tam primi libri quam secundi Posteriorum Anaeticorum dati a domino Johanne de Sancto Germano de Cornubia. Amen.

stantly cites *Lincolniensis*, it cannot be the work of John of Salisbury's contemporary of that name,¹ whose writings moreover betray no familiarity with Greek; and even if we crowd the chronology sufficiently to admit the citation of Grosseteste on the one hand and the use of the *Questiones* by Albert on the other, there is, in such portions of the text as I have been able to examine by means of photographs, no indication that any save the ordinary translation was used in the *Questiones*. For the present we must leave the problem of John's version unsolved.

Likewise of the twelfth century is the first translation of the *Posteriora* from the Arabic, which appears in the long list of works turned into Latin by that indefatigable translator Gerard of Cremona, who died in 1187.² No copy of this translation has been found under Gerard's name,³ but if it acquired anything of the popularity enjoyed by his other versions, we are justified in identifying it with a version which occurs not infrequently in manuscripts of the thirteenth century and is plainly derived from the Arabic.⁴ The list of Gerard's translations also includes the commentary of Themistius on the *Posteriora*, of which we have copies which are clearly based upon an Arabic original.⁵

¹ On whom see Kingsford, in *Dictionary of National Biography*, XXIX, p. 438.

² Boncompagni, *Della vita e delle opere di Gherardo Cremonense traduttore del secolo duodecimo*, in *Atti dell' Accademia dei Lincei* (1851), IV, p. 388; Wüstenfeld, *Die Uebersetzungen arabischer Werke in das Lateinische*, in *Abhandlungen of the Göttingen Academy* (1877), XXII, p. 58; Steinschneider, in *Vienna Sitzungsberichte*, CLIX, 4, p. 16.

³ It is, however, cited by Richard of Furnival, ca. 1250: Delisle, *Cabinet des MSS.*, II, p. 525.

⁴ Jourdain, p. 404, gives a specimen.

⁵ See the specimen in Jourdain, p. 405; and cf. MS. Lat. 14700 of the Bibliothèque Nationale; MS. 17-14 of Toledo, f. 54; Cod. Lat. Monacensis 317 (*Catalogus Codicum MSS. Latinorum*, edition of 1892, I, p. 80). Probably this is the commentary mentioned in the mediaeval catalogue of the Sorbonne: Delisle, *Cabinet des MSS.*, III, p. 57.

It may be observed in this connection that the MSS. themselves give no support to Valentinelli's statement (*Bibliotheca Manuscripta*, IV, pp. 13-15) that the translation of the *Topica* and *Elenchi* in two codices of St. Mark's is the work of Abraham de Balmes, the physician of Cardinal Grimani. The MSS. are anterior to Abraham's time, and the text has the *incipits* of the current mediaeval version.

By the close of the twelfth century, accordingly, there had been produced at least four Latin versions of the *Posterior Analytics*, the work respectively of Boethius, James of Venice, the anonymous translator of the Toledo manuscript, and Gerard of Cremona; while further investigation is required to determine whether the *nova translatio* cited by John of Salisbury and the version of the unknown John should be added as a fifth and a sixth or are to be identified in one or both cases with those of James of Venice and of the Toledo text.

As a subject of academic study the *Posterior Analytics* found its way slowly into the mediaeval universities. Alexander Neckam, who can hardly have begun his studies at Paris before 1175, describes the change in the teaching of logic there produced by its introduction,¹ and Roger Bacon speaks of the first lectures on it at Oxford as given in his time by a certain Master Hugh.² Elaborate commentaries were, however, prepared by the great schoolmen of the thirteenth century, some of whom took pains to collate the different versions. Grosseteste, though relying mainly upon the current Boethian translation, also cites *alie translationes* and the commentary of Themistius.³ The *Questiones* of John of Cornwall, whoever he may have been, seems to follow Grosseteste and the current version.⁴ Albertus Magnus is careful to compare this version, which he ascribes to Boethius, with that from the Arabic and with that of the unknown John, and cites the works of Themistius and John the Grammarian, as well as the Arab commentators.⁵ The commentary of Thomas Aquinas on the *Posteriora* ⁶ is, like his other commentaries, less discursive and follows with some closeness the current text, corrected in at least one instance

¹ *De naturis rerum*, ed. Wright, p. 293: Antequam legeretur liber ille asserebant doctores Parisienses nullam negativam esse immediatam. Sed hic error sublatus est de medio per beneficium Apodixeos. On Neckam's biography, see *Harvard Studies*, XX, pp. 78 f.

² Rashdall, *Universities of the Middle Ages*, II, p. 754; Sandys, *History of Classical Scholarship*², I, p. 570.

³ Baur, *Die philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste*, in Baeumker's *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* (1912), IX, p. 18*. I have examined MS. Borghese 306 of the Vatican.

⁴ *Supra*, p. 101.

⁵ See his commentary in *Opera* (Lyons, 1651), I, pp. 513-658; and cf. Jourdain, pp. 308-310.

⁶ *Opera* (Rome, 1882), I, pp. 129-403.

by reference to the Greek.¹ The ordinary version is also followed by the later schoolmen, Egidio Colonna, Albert of Saxony, and Walter of Burley.²

It is characteristic of the place which Aristotle still held in European thought that he should have been one of the earliest authors at whom the humanists tried their hand. Roberto de' Rossi, the first pupil of Chrysoloras, busied himself with the works of the Stagyrte, seeking to soften the bare harshness of the literal version of Boethius,³ and we have from his pen a rendering of the *Posterior Analytics* which can be definitely assigned to the close of the year 1406. Voigt, it is true, knows of Robert's translations only through their mention by Guarino of Verona and says they do not occur in the manuscript catalogues;⁴ but MS. 231 of the *Fondo antico* of St. Mark's⁵ contains *Aristotelis Posteriorum Analeticorum nova Roberti translatio*, accompanied by a preface and by verses at the end which fix the date by reference to the reconstruction of the citadel and walls of Pisa.⁶ Valentinelli indeed infers from these verses that the author was a Pisan of the late fourteenth century, but *nostri cives* would have no point if a Pisan were speaking, and the only others so engaged at Pisa were the Florentines, whose fortification of the city and oppression of the con-

¹ Bk. I, lect. 6, according to the text of Jourdain, p. 396. I can find no evidence that, as Mandonnet says (pp. 11, 40-42), William of Moerbeke translated the logical works for the benefit of St. Thomas. The passages cited from contemporary writers do not mention these among William's Aristotelian translations, nor is any copy of them known. Cf. Grabmann, II, 70.

² The commentaries of Egidius Romanus and Burley exist in various early editions. That of Albertus de Saxonia is in MS. 227 of Avranches (*Catalogue des MSS. des départements*, X, p. 106).

³ Dignus enim vir ille ut cunctis modis humanitatis auribus insinuetur atque sterilis illa durities quam ad verbum translatio pepererat pro viribus nostris civibus delinienda et demulcenda paulum fuit (*sic*). F. 2 v of the MS.

⁴ *Wiederbelebung*³, I, p. 289, II, p. 173.

⁵ Parchment, written in a humanistic hand of the fifteenth century. Cf. Valentinelli, *Bibliotheca Manuscripta ad S. Marci Venetiarum*, IV, p. 32.

⁶ Haec ego dum conor nostris aperire Latinis

Interea nostri reparabant turribus arcem
Pisanam murisque novis atque aggere cives.

The lines are given in full by Valentinelli.

quered after its final capture¹ are here exactly described. The author is not further indicated, but the name and year can point only to Robert de' Rossi.² Freer in style and less indebted to the mediaeval rendering was the more popular Renaissance version which John Argyropoulos dedicated to Cosmo de' Medici.³ The Boethian translation, however, persisted in early imprints, corrected and touched up in course of time in ways which still require investigation,⁴ but still holding its own by reason of its faithfulness to the text of the master whose words were not to be lightly changed.

¹ See *Cronichetta di anonimo pisano*, in Corazzini, *L'assedio di Pisa* (Florence, 1885), p. 75; Matteo Palmieri, in Muratori, *Scriptores*, XIX, p. 194; Morelli, *Cronaca*, p. 338.

² The text begins (f. 4): *Omnis doctrina omnisque disciplina intellectiva ex antea existenti efficitur cognitione. Preclarumque hoc est his qui per cuncta aciem mentis intenderint. Quę enim scientiarum sunt mathematicę per huiusmodi modum acquiruntur atque aliarum etiam quęvis artium. . . .*

³ It begins: *Omnis doctrina omnisque disciplina intellectiva ex antecedenti cognitione fieri solet. Id si omnis quo fiunt pacto considerabimus manifestum profecto fiet . . .* MS. Vat. Lat. 2116, f. 49 v. For the author's prefaces in MSS. of the Laurentian, see Bandini, *Catalogus Codicum Latinorum*, III, coll. 4, 350.

⁴ The humanistic retouching of the text in the Basel edition and in Migne is obvious but cannot be studied until we have a critical restitution of the mediaeval text. It should, however, be kept in mind that the text of these editions is not, as Grabmann thinks (II, p. 72), the same as the version of Argyropoulos.

THE LAW OF THE HENDECASYLLABLE

R. K. HACK

Lex haec carminibus data est iocosis,
Ne possint, nisi pruriant, iuvare.

Martial 1, 36, 10, 11.

“THIS is the law of gay poetry, that it is nothing worth, unless it be indecent.” These two lines, written by Martial to an otherwise unknown friend Cornelius who had complained that his verses were *parum severi* and not adapted for reading aloud in school, have been erected into an *ex post facto* law, supposed by at least one reputable critic, Georges Lafaye, to have exerted its malign influence over various kinds of light poetry, and in particular the hendecasyllable, throughout their career from the time of their earliest appearance in Greek literature.

It is extremely difficult to disentangle a poet from his work, it is even more difficult to disentangle his work, his poems, from the mass of contributory causes which have helped to shape it, to give the form and content of the written product to the more or less nebular nucleus of the poet's original idea or emotion. Obviously the critic's task will be lightened in exact proportion to the number of so-called laws or general principles he can discover. If we know that lyric poets since the days of Archilochus had a habit of leaving their shields on the field of battle, we can confidently affirm both the irony and the bravery of Horace when we read the lines (*Od.* 2, 7, 9, 10): —

Tecum Philippos et celerem fugam
sensi relictæ non bene parmula

“We were together when I felt the shock of Philippi and the headlong rout, my poor shield ingloriously left behind me.” But such clear cases are rare; one must be very sure that the general principle is really general, and that it applies to the particular kind of poems with which we are dealing. It is because M. Lafaye's law of the hendecasyllable would if correct be so important for the history of the

metre that it seems worth while to review his argument (*Catulle et ses modèles*, pp. 95-137).

M. Lafaye begins by making a distinction between true lyric and light poetry, *poésie légère*, which must be content with a form less ample and rich than that of true lyric and must renounce complicated metres. The Romans employed for this genre a special metre, the hendecasyllabic. Before the Romans, little is known of the history of the hendecasyllable. We are certain that Sappho and Anacreon used it, but none can say whether or not it was already the sign, the distinctive index of a genre. M. Lafaye argues that the Alexandrian epoch was very fertile in hendecasyllables; "if they have not survived and if Latin writers do not even quote them, it is precisely because the production was so voluminous" — an argument which seems a precarious foundation for his assertion that the Roman use of the metre was very similar to that of the Alexandrians. Coming down to Roman times, he makes the following estimate of the character of the genre. "No kind of verse except comic trimeter was more like prose. It lacked dignity, and so was foreign to the Roman genius. It was well adapted to the liveliness and wit of Greek conversation, but this very quality was a defect in the eyes of the Romans. For the Roman people in their conduct of life assigned a definite share to indecency; they set limits to it, within which it might freely display itself; they forbade it to go beyond these limits and were strong enough to keep it confined within them. Among the Greeks, on the contrary, this indecency showed itself everywhere with the fine unconscious naïveté which distinguishes it in the comedies of Aristophanes; their conversation reflected this peculiar trait of their manners, and they themselves liked to discover it in their familiar poetry; licentious language was not merely tolerated in the hendecasyllable, but demanded as an indispensable spice; it was one of the laws of the genre." This is Lafaye's central position, to the support of which he brings various passages from Pliny the Younger, Martial, and Catullus himself.

The Romans did not understand how a respectable man could publish verses in which things were called by their names.¹ Pliny hopes his friends will be indulgent; admits he is not as brave as his

¹ Plin. *Ep.* 4, 14, ne verbis quidem nudis abstinuisse.

predecessors; he has avoided *verba nuda*. This is a great reform and he hopes to disarm critics. But in vain, for Aristo¹ tells him he is being discussed in the salons. Pontius, another friend, attacks him frankly.² Pliny defends himself by recalling Cicero's verses on Tiro, about the indecency of which there is no doubt; and finally invokes the success his hendecasyllables have had; "even the Greeks have begun to sing them." But really all his argument hangs on the lines of Catullus: —

Nam castum esse decet pium poetam
ipsum, versiculos nihil necesse est.³

Accordingly, one hundred and fifty years after Catullus the hendecasyllable was still under suspicion, and Catullus's example did not protect his successors from severe criticism. Lafaye repeats that the law of the genre required the poet to trample under foot all modesty, and quotes the passage from Martial to which I referred at the beginning of this paper, "lex haec, etc.," and also Pliny (4, 14): — Scimus alioqui huius opusculi illam esse verissimam legem, quam Catullus expressit:

Nam castum esse decet, etc.

"It is no use," says Lafaye, "to cite Boileau's line 'le latin dans les mots brève l'honnêteté;' early Romans had the same ideas of propriety as we." If it happens that we often say in Latin what we should not dare to say in French (I am quoting M. Lafaye's rather naïve remark), it is because Latin is a dead language, which runs no risk of being understood by those before whom we desire to preserve our dignity. A *père de famille*, in Catullus's time, would not have accepted the aphorism of Boileau. If an important part of Latin literature seems to give the lie to this opinion it is because (1) in every country, one often reads and writes things that one would not say aloud (which seems to be Lafaye's prose version of Herrick's lines: —⁴

When words we want, Love teacheth to endite;
And what we blush to speake, she bids us write.

(2) Because the Romans tolerated in certain genres, by a special convention, audacities that they reproved in others. All which had its

¹ Plin. *Ep.* 5, 3.

² *Ibid.* 7, 4.

³ Cat. 16, 5.

⁴ Herrick, no. 847.

origin in the people or was addressed to them enjoyed complete immunity: Versus Fescennini, the comedy of Plautus, Caecilius, Turpilius, and the Atellana. But was this new kind of poetry compatible with polite manners? The Greeks had never doubted it; the Romans still persisted in denying it. Three accusations were made:—

1. If poetry itself was frivolous, what could they think of a man who gave his time to the most frivolous kind of poetry?

2. The hendecasyllable gave too much attention to love affairs, which are dangerously enervating to men; such verses are *teneri*.

3. They were indignant at their obscenity, calling them *molles* and *parum pudici*.

Here Lafaye gives a curious interpretation of Catullus 5, 2, 3.

Rumoresque senum severiorum
omnes unius aestimemus assis.

He asserts that Catullus foresaw that the *senes* of Rome would bitterly criticize the ensuing verses, with their *da mi basia mille*. It seems to me much more natural to take *rumores* as referring to the gossip produced by their *liaison* itself, rather than to the poems which Catullus might write under Lesbia's inspiration.

At any rate, Lafaye accepts Catullus's apology and proceeds to justify it by some curious statements about dual personality and the Roman definition of chastity. Catullus, according to this view, is not insincere in detaching himself from his work, and is quite within his rights in claiming the honorable title of *pius poeta*. Lafaye insists that the Romans did not mean by *castitas* what we mean by chastity. A woman, married or not, could pass for chaste if she remained faithful to the man to whom she had given herself, if she led a peaceful, retired life; in this sense Tibullus uses the word of Delia and Neaera.¹ They are under the protection of the goddess called by Martial (2, 34) *casta Venus*. So Catullus, *amant* of Lesbia, might claim this epithet, if he respects their oaths, if he causes no public scandal, if he does not get himself or her talked about. But in this case, how could he write hundreds of lines that all the town might read? The answer to this, says Lafaye, is that Catullus deliberately broke with the Roman tradition of reticence, and laid siege to the fortress of *gravitas Romana*.

¹ Tib. 1, 3, 83; 3, 1, 23; Ovid, *Metam.* 2, 5, 44.

Hence his exaggerated violence, and his passion for shocking the *bourgeoisie*, "quibus est equus et pater et res."¹

Lafaye hactenus. In the first place, it seems worth while to ascertain whether the hendecasyllable was or was not the exclusive metre of occasional verse, *poésie légère*. It is more or less the fashion, particularly with certain German critics, to talk as if each *εἶδος* or *genre* were the inalienable possession of a certain metrical form, and conversely as though each metre cried aloud for its traditional content, and were never disappointed. A famous passage in the *Ars Poetica*, 73-92, supports this view: "The changing parts and tone of each kind of poetry have had their limits set. If from inability or ignorance I cannot keep to them, why am I hailed a poet? . . . A theme that belongs to Comedy will not be set forth in the verses of Tragedy. So too the supper of Thyestes disdains to be told in strains of common life which suit well enough the comic sock. Each has had its becoming place allotted: let them keep to it."

True as this may be of epic, it is not true of lyric poetry, which was written in Rome under special conditions. It is far from being true even of Horace's own procedure.² By the first century B. C., the epigram had gone through a long acclimatization and was thoroughly settled on Roman soil; but lyric, by far the most difficult kind of poetry for the Roman genius to assimilate, was so far as we know very little practised before Catullus. All we have is a stray remark of Porphyrio on Horace, *Carm.* 3, 1, 2; "carmina non prius audita." Porphyrio says "quamvis Laevius lyrica ante Horatium scripserit." The shadowy figure of Laevius however cannot detain us; what is certain is that the lyric of personal emotion reached its highest point at Rome in the work of Catullus; and a great proof of his genius is his ability to turn forms like the limping, inelegant scazon, the rapid hendecasyllable and the elegiac distich into vehicles which I cannot help believing he chose almost indifferently. It is impossible to say from

¹ Horace, *A. P.* 248.

² See the very interesting passage in *Ep.* 1, 19, 21-25.

Libera per vacuum posui vestigia princeps,
non aliena meo pressi pede. qui sibi fidet
dux reget examen. Parios ego primus iambos
ostendi Latio, numeros animosque secutus
Archilochi, non res et agentia verba Lycamben.

the content why such poems as *Miser Catulle, desinas ineptire*, as *Paene insularum, Sirmio, insularumque* or *Iucundum, mea vita, mihi proponis amorem* should not have been written in either of the other two metres; and I am forced to conclude that Catullus was an innovator, that he abandoned the path of Greek tradition and greatly altered the content of his favorite forms. There are many echoes of his Greek predecessors, some of which we can recognize; but Catullus was the fit poet of an intensely individualistic age; he was master of his metres if not of his moods, and he wrote what he pleased in them. Certainly he did not regard the hendecasyllable as the only possible form for occasional verse.

In the second place, granting that the material of *poésie légère* could find expression in other forms, what specific information have we concerning the actual content of Catullus's hendecasyllables? M. Lafaye says they must be indecent, indecent by law and not by choice or by chance. I confess that on first reading his chapter he seemed to be that rare critic who strikes oil instead of merely boring, but sober consideration leads me to doubt the validity of this law of indecency. There are in Catullus forty-two poems in hendecasyllables; yet after reading and re-reading them there are only sixteen to which by exercising the utmost fastidiousness I can award the stigma of indecency. This seems hardly sufficient to establish a law; and I am sure that M. Lafaye would have arrived at approximately the same conclusion if he had not been reading under the influence of a strong preconceived idea. Among the twenty-six thoroughly decent poems occur such gems as the *Passer deliciae meae puellae*, the *Vivamus, mea Lesbia, atque amemus*, the *Acmen Septimius suos amores*, the *Iam ver egelidos refert tepores*, verses of which it is necessary to quote only the first words in order that we should recollect their lyric beauty.

The solution of the puzzle lies, I think, in the right interpretation of the very lines cited as proof of the law:¹ Catullus addresses a vehement rebuke to Aurelius and Furius "who have supposed me to be immodest, on account of my verses, because these are rather voluptuous (*molliculi*). For the sacred poet ought to be chaste himself, his verses need not be so; for they have no wit and charm unless they are voluptuous and immodest and lascivious."

¹ Cf. 16, 3.

M. Lafaye takes these lines as the solemn statement of a poet who aspires to be dignified in the more personal part of his dual personality; I regard them as the half-joking apologia of Catullus in reply to an accusation, which (as Robinson Ellis suggests) was not made very seriously. The profound error lies in confusing two quite different kinds of indecency; Rome did indeed dislike the one, but accepted the other, and what is more cultivated it assiduously. In the opinion of a Roman, lyric love *was* indecent; at least it was *tener* and *mollis*, opposed to the severe national ideal of *gravitas*; and in so far Catullus, who wrote *Da mi basia mille*, was open to this charge. That he was aware of the exact bearing of the accusation is made plain by lines 12 and 13:—

Vos, quod millia multa basiorum
legistis, male me marem putatis.

“You have read what I wrote about thousands of kisses, and so you think me effeminate.” He distinctly does not say, “You have read my poem

O fur optime balneariorum, etc.¹

and so you think that I use indecent language and that I ought to be excluded from society.”

This interpretation is confirmed by everything that I have been able to find in Ovid, Pliny, and Martial, who have all adapted the lines of Catullus to suit their several and very different cases.

Ovid says:—

Crede mihi, mores distant a carmine nostro.
Vita verecunda est, Musa iocosa mihi.²

Do but believe, my life is different from my lay;
My life is sober, but my Muse is gay.

Pliny's excuses are more amusing. He had published a volume of poems, apparently short and composed in hendecasyllabics; he sent a copy to Paternus with the following statement: “In them you will find my witticisms, my gaiety, my loves, my sorrows, my complaints, my quarrels; some descriptions done in the plain style, others in a

¹ Cat. 33.

² *Trist.* 2, 353.

loftier manner; by this variety I hope that every one will discover something to his taste, and that certain poems will be liked by all. If however a few among them seem to you a trifle too impudent (*petulantiora*), I shall expect a man of your deep learning to recollect that those very eminent and serious men who have written such verse have not only dealt with scabrous subjects, but have handled them without gloves: this I have shrunk from doing, not because I am more prudish (why in the world should I be ?) but because I am rather a coward.”¹ And then to bolster up his very feeble case, he desperately quotes the ‘law,’

Nam castum esse decet pium poetam !

Later, writing to Pontius (7, 4), he boasts of the success his volume has had. The salient fact about Pliny’s handling of the metre is not that some of his hendecasyllables were indecent, but that by his own account a great many of them were not; that they dealt in fact with ordinary lyrical and epigrammatical subjects.

Passing on to Martial, we find ourselves in a different literary world. Here is a man, with a vein of true poetry about him, who wrote not as Catullus did because he could not help writing, but as a Grub Street hack, because his writing helped him. He earned his living by the patronage it won him, and one of the few thoroughly decent qualities of Martial is his frank recognition of his own limitations and equally frank acknowledgment of his purpose. He wrote quantities of hendecasyllables, most of them indistinguishable in their clever nastiness from his epigrams in the elegiac distich. But their content, as that of all his verse, was uniformly controlled by his necessity of being read; as he says for example in 4, 49, 9, 10:—

Illa tamen laudant omnes, mirantur, adorant.
Confiteor: laudant illa, sed ista legunt.

And in 5, 16:—

Seria cum possim, quod delectantia malim
Scribere, tu causa es, lector amice, mihi.
Qui legis, et tota cantas mea carmina Roma.

¹ Plin. *Ep.* 4, 14.

In 7, 25 he informs a *malus poeta* that *dulcia epigrammata* are simply not read: —

O demens, vis tamen illa legi!

And we know his famous line 8, 56: —

Sint Maecenates, non deerunt, Flacce, Marones.

We can therefore easily understand how he came to write indecency into most of his work, not merely or specially into his hendecasyllables; and with his methods in mind, I cannot help denouncing those lines of his with which I began this paper as merely another bit of special pleading, which puts the stigma of indecency, not on the innocent *genre* he employed, but on the poet's own purpose. It was in pursuit of patronage that he deformed the hendecasyllable to his ends.

I cannot trace the varied career of the metre in full; it had at any rate two glorious periods; the first when Sappho wrote a large part of her fifth book in it, as we learn from Caesius Bassus;¹ and the second when Catullus wrote in it those lines which may have caused some of his acquaintances to deride him, but which we count among our chief treasures.

I conclude then that the so-called law of the hendecasyllable is null and void; and the positive conclusion I wish to set in its place is this: that Roman poets of the earlier period were extremely free in their treatment of the metrical *εἶδη* or *genres* which they adapted from the Greek, and that it is unsafe to argue backward from the restrictions, internal and external, which surrounded a poet of the Silver Age, to the free individualism and plasticity of the last century of the Republic.

¹ Keil, vol. 6, p. 2674 P. "Venio nunc ad hendecasyllabum phalaecium, qui ex simili causa, ut plerique, a cultore suo, non inventore, nomen accepit. nam hic versus apud Sappho frequens est, cuius in quinto libro complures huius generis et continuati et dispersi leguntur."

MOLLE ATQUE FACETUM

HORACE, *Satires*, I, 10, 44

BY CARL NEWELL JACKSON

IN the tenth satire of the first book, returning to a theme which he had treated in the fourth satire, Horace reiterates his criticism of Lucilius and defends at the same time his own literary ideals and methods of composition against the charges of his critics. With wonted modesty he depreciates (37) his own efforts in the field of satire, the type to which he felt his genius at the time best adapted, and acknowledged inferiority therein to his predecessor Lucilius (48). Eminence in other literary forms, which by reason of his own limitations he wisely declined to cultivate, he assigns to certain of his contemporaries, — in comedy to Fundanius, in tragedy to Asinius Pollio, in epic to Varius, and in bucolic poetry to Virgil.

Arguta meretrix potes Davoque Chremeta
eludente senem comis garrere libellos
unus vivorum, Fundani; Pollio regum
facta canit pede ter percusso; forte epos acer,
ut nemo, Varius ducit; molle atque facetum
Vergilio adnuerunt gaudentes rure Camenae.

It is with this phrase *molle atque facetum* as applied to the bucolic poetry of Virgil that this paper is concerned.

The annotators on this passage are not unanimous in their interpretation, — “tenderness and playfulness,” “tenderness and elegance,” “gentleness and elegance,” “tenderness and gracefulness” will serve as examples — and apparently they are in some doubts as to what the real meaning is. Their uncertainty is not surprising. Quintilian himself (6, 3, 20) found the phrase baffling. “Facetum,” he said, “quoque non tantum circa ridicula opinor consistere. Neque enim diceret Horatius facetum carminis genus natura concessum esse Vergilio.” Quintilian therefore conceived the term to imply grace and refined elegance, “Decoris hanc magis et excultae cuiusdam

elegantiae appellationem puto," and in support of this conjecture quoted these words of Brutus: "Ideoque in epistolis Cicero haec Bruti refert verba: 'Nae illi sunt pedes faceti ac deliciis ingredienti mollius.' Quod convenit cum illo Horatiano, molle atque facetum Vergilio." But even this surmise of Quintilian relative to the meaning of *facetum* is not acceptable to one modern scholar at least. Palmer in his edition of the *Satires* cannot believe that Quintilian is correct in interpreting *facetum* as elegant, and assumes that the term must allude to the *Culex* and the playful and erotic compositions of Virgil.

Amid all these uncertainties, ancient and modern, one fact stands out as well-nigh incontestable, and that is, that these terms *molle atque facetum* are rhetorical and relate to certain stylistic qualities in the bucolic poetry of Virgil. The very satire in which this phrase occurs is devoted entirely to matters of style and contains as well other rhetorical terms than the two in which we are now interested. The interpretation of these two terms however is not to be learned from Horace himself. Though *mollis* occurs several times in his poems, as a stylistic epithet it is used, if I may beg the question, only twice or perhaps three times, twice in this tenth satire and once in the *Odes* (2, 12, 3). The adjective *facetus* appears only four times in the whole of Horace; in a stylistic sense only in our present passage and perhaps in the fourth satire of the first book (7) as an epithet of Lucilius.

Our quest then leads us to the Greek and Latin rhetoricians, to determine, if possible, the meaning which these words bear in literary criticism. Let us consider first the adjective *mollis*.

Not only is *mollis* etymologically akin to the Greek adjective *μαλακός* (or *μαλθακός*)¹ but the Latin glossaries² and the Romans themselves in their literature recognized an equivalence in meaning.³ From the radical or primary meaning of softness are derived the various shades of meaning which both *μαλακός* and *mollis* assume in rhetorical literature.

¹ Cf. Walde, *Lat. Etym. Wörterb.*, s.v.

² Cf. *Corp. Gloss. Lat.* (Loewe-Goetz) 2, 130, 29.

³ Cf. e.g. *mollis* as an epithet of *somnus* in Catullus, 68, 5; Virg. *Geor.* 3, 435; Tib. 1, 2, 74; Ovid, *Met.* 1, 685 with *Il.* 10, 2 *μαλακῷ ὕπνῳ* and Servius on Virg. *Geor.* 2, 470. Cf. also the parallelism pointed out by Norden, *Antike Kunstprosa* I², 341, between Tac. *Hist.* 1, 22, and Plut. *Galba*, 25, with respect to *mollis* and *μαλακία*.

A common usage of both adjectives is to denote a quality of *σύνθεσις* or *compositio*, i.e. the euphonious or rhythmical collocation of words. In his treatise *περὶ συνθέσεως* Dionysius of Halicarnassus expounds the three *ἁρμονίαι* or modes of composition, the austere, the smooth, and the intermediate, setting forth the characteristic features of each. Of the smooth mode (*γλαφυρά*) he says: "It requires that all its words shall be melodious, smooth (*λεία καὶ μαλακά*), soft as a maiden's face; and it shrinks from harsh, clashing syllables, and carefully avoids everything rash and hazardous."¹ As an exemplar of this mode of composition in poetry Dionysius names Sappho, and comments on her Aphrodite ode by saying:² "Here the euphonious effect (*εὐέπεια*) and the grace (*χάρις*) of the language arise from the coherence and smoothness (*λειότητι*) of the junctures (*ἁρμονιῶν*)"; and again:³ "the language has a certain easy flow and softness (*μαλακή*)."⁴ In prose Dionysius chooses Isocrates as a type of this mode, and on an illustrative passage from the *Areopagitica* declares⁵ that "the links which bind the passage together are gentle and soft and flowing (*μαλακαὶ καὶ προπετεῖς*)."⁶ Finally, in speaking⁷ of the *αὐστηρὰ σύνθεσις* Dionysius quotes the opening lines of Thucydides, upon which he remarks that "there is no need for me to say, when all educated people know it as well as I, that this passage is not smooth (*λείας*) or nicely finished in its verbal arrangement, and is not euphonious and soft (*εὐεπής καὶ μαλακή*), and does not glide imperceptibly through the ear, but shows many features that are discordant and rough and harsh (*τραχὺ καὶ στρυφνόν*)."

μαλακός then is an epithet appropriate to the *γλαφυρὰ σύνθεσις*, being virtually synonymous with such words as *εὐεπής*, and *λείος*, as shown above, and also *εὐφώνος*,⁸ and implying smoothness and softness of sound. Thus with its congeners *μαλθακός* and *μαλακόφωνος*, it is used by Dionysius of *γράμματα* (*Dem.* 40, 1076), *ῥῆχοι* (*ibid.* 1077), *ὀνόματα* (*ibid.* 1075), *ῥήμιφωνοι* (*de comp.* 16, 97),⁹ *φωναί* (*ibid.*

¹ *De comp.*, ch. 23, 171 R; Roberts's translation, and so for other passages from Dionysius.

² *Ibid.* 179.

³ *Ibid.* 180.

⁴ *Ibid.* 184.

⁵ *Ibid.* 22, 165.

⁶ Cf. Dion. Hal. *Demosthenes*, 40, 1076.

⁷ Cf. P. Geigenmueller, *Quaestiones Dionysianae de Vocabulis Artis Criticae*, p. 84.

15, 89), and it is opposed in meaning to σκληρός, as λείος is to τραχύς.¹

In like fashion in Cicero (*Orator*, 77) is *mollis* used with reference to *compositio*: “verba etiam verbis quasi coagmentare neglegat; habet enim ille tamquam hiatus et concursus vocalium molle quiddam et quod indicet non ingratam neglegentiam de re hominis magis quam de verbis laborantis;” and in a sentence too where the verb *coagmentare* yields the same figure which lies in the ἀρμονία of Dionysius. Cicero’s own doctrine of *compositio*, derived of course from Greek theory, is expressed briefly in *de Or.* 3, 171: “collocationis est componere et struere verba sic, ut neve asper eorum concursus neve hiulus sit, sed quodam modo coagmentatus et levis; in quo lepide soceri mei persona luit is, qui elegantissime id facere potuit Lucilius:—

quam lepide λέξεις compostae ! ut tesserulae omnes
arte pavimento atque emblemate vermiculato,”

a passage which should be read in connection with Cicero’s judgment in the *Brutus* (274) on the style of the Atticist, Marcus Calpidius. It is noteworthy that in both these passages Cicero quotes from the same fragment of Lucilius to illustrate his theory of *compositio*. Now the style of Calpidius is described as *mollis et pellucens* and further defined as “ita pura erat ut nihil liquidius, ita libere fluebat ut nusquam adhaeresceret; nullum nisi loco positum et tamquam in ‘vermiculato emblemate,’ ut ait Lucilius, structum verbum videres; nec vero ullum aut durum aut insolens aut humile aut longius ductum.” It is to be observed that just as the force of *pellucens* resides in the words *liquidius* and *nec . . . insolens*, so that of *mollis* is implied in the locution *libere fluebat* and the antonym *durum*. The *compositio* then of the style of Calpidius (*libere fluebat*) may aptly be compared with Dionysius’s description of the style of Theopompus (*ad Pomp.* 6, 786) ἡδέως καὶ μαλακῶς ῥέονσα.

It is this sense of the word which Horace adopts in our tenth satire, the one in which the phrase *molle atque facetum* occurs, when he criticises the versification of Lucilius (*Sat.* 1, 10, 57 sq.).

¹ Cf. last reference, and also *de comp.* 12, 66, τραχέσι λεία μίσγοντα καὶ σκληροῖς μαλακά κτλ. Cf. as well Plato, *de Rep.* 3, 398 E μαλακαὶ τε καὶ συμποτικαὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν, and 411 A.

Quid vetat et nosmet Lucili scripta legentis
quaerere, num illius, num rerum dura negarit
versiculos natura magis factos et euntis
mollius.

Here the *mollius* clearly looks back to the first line of this satire, where the verses of Lucilius are said to run *incomposito pede*, that is to say, without *compositio*.

It has just been intimated that *molles* may act as the antonym of *durus*, in the same way as we have seen *μαλακός* acts to *σκληρός*. This antithetic relation which *molles* bears, to define one extreme as offset to the other, is the most important office which it fills in the sphere of Latin literary criticism. In the matter of sound, rhythm and metre, style, types of literature, *molles*, like *μαλακός* in the case of the *γλαφυρά σύνθεσις*, represents the counterterm.

Let us now consider briefly these various manifestations of our adjective *molles* in Latin literature.

In respect of sound or euphony, which played an important part in Stoic rhetorical theory,¹ *molles* becomes the antonym of *durus*. Thus Varro in the *de Lingua Latina*² distinguishes syllables as *asperae* and *leves*, *durae* and *molles*, and gives as examples of the *durae* the word *ignotus*, of the *molles* the word *aedes*. Quintilian frequently points the contrast between the *durum* and the *molle*, using the verb *mollire* in the sense of softening harsh sounds.³ So Pliny, in speaking of the verse of Pompeius Saturninus, shows its similarity to that of Catullus and Calvus because of the combination of the *mollibus levibusque* with the *duriusculos <versus>*.⁴ Quintilian, following in the footsteps of Cicero,⁵ transfers these rhetorical epithets to the vocabulary of aesthetic criticism, and contrasts the *duriora* statues of Callon and Hegesias with the *molliora* of Myron.⁶

¹ Cf. Reitzenstein, *Varro und Johannes von Euchaita*, p. 71, n. 1.

² Goetz-Schoell, p. 229, l. 4.

³ Cf. *e.g.* 1, 5, 42; 8, 3, 32; 9, 4, 39; 12, 10, 32.

⁴ *Ep.* 1, 16, 5. Cf. 8, 4, 4: si datur Homero et mollia vocabula et Graeca ad levitatem versus contrahere, etc. And Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3, 1408 b 9, ἐὰν οὖν τὰ μαλακὰ σκληρῶς καὶ τὰ σκληρὰ μαλακῶς λέγεται κτλ.

⁵ *Brutus* 70: Calamidis dura illa quidem, sed tamen molliora quam Canachi.

⁶ 12, 10, 7.

Moreover, in this same province of *compositio*,¹ rhythm and metre, like melody, contribute to the charm and beauty of composition. Just as Dionysius² opposes the *τρυφεροὶ καὶ μαλακοὶ ῥυθμοὶ* to the *ἀξιωματικοὶ καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς*, that is "the effeminate and soft to the noble and impressive rhythms," and as Demetrius³ implies this same antithesis, when he says: "The structure of clauses is affected, when it is anapaestic and resembles most nearly such broken and undignified measures (*κεκλασμένοις καὶ ἀσέμνοις*), as are particularly the Sotadean, with their effeminate gait (*διὰ τὸ μαλακώτερον*)," so in Latin the *mollis numerus* is the undignified movement in contradistinction to the *σεμνός* or *μεγαλοπρεπής*. Thus the *τροχαῖος μαλακώτερος* of Dionysius⁴ is characterized by Cicero (*Or.* 193) as a foot which "dignitatem non habet." One of the charges brought against Cicero's oratorical style by his opponents was that he was "in compositione fractum, exultantem ac paene (quod procul absit), viro molliorem,"⁵ though the younger Seneca asserted that Cicero's *compositio* was "sine infamia mollis."⁶ Cicero himself (*Or.* 40) had contrasted the style of Isocrates, "mollioribus numeris explere sententias," with that of Thucydides, which he terms *prae fractionior*, and Persius satirized "carmina molli numero" as verses which lacked manly vigor (1, 63).⁷

Another use of *mollis* is in connection with metaphors. Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* (3, 1396 b 1) had used *μαλακός* to define a less vigorous mode of reasoning as opposed to *ἀκριβής*, the more exact mode. In like manner *mollis* is used of softening the harshness of a metaphorical expression. We read in Longinus the statement that "Aristotle and Theophrastus point out that the following phrases serve to soften bold metaphors — 'as if,' and 'as it were,' and 'if one may so say,' and 'if one may venture such an expression'; for the qualifying words

¹ For other examples of *mollis* in connection with *composito*, see Seneca Rhetor, *Contr.* 9, 2, 24, and 7, 4, 8, *emollitae compositionis*; Fronto, p. 20 N, *mollitia*, and Sulpicius Victor, p. 321, 6 Halm, *mollire*.

² *Dem.* 48, 1103.

³ *De elocutione*, 189, Roberts's translation.

⁴ *De comp.* 16, 106.

⁵ Quin. 12, 10, 12.

⁶ Sen. *Ep.* 100, 7, and cf. *ibid.* 114, 16.

⁷ For other similar instances of *mollis*, cf. Cic. *Or.* 192, Quin. 9, 4, 65, 78, 97; Diomedes, *Gram. Lat.* 1, p. 472, 4.

mitigate, they say, the audacity of expression.”¹ This Peripatetic doctrine appears in Latin rhetoric in the *Auctor ad Herennium* (4, 45), who counsels the use of the *translatio pudens*, and in Cicero, who declares (*de Or.* 3, 165) that the metaphor should be *verecunda* and that a *durior translatio* may be toned down (*mollienda*) by the use of some such expression as *ut ita dicam*. Both these adjectives, *pudens* and *verecunda*, are in this connection synonymous with *mollis*, as may be inferred from the fact that in the *Orator* (85) Cicero asserts that in the *genus tenue* or plain style the metaphors should be as modest as possible, *translationibus quam mollissimis*, thus befitting a style which is modest when compared with the grand style.²

Still another use of *mollis* is to discriminate one literary form from another, thus marking again a contrariety to that which is *durus* or *fortis* or *gravis*, with reference now not to form but to matter. In this respect *mollis* denotes primarily, as has been observed in regard to metaphors, what is modest and unpretentious, the simpler and lighter kinds of verse as contrasted with the epic especially. Hence it is used in a somewhat depreciatory sense by the lyric or the elegiac poet, when he refuses to attempt a flight in the grand style of the epic poet. This refusal becomes a commonplace in Greek and Latin literature. The poet of the *Anacreontic* (23), for example, complains of his lyre's inability to sing of the exploits of the Atridae, Cadmus, or Hercules. Horace begs³ Maecenas to excuse him from celebrating the achievements of the *durum Hannibalem*, which were not adapted, said he, for the *mollibus citharae modis*, the *molli lyra* of Statius,⁴ by the way. Propertius alleges his unfitness “in heroic verse (*duro versu*) to trace the line of Caesar to his Phrygian ancestors” (2, 1, 41), and asks Maecenas to be allowed to sing of love, *mollis liber* (2, 1, 2). This same contrast between the graver and the lighter forms of verse is evident again in the epigram of Domitius Marsus on the death of Tibullus, in the “elegis molles amores” and the “caneret *forti* regia bella *pede*.” Thus in lyric poetry *mollis* serves as the stock epithet of the elegiac mode and is so used frequently by poets like Ovid and

¹ Longinus, *de sublimitate*, 32, 3, Roberts's translation.

² Cf. also *Or.* 81 and *Quin.* 4, 5, 16; 5, 12, 18; 8, 6, 17; 9, 2, 32.

³ *Od.* 2, 12, 2.

⁴ *Theb.* 10, 876. Cf. *Quin.* 10, 1, 62.

Propertius.¹ In this sense, its most obvious sense, the word has been translated by the annotators on our phrase *molle atque facetum* as "tender," importing into pastoral poetry the characteristic quality of elegiac verse. But this meaning of *mollis* cannot be impressed into service on every occasion. The word, it seems to me, is primarily discriminative, defining the simpler and lighter forms of verse as compared with the more ornate and elevated. Thus Statius in celebrating the bath of Claudius Etruscus² disclaims any intention of making his subject famous in epic style (vs. 1): —

Non Helicon gravi pulsat chelys enthea plectro,

but he would sing *carmine molli* (vs. 29), and this too in a poem which is free from the elegiac or amatory tone. So Virgil in the *Culex* disavows any intention of singing of *bellum triste*, of Giants, Centaurs, and so on (26 sqq.), but *mollia carmina* (35), in this sense an epyllion, and parodic at that, of *stilo remissiore*, as Statius says.³ At a later time Virgil promises to sing *graviore sono*, that is, in epic verse (vs. 8). So the author of the *Ciris* uses the phrase *molli pede* (vs. 20) to indicate the lighter forms of verse. So Horace implies, partly at least, in his *molle atque facetum* a distinction between the simple pastoral poetry of Virgil and the epic of Varius, which Horace terms *forte*.⁴ At all events, this is what Servius understood by the word *mollis* when, in commenting on *Eclogues*, 6, 5, he says: "Deductum carmen. Id est bucolicum. Sane 'cum canerem reges et proelia' et 'deductum dicere carmen' quidam volunt hoc significasse Vergilium, se quidem altiore de bellis et regibus ante bucolicum carmen elegisse materiam, sed con-

¹ Cf. e.g. Prop. 1, 7, 19; Ovid, *A. A.* 3, 344; *Tr.* 2, 307, 349; *Pont.* 1, 5, 14; 3, 4, 85; 4, 16, 32. Compare also μαλακῷ πνεύμ' ἀπὸ πενταμέτρου of Hermesianax apud Athenaeum 13, 598A, cited by Crusius in Pauly-Wissowa, s. v. *Elegie*, 2264.

² *Silvae*, 1, 5.

³ *Silvae*, Praef. I. Cf. also Mart. 8, 56, 20, qui modo vix Culicem fleverat ore rudi, and *Harv. Stud. in Class. Phil.* 24, 50.

⁴ For the use of *fortis* in Latin literary criticism to denote a quality of the grand style, cf. Cic. *de Or.* 3, 32, forte, vehemens, commotum in agendo; *ibid.* 2, 183, non enim semper fortis oratio quaeritur, sed saepe placida, summissa, lenis; and *Or.* 95, and *Brut.* 268. For a like use of *acer* as an epithet of the grand style, cf. C. Causeret, *Étude sur la Langue de la Rhétorique et de la Critique Littéraire dans Cicéron*, p. 162. Horace, it will be remembered in the line preceding *molle atque facetum* had called Varius *acer*.

siderata aetatis et ingenii qualitate mutasse consilium et arripuisse opus mollius, quatenus vires suas leviora praeludendo ad altiora naranda praepararet."

There remains the consideration of the use of *mollis* as an epithet to characterize style. It has already been seen that *mollis* is suitable in various ways for pointing a contrast. So now in respect of style it may denote in Cicero's rhetorical works, in contrast to the grand style, a quality of the γένος ἰσχνόν, *genus tenue* or *subtile*, that is, the plain style. We have already noticed above¹ this use of the word by Cicero, with reference to both *compositio* and metaphors, as a feature of the plain style. So μαλακός had been used by Dionysius (who is to be sure subsequent in time to Cicero but preserves for us the same rhetorical theory that Cicero derived from Greek doctrine) in a significant passage relating to Lysias (*Lys.* ch. 19, 496 R): περὶ δὲ τὰ πάθη μαλακώτερός ἐστι καὶ οὔτε αὐξήσεις οὔτε δεινώσεις οὔτε οἴκτους οἶθ' ὅσα τούτοις ἐστὶ παραπλήσια νεανικῶς πάνυ καὶ ἔρρωμένως κατασκευάσαι δυνατός.² Now Lysias was the chief exemplar of the plain style of oratory, and he became the model of the Roman Atticists, the *isti novi Attici*, as Cicero contemptuously calls them (*Or.* 89). Hence the appropriateness of the epithet *mollis* when chosen by Cicero in the *Brutus* (274) to describe the oratorical style of the Atticist, Marcus Calidius, *mollis et pellucens*, and its real significance when applied by Cicero to characterize the style of the historical work of Lutatius Catulus, *molli et Xenophonteo genere sermonis*.³ We know from another source⁴ that Catulus wrote in the plain style, and thus continued the literary traditions of the Scipionic circle, transmitting them ultimately to the Atticists.

Mollis likewise serves a similar purpose in defining the style of the philosophers. In that section of the *Orator* (64) in which Cicero distinguishes the style of the perfect orator from that of the philosopher, he says: "mollis est enim oratio philosophorum et umbratilis nec

¹ Pp. 120 and 123, in *Or.* 77 and 85.

² Cf. also *ibid.* 28, 519. F. Nassal, *Aesthetisch-Rhetorische Beziehungen zwischen Dionysius von Halicarnass und Cicero*, p. 9, posits Caecilius as a common source of Cicero and Dionysius.

³ *Brut.* 132. The conjunction of *molli* with *Xenophonteo* is noteworthy.

⁴ Gellius, 19, 9, 10, and cf. *Cic. de Or.* 2, 7 and 3, 29.

sententiis nec verbis instructa popularibus nec vincta numeris, sed soluta liberius; nihil iratum habet, nihil invidum, nihil atrox, nihil miserabile, nihil astutum; casta, verecunda, virgo incorrupta quodam modo. itaque sermo potius quam oratio dicitur; quamquam enim omnis locutio oratio est, tamen unius oratoris locutio hoc proprio signata numine est." The synonymity of *mollis* and *verecunda*, herein implicit, has been shown above¹ with reference to metaphors. The style the philosophers affect, therefore, is the *tenuis*, the dry, pragmatic style of philosophic discussion, the "tenui quodam exsanguique sermone."² This distinction of style, oratorical, historical, and philosophical, which *mollis* implies may be observed at a glance by reference to that passage in the *Brutus* (317), in which Cicero evaluates the styles of two antithetic orators, Cotta and Hortensius. The former, an exponent of the plain style,³ is described as "remissus et lenis," whereas the latter, who typifies the grand style, is "ornatus, acer . . . verborum et actionis genere commotior." Now *remissus*, in Cicero regularly opposed to *intentus*,⁴ is found in combination with *mollis* in the *de Oratore* (2, 95): "alia quaedam dicendi molliora ac remissiora genera viguerunt. Inde Demochares⁵ . . . tum Phalereus ille Demetrius," etc. And *mollis* is used again of the style of Demetrius Phalereus by Cicero in the *Brutus* (38): "hic primus inflexit orationem et eam mollem teneramque reddidit et suavis, sicut fuit, videri maluit quam gravis." Demetrius and Demochares, then, in Cicero's opinion were responsible in the history of oratory for the *genera molliora ac remissiora*, that is, for the degradation of oratory, as Cicero thought, from the *σεμνόν* or *grande genus* of the great Attic orators.

¹ Cf., p. 123.

² *De Or.* 1, 56. For other references to philosophic style, cf. Quin. 10, 1, 84; 11, 1, 33, and Sen. *Ep.* 40, 2 and 7; and *ibid.* 100, 4. See also J. Stroux, *de Theophrasti Virtutibus Dicendi*, p. 40.

³ Cf. *Brut.* 202, and Sandys on *Or.* 106.

⁴ Cf. Wilkins on *de Or.* 2, 95, n. 8. For *remissus*, cf. also Sen. *Rhet. Contr.* 3, *Praef.* 7, genus dicendi non remissum aut languidum, sed ardens et concitatum, of the style of Cassius Severus: and also Macrobius, 2, 4, 12, idem Augustus, quia Maecenatem suum noverat stilo esse remisso molli et dissoluto, etc., and Pliny, *Ep.* 2, 11, 21.

⁵ Cf. *Brut.* 286: sed Attici tamen: quorum . . . Demochares, etc.

Mollis therefore may, in the Horatian phrase, point to the use of the plain style as well as indicate contradistinction to the style of the epic, namely the grand style.

We have next to investigate the meaning of the second term in the phrase *molle atque facetum*, namely *facetum*, a word of not such varied import as *molle*; and in conjunction therewith I shall include in the discussion its congeners *facetiae* and *facete*.

There is no one word in Greek which acts as the equivalent in point of both etymology and meaning, but the Latin glossaries yield the information that some of the Greek equivalents of *facetum*, *facetiae*, and *facete* were εὐχαρίς, χάριτες ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, κωμικὴ χάρις, ἀστεϊότητες, and εὐφυνός, the Latin synonyms being such words as *urbanus*, *eloquens*, *gratiosus*.¹ By following these clues among the Greek rhetoricians, we can perceive how Cicero imported into the sense of *facetum* a part of the doctrine of Greek rhetorical theory περὶ γελοίου.

In the third book of his *Rhetoric* (chs. 10, 11) Aristotle treats at some length, as a topic suitable to oratory, ἀστεῖα, a comprehensive term including such diverse matters as metaphors, similes, proverbs, apothegms, riddles, enthymemes, as well as wit and humor. Ἀστεῖα therefore connotes more than is implied in our terms wit and humor, that is to say, it means such clever sayings as are ornaments of style. These ἀστεῖα, says Aristotle (1410 b 8), are the work of the εὐφυνός, the man of genius. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* (2, 7, 1108 a 24) he applies the doctrine of the mean to particular virtues and observes with reference to witticisms that he who keeps the mean is witty (εὐτράπελος), he who exceeds is guilty of buffoonery (βωμολοχία), and he who is deficient in wit is boorish (ἄγροικος). Εὐτραπεία then is the mean between ἄγροικία and βωμολοχία, and the εὐτράπελος man will be he "whose fun is in good taste"² and he will say only those things befitting an ἐλευθέριος,³ a gentleman, and hence he becomes in Aristotelian doctrine χαρίεις.⁴ Now the equation of εὐτραπεία and χάρις is apparent from Dionysius, who in his essay on *Demosthenes* (54, 1122)

¹ Cf. *Corp. Gloss. Lat.* (Loewe-Goetz), II, 69, 49; II, 69, 53; II, 357, 39; II, 248, 33; II, 320, 23; II, 579, 23; IV, 72, 30.

² *Ethic. Nic.* 4, 14, 1128 a 10.

³ *Ibid.* 1128 a 17 sqq.

⁴ *Ibid.* 1128 a 16, and 1127 b 29.

says that the orator was deficient in *εὐτραπεία*, ἣν οἱ πολλοὶ καλοῦσι χάριν. To complete our chain of reasoning, Demetrius of Phalerum, we are told, considered *χάρις* equivalent to *ἀστέιον*,¹ and the Latin glossaries, as shown above,² repeat the doctrine. The fullest treatment of these rhetorical epithets may be found in Demetrius *de elocutione*, who associates with the *γλαφυρός* or the smooth style, the terms *χάρις*, *χαριεντισμός*, *ἰλαρόν*, *ἡδονή*, and *ἀστεισμός*, and cites Lysias and Xenophon as exemplifying these qualities (128 and 131).

Now all this Greek rhetorical theory appears in almost this identical form in the writings of Cicero. In the *de Officiis* (I, 103) he declares, "ipsūque genus iocandi non profusum nec immodestum, sed ingenuum et facetum esse debet," and then divides the "genus iocandi" into two classes, one "illiberale, petulans, flagitiosum, obscenum," the other, "elegans, urbanum, ingeniosum, facetum." *Facetiae*, therefore, by reason of this contrast of *facetum* to *illiberale*, are peculiar to the gentleman, and here, as in the *Orator* (87-88), there is implicit recognition of the fact that the *facetus* man like the *εὐτράπελος* follows the mean of good taste in his witticisms, avoiding scurrility on the one hand and boorishness on the other.³ Hence *facetus* is often found in conjunction with *urbanus* and its congeners, as in such a phrase as "hominum facetorum urbanitatem."⁴ Again *facetiae* appears many times in juxtaposition with such words as *venustas*⁵ and *lepos*,⁶ as *facetus* with *elegans*,⁷ and *acutus*⁸ and *salsus*,⁹ being opposed in meaning to *profusus*,¹⁰ *rudis*,¹¹ and *ineptus*.¹² In the *Orator* (87) *facetiae* and *dicacitas* are subsumed under *sales*, the generic term, in the sense of humor and wit, just as in the *de Oratore*, in the chapter *de ridiculo*, *facetiae*, here the generic term, is subdivided into *cavillatio* (humor) and *dicacitas* (2, 218). In short, *facetiae* in Cicero as a rhetorical term connotes like

¹ *Anecd. Oxon.*, p. 384, cited by Liers, *Fleckeisen Jhrb.* 135, 692.

² P. 127.

³ Cf. *de Or.* 2, 252 and *Brut.* 143.

⁴ *Fin.* 2, 103. Cf. also *de domo*, 92, *Cael.* 6, *de Or.* 2, 217 and 227; *Quin.* 6, 3, 102 sqq.

⁵ Cf. *Flacc.* 76.

⁶ Cf. *de Or.* 1, 17, 159, 243; 2, 219, 220, 225, 252; *Brut.* 173 with *Off.* 1, 108. See also Catullus, 50, 7; Sallust. *Jug.* 25, and Val. Pat. 1, 17, 1.

⁷ Cf. *Brut.* 292; *de Or.* 2, 241.

⁸ Cf. *Brut.* 63.

⁹ Cf. *de Or.* 2, 228.

¹¹ Cf. *de Or.* 1, 32.

¹⁰ Cf. *Off.* 1, 103.

¹² Cf. *Brut.* 292.

the *ἀσρέϊα* of Aristotle the ready wit and humor of a gentleman, the refined pleasantries of an alert mind, the sparkling language of a genial spirit. At times, so general is its application that one is tempted to equate it with *δεινὸς λέγειν* and accept the definition of Donatus,¹ "facetis est qui facit verbis quod vult."

Now the part that *facetiae* play in oratory is no unimportant one. Like Aristotle² Cicero asserts that *facetiae* are appropriate to the orator³ and assigns them a place among the qualities pertaining to the plain style, not only in his preliminary treatment of the matter in § 20 of the *Orator* but also in the detailed discussion of this kind of style in §§ 76 sqq. "Huic generi orationis," says Cicero of the plain style (*Or.* 87), "aspergentur etiam sales, qui in dicendo nimium quantum valent; quorum duo genera sunt, unum facetiarum, alterum dicatitatis." "The former," he continues in a statement important for our purpose, are useful "in narrando aliquid venuste." Herein is allusion to the Peripatetic dichotomy of *γελοῖον* and *εὐχαρι*, as expounded by Demetrius,⁴ and as comprehended by Dionysius in his stylistic quality of *χάρις*. The close community of meaning which binds these three words, *facetiae*, *venustas*, *χάρις*, together may be shown in other ways. We know on the authority of Fortunatianus⁵ that every style had its nuances, an *αἰσθηρόν* and an *ἀνθηρόν*. So Cicero (*Or.* 20) distinguishes two varieties of the *genus tenue*: "in eodemque genere alii callidi, sed impoliti et consulto rudium similes et imperitorum, alii in eadem ieiunitate concinniores, id est, faceti, florentes etiam et leviter ornati." This same distinction is apparent in Dionysius⁶ between τὸ αὐχμηρόν (*Vet. Cens.* 431) and ἡ κοσμοῦσά τε καὶ ἀνθίζουσα τὴν λέξιν αὐτοῦ χάρις (*de Lys.* 13, 481). This quality *χάρις* furthermore is virtually identified with *ἡδονή* and *ἀφροδίτη* (*ibid.* 11, 477), and hence the definition of Quintilian (6, 3, 18): "venustum esse, quod cum gratia et venere dicatur, apparet."⁷

¹ Ad Ter. *Eun.* 427.

² *Rhet.* 3, 1419 b 2.

³ *De Or.* 2, 271.

⁴ *De Eloc.* 163 sqq. Cf. E. Arndt, *de ridiculi doctrina rhetorica*, p. 21.

⁵ Cited by Schmid, *Rhein. Mus.* 35, 137.

⁶ See Nassal, *Aesth.-Rhet. Beziehungen zwischen Dion. und Cic.*, p. 62.

⁷ Cf. Varro apud Aul. Gell. 6, 14, 3, *gracili venustas et subtilitas*, and see the Latin glosses above, p. 127. Cf. the expression of Catullus. 22, 2, *venustus et dicax et urbanus*, and Quin. 10, 1, 100 and 12, 10, 35.

Both Greek and Roman theory is unanimous in regarding *facetiae* as a mint-mark of the style of the Attic orators, though Cicero, with the ulterior purpose of defending himself against the charge of the Atticists that he was "in salibus aliquando frigidum,"¹ maintains² that none of the *novi Attici* had ever attained this quality of style. Of the Attic orators themselves he declares that not all of them were *faceti*, "Lysias satis et Hyperides, Demades praeter ceteros fertur, Demosthenes minus habetur."³ *Facetiae* therefore, to judge from such Ciceronian passages as *Orator*, 87 and 89,⁴ are one of the elements which are embodied in the ancient conception of the *genus tenue*. As such, *facetiae* and its congeners are found not infrequently in Cicero's rhetorical works in contrast to *gravis*, which defines an element of the grand style. Thus, in the *Brutus*, in Cicero's very formal appraisal of the style of the Roman orators, *facetus* serves to indicate the plain style. For instance, Lysias and Cato, both representatives of the plain style, are characterized as *acuti*, *elegantes*, *faceti*, *brevis*,⁵ each of these epithets being in a rhetorical sense appropriate only to the *genus tenue*.⁶ So Philippus is spoken of as "*tam suavem, tam gravem, tam facetum*,"⁷ that is to say, he is accomplished in all three styles, for *suavis* stands for an attribute of the middle style.⁸ So finally the

¹ Quin. 12, 10, 12.

² Or. 89.

³ Or. 90.

⁴ For Or. 87, see p. 129. Or. 89, quibus exceptis sic utetur sale et facetiis, etc.

⁵ Brut. 63.

⁶ Or. 20.

⁷ Brut. 186.

⁸ Or. 91, hoc in genere (*i.e.* of the middle style) nervorum vel minimum, suavitatis autem est vel plurimum, and *ibid.* 92, huic omnia dicendi ornamenta conveniunt plurimumque est in hac orationis forma suavitatis. Though there is no explicit statement in the *Brutus* of the threefold division of style (see Hendrickson, *A. J. Ph.* 26, 265 and Stroux, *de Theophrasti virtutibus dicendi*, p. 88), yet I cannot but think that Cicero had in mind while composing the *Brutus* the distinction which he very succinctly makes in his earlier work, *de Oratore*, 3, 177, 199, 212, and more fully in the *Orator*, 20 and 76 sqq., the last of these three works. As for the statement made in the *Brutus*, 201, see Kroll's note *ad loc.* (ed.⁵). I believe, therefore, that of the Theophrastean *ἀπέραλ*, the ἡδύ and the μεγαλοπρεπές, Cicero associated the former with the middle style even in the *Brutus* as well as in the *Orator*, as shown above. See the examples of *suavis* = ἡδύ in the *Brutus* in Stroux, *op. cit.*, p. 86, especially Brut. 37 (Demetrius Phalereus) *suavis, sicut fuit, videri maluit quam gravis*. But whether or not *suavis* can bear this interpretation, *facetus* unquestionably denotes a contrast to *gravis* and a quality of the plain style. Cf. Causeret, *op. cit.*, p. 152, and Cic. *Part. Or.* 21.

oratorical style of L. Crassus is thus defined:¹ "erat summa gravitas, erat cum gravitate iunctus facetiarum et urbanitatis oratorius, non scurrilis lepos; Latine loquendi accurata et sine molestia diligens elegantia," etc., where the opposition of *facetiae* to *gravitas* is clearly marked.²

The association therefore of *facetus* and *facetiae* with the qualities which characterize the *genus tenue* is quite evident from Ciceronian usage.³ In view of the results to which this discussion has brought us thus far, it is *a priori* probable that the Horatian phrase *molle atque facetum* contains within itself an allusion to this plain style. Quintilian, it will be remembered, had been at a loss to fix the proper

¹ *Brut.* 143.

² For other examples of this opposition, cf. *de Or.* 1, 75, multa non tam graviter dixit quam facete, and *Brut.* 158, 164, 198, and *de Or.* 3, 30.

³ In the earliest discussion of the threefold classification of style in the *Auctor ad Herennium* is to be found in connection with the plain style the phrase *in illa facetissima verborum attenuatione* (4, 16, p. 304 Marx), though the word *facetissima* has hardly its predominant signification in this passage, but the meaning it bears in some Plautine and Terentian lines, deft, adroit, versatile. Cf. *Thesaurus Ling. Lat.* s.v., and Norden, *Einleitung in die Allertumswissenschaft* (Gercke-Norden) I, 449.

The *Auctor ad Herennium* had defined the plain style as (4, 11), "attenuata est, quae demissa est usque ad usitatissimam puri consuetudinem sermonis." The latter part of the definition alludes to the virtues, *elegantia* and *Latinitas*, which, we are told (4, 17) have reference to *pure et aperte dici* and the *sermo purus*. It is tempting to interpret in the light of these facts the *facetior* in the Lucilian fragment (963 M):—

quo facetior videare et scire plus quam ceteri
pertisum hominem non pertaesum dicere,

where there is an obvious reference to the analogistic studies of Scipio Minor. Cicero's comment (*Or.* 159) is quite significant: ex quo quidam pertisum etiam volunt, quod eadem consuetudo non probavit. quid vero hoc elegantius, quod non fit natura, sed quodam instituto? If *facetus* in the *Auctor* and Lucilius has allusion to simplicity and purity of style, the Lucilian fragment may have some bearing on the question of the relation of the analogists to the Atticists. See Kroll's edition (1913) of the *Orator*, p. 12, n. 1. Cf. also these interesting but probably worthless statements: Fortunatianus (p. 123. Halm): gentilia verba quae sunt? quae propria sunt quarundam gentium, sicut Hispani non cubitum vocant, sed Graeco nomine ancona, et Galli facundos pro facetis, etc., and Albinus (p. 544, Halm): facunda (elocutio) erit si grammaticae regulas servat et auctoritate veterum fulcitur.

meaning of *facetum*. He had failed to recognize the connection in early Latin rhetoric of *facetus* with one of the three kinds of style. In the century and more that had elapsed since the death of Cicero, many of the fine distinctions of meaning attaching to rhetorical terms had disappeared. Such was the case with Quintilian, who when describing in the *Institutio* the virtues of the plain style¹ makes no mention of *facetiae* in his list of qualities.

Is there now any evidence, external or internal, in the poetry of Horace and Virgil which would point to their use of the plain style? Both these poets had passed their youth in Rome at a time when questions of style were stirring deeply the literary circles of the city. In verse that school of poets whom Cicero called *poetae novi* (*Or.* 161) had forsaken the Ennian literary traditions and the composition of long epics in the grand style for the shorter epyllia and the lighter kinds of verse which they elaborated with Alexandrian preciousness. In prose was that group of orators, the Roman Atticists, who during the fifties and early forties protested against the prevailing style of oratory, Asianism so-called, and, setting up Lysias as their model, engaged in that literary feud with Cicero over the question of the proper medium of oratorical expression. Some indication at least of the interest taken by the Romans in this stylistic controversy is afforded by the fact that Julius Caesar, so Suetonius (*J. C.* 56) tells us, composed while he was crossing the Alps his two books *de Analogia*, which had been inspired by the publication of Cicero's *de Oratore*. So stout was the assault made by these exponents of the *genus tenue*² upon the position held by Cicero in his advocacy of a more embellished style, that the orator was obliged to defend himself, to maintain the pre-eminency in the oratorical field. The *Brutus*, the *Orator*, and the *de optimo genere oratorum* were his answer, polemics against what seemed to him to be the narrow, illiberal stylistic views of those who had neglected the greater Attic Demosthenes for the lesser Attic Lysias. It is noteworthy that in the *Orator*, which is to be regarded as the handbook of Latin prose style, Cicero devoted a disproportionate amount of space to expounding the virtues of the plain style in comparison with those of the middle and the grand styles.

¹ 10, 1, 44 and 12, 10, 59.

² Cf. Quin. 12, 10, 12 and Fac. *Dial.* 18.

In such a literary atmosphere did Horace and Virgil move in their early years of residence in Rome. They were brought directly into contact with the stylistic ideals of the Atticists by the associations which they formed with Brutus and Asinius Pollio, among the most prominent of the Atticising orators. The friendly relations which Horace bore to the former are attested by passages in the *Odes* (2, 7) and the *Satires* (I, 17); to the latter, Pollio, Horace dedicated the first ode of the second book, and in the tenth satire cited him for his eminence in tragic composition.¹ Towards the end of this satire Horace included him in the number of his friends. Well known too is the part played by Pollio in inspiring Virgil to compose his *Eclogues*.

Pollio amat nostram, quamvis est rustica, musam,

declared Virgil in the third eclogue (84), and to Pollio Virgil dedicated his fourth and eighth eclogues. With the stylistic ideals of the Atticists, therefore, and their championship of the *genus tenue*, both Horace and Virgil must have been well acquainted.²

With the poets also who affected the new style of poetic art and with the literary tendencies which Catullus, Calvus, and others represented, Horace and Virgil were familiar and sympathetic.³ It is a striking coincidence that one of these *poetae novi*, Licinius Calvus, belonged to the group of *novi Attici* and enjoyed a considerable reputation as orator. We have fortunately in the *Brutus* (283 sqq.) Cicero's judgment on this man, who, as Cicero said, "ipse errabat et alios etiam errare cogebat." So pronounced were Cicero's feelings against him that the mention of Calvus's name by Brutus called forth from the great orator his indignant and moving protest against the narrow conceptions his rivals had of the true Attic style.

The language which Cicero chose to assess the oratorical style of Calvus is very expressive. It is obvious from such phrases as *adcuratius quoddam dicendi et exquisitius . . . genus*, and the *nimum tamen inquirens in se atque ipse sese observans metuensque ne vitiosum conligeret*, and finally the *oratio nimia religione attenuata*, that Calvus

¹ Cf. p. 117.

² I do not wish to imply that social or political reasons induced these poets to adopt the plain style in their early compositions.

³ As Professor E. K. Rand has shown, *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, 17, 15 sqq.

carried over into his prose style that same meticulous devotion to form which must have marked the composition of his epyllion, the *Io*. It is this very stylistic precision of form which is reflected in the fine finish, the *curiosa felicitas* of Horace's verse. The *limae labor* (*A. P.* 291) is after all but the *limatus dicendi* . . . *genus*¹ of the Atticists, the *subtili quadam et pressa oratione limati*,² to quote some Ciceronian expressions for the *genus tenue*, showing that both Horace and the Atticists devoted their efforts in manipulation of style with an eye not to embellishment, *ornatus*, in the Ciceronian sense, but to classical restraint. Of interest then is such a definition of the Atticists' style as *minuta subtilitas* (*Brut.* 291) or the use of the rhetorical epithets, *politus*, *urbanus*, and *elegans*, which are stereotyped epithets of the plain style as well.³

Now the allusions in the poetry of Horace to the threefold classification of style are by no means infrequent, and the epithets which he employed to denote stylistic qualities are identical many times with those used by Cicero. A few examples will suffice. In the sixth ode of the first book, in which Horace turns aside the request of Agrippa for a poem commemorative of his exploits by pleading his own inability, he contrasts the respective styles of his lyric verse and the epic by the immediate juxtaposition of the adjectives *tenues grandia*, which are in Latin rhetoric the most common epithets of the plain and the grand style. Again in the sixteenth ode of the second book (37) Horace speaks of his modest possessions and attainments as

mihi parva rura et
spiritum Graiae tenuem Camenae,

and in similar vein at the close of the third ode of the third book (72) reproaches himself for attempting such mighty themes with the words

magna modis tenuare parvis.⁴

This epithet *parvis* attains a rhetorical, as well as material sense, in this passage, as again in *Od.* 3, 25, 17, where Horace celebrates in dithyrambic strain the glory of Caesar, abandoning for the nonce his usual style: —

¹ *Brut.* 93.

² *Or.* 20. For other instances of *limatus*, cf. Sandys *ad loc.* Cf. *Tusc.* 2, 1, 3.

³ Cf. *e.g.* *Brut.* 285.

⁴ Cf. also Hor. *A.P.* 46, in verbis etiam tenuis.

nil parvum aut humili modo,
nil mortale loquar.

Noteworthy in this couplet is the Ciceronian epithet of the plain style, *humilis*.¹ Another occurrence of *parvus* is in *Od.* 4, 2, 31: —

operosa parvus
carmina fingo,

where Horace applies the epithet to himself in contradistinction to the

profundo
Pindarus ore.²

Parvus is comparable in sense to the Ciceronian stylistic epithets, *summissus* and *demissus*,³ and is used by Horace in the passage just quoted in the fashion which Cicero frequently adopts in the *Brutus* and the *Orator*, applying to the man the epithet adapted to the style.

In the juvenile verse of Virgil likewise may be found here and there allusions to the plain style. In one of the minor poems (*Catalepton*, 5, 1), where he bids farewell to the rhetorical schools, he expresses his disgust for the vain embellishments and bombast of the style which is antithetic to the pure Attic style: —

Ite hinc, inanes, ite, rhetorum ampullae,
inflata rhuso non Achaico verba.

It was in this *genus tenue* that his earliest verse was written. Thus in the *Culex*, besides the opening lines: —

Lusimus, Octavi, gracili modulante Thalia
atque ut araneoli tenuem formavimus orsum,

with the rhetorical use of *gracili* and *tenuem*, there is the line, cited above,⁵

mollia sed tenui pede currere carmina, versu

with its contrast between light verse and the epic, in which form the poet tells Octavius (8) that

posterius graviore sono tibi musa loquetur.

¹ Cf. Causeret, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

² Cf. vs. 7.

³ Cf. Causeret, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

⁴ Cf. e.g. *Brut.* 317, and *Or.* 76: ac primum informandus est ille nobis, quem solum quidam vocant Atticum: summissus est et humilis, etc.

⁵ P. 124.

The epithet *gracili* of the first line of the *Culex* appears again in the *Ciris* where the author in the words (19):—

quamvis interdum ludere nobis
et gracilem molli liceat pede claudere versum,

makes the same contrast as Virgil in the *Culex*, and as Virgil makes again in the quatrain prefixed to the Aeneid, in which he marks the transition from the simple poetry of his earlier days to the grand style of the epic.

Ille ego, qui quondam gracili modulatus avena
carmen, et egressus silvis vicina coegi
ut quamvis avido parerent arva colono,
gratum opus agricolis, at nunc horrentia Martis.

This adjective *gracilis*, it should be said, is used by Varro¹ as the distinguishing epithet of the plain style.

Finally, in the *Eclogues* themselves is the evidence desired to corroborate the theory that has already been advanced. On the *tenui avena* in the familiar lines at the very beginning of the first eclogue Servius thus comments: "dicendo autem 'tenui avena,' stili genus humilis latenter ostendit, quo ut supra dictum est, in bucolicis utitur." Similarly in the sixth eclogue, addressed to Alfenus Varus, who had probably asked Virgil to celebrate his martial deeds, the poet in consonance with the convention of the lyric poet² pleads in refusal Apollo's command to devote himself to the humbler theme of bucolic poetry (3):

Cum canerem reges et proelia,³

"I was bidden," says the poet, *deductum dicere carmen*. This phrase may aptly be compared in meaning with Horace's *tenui deducta poemata filo*,⁴ and is defined by Servius as *tenue*, and by the *Scholia Veronensia* as *tenue, gracile, subtile, quale Bucolicis convenit*. Then Virgil continues:—

Nunc ego (namque super tibi erunt qui dicere laudes,
Vare, tuas cupiant et tristia condere bella)
agrestem tenui meditabor harundine musam.

¹ Gellius, 6, 14, 2, and cf. *Brut.* 64.

² Cf. p. 123.

³ The stereotyped expression, by the way, among the Latin poets for epic poetry.

⁴ *Ep.* 2, 1, 225.

Again in the tenth eclogue (71) Servius annotates the *gracili . . . hibisco* by saying that by the use of *gracili* Virgil "allegoricos autem significat se composuisse hunc libellum tenuissimo stilo." And to the same effect Servius speaks in his proem to the *Eclogues*, when he declares (12): "qualitas autem haec est, scilicet humilis character. tres enim sunt characteres, humilis, medius, grandiloquus. quos omnes in hoc invenimus poeta. nam in Aeneide grandiloquum habet, in Georgicis medium, in Bucolicis humilem pro qualitate negotiorum et personarum: nam personae hic rusticae sunt, simplicitate gaudentes, a quibus nihil altum debet requiri."

Virgil himself was conscious of the distinction here set forth, for in the opening line of the so-called Messianic eclogue (4, 1), which, as Servius tells us,¹ is not bucolic in tone, he says: —

Sicelides Musae, paulo maiora canamus,

that is to say, in a higher strain than usual, *maiore plectro*, to use a phrase of Horace,² or *plectro graviore*, as Ovid would say,³ both expressions suggesting the *elatio atque altitudo orationis* of Cicero.⁴ Virgil therefore in his early verse, like Horace, adopted in general the plain style, in harmony with the ancient rhetorical theory which accommodated the subject to the form.

When we bear in mind this fact, as well as the evidence which has been presented, there is no reason, I believe, why we should not infer that the Horatian *molle atque facetum* alludes to the *genus tenue*, in which the *Eclogues* were written. Horace had, as will be recalled, indicated in the most general terms the essential characteristics of the three literary forms, comedy (*comis libellos* of Fundanius), tragedy (*pede ter percusso* of Pollio), and epic (*forte epos* of Varius), somewhat after the mode of the labelling school of literary criticism, which Quintilian so well exemplified in his survey of Greek and Latin literatures. So with reference to the *Eclogues*, Horace had in mind, it seems to me, no more specific qualities than the simple style and the Attic charm, which are distinctive features of the *genus tenue*.

¹ Haec ecloga discedat a bucolico carmine.

² *Od.* 4, 2, 33.

³ *Met.* 10, 150.

⁴ *Brut.* 66.

HIPPOCRATEA, I

By WILLIAM ARTHUR HEIDEL

THE following notes are a by-product of studies undertaken with no thought of conjectural emendation. My sole desire had been to comprehend the meaning of the "Hippocratic" treatises and to derive from them such elucidation as they might afford of the thought, scientific and philosophic, of the fifth century B.C. After ten years of almost continuous study of the *Corpus Hippocrateum* I recently sorted out the large mass of notes which had gradually accumulated, and found to my surprise several thousand which related to questions of text and interpretation. A preliminary examination showed that much the largest part of these suggestions referred to the text of Kühn's edition, in which I had begun my reading of Hippocrates. On comparing my suggestions with the text of Littré, I was relieved at finding that the latter scholar, to whom all students of Hippocrates are deeply indebted, had by his wider acquaintance with the MSS. confirmed and adopted the readings I had thought to propose in quite ninety per cent of the cases. Further large reductions in the number of passages to be considered resulted from a comparison of my suggestions with the texts of Ermerins, Kühlewein, Gomperz, Nelson, Gundermann, and Villaret, besides the critical discussions of such other scholars as were accessible to me. It is doubtless too much to hope that the notes which remain will in proportional number commend themselves to the judgment of others, but I am encouraged to believe that in the main I have rightly interpreted the text and caught the meaning of the authors, even when, as in reading after Kühn, I was seeing through a glass darkly. May the editors of Hippocrates for the *Corpus Medicorum* derive some benefit from the discussion of the passages herewith presented for their consideration. Questions of orthography have in general been ignored in the belief that we are not yet in a position to settle them with even approximate certainty. The conjectural critic is here more fortunate than the editor, for whom a decision of such matters, however arbitrary it may be, is a practical necessity.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΧΑΙΑΣ ΙΗΤΡΙΚΗΣ

9 (I, 588 L.) καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν ἀπλοῦν, ὥσπερ ὑφήγητο, ὅσα μὲν ἦν ἰσχυρότερα, ἔβλαπτεν, ὅσα δ' ἦν ἀσθενέστερα, ὠφέλει τε καὶ ἔτρεφεν καὶ τὸν κάμνοντα καὶ τὸν ὑγιαίνοντα, εὐπετές ἂν ἦν τὸ πρᾶγμα.

It seems to me very likely that the author wrote καὶ εἰ μὲν . . . ὥσπερ ὑφήγητο, <εἰ> ὅσα μὲν κτλ. Then ὑφήγηται (M) would have arisen from ὑφήγητοι, ι being a relic of εἰ. The proposed alternative to εἰ μὲν was omitted, or rather given in an altered form. Gomperz, *Philol.* LXX, p. 233, proposes <καὶ>, which seems to me less satisfactory.

9 (I, 590 L.) διὸ ἔργον οὕτω καταμαθεῖν ἀκριβέως, ὥστε σμικρὰ ἀμαρτάνειν ἔνθα ἢ ἔνθα, κἂν ἐγὼ τοῦτον τὸν ἱητρὸν ἰσχυρῶς ἐπαινέοιμι τὸν σμικρὰ ἀμαρτάνοντα.

It is, of course, possible that the author used σμικρὰ in both sentences in the same sense, to wit, "a little only," which it undoubtedly bears in the latter; but it would clearly add point to the whole if he added <μῇ>, as I believe he did, after ὥστε.

12 (I, 596 L.) οὐ φημι δὲ δεῖν διὰ τοῦτο τὴν τέχνην ὡς οὐκ ἐοῦσαν οὐδὲ καλῶς ζητηομένην τὴν ἀρχαίαν ἀποβάλλεσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἔχει περὶ πάντα ἀκρίβειαν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ ἐγγὺς οἶμαι τοῦ ἀτρεκεστάτου δύνασθαι ἡκεῖν λογισμῷ ἐκ πολλῆς ἀγνωσίης θαυμάζειν τὰ ἐξευρημένα, ὡς καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς ἐξεύρηται καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης.

After ἀτρεκεστάτου M adds ὁμοῦ, A οὐ. Both readings are, of course, wrong, but it seems clear that something has been lost. What the author wrote may be inferred from *Περὶ διαίτης* Γ, 67 (6, 594 L.) ὡς μὲν οὖν δυνατόν εὐρεθῆναι ἔγγιστα τοῦ ὅρου ἐμοὶ εὐρηται, τὸ δὲ ἀκριβὲς οὐδενί. Here ἔγγιστα τοῦ ὅρου is equivalent to ἐγγὺς τοῦ ἀτρεκεστάτου <ὅρου>, which our author presumably wrote. Gomperz suggested οὐ, but few will think it acceptable.

20 (I, 620 L.) λέγουσι δὲ τινες ἱητροὶ καὶ σοφισταί, ὡς οὐκ εἴη δυνατὸς ἱητρικὴν εἰδέναι ὅστις μὴ οἶδεν, ὃ τί ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὅπως ἐγένετο πρῶτον καὶ ὁπόθεν συνεπάγη ἐξ ἀρχῆς· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δεῖ καταμαθεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς θεραπεύειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους.

Ermerins reads *ὡς οὐκ ἔστι*, without good reason; but he defends *δεῖ* on the ground that, like *ἔστι* (*είη*), it depends on *ὡς*. So far as I know, all editors retain *δεῖ*, which ought clearly to be altered to *δεῖν*. In reading the proof sheets I note that Gomperz, *Philol.* LXX, p. 237, also reads *δεῖν*. Probably we should read also <τὸ> *πρῶτον*.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΕΡΩΝ ΤΔΑΤΩΝ ΤΟΠΩΝ

13 (2, 56 L.) *περὶ μὲν οὖν Αἰγυπτίων καὶ Λιβύων οὕτως ἔχειν μοι δοκεῖ. 13 περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν δεξιῇ τοῦ ἡλίου τῶν ἀνατολέων τῶν θερινῶν μέχρι Μαιώτιδος λίμνης.*

The lacuna toward the close of c. 12 has long been noted. Wilamowitz has shown that the remainder of the chapter relates to Egypt and Libya, as the last sentence of c. 12 states. He has also correctly seen that the reference to the sun-rise is based not upon geographical determinations resulting from close astronomical observations, but upon loose popular phraseology. For *ἀνατολέων τῶν θερινῶν* our MSS. give *ἀ. τ. χειμερινῶν*. This has been altered merely to enable us to connect it with *μέχρι Μαιώτιδος λίμνης*. But is such a connection possible? There can be no doubt, it would seem, that when our author says *περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν δεξιῇ τοῦ ἡλίου τῶν ἀνατολέων* he refers to a region to the south of the sun-rise, as seen from Greek lands. After the discussion of Egypt and Libya we expect at least a reference to the southeast (that is to say to the southwestern part of Asia). Whether our author possessed a knowledge of Syria and Arabia sufficient to warrant more than a general reference may well be doubted; but so much at least I think we must suppose him to have given here. Just where the lacuna, which I confidently assume, began, or what it contained, I do not profess to know. Perhaps it was quite brief, not longer than this: *περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν δεξιῇ τοῦ ἡλίου τῶν ἀνατολέων τῶν χειμερινῶν <έάσω· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐντὸς τῶν ἀνατολέων τῶν χειμερινῶν καὶ τῶν θερινῶν> μέχρι Μαιώτιδος λίμνης — οὗτος γὰρ ὅρος τῆς Εὐρώπης καὶ τῆς Ἀσίας — ὧδε ἔχει περὶ αὐτῶν*. In this case, since the author's narrative follows the direction from south to north, there would be no difficulty in the phrase *μέχρι Μαιώτιδος λίμνης*, which as the northern boundary of "Asia" can hardly follow *ἐν δεξιῇ τοῦ ἡλίου τῶν ἀνατολέων*, especially if, as we seem bound to do, we read *τῶν χειμερινῶν*.

This passage is important in relation to the inquiry into the sources for the geographical and ethnographical knowledge displayed in this treatise. The reference to the solstices, as we have seen, is such as to preclude the assumption that it rests on astronomical observations. The conjecture *θερινῶν* for *χειμερινῶν* is based on the false hypothesis that our author represents the scientific tradition, which had more or less accurately marked the zones. Our doxographic tradition is, as usual, vague or contradictory on this head; for it attributes to Parmenides the first projection of zones, and to Anaximander the discovery of the gnomon, and hence of the solstices and equinoxes. As to the theory of zones, it presupposes a spherical earth; but Anaximander held that the earth's surface was approximately flat, and it is not quite certain that Parmenides did not share his view. On the other hand it was quite possible with the gnomon, which Anaximander undoubtedly knew, to determine the solstices and equinoxes as chronological periods. Anaximander is credited also with the discovery of the inclination of the ecliptic, which was indeed a natural consequence of the observation of the solstices, but did not necessarily imply geographical zones or the sphericity of the earth. The statement that Anaximander set up a gnomon at Sparta, if true, would be important as suggesting that he sought data for the geographical determination of solstices and equinoxes, since a gnomon must vary in construction according to latitude. The story may, however, be a fiction based upon the supposition, true or false, that the bronze *πίναξ* displayed at Sparta by Aristagoras (Hdt., 5, 49) was the chart of Anaximander. At all events we have no evidence that the charts of Anaximander and Hecataeus marked the tropics; but even if that should have been the case, there is no reason to think that the author of our treatise drew upon either the charts or the geographical texts of the Milesian school. The arrangement of parts of our treatise has undoubtedly been disturbed; but it is clear that the description of lands and peoples follows the direction from south to north, whereas Hecataeus (who doubtless followed the example of Anaximander), like Scylax, proceeded from north to south. We must, therefore, look elsewhere for the sources of our author; and we shall do well to consider the probability that he drew upon medical *ἐπιδημιαί*, of which I have no doubt many existed in the fifth and even in the sixth century B.C.

21 (2, 76 L.) μέγα δὲ τεκμήριον αἱ οἰκέτιδες ποιέουσιν.

Wilamowitz would delete ποιέουσιν; Ermerins substitutes παρέχουσι. It would be simpler and better to insert <δ> or <ἀ> after τεκμήριον.

22 (2, 76 L.) ἔτι τε πρὸς τούτοις εὐνουχίαι γίνονται οἱ πλείστοι ἐν Σκίθῃσι καὶ γυναικεῖα ἐργάζονται καὶ ὥς αἱ γυναῖκες <διδαιτεῦνται> διαλέγονται τε ὁμοίως· καλεῦνται [τε] οἱ τοιοῦτοι Ἀναριεῖς.

So Kühlewein, who was, I believe, right in supplying διαιτεῦνται, after Gomperz, and in bracketing τε. I had independently chanced upon both points, and had another suggestion. It seemed to me probable that the source was a MS. having a standard line of 28-30 characters and that it showed $\begin{matrix} \text{διδαιτεῦνται τε} \\ \text{καλεῦνται} \end{matrix}$, and that in consequence the scribe's eyes wandered, giving rise to the omission of the first τε, and the incorrect insertion of τε after καλεῦνται. The second τε may however be due to dittography of the preceding ται.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΓΜΩΝ

8 (3, 446 L.) ἐπὴν δὲ ταύτας ὑπερβάλῃ, λύειν χρή καὶ ἐπὶ ἥσσον πιέζειν τοῖσιν ὀθονίοισιν καὶ ἐπὶ ἐλάσσοσιν ἐπιδεῖν.

We should delete the second ἐπί, which is due to ἐπὶ ἥσσον.

ΕΠΙΔΗΜΙΩΝ F

10 (5, 348 L.) καὶ ἐλπίζει καὶ ἀδοξέει.

The required sense is obvious. Crönert-Passow wrongly quotes Alex. Aphrod. in Arist. Top. 554, 2 as a parallel to ἀδοξέει; for there the word means to be of ill repute, a sense excluded in our passage. Ermerins, feeling that ἀδοξέει yielded no sense, declined to translate it. The word is, I believe, corrupt. Ionic has προσδοκέω = προσδοκάω, and I suspect that we should here read the parallel form ἀδοκέει, though it is not otherwise attested.

ΠΕΡΙ ΤΕΧΝΗΣ

12 (6, 26 L.) ἕτερα μὲν οὖν πρὸς ἐτέρων καὶ ἄλλα δι' ἄλλων ἐστὶ τά τε διόντα τά τ' ἐξαγγέλλοντα, ὥστε οὐ θωμάσιον αὐτῶν τὰς τ' ἀπι-

στίας χρονιωτέρας γίνεσθαι τὰς τ' ἐγχειρήσιας βραχυτέρας, οὕτω δι' ἁλλοτρίων ἐρμηνειῶν πρὸς τὴν θεραπεύουσαν σύνεσιν ἐρμηνευομένων.

So the text of Gomperz, *Die Apologie der Heilkunst*², p. 58. Diels, *Hippokratische Forschungen*, IV (*Hermes*, 48), p. 402, n. 4, rightly approves Schwarz's emendation of βραδυτέρας for βραχυτέρας. Gomperz and Littré prefer τὰς τ' ἀπιστίας, the reading of certain inferior MSS., to that of AMR, τὰς τε πίστίας. It seems to me however, that the latter is clearly right; for our author means to say that, since the physiological actions of medicines and nutrients are very complicated, it is not surprising that the confirmation of the theories, on which this or that remedy is tentatively administered, should require time, and that in consequence the treatment should be slow. The reactions being complicated and the indications being indirect, with the possible need of eliminating this or that secondary effect from the consideration of the physician in attendance, delay is unavoidable.

ΠΕΡΙ ΤΡΩΝ ΧΡΗΣΙΟΣ

2 (6, 126 L.) οἶον καὶ τὰ ὕδατα, ψυκτέα, θερμαντέα, διὰ λεπτότητα.

Editors and translators have been able to make nothing of this passage. It is obviously corrupt, but I think we may with certainty establish the writer's meaning, even if we cannot restore his exact words. The Greeks, having no thermometers, which owe their origin to Galileo, possessed no objective means of measuring heat and cold, being confined to the temperature sense of the body. Consequently there were made many serious mistakes, which led to curious theories, such as those which deal with the question, why springs are cold in summer and warm in winter. One may still hear among the uneducated or the half-educated things confidently asserted which science does not admit. Thus a poultry-man assured me that one must not give the hens warm water in cold weather, because it will immediately freeze. A maid-servant refused to scrub the veranda with warm water for the same reason, and a plumber assured me that if hot and cold water pipes are equally exposed and either freezes, it is always the former rather than the latter. The Greek equivalents are to be found in Arist. *Meteor.*, A 12, 348^b 30 sq. and Plut., *Qaest. Conv.*, 6, 4, 690 B sq., where we are told that if water

or wine is to be cooled, it is advisable first to heat it. Many meteorological phenomena are explained by the ancient philosophers on this principle, to which I devoted some remarks in my review of Döring's *Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, Philos. Review*, XIV (1905), p. 69 sq. I am confident that our author here refers to this principle, and that he gave also its counterpart, to wit, that if you wish to heat water, it should first be chilled. Possibly he may have written οἶον καὶ τὰ ὕδατα <τὰ> ψυκτέα <διὰ πυκνότητα θερμαίνουσι καὶ ψύχουσι τὰ> θερμαντέα διὰ λεπτότητα.

ΠΕΡΙ ΝΟΤΣΩΝ Α

3 (6, 142 L.) ἀνάγκη δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει γίνεσθαι, ὅταν γίνηται.

So far as I know, all editors retain this text, except that Ermerins introduces ὥστε before γίνεσθαι. This addition is probably right, as the following passages will show; but they also show that we should read not ἀνάγκη, but ἀνάγκην. Cp. c. 1 (6, 140 L.) ἔπειτα δέ, ὁκόσα ἀνάγκας ἔχει τῶν νοσημάτων, ὥστε, ὅταν γίνηται, εἶναι ἢ μακρὰ ἢ βραχέα ἢ θανάσιμα κτλ. c. 3 (6, 144 L.) τῶν δὲ νοσημάτων τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει ἀνάγκας, ὥστε ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὅταν γένωνται. c. 8 (6, 156 L.) σχεδὸν δὲ ὅσα ἀνάγκας ἔχει, ὥστε γίνεσθαι ἐν τοῖσι νοσήμασι καὶ τρώμασι κακὰ ἐπὶ κακοῖσι, τὸν ἰητρὸν αἰτιῶνται τούτων γινομένων, καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην τὴν τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀναγκάζουσιν γίνεσθαι οὐ γινώσκουσιν. Περὶ παθῶν, 37 (6, 246 L.) καὶ τοῦτο εὖ εἶδέναι, ὅτι ἀνάγκην ἔχει, ὥστε ὑπὸ τούτων τοῦ ἑτέρου ἢ ἀμφοτέρων γίνεσθαι.

20 (6, 178 L.) ἦν δὲ διαθερμανθῇ τε μᾶλλον ἢ σὰρξ καὶ εἰρύση πλέον τὸ ὑγρὸν, ὀδύνην παρέχει, καὶ ὅπῃ ἂν τοῦ σώματος ἀπ' αὐτῆς ὀρμήσῃ καὶ καταστηρίξῃ, ὀδύνην παρέχει ὀξέην, καὶ δοκέουσιν ἐνιοὶ αὐτοῖσι τὸ ῥήγμα μεθεστάναι. *Ibid.* καὶ ὁκόταν μιχθῇ τό τε αἷμα καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς σαρκός, παχύνεται τὸ αἷμα πολλαπλασίως αὐτὸ ἑωυτοῦ ταύτη, ἢ ἂν ἡ φλέψ τυγχάνῃ ἐσπασμένη, καὶ νοσωδέστερον γίνεται καὶ στασιμώτερόν τε καὶ πλέον· καὶ ὁκόταν πλέον γένηται, μετανέστη τὸ πλήρωμα, ἢ ἂν τύχῃ, καὶ ὀδύνην παρέχει ὀξέην, ὥστε ἐνίοισι δοκεῖν τὸ ῥήγμα ἑωυτοῖσι μεθεστάναι.

In the first of these passages Θ alone has ἑωυτοῖσι for αὐτοῖσι of the other MSS.; in the latter all agree on ἑωυτοῖσι. In view of the proven

superiority of Θ it might seem simplest and almost certain that its reading should be adopted in both instances. But is it, after all, so certain that either reading is correct? In view of the insistence in the text upon the fact of a change in the internal condition, it hardly seems necessary to insist that some persons think that the lesion has changed its position; besides, there is much emphasis in both passages upon the precise locality at which the humor collects. I suspect that our author wrote αὐτόσε in both passages, which became corrupted into αὐτοῖσι, and then by systematic corrections for dialectical purposes was changed to ἐνωτοῖσι. If this be true, it is of importance in estimating the Ionic color of our MSS., notably of Θ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΠΑΘΩΝ

47 (6, 254 L.) τῶν σιτίων ἃ δύναμιν ἕκαστα ἔχει, τεκμαίρεσθαι χρὴ ἀπὸ τῶν φανερῇ τῇν δύναμιν ἐχόντων.

It is obvious that ἃ, the reading of the MSS. retained by Littré, is impossible. Ermerins adopts the conjecture of Mack, ἦν. It is more probable that the correct reading is <ἦντιν>α.

ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΠΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΝ

9 (6, 292 L.) ρεῖ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν θερμότητα, ὅταν αἱ σάρκες ἀραιαὶ γινόμεναι διόδους ποιήσωσι καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν θερμανθὲν λεπτότερον γένηται· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὑγρὸν θερμαινόμενον λεπτότερον γίνεται, καὶ πᾶν ἐς τὸ ὑπεῖκον ρεῖ· μάλιστα δ' ὅταν λίην ὑπερφλεγμῆνῃ, διὰ τόδε ρεῖ· αἱ σάρκες λίην ἔμπλεαι γινόμεναι ὅ τι ἂν μὴ δύνωνται χωρέειν, ρεῖ τὸ ὑγρὸν τὸ μὴ δυνάμενον χωρέεσθαι, ρεῖ δὲ ἢ ἂν τύχῃ· ἐπὴν δὲ ἅπαξ εὖροσι αἱ ῥοιαὶ γένωνται, ρεῖ ἐς τὸ χωρίον ἢ ἂν τύχῃ, ἔστ' ἂν συμπιεχθῶσιν αἱ διόδοι τοῦ ῥόου δι' ἰσχύνητα, ὅταν τὸ σῶμα ξηρανθῇ· ὥστε γὰρ τὸ σῶμα κωινωλέον αὐτὸ ἐνωτῷ διαλαμβάνει καὶ ἄγει, καθ' ὃ τι ἂν ὑγρὸν ἐπιτύχῃ, ἐς ἐνωτὸ τὸ ξηρόν· ἄγειν δὲ οὐ χαλεπὸν αὐτὸ ἐστίν, ὥστε τοῦ σώματος κενοῦ τε καὶ οὐ συνοιδέοντος ὑπὸ ἰσχύνητος.

Ermerins has rightly transposed πᾶν ἐς τὸ ὑπεῖκον so as to read ἐς πᾶν τὸ ὑπεῖκον, and has supplied in the last clause κενοῦ τε <έόντος>, both of which corrections I had independently made. He also omits, without MS. warrant, τὸ ὑγρὸν . . . χωρέεσθαι (5 sq.). Instead of ἐς τὸ χωρίον (7) I think we should clearly read ἐς τι χωρίον, and we should

place a comma after διαλαμβάνει (9). The translators render καθ' ὅ τι 'wherever.' I should prefer to delete καθ' altogether, because ἐπιτύχη can hardly mean "en quelque lieu que ce soit" (Littré), and if we retain καθ', we expect τὸ σῶμα rather than τὸ ξηρόν as its subject. In fact, I believe that some scribe, who overlooked the change of construction, because of the long deferred subject, deliberately added καθ'. The same difficulty accounts in part for the corruption of ἄγει to ἀλγεί (A). I should omit the comma after ἄγει. Similarly I regard κοινωνέον as a deliberate "correction" for the true reading κενὸν ἔον, due to a failure to understand διαλαμβάνει, which means to 'distribute,' not to 'separate,' and αὐτὸ ἐωυτῷ is to be taken with the verb, not with the participle κενὸν ἔον [κοινωνέον]. Once κοινωνέον was introduced it naturally suggested ἀλγεί for ἄγει, because it was taken to imply συμπάθεια. Littré was so far misled that he failed to see that τὸ ξηρόν was the subject of the last clause.

This passage sets forth with exceptional clearness the Hippocratic conception of ἔλξις, which is simple and finds application in the explanation of innumerable phenomena. Heat tends first to expand all on which it acts. When flesh expands it becomes rarefied (ἀραιαί) and empty channels (διόδους, κενοῦ <έοντος>) appear in it, whereas liquids become subtile in the process of expansion, which forces them out of their proper vessels to follow the line of least resistance (ἐς πᾶν τὸ ὑπεῖκον). Such an abnormal overflow occurs chiefly when inflammation sets in. For inflammation produces two results, (a) by the increased temperature producing a violent expansion of the fluids of the body, and (b) by the attendant congestion closing the ordinary channels so that they cannot receive the overflow. But when once the flow is started it tends, on the familiar principle of "water on the table" (for which see below, p. 166 sq.), to continue and finds some casual cavity (ῥεῖ ἔς τι χωρίον ἢ ἂν τύχη) until, by the drainage thus afforded, the secondary effects of heat appear, to wit, the drying and emaciation of the flesh, in consequence of which the channels close and stop the flow. The body being once more drained and empty (κενὸν ἔον), the dry attracts whatever fluid comes its way, and the body distributes the humors to its several parts (αὐτὸ ἐωυτῷ διαλαμβάνει). This distribution is easy since, by reason of its emaciation, the body is empty and its congested condition has passed.

44 (6, 338 L.) ἡ δὲ ἱητρικὴ ὀλιγόκαιρος ἐστίν· καὶ ὅς τοῦτο ἐπίσταται, ἐκείνῳ καθέστηκε, καὶ ἐπίσταται τὰ εἶδεα καὶ τὰ μὴ εἶδεα, ἃ ἐστὶν ἐν ἱητρικῇ ὁ καιρὸς γινῶναι· ὅτι τὰ ὑποχωρητικὰ οὐχ ὑποχωρητικὰ γίνεται, καὶ τᾶλλα ὅτι ὑπεναντία ἐστί, καὶ τὰ ὑπεναντιώτατα ὑπεναντιώτατα. ὁ δὲ καιρὸς ὅδ' ἐστίν· τὰ σιτία προσφέρειν, ὅσων μέλλει τὸ σῶμα προσφερόμενον τὸ πλῆθος κρατεῖν.

A has ὀλγοχρόνιος for ὀλιγόκαιρος, and is probably right. For ὅς we should probably write ὅστις. Ermerins omits καὶ ἐπίσταται, regarding it (in the form ἡ ἐπίσταται) as a gloss on καθέστηκε, and omits also, as a scholion, ὅτι τὰ ὑποχωρητικὰ . . . οὐχ ὑπεναντιώτατα. I had independently suggested both these omissions. For προσφερόμενον we should probably read προσφερομένων. Littré notes that A correct. gives ἡδέα both times for εἶδεα, which might suggest ἥθεα; but εἶδεα is probably right.

For εἶδος Littré *ad loc.* refers to *Περὶ τέχνης*, 2 (6, 4 L.), on which passage see Gomperz, *Die Apologie der Heilkunst*², p. 98 sq., and Diels, *Hippokratische Forschungen IV (Hermes, 48)*, p. 388 sq. Diels, *ibid.*, p. 390, calls in question my statement regarding pre-Socratic definition (*Περὶ Φύσεως*, p. 116, n. 146). What he says deserves attention and I admit that my statement was premature. I have in preparation a study of the subject which shall be as nearly as possible exhaustive, and prefer to await the results of it before saying anything more on the subject, which is immensely complicated by the problematical dates of certain Hippocratic treatises. Here the εἶδεα refer to classes, especially of foods and drugs, which bear a common name; and they are called μὴ εἶδεα because, as in *Περὶ τροφῆς*, 21 (9, 104 sq. L.), they either do not deserve the common name or actually go under a different name, and hence have conventionally a different εἶδος. In all cases, as in *Περὶ τροφῆς*, the final test lies in their ἔργον. See my remarks in *On Certain Fragments of the Pre-Socratics: Critical Notes and Elucidations (Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, XLVIII, No. 19)*, p. 702 sq. For τὰ εἶδεα καὶ τὰ μὴ εἶδεα see *Περὶ τόπων τῶν κατὰ ἄνθρωπον*, 46 (6, 342 L.) οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὰ φάρμακα ἢ τὰ μὴ φάρμακα.

Scholars appear to have paid little attention to the interesting development of the term καιρὸς in the medical writers. The principle that all treatment must be individual led naturally to the further

refinement that it must be directed to the momentary condition of the individual and that the physician must seize the favorable moment (*καιρός*). Obviously the frequent use of the term *καιρός* in different connections tended to charge it with a wealth of meaning which it did not originally possess. Here we find a quasi-definition of *καιρός* as the knowledge of what will or will not under given conditions produce the desired physiological reaction: *καὶ ὅστις τοῦτο ἐπίσταται, ἐκείνῳ καθέστηκε τὰ εἶδεα καὶ τὰ μὴ εἶδεα, ἃ ἐστὶν ἐν ἱητρικῇ ὁ καιρὸς γνῶναι*. Clearly *καιρός* is here a very highly specialized technical term.

Ibid. ἐπὴν δὲ τὸν καιρὸν ὑπερβάλλῃ, τὸ ὑπεναντίον γίνεται, καὶ οἱ πρὶν ὑπερπέσσειν οἴονται ἔχειν, καὶ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι.

The text is in desperate condition. No suggestion has yet been made to solve the puzzle. Littré vainly tries to defend and explain the text as given above. Ermerins, whom Fuchs follows, would omit *καὶ οἱ . . . θερμαίνεσθαι*; but Ermerins is far too free in making excisions especially where, as here, there is no sufficient ground for believing that scholia have intruded. It is better to assume a lacuna after *ὑπερπέσσειν* and to read something like *καὶ οἱ πρὶν ὑπερπέσσειν <μεμαθηκότες . . .> οἴονται ἔχειν, καὶ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι*.

45 (6, 340 L.) τὰ ὑποχωρητικὰ τοιαῦτα ἐστίν, ὅσα ὀλισθηρὰ καὶ τμηματώδεα, καὶ ὅσα ἐν τοῖσι θερμοῖσι λεπτύνονται. ἡ γὰρ κοιλίη θερμὴ ἐστὶ· καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ ἀλμυρὰ καὶ ὅσα τῶν τοιούτων πλεῖστον ἔχουσιν. τὰ δ' οὐ χωρητικὰ ἀλλὰ στάσιμα, ὅσα φῦσαν παρέχουσιν· τὰ γὰρ ὑγρὰ ξηραίνόμενα φῦσαν ποιέουσι, καὶ τὰ στύφοντα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ θερμοῦ πηγνύμενα, καὶ τὰ ψαθυρὰ καὶ τὰ ξηρά. πάντα δὲ τὰ ἐντὸς φλεγμαίνειν ποιέουσι προσφερόμενα, ἅσσα τὰ ἐκτὸς ἰσχυαίνουσιν· ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἰσχυτήριά ἐστι καὶ φλεγματώδεα. καὶ τὰ ὑποχωρητικὰ ἰσχυαίνοντα θερμαίνουσι τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἔτι δὲ τὰ ὀξέα καὶ φλεγματώδεα. πάντα δὲ τὰ ψύχοντα τὰ ἐν τῇ κοιλίῃ· τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ὑποχωρητικὰ ἐστὶ· καὶ τὰ ψυχρὰ καὶ τὰ ὑγρὰ· ὁπότεν δὲ μὴ ὑποχωρητικὰ ἔωσι, θερμαίνουσιν.

I will not speak of minor matters here; for Ermerins has in part anticipated me. But the classification of τὰ ἀλμυρὰ as cathartic and of τὰ ὑγρὰ as constipating seems to me to call for remark. In the first place, at the close of the passage τὰ ψυχρὰ καὶ τὰ ὑγρὰ are classed as diachoretic, as one should expect; then in the early portion of the clas-

sification we find ὅσα ἐν τοῖσι θερμοῖσι λεπτύνονται listed as cathartic. It would seem to be certain from general considerations that this referred to liquids, quite apart from the express statement c. 9 (6, 292 L.) πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὑγρὸν θερμαινόμενον λεπτότερον γίνεται. In view of these facts I had concluded that some one had willfully transposed ἀλμυρά and ὑγρά in our text. But further investigation shows that we are rather confronted with a curious document of early Greek medicine. Evidently the question (naturally raised by the culinary and religious uses of salt as a purifying and preserving agent), whether salt was really diachoretic, was much discussed. Our passage seems to present a compromise answer. It would require too much space to discuss the texts at length, which would be necessary to a real consideration of the question. Instead of doing so, I will refer to other passages which relate to the subject. Hippocr. *Περὶ διαίτης*, B 48 (6, 550 L.) οἱ τάριχοι ξηραίνουσι καὶ ἰσχυαίνουσιν. *Περὶ παθῶν*, 59 (6, 268 L.) τὰ διαχωρητικὰ ἐν τῇ κοιλίῃ θερμαίνεται ταχύ, καὶ θερμαινόμενα μαραίνεται καὶ τήκεται, καὶ τὴν διαχώρησιν διὰ τοῦτο ταχείην παρέχει· ὅσα δὲ στάσιμα τῶν σιτίων καὶ θερμαίνεται βραδέως, καὶ θερμαινόμενα ξηραίνεται καὶ ξυνίσταται, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περίσκληρα γινόμενα οὐ διαχωρεύει. τὰ διαχωρητικὰ ἔγχυλά ἔστι καὶ φύσει θερμά, τὰ δὲ οὖρητικὰ ξηρά καὶ ψυχρά. Pliny, *H. N.*, XXXI, 45, gives after Dioscurides a characterization of the physiological action of salt, which is sufficiently complicated and embodies the compromise above noted. Galen, XIII, 501 K. says πρὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῖς ἅλλοις καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς ἀλσιν ἐξαίρετον ὑπάρχει, τὸ στύφειν μᾶλλον ἢ ῥύπτειν. Oribasius, II, p. 712 sq. and V, p. 600 sq., presents the traditional compromise. Paul of Aegina, Bk. VII, 3, says that salts have desiccant and astringent powers. In view of this showing I prefer to leave the text as it stands, although it appears to be self-contradictory.

46 (6, 342 L.) ἱητρικὴ δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ἤδη ἀνευρῆσθαι ὅλη, ἥτις οὕτως ἔχει, ἥτις διδάσκει ἕκαστα καὶ τὰ ἔθεα καὶ τοὺς καιρούς. ὅς γὰρ οὕτως ἱητρικὴν ἐπίσταται, ἐλάχιστα τὴν τύχην ἐπιμένει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄνευ τύχης καὶ ξὺν τύχῃ εὐποιοιθεῖη ἄν.

Our MSS. here give ἔθεα, which is impossible. In my *Περὶ Φύσεως*, p. 117, I translated it "characters" and meant in n. 152 *ibid.* to suggest ἔθεα but somehow omitted to do so. Ermerins reads εἶδεα. This

would, of course, be admissible, but the frequent confusion of *ἔθος* and *ἥθος* makes it more probable that we should read *ἥθεα*. The important function of the physician, according to the 'old medicine,' was to discover and address himself to the individual *φύσις* and the precise juncture of circumstances, which constitutes the *καιρός*. The *φύσις* is also called the *ἥθος*, especially when it refers to the total individuality; since, however, in practice the individuals were grouped in classes, *εἶδος* likewise occurs. See *Περὶ ἀέρων ὑδάτων τόπων passim*, and cp. *Προρρητικὸν* B 3 (9, 12 L.) ἀλλ' ὅμως πρόσθεν ἢ τὰ ἥθεα τῶν νοσημάτων τε καὶ τῶν ἀλγεόντων ἐκμάθη ὁ ἱητρός, οὐ χρὴ προλέγειν οὐδέν. (For the text of this latter passage see below, p. 187.) For *εἶδεα* see *ibid.*, c. 11 (9, 30 L.).

I cannot believe that *εὐποιηθείη*, which Ermerins also retains, is correct; nor would it help us to write *εὖ ποιηθείη*. Perhaps our author wrote *εὐποροίη ἂν* or *εὐποιος εἴη ἂν*.

Ibid. ὅστις δὲ τὴν τύχην ἐξ ἱητρικῆς ἢ ἐξ ἄλλου τινὸς ἐξελάσει, φάμενος κτλ.

Cp. Plato, *Meno*, 96 C.

ΠΕΡΙ ΙΠΗΣ ΝΟΥΣΟΥ

18 (6, 394 L.) ἕτερον γὰρ ἐτέρῳ τροφή ἐστι, τῷ δὲ κάκωσις.

Here Θ has *τότε*. Wilamowitz has shown the superiority of Θ, especially in this treatise. We should clearly write *τοτέ* δὲ κάκωσις, which brings the passage into line with the doctrine of *καιρός*.

ΠΕΡΙ ΕΛΚΩΝ

2 (6, 404 L.) τὸ δὲ ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν, ἐλαίῳ τὴν χρῆσιν ποιέεσθαι.

The MSS. are divided between *χρῆσιν* and *χρίσιν*, with the preponderance of authority in favor of the former. Ermerins adopts the latter reading, which is more appropriate; I suspect, however, that our author wrote *ἴησιν*. Cp. *Περὶ τῶν ἐν κεφαλῇ τρωμάτων*, 13 (3, 228 L.) οὐδὲ καταπλάσσειν οὐδὲ μοτῷ τὴν ἴησιν ποιέεσθαι.

ΠΕΡΙ ΔΙΑΙΤΗΣ Α

Carl Fredrich, *Hippokratische Untersuchungen*, Berlin, 1899, devoted ch. VI, of his excellent book to Περὶ διαίτης. He gives especial attention to A, cc. 3-25 and 35, of which he offers an improved text and an analysis, which has been much praised. Indeed, his study possesses undoubted merits, which I have no desire to minimize, but it has glaring defects also, which ought not to be perpetuated. Fredrich, addicted to the excesses of Quellenforschung, was interested chiefly in dissecting the treatise with a view to discovering the sources of its several constituents. In the excitement of the chase he at times quite failed to catch the essential thought of the author. He distinguishes three strata: (a) the physiological and dietetic doctrine of the medical compiler, (b) the opinions of an unidentified physiologer ("Physiker"), and (c) certain sayings derived more or less directly from Heraclitus. These strata are in his opinion so clearly distinguishable that they can be sharply contrasted and printed in different type. After this has been done throughout, Fredrich himself, p. 109 sq., admonishes us that we are not to accept too literally the results which he has obtained by his elaborate study. This is in the manner of anti-climax and has the appearance of an afterthought suggested by a critical scholar (perhaps von Wilamowitz?), who had read the discussion in manuscript. The difficulty with this search for definite sources, as with many another of its kind, is that we know far too little of the history of fifth century scientific thought. We know a few names, chiefly of "philosophers," and possess, aside from the enigmatic *Corpus Hippocrateum*, a few fragments only of the scientific literature of the period. Galen, who utters a noteworthy warning against this sort of Quellenforschung (XV, 22 sq., 67 sq. K.), reminds us (and though we know the fact, we cannot be too often reminded of it) that we owe our doxographic record chiefly to the Peripatetics, whose interest was primarily centered on the "philosophers" and on philosophical, that is to say, metaphysical, opinions. This fact has naturally led to false inferences from the character of our tradition. The relative importance of philosophers and philosophy has undoubtedly been overestimated, and it is generally assumed that a few "philosophers" originated all the ideas current in the extraordinarily

fertile period of the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. Then, when we have discovered a certain resemblance between the opinions, say, of a medical writer and of a "philosopher," we are sure of our source. How widespread this prejudice is among leading scholars might be shown by almost innumerable examples. Take a single illustration. Certain doctrines are credibly ascribed to Pythagoras, — that is, the Pythagoreans, — Alcmaeon, Empedocles, etc.¹ Aristotle was not prepared to say whether the Pythagoreans borrowed from Alcmaeon, or he from them. Our later tradition regards Alcmaeon as a Pythagorean. At all events he is a "philosopher," if for no other reason, because Aristotle deigned to allude to his opinions. Others go so far as to attribute the doctrines to Empedocles, although they do not dispute the authority of those who ascribe them to Alcmaeon. We do not even know what was the difference between a φιλόσοφος and a σοφιστής, unless we adopt the distinction of Plato, which can be applied to early representatives of the two classes only *cum grano salis*, if at all. We are forbidden by high authority to use the term *ιατροσοφιστής*, because it is late; but we are constantly confronted with the problem, whether the writer of a given Hippocratic treatise was a physician or a Sophist. Where are we to draw the line of distinction? A leading authority has quite recently spoken of the science of Hippocrates, as if we knew *à priori* what a scientist of the fifth century was and how he regarded his function! It is not too much to say that as yet we know none of these things: hardly has a fair beginning been made of a comprehensive inquiry into the ideals and the state of science in the fifth century. Until we shall know much more than we do at present, the attempts to make sharp distinctions and to discover the precise origin and source of concepts must be regarded with grave suspicion. Fredrich, p. 110, says, "Er (the author of *Περὶ διαίτης*)

¹ Thus Fredrich speaks (p. 140) of the author of *Περὶ διαίτης* as using "Empedocles's theory of pores," although he is aware that the theory was known to Alcmaeon. A similar case may be found in Gilbert, *Die meteorologischen Theorien des griechischen Altertums*, p. 350, where he says of the Hippocratics: "theoretisch ist es die Empedokleische Gleichheit aller Grundstoffe, von dem die Verfasser der verschiedenen Schriften ausgehen." P. 352, n. 2, he refers to Alcmaeon: "die Voraufstellung der vier Grundqualitäten zeigt, dass Alkmaion der herrschenden Lehre sich anschloss." This "prevailing doctrine," if it existed before Alcmaeon, can have come only from the medical tradition, which must have been far older than Empedocles!

ist in gewissem Sinne selbst der Physiker." So much for distinctions (a) and (b). What shall we say of (c), the Heraclitean element? It is not necessary, nor is it desirable, here to discuss the extent or the character of our author's borrowing from Heraclitus. That he was largely indebted to the latter is beyond question. Here for once we have in the thoroughly individualized style a clue which cannot lead us altogether astray. But even here Fredrich and others have been at fault. Heraclitus is regarded from a false point of view, which has led Fredrich into the error of attempting to distinguish sharply between him and his physiologer. What, then, was Heraclitus himself? The several threads of the fabric are inextricably interwoven in the texture of *Περὶ διαίτης*, particularly in the earlier chapters. A careful study will show this. Take a single illustration. In c. 9, which according to Fredrich belongs to his "Physiker," *ζωπυρεῖται* clearly anticipates the illustration of the coals of fire in c. 29, which according to Fredrich (p. 108) is an addition of the compiler of *Περὶ διαίτης*, but was derived from Heraclitus (p. 149).

This fruitless attempt to determine the stratification of original sources has obscured the real course of thought, which Weygoldt had in part clearly perceived. Thus Fredrich, pp. 109, 139 sq., makes much of the "opposition" of the author of *Περὶ διαίτης* to the views of the physiologer in cc. 35-36. Now there is in fact a certain difference of point of view to be seen there; but, if I am not mistaken, it is not one which implies different authors. The author is merely speaking in two capacities. First, as "chemist" (if I may use the term), he speaks of the chemical 'elements' fire and water; then, as physiologist and dietetist, he deals with physiological elements or ultima. The same contrast occurs also in the statements about the composition of the *ψυχή* in cc. 6, 7, 25, etc. A physiologist, who was also a physiological chemist, might have the same difficulty in setting forth his views to-day; for it would be easy to lapse from one plane to another in the course of an exposition of his views. Fortunately there is less confidence shown by scholars and scientists to-day in the effort to give ultimate explanations of phenomena, and proximate principles are more to the taste of physiologists than chemical elements, because the former can be more directly observed and yield more significant data for further study.

2 (6, 468 L.) φημὶ δὴ δεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ὁρθῶς συγγράφειν περὶ διαίτης ἀνθρωπίνης πρῶτον μὲν παντὸς φύσιν ἀνθρώπου γινῶναι καὶ διαγινῶναι, γινῶναι μὲν ἀπὸ τίνων συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, διαγινῶναι δὲ ὑπὸ τίνων μερῶν κεκράτῃται· εἴτε γὰρ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς σύστασιν μὴ γινώσεται, ἀδύνατος ἔσται τὰ ὑπ' ἐκείνων γινόμενα γινῶναι, εἴτε μὴ γινώσεται τὸ ἐπικρατέον ἐν τῷ σώματι, οὐχ ἱκανὸς ἔσται τὰ συμφέροντα προσενεγκεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.

I give the improved text according to Diels, *Hippokratische Forschungen I* (*Hermes*, 45), p. 140. The only question I desire to raise concerns the reading of γινώσεται in the clause εἴτε μὴ γινώσεται τὸ ἐπικρατέον. Diels gives the text of Θ, apparently confirmed by P ("si nesciat"), though in such matters its support counts for little. Apparently, M here has ἐπιγινώσεται, though Diels gives this as referring to the preceding γινώσεται, which I infer from Diels' note (ἀδύνατος . . . γινώσεται Θ P: fehlt M) is wanting in M. What we naturally expect is διαγινώσεται, as I suggested in my *Περὶ Φύσεως*, p. 125, n. 174. The fact, if it be a fact, that M has a variant, though a false one, may possibly favor the change. If we adopt διαγινώσεται, the passage affords a particularly striking illustration of the stylistic arts of our author noted by Diels, *ibid.*, p. 135 sq.

7 (6, 480 L.) περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἐάσω, περὶ δὲ ἀνθρώπου δηλώσω. ἐσέρπει γὰρ ἐς ἀνθρωπον ψυχὴ πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος σύγκρησιν ἔχουσα, μοῖραν δὲ σώματος ἀνθρώπου. (ταῦτα δὲ καὶ θήλεα καὶ ἄρσενα πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα τρέφεται τε καὶ αὖξεται διαίτῃ τῇ περ ἀνθρώπος.) ἀνάγκη δὲ τὰ μέρεα ἔχειν πάντα τὰ ἐσιόντα· οὐτινος γὰρ μὴ ἐνείῃ μοῖρα ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οὐκ ἂν αἰξηθείη οὔτε πολλῆς τροφῆς ἐπιούσης οὔτε ὀλίγης.

Again I give the text of Diels, *Vorsokr.* ³, I, p. 106. In the second sentence Diels formerly adopted Bernays' μοίρας for the μοῖραν of the MSS. I believe neither reading is right, but we should adopt μέρεα (as proposed by Fredrich), which occurs in the parallels in cc. 6 and 25. Doubtless μοῖραν is due to μοῖρα below, οὐτινος γὰρ μὴ ἐνείῃ μοῖρα, where however, as in cc. 5, 9, etc., our author uses it in the appropriate sense of "allotted portion," which it does not bear here. Besides, the following ταῦτα presupposes a neuter plural such as μέρεα or μόρια, as we find τὰ μόρια τὰ ἐωυτῆς in c. 6. The parallels cited point, however, to μέρεα.

In the first sentence Fredrich finds striking proof of the scissors and

paste-pot. The compiler has cut up the treatise of a physiologer in which there was an extensive discussion of the other animal forms, and has discarded it after a phrase, mechanically supplying a formula of transition. We should all be thankful to him if he could prove the existence of such a zoölogical treatise. In the fragments of the philosophers we are confronted with the same phenomenon that we meet here. If we may judge from the doxographic record, Anaximander gave a very general sketch of the origin of animal life and then passed on to a somewhat detailed account of the beginnings of man, in whom his interest centered. The same is true, proportionately, of the other pre-Socratics. Among the medical fraternity we hear of the dissection of animals, but always with a view to throwing light on human physiology. Everywhere we meet the common assumption that inferences from animal to human physiology are valid, even when more advanced knowledge has shown that here and there they were led into error. The Greeks were frankly anthropocentric in their philosophy and science. That a physician should be so can hardly call for apology. Veterinary surgery arose late, from all that we can learn. The only classification of animal life (except that which is embodied in the popular language of the Greeks), which may be assumed to antedate Plato, is, if I mistake not, that which occurs in the second book of *Περὶ διαίτης* in a classification of food-stuffs. If Fredrich or some other scholar can trace scientific study of zoölogy, not in the interest of human physiology and dietetics, farther back, he will render science a service. The writer of *Περὶ σαρκῶν* gives an equally clear indication of this point of view. See my discussion of c. 1 below, p. 179. The beginning of *Περὶ παρθενίων* is likewise of the same sort. Other examples, as from *Περὶ τέχνης* and from *Περὶ ἀέρων ὑδάτων τόπων*, could easily be adduced. One and all point to the same conclusion: to wit, that scientists were fond of linking their special inquiries with a more comprehensive view of the world. In most cases it is quite impossible to determine from whom they got this comprehensive view. We must always remember that speculation was, so to speak, in the air, and that men of active intelligence made their own syntheses, as men do now. As I have remarked before, Fredrich's method is too mechanical and offends both by ignoring the intellectual *milieu* and by attributing too scant intelligence to his man-of-straw, "the compiler."

But let us return to our passage. It will be noted that Diels places the sentence ταῦτα δὲ . . . ἄνθρωπος in parentheses. This he has done in all his editions except in *Herakleitos von Ephesos*.² In the first edition of that work he suggested that the sentence probably belonged to the close of c. 6. In my *Antecedents of Greek Corpuscular Theories*, p. 149, I offered the more reasonable suggestion that it was misplaced and belonged after ἐάσω. But neither was right; for the words belong where they stand, and there is no need of parentheses. In order to understand the section, cc. 6-31, it is necessary to note only that, with the exception of cc. 11-24, in which our author sought to embellish his work with general reflections derived more or less directly from a Heraclitean source, it is embryology with which the writer is concerned. This fact is somewhat obscured by our author's use of ψυχή for the vital principle. In c. 25 ψυχή is used in a sense which finds a close analogy in Περὶ ἐβδομάδων, 13 (Roscher, *Die hippokratische Schrift von der Siebenzahl*, p. 19), as Fredrich pointed out, p. 135. There however, something like a transmigration of ψυχαί is in our author's mind, disclosing the tenacity of the religious association of ideas. He had in mind, however, the connection also of ψυχή with πνεῦμα, the breath of life, which likewise recurs in Περὶ ἐβδομάδων, 13. It would lead us too far afield to discuss here the curious developments of the concept ψυχή in the fifth century, many phases of which appear in the Hippocratic writings. In cc. 6 and 7, however, our author speaks from a different point of view, which he may have connected with the others, though we do not know how he reconciled them. To put it briefly, he practically identified ψυχή, the life principle, with σπέρμα, accepting the doctrine of procreation universally held by the Hippocratics. He thus predicates of the ψυχή what others predicate of the σπέρμα. What this old view of procreation was, I set forth briefly in my *Antecedents of Greek Corpuscular Theories*, p. 170. Wilamowitz, *Die hippokratische Schrift Περὶ ἰρῆς νοῦσου*, p. 15, n. 2, cites the agreement of Περὶ ἀέρων ὑδάτων τόπων with Περὶ ἰρῆς νοῦσου on this point as evidence that the two treatises are the work of the same author. How inconclusive such an argument is will readily be seen if one compares the following passages where the point of view is fundamentally the same: Περὶ ἀέρων ὑδάτων τόπων, 14 (2, 60 L.); Περὶ διαίτης A, 27 (6, 500 L.), 30 (6, 504 sq. L.); Περὶ γονῆς, 1 (7, 470 L.), 3 (7, 474 L.), 8 (7, 480 L.);

Περὶ φύσιος παιδίου, 12 (7, 486 L.), 17 (7, 496 sq. L.); Περὶ νούσων Δ, 32 (7, 542 L.); Γυναικείων Α, 8 (8, 34 L.), 17 (8, 56 L.), 24 (8, 62 L.), 25 (8, 64 L.); Γυναικείων Β, 175 (8, 358 L.), where ἐξονειροῖ is used in speaking of a woman; Περὶ ὁστέων φύσιος, 15 (9, 188 L.). Other passages of like tenor I omit because I have cited them elsewhere. It is from this point of view that our author asserts in cc. 28 and 29 that there is a fusion of the parental ψυχαί in their offspring, although he is aware (c. 29) that his doctrine will hardly win acceptance. In c. 3 he has stated that fire and water are the elements of which all animals are composed; in c. 4, that these elements combine in varying proportions, which give rise to a great variety of organic forms and substances. These "proximate principles" are the "elements" with which the physiologist is immediately concerned. To them he applies the names ὅλα ὄλων, μέρεα μερέων, μέρεα σώματος ἀνθρώπου, to be sure, from the special point of view of embryology and procreation. He cannot of course entirely forget the result of his "chemical" analysis, and hence refers to ψυχὴ as having πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος σύγκρησιν; yet it is the μέρεα σώματος ἀνθρώπου with which as a physiologist he is directly concerned in dealing with the problems of nutrition, growth, and procreation. These μέρεα σώματος ἀνθρώπου are ὅλα ὄλων as being derived from the entire bodies of the parents and reproducing them in miniature, and they contain in themselves the elements of sex, being male and female (cc. 7, 8, 27 sq.), though not because the parents are male and female respectively, but because each parent contributes elements of opposite sex value. These physiological elements are contributed by the parents in large quantity and in great variety. The processes of growth and nutrition, which apply also to the composition and growth of the embryo, depend, as in the philosophy of Anaxagoras, upon the accession of like to like, not of the 'chemical' elements as such, but of the physiological compounds or "proximate principles." I have no doubt, as I said in my *Antecedents of Greek Corpuscular Theories*, that Anaxagoras derived his point of view from the medical tradition, not *vice versa*. Since the principle of growth by the accession of like to like obtains in nutrition and growth, each "proximate principle" that is to grow and produce the body of the offspring must be present in the ψυχὴ (= σπέρμα). I think there can be no doubt of the correctness of this explanation.

7 (6, 480 L.) ἔσω δὲ βιαζόμενον, ἔξω ἔρπει.

Here M has βιαζόμενον, Θ βιαζόμενου. Littré and Ermerins follow the former; Diels, the latter. It seems certain that M is right; for (τὸ) βιαζόμενον is the subject to ἔξω ἔρπει.

8 (6, 480 L.) χρόνον δὲ τοσούτον ἕκαστον τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ἔχει, ἄχρι μηκέτι δέχεται ἢ χώρῃ μηδὲ τροφὴν ἱκανὴν ἔχῃ ἐς τὸ μῆκιστον τῶν δυνατῶν. ἔπειτεν ἀμείβει ἐς τὴν μέζονα χώρην, θήλεα καὶ ἄρσενα, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑπὸ βίης καὶ ἀνάγκης διωκόμενα· ὁκότερα δ' ἂν πρότερον ἐκπλήσῃ τὴν πεπρωμένην μοῖραν, ταῦτα διακρίνεται πρῶτα, ἅμα δὲ καὶ συμμίσγεται.

Diels gives ἡ χώρῃ μηδὲ τροφὴν after M; Θ shows ἡ τροφῇ μηδὲ χώρην, which is undoubtedly wrong. I suspect that we should read ἄχρι μηκέτι δέχεται (sc. ἡ τάξις) ἢ χωρῇ μηδὲ τροφὴν ἱκανὴν ἔχῃ, χωρεῖν being used impersonally as in Arist., *H. A.*, 10, 46, 626^b 10 καὶ τοὺς κηφήνας δὲ ἀποκτείνουσιν (sc. αἱ μέλιτται), ὅταν μηκέτι χωρῇ αὐταῖς ἐργαζομένας. In that event ἡ χωρῇ may be a gloss on δέχεται.

It is more important, however, to grasp the meaning of the passage. It refers, I believe, to the causes which bring about the separation of the ψυχὴ (= σπέρμα), with its male and female constituents, from the bodies of the parents preparatory to procreation. This segregation occurs when, to use modern phraseology, the cells have attained their maximum development in the mature body, as our author more clearly states in c. 25. Want of room and want of the requisite nutrition for further growth causes them to migrate to a larger and more favorable place, — to wit, the womb (see c. 9). There is, however, another problem, arising from the fact that ψυχὴ (= σπέρμα) is extruded not once for all, but from time to time. This problem our author tries to solve by asserting that some "cells" attain their allotted measure of development (τὴν πεπρωμένην μοῖραν) earlier than others. Compare the description of the ἀκμή of the body as a whole, c. 25: ὁκόσα δὲ τῶν σωμάτων ἀκμάζοντά ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῇσι ἡλικίῃσι τῇσι γονίμῃσι, δύναται τρέφειν καὶ αὔξειν. Once the "cells" have attained their maximum growth in the parental body, they flow off and are fused in the act of conception. With c. 9. the attention of our author shifts from the parents to their offspring.

9 (6, 484 L.) τὸ δὲ πῦρ ἐκ τοῦ συμμιγέντος κινεόμενον τοῦ ὑγροῦ διακοσμεῖται τὸ σῶμα κατὰ φύσιν διὰ τοιήνδε ἀνάγκην.

This is the text of Diels, *Vorsokr.*³, I, p. 107. The MSS. have κινεομένου; κινεόμενον is due to Diels. In *Herakleitos von Ephesos*², p. 61 sq., he translates: "Das Feuer jedoch, das sich von dem ihm beigemischten *Element*, dem Wasser, in Bewegung setzt, bildet, usw." This seems to me practically impossible. Ermerins, who retains the MS. reading, renders the sentence thus: "Ignis autem ex commixto humore com-moto corpus secundum naturam propter hanc necessitatem com-ponit." This is more nearly in accordance with the author's thought; for fire, as the active element, can hardly be said to be set in motion by water. In either case, however, the phraseology is awkward. I still regard as most probable the suggestion I made in *Class. Philol.* 5, 247 — to wit, to read τὸ δὲ πῦρ [ἐκ] τοῦ συμμιγέντος κινεόμενον <ἐκ> τοῦ ὑγροῦ κτλ. "When the mixture (of fire and water: with τοῦ συμμιγέντος compare ἐν τῷ συνεσθηκότι two lines above) is set in motion (by the active fire within it), the fire fashions the body out of the moist mass." This remedy is both simple and consonant with the following statements of our author. The process here described is essentially the same as that by which the author of *Περὶ σαρκῶν*, c. 3 sq., explains the formation of the various inner organs. Not very different is *Περὶ φύσιος παιδίου*, 12 (7, 486 sq. L.).

Ibid. πλείστον γὰρ τὸ ὑγρὸν ἐνταῦθ' ἐνῆν, ὅπη κοιλίη καλεῖται· καὶ ἐξέπεσεν ἐντεῦθεν, ἐπεὶ οὐκ εἶχε τροφήν, ἔξω, καὶ ἐποιήσατο τοῦ πνεύματος διεξόδους καὶ τροφῆς ἐπαγωγὴν καὶ διάπεμψιν. τὸ δὲ ἀποκλεισθὲν ἐς <τὸ> ἄλλο σῶμα περιόδους ἐποιήσατο τρισσάς· ὅπερ ἦν ὑγρότατον τοῦ πυρός.

It is quite impossible to restore to integrity this passage, in which there is doubtless considerable confusion and some loss. This remark applies especially to the close of c. 9, but likewise to the part here printed. The last clause ὅπερ ἦν ὑγρότατον τοῦ πυρός is certainly either corrupt or the result of a considerable lacuna. There is one point, however, where Diels has erred without necessity: he renders διάπεμψιν with "Zuleitungen." The word, as Fredrich, p. 100, and Ermerins have seen, refers to the other end of the alimentary canal. In the case of respiration the organs for intake and outlet are the same; in

the alimentary tract it is not so. Cp. Περὶ σαρκῶν, 3 (8, 586 L.) κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ἡ φάρυγξ καὶ ὁ στόμαχος καὶ ἡ γαστήρ καὶ τὰ ἔντερα ἐς τὸν ἀρχὸν κοῖλα ἐγένοντο.

16 (6, 490 L.) ἀπὸ μιῆς ψυχῆς διαιρεομένης πλείους καὶ μείους καὶ μέζονες καὶ ἐλάσσονες.

This sentence has created difficulties. Littré renders: "D'une seule âme partagée en viennent plusieurs et plus petites et plus grandes et moindres." One sees at a glance that this is impossible. Ermerins, "Ab uno animo in partes divisio plures et pauciores, maiores et minores fiunt," and Diels, in the same sense, "Von einer Seele, die sich mehr oder minder teilt, bilden sich grössere oder geringere Seelen." I regard these interpretations as erroneous. As we have seen, our author regards the ψυχὴ as an efflux from the entire ψυχὴ of each parent fused in conception. Hence there can hardly be a question of more or less division or of division in more or fewer parts. Nor can we suppose that the writer refers to successive emissions of ψυχαί from the parental ψυχῆ; for he has already touched upon that, and it would hardly have any bearing on his present problem. All the renderings above given rightly interpret μέζονες καὶ ἐλάσσονες; they err, I believe, in mistaking the sense of πλείους καὶ μείους, which I conceive to be identical in meaning with μέζονες καὶ ἐλάσσονες. That πολὺς may have the sense of "large" is well known: πλεῖστα occurs in this sense, c. 25. Our author, I believe, is still speaking of procreation, and has in mind the problem of the likeness or unlikeness (in size) of offspring to parent.

28 (6, 502 L.) ἦν μὲν οὖν ἐς ἄρσενα τὰ σώματα ἀποκριθέντα ἀμφοτέρων τύχη.

Littré here introduces ἐς from Θ. It is clearly out of place. I had independently suggested the reading adopted by Ermerins ἦν μὲν οὖν ἄρσενα τὰ [σώματα] ἀποκριθέντα <ἀπ'> ἀμφοτέρων τύχη. The only question which seemed to me difficult to answer was whether we should retain σώματα in the sense of 'masses.' Θ here seems to be rather untrustworthy. Below, in the same chapter, we read τὸ δὲ σῶμα τὸ μὲν ἄρσεν αὖξεται, τὸ δὲ θῆλυ μειοῦται καὶ διακρίνεται ἐς ἄλλην μοῖρην (μοῖραν Θ). Here again σῶμα is at least questionable, and I suspect that we

should read *χώρην* for *μοίρην*. If that be true, Θ's *μοῖραν* would be another instance of the influence of the corrector for dialectic and orthographic purposes. At the close of c. 28 I assume a lacuna: *διὰ τὴν σύγκρησιν τοῦ ὕδατος <καὶ τοῦ πυρὸς> τῶν μερέων*.

29 (6, 504 L.) *τοῦτο καὶ ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ πάσχει*.

In the preceding comparison of the fusing souls with live coals, I should follow the text of Fredrich, *Hippokratische Untersuchungen*, p. 149, n. 4; but we should clearly adopt Ermerins' *τῶντό* for *τοῦτο* in the final sentence here given, and read <ῃ> *ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχῇ*.

33 (6, 512 L.) *ἀτρεμίζον δὲ τὸ σῶμα τῆς αὐξήσιος ἔψυκται*.

Ermerins reads *κατέψυκται*. He and Littré make *τῆς αὐξήσιος* depend on *ἀτρεμίζον*, which is somewhat forced. I should prefer to assume the loss of a participle, say, *ληξάσης*, before *αὐξήσιος*.

36 (6, 524 L.) *φύσιν γὰρ μεταπλάσαι ἀφανέα οὐχ οἶόν τε*.

Littré appears here to misconceive our author's meaning, as he frequently does when *φύσις* is involved. The *φύσις ἀφανής* is of course the *ψυχῇ*. Since we may not deal with it directly, we must, our author says, approach it indirectly, by changing the *πόροι* through which the *ψυχῇ* operates. There is, as was stated above, p. 154, a certain want of consistency here, in that certain characteristics of the *ψυχῇ* are derived from their elemental composition while others are explained as due to the physiological structure of the body. Fredrich regards this as proof positive that our author is a mere compiler. But close attention will disclose the same inconsistency in the physiology of Epicurus, and what is more significant, in the philosophy of Leucippus and Democritus. It is well known that these great philosophers (of whom, as philosophers, we must of course speak with the utmost respect) explained certain phenomena by direct reference to the shapes of the constituent atoms, while they accounted for the great mass of phenomena by a somewhat vague reference to the groupings and combinations of atoms without much regard to their several shapes. That our author here uses the voice as an illustration to elucidate the influence of the *πόροι* on the state of the *ψυχῇ* is due to the fact that the voice depends on the breath (*πνεῦμα*), with which our author, as does the author of *Περὶ ἐβδόμαδων*, 13, intimately associ-

ates ψυχή (cp. c. 25). If any one is inclined to despise him because his ψυχή is associated now with σπέρμα, now with the ἐμφυτον θερμόν, now with πνεῦμα, let him reflect on the complexity of the concept ψυχή in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, and let him try to dissociate the complex group of concepts combined in the Stoic νοῦς.

ΠΕΡΙ ΔΙΑΙΤΗΣ Γ

71 (6, 610 L.) ὁκοίη γὰρ ἂν ἔλθῃ ἀπόκρισις καὶ ὅτου ἂν κρατήσῃ, τοῦτο ἐνόσησεν.

The MSS. have ὁκοίη or ὁκοία. Θ has ὅκου for ὅτου and ἐνοσοποίησεν for ἐνόσησεν. At both these latter points Θ is clearly right, as the parallel sentence, c. 73 (6, 612 L.) ὅκῃ ἂν ῥαγῇ ἢ πλησμονή, τοῦτο διαφθείρει, sufficiently proves. Ermerins took ἐνόσησεν as transitive and so thought to retain it. The variants ὁκοίη and ὁκοία are probably due to conflation of ὅκῃ and ὅκοι. We should read ὅκῃ γὰρ ἂν ἔλθῃ <ῥ> ἀπόκρισις καὶ ὅκου ἂν κρατήσῃ, τοῦτο ἐνοσοποίησεν.

ΠΕΡΙ ΔΙΑΙΤΗΣ Δ

88 (6, 642 L.) ὅταν δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἡμερινὰς πρήξιας ὑπεναντίωται τὰ ἐνύπνια καὶ ἐγγίνηται περὶ αὐτέων ἡ μάχη ἢ νίκη, τοῦτο σημαίνει ταράχην ἐν τῷ σώματι. καὶ ἦν μὲν ἰσχυρὴ ἦ, ἰσχυρὸν τὸ κακόν, ἦν δὲ φαύλη, ἀσθενέστερον.

Interest centers in ἡ μάχη ἢ νίκη, which is the reading of Θ, except that νίκη stands without accent. Littré defends this text, saying that νίκη answers to ἰσχυρὴ, μάχη to φαύλη. This conclusion is hard to accept, and Ermerins cut the knot by reading simply μάχη for ἡ μάχη ἢ νίκη. The readings of the other MSS. show various attempts to solve the puzzle, but make it plain that νικη must somehow represent the true reading. There are two possibilities, between which it is difficult to decide: (a) our author may have written ἡ μάχη ἢ νείκεα, when νείκη came into the text by some careless scribe, and νικη resulted by itacism: in this case ἰσχυρά (Θ) might be meant for a plural due to νείκεα; or (b) our author may have written ἡ μάχη ἢ νείκη, intending νείκη to be taken as feminine singular. Of the scant evidence for νείκη, fem., only Heath's νείκης (for MSS. νίκης), in Aesch., *Agam.*, 1378, accepted by many editors, and the mention of the form in E. M.

appear to be left; for the epigram in Paus., 5, 2, 5 is equivocal, and Diels reads Νίκης in Timon, fr. 21, 2, while most editors reject Hermann's νείκης (for MSS. νίκης) in Aesch., *Eum.*, 903. That one or the other form stood here seems to me certain; for we thus obtain the proper contrast, μάχη answering to ισχυρή, νείκεα (or νείκη) to φαύλη.

ΠΕΡΙ ΓΥΝΑΙΚΕΙΗΣ ΦΥΣΙΟΣ

1 (7, 312 L.) περί δὲ τῆς γυναικείης φύσιος καὶ νοσημάτων τάδε λέγω· μάλιστα μὲν τὸ θεῖον ἐν τοῖσιν ἀνθρώποισι αἴτιον εἶναι· ἔπειτα αἱ φύσιες τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ χροιαί.

Littré, 8, 527 sq., has discussed this remark at length, and has sought to connect it with the beginning of *Περὶ παρθενίων* (8, 466 L.) and thus to bring the doctrine into harmony with that of *Περὶ ἰρῆς νούσου* and *Περὶ ἀέρων ὑδάτων τόπων*. In all these matters he was, I believe, quite in the wrong. There is, I conceive, no relation between τὸ θεῖον, as here intended, and the cosmological principles referred to in *Περὶ παρθενίων*. Of that passage we shall have more to say in its place. That there should be different points of view represented in so composite a body of literature as the collection of ancient medical treatises handed down to us as the works of Hippocrates, is no longer a matter for wonderment. Littré himself probably did more than any one other scholar to make this a thing of common knowledge. Alongside the scant courtesy shown to the votaries of religion in *Περὶ ἰρῆς νούσου* we have the pious genuflexions of *Περὶ εὐσχημοσύνης*, 6 (9, 234 L.). So too *Προγνωστικόν*, 1 (2, 112 L.) runs directly counter to *Περὶ ἰρῆς νούσου*, 2 (6, 364 sq. L.). As for our passage from *Περὶ γυναικείης φύσιος*, the obvious meaning of the words is also that intended by the writer. He recognizes that divine agency brings about many, even the most important things. How they are brought about he does not pause to inquire,—at any rate, not to inform us. But for him, a man of science, science, which alone is his present concern, has nothing to do with these; therefore he passes abruptly on to matters which lie within its province. Possibly the author may have been of the number of those who, like Socrates, held that the limits of man's art and intelligence are closely drawn and sharply defined, and that the wise man will cultivate his garden and commit the rest to the gods. At

all events, one is reminded by his statement of certain expressions purporting to represent the Socratic turn of thought, such as *Xen., Mem.*, I, 3, 5, Διαιτή δὲ τήν τε ψυχὴν ἐπαίδευσε καὶ τὸ σῶμα, ἢ χρώμενος ἄν τις, εἰ μὴ τι δαιμόνιον εἴη, θαρραλέως καὶ ἀσφαλῶς διάγοι, and *Equit.*, II, 13. There is also a passage in *Προρρητικὸν* B, 8 (9, 26 L.) which seems at least to hint that beyond the range of man's art — though of course the writer is concerned solely with that — there lies the possibility of divine intervention: περὶ δὲ ποδαγρώντων τάδε· ὅσοι μὲν γέροντες ἢ περὶ τοῖσιν ἄρθροισιν ἐπιπωρώματα ἔχουσιν, ἢ τρόπον ταλαίπωρον ζῶσι, κοιλίας ξηρὰς ἔχοντες, οὗτοι μὲν πάντες ἀδύνατοι ὑγιέες γίνεσθαι ἀνθρωπίνῃ τέχνῃ, ὅσον ἐγὼ οἶδα· . . . ὅστις δὲ νέος ἐστὶ καὶ ἀμφὶ τοῖσιν ἄρθροισιν οὐπω ἐπιπωρώματα ἔχει, . . . οὗτος δὴ ἱητροῦ γνώμην ἔχοντος ἐπιτυχῶν ὑγιὲς ἂν γένοιτο. I may add that Littré, besides being at fault in his apprehension of our passage, was mistaken also in his interpretation of *Περὶ ἱρῆς νόσου*, 2 (6, 364 L.) φύσιν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ πρόφασιν ἀπὸ ταῦτο τὸ θεῖον γίνεσθαι ἀφ' ὅτου καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα. He failed to see — what is obvious from the context — that τοῦτο is to be taken with τὸ θεῖον, and that one must supply from the foregoing sentence ἔχει to govern φύσιν καὶ πρόφασιν, the infinitive γίνεσθαι depending on φύσιν <ἔχει>, as it might on πέφυκεν. Fuchs, though apparently somewhat uncertain about the syntax, correctly renders the thought.

2 (7, 314 L.) καὶ ἐνίοις προσθετοῖς χρήσθω.

Here, apparently, all the MSS. show ἐνίοις. The author is, however, prescribing the treatment in every detail, and nowhere else does he use so general terms. In fact, general rather than specific directions are extremely rare in the *Corpus*. I have noted but three other instances — all in *Περὶ ὄψις* — which may be worthy of remark: c. 4 (9, 156 L.), where Sichel reads τότε δὲ χρὴ τινι τῶν ὑγρῶν φαρμάκων, ὅταν δὲ τὸ αἷμα ἀπορρῇ, χρὴ διαχρίειν τῷ ἐναίμῳ (Ermerins introduces his own conjecture ἐναίμῳ τινὶ) φαρμάκῳ. c. 9 (9, 160 L.) ρεύματος δὲ μὴ ἔχοντος, μετὰ γέ του (τοῦ Ermerins) ξηροῦ τὴν ὑπάλειψιν ξυμφέρει ποίεσθαι. Even these exceptional instances of rather general directions are somewhat uncertain. Possibly this fact had its influence with Ermerins, who in our passage simply omitted ἐνίοις ("Equidem ἐνίοις abicio"). This accords with his practice of omitting almost anything which causes difficulty: an easy remedy, but one hardly

to be commended. In our treatise, and in the other gynecological treatises of the *Corpus*, woollen bandages and applications are prescribed on almost every page. I therefore suggest that we read ἐρίους or εἰρίους for ἐνίοις. The two forms are so constantly confused in the MSS. that I prefer to leave the choice between ἐρίους and εἰρίους to others.

ΠΕΡΙ ΟΚΤΑΜΗΝΟΤ

12 (7, 458 L.) ἕκαστα γὰρ χωρίζεται ῥέποντα κατὰ τὰς συλλοχίας· κρατιστεύει δὲ τὰ τῷ ἡλίῳ ξυντροφώτατα.

The meaning of these words has, so far as I know, been missed by all the interpreters. It depends on that of συλλοχίας (an ἅπαξ εἰρημόνον), and of ξυντροφώτατα. As a matter of fact, the sentence is somewhat uncalled for, and has no immediate connection with embryology, but was suggested by the reference to excrement at the close of the preceding sentence. When anything passes off from the body, in which it was combined with others in physiological compounds, it is resolved into its elements, which tend to reunite each with its own kind. This is the meaning of the first clause, and so it was obviously understood by the Schol. Galen.: συλλοχίας, ἀθροίσματα· ἡ μεταφορὰ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰς τοὺς λόχους συνειλεγμένων. The thought, a commonplace in the *Corpus*, I have abundantly illustrated in my essay *On Certain Fragments of the Pre-Socratics* (*Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, vol. XLVIII), p. 726 sq. As to the last clause, the author means only that the warm element (fire) is the best. This also is a commonplace in early Greek thought, for which see Fredrich, *Hippokratische Untersuchungen*, p. 134 sq. Compare in particular Hipp., Περὶ ἐβδομάδων, cc. 6 and 15. Here ξύντροφος is practically equivalent to συγγενής.

ΠΕΡΙ ΦΤΥΣΙΟΣ ΠΑΙΔΙΟΥ

18 (7, 502 L.) ὥσπερ ὕδατι ἐπὶ τραπέζης.

It is often said of the Greeks that they were over much inclined to theorize. It is true that they were keen to "explain" everything, and that in their efforts they displayed a great fertility in the invention of hypotheses; but the reproach implied in the oft-repeated re-

mark applies to the Greeks no more than to modern representatives of science, who have merely ignored their debt to the past and hence count themselves superior. All science rests upon observed facts, which it attempts to explain by applying to the interpretation of them principles which are conceived to underly observed facts in another and supposedly related field. So much is common to all science, ancient and modern alike. What distinguishes modern from ancient science is only the clarified vision which has served to define more accurately the facts really observed and to limit the spheres within which one may safely reason from analogy. Little by little the gaps of human knowledge have been narrowed by intercalating sciences with their appropriate facts and principles, and with the multiplication of sciences has come a corresponding consciousness that empirical principles can be safely applied, even tentatively, only to closely related facts. The natural, and indeed under the circumstances inevitable, failure of the Greeks in the dawn of science to observe these necessary limitations to analogical reasoning, gives to their science, when compared with that of to-day, the appearance of wild and somewhat irresponsible speculation. The impression of empty theorizing is aggravated by another characteristic of the Greeks, which appears most markedly in their literature. I refer to their reticences, imposed upon their artists by a natural and highly cultivated esthetic sensibility. They prefer to give us a finished product in which there shall remain as few traces as possible of the "accidents" of production. All the scaffolding, all the mechanical devices employed in the erection of their symmetrical structures are removed, and they stand forth as eternally existent types, mysteriously let down from heaven. Occasionally an uncompleted structure, a half-finished statue, or the Athenian Propylaea, will disclose what Greek art, left to perfect its work, would have concealed with preternatural *honte*. So too Greek philosophers, in depicting the sublimest of all works of art, the Kosmos, might naturally reveal its laws and principles of operation, but they generally concealed the stages by which they mounted to an apprehension of them. Above all, they rarely mentioned the homely facts of observation which suggested their theories. Hence many, who possess little knowledge either of human life or of the operations of the human mind, have been misled into the indefensible error of

supposing that the Greeks by some mysterious process created their views of the world out of their inner consciousness without a *πὸν στῶ* in the realm of fact. Fortunately for us there has survived a mass of early writings which for the most part does not deserve the name of literature, because it was not wholly subjected to the principles of esthetic composition. In the Hippocratic treatises more than anywhere else we find revealed the observations in detail upon which the generalizations and inferences of Greek science were erected. In the interest of science and of the history of human thought it is of the greatest importance that we note these observations and the uses to which they were put in the explanation of other phenomena.

One of these precious observations is referred to in the words we have cited. The Greeks were well aware that water tends to seek a level. When they wished to characterize a world utterly topsy-turvy, in which everything was at cross-purposes and nature was violated, they quoted or alluded by preference to the words of Euripides,

*ἄνω ποταμῶν ἱερῶν χωροῦσι παγαί·
καὶ δίκαια καὶ πάντα πάλιν στρέφεται.*

Hippocrates refers repeatedly to this fact, *Περὶ φύσιος παιδίου*, 24, 25 (7, 522 L.), 22 (7, 514 L.); *Περὶ φυσέων*, 14 (6, 112 L.); *Περὶ τόπων τῶν κατὰ ἄνθρωπον*, 9 (6, 292 L.). But there was another homely observation which ran counter to this.

Water may often be seen standing in considerable globules on a table or other plane surface at a height above the surrounding level without beginning to flow. So far as I know, the Greeks were not aware of the fact of surface tension in liquids by which science now explains this phenomenon and the related one of bubbles. They did know, however, that if one moistens the surface next to the up-standing globules, they will flow off. Once the flow is started, the water will continue to flow down hill. Other references to this principle occur in Hippocrates: *Περὶ τόπων τῶν κατὰ ἄνθρωπον*, 9 (6, 292 L.), for which see above, p. 146 sq.; *Περὶ φύσιος παιδίου*, 21 (7, 512 L.) *καὶ ὁκόταν ἀφίκηται ἐς τὰς μήτρας, ἰδέην ἔσχει τοῦ γάλακτος, καὶ τὸ παιδίον ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐπαυρίσκειται ὀλίγον, οἱ δὲ μαζοὶ δεχόμενοι τὸ γάλα ἀείρονται πιμπλάμενοι· καὶ ὁκόταν τέκη, ἀρχῆς κινήσιος ὑπογενομένης, χωρεῖ τὸ γάλα ἐς τοὺς μαζοὺς τούτους, ἣν θηλάζῃ. ἔχει γὰρ οὕτω· θηλαζόμενοι τοῖν μαζοῖν εὐρώτερα γίνεται τὰ φλέβια ἐς τοὺς μαζοὺς· εὐρώτερα δὲ*

γενόμενα, ἀπὸ τῆς κοιλίης ἔλκοντα τὸ πιαρόν, τοῖν μαζοῖν διαδιδάσαι. Here, however, the principle is somewhat obscured by being combined with that of ἔλξις. In *Περὶ νούσων* Δ, 50 (7, 588 L.) τὸ ἐπὶ τραπέζης ὕδωρ is connected with the observation of the stoppage of a liquid's flow from a narrow-necked flask inverted upright. There is probably an allusion to the principle in *Γυναικείων* Α, 16 (8, 54 L.) πρὸς γὰρ τὸ κινεῖμενον φιλέει ἰέναι and in other passages where κινεῖσθαι occurs in the gynecological treatises. *Περὶ φύσιος παιδίου*, 30 (7, 538 L.) μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὕδρωψ ἔρχεται αἱματώδης ἀπὸ τε τῆς κεφαλῆς καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου σώματος, ἀποκριθεὶς ὑπὸ βίης τε καὶ πόνου καὶ θερμῆς, καὶ ὁδὸν ἀφηγήσατο τῇ τῶν λοχίων καθάρσει . . . καὶ οἱ τε μαζοὶ καὶ τᾶλλα μέλεα ὁκόσα ὑγρότερα ἔστι, καταρρήγνυται τῶν γυναικῶν, ἥκιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τόκῳ, ἔπειτα δέ, ὡς ἂν πλειόνων πειρέωνται τόκων, ἔτι μᾶλλον καταρρήγνυται διακενουμένων τῶν φλεβῶν ὑπὸ τῆς καθάρσιος τῶν λοχίων. In this passage I suspect that we should read ὁδὸν ὑφηγήσατο, as in other similar instances. Another observation, which ran counter to the principle that liquids tend to flow down hill, that of capillarity, was doubtless known to the Greeks. This they must have known from their experience with lamps. Gomperz, *Philol.* LXX, p. 221, sees the first recognition of it in Hippocr., *Περὶ ἀρχαίης ἱητρικῆς*, 23. He refers, of course, to c. 22. The attraction of wool for moisture and the capacity of loose masses of wool to hold larger quantities of it than tightly woven woolen fabrics were well known to the Greeks, as appears from *Περὶ γυναικείων* Α, 1 (8, 12 L.) and *Περὶ ἀδένων*, 16 (8, 572 L.); but these references apparently apply to the attraction of moisture from the air, as does Lucretius, 1, 305; 6, 470 sq; 6, 616 sq.

27 (7, 528 L.) ἦν δὲ τις βούληται ἐννοεῖν τὰ ῥηθέντα ἀμφὶ τούτων ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐς τέλος, εὐρήσει τὴν φύσιν πᾶσαν παραπλησίην εὐῶσαν τῶν τε ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυομένων καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων.

Littre and Ermerins have, I believe, wrongly punctuated and interpreted this passage; for the phrase ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐς τέλος belongs not to the preceding clause, but to the following, serving indeed to enforce πᾶσαν. Cp. c. 29 (7, 530 L.) ὧδε ἔχουσιν εὐρήσεις πᾶσαν μέχρις ἐς τέλος. It seems obvious also that ἐξ before ἀνθρώπων was erroneously added by a scribe out of deference to ἐκ τῆς γῆς. A careful reader would note this even if he did not know that for τῶν [ἐξ] ἀνθρώπων there was a variant reading, preserved in Cξ, τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν.

28 (7, 528 L.) καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀτρεκείη κρῖναι.

Ermerins saw, as did I, that we must read ἀτρεκείη.

30 (7, 534 L.) τοῦτο δὲ ἦν αἰὶ γίνεται, ἐν φύσει καὶ ἐν γένει μητρῶόν σφιν ἔστιν.

Littré and Ermerins agree in placing the comma after γίνεται. It should be placed after γένει. Littré renders, "s'il en est constamment ainsi, cette condition leur est originelle, naturellement et spécialement." He refers to *Περὶ νούσων* Δ, 34 (7, 546 L.) οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ ἔφν, ὅτι μὴ συγγενές. The parallel is germane, but the translation is wrong. Fuchs is more nearly right: "Kommt das immer vor, in Natur und Geschlecht, so ist es von der Mütter vererbt." But Fuchs, like his predecessors, errs in regard to the meaning of ἐν φύσει καὶ ἐν γένει. One who studies attentively the extremely varied use of φύσις in Hippocrates, which baffled even Galen, will readily understand why our author added καὶ ἐν γένει. The whole phrase is another instance of the common defining ἐν διὰ δυοῖν, which I have elsewhere illustrated (*On Anaximander, Class. Philol.*, VII, p. 212 sq.) by the locutions ἀρχή καὶ στοιχείον, ἀρχή καὶ πηγὴ, ἀρχή καὶ ρίζα. As ἀρχή had a great variety of meanings, which it might be desirable for the sake of clearness to differentiate by the addition of more specific synonyms, so φύσις had, among a multitude of other meanings, that also of family or stock, which our author distinguishes by adding καὶ ἐν γένει. That weakness or disease may be inherited was a common opinion among Greek physicians; cp. *Περὶ ἰρῆς νούσου*, 2 (6, 364 L.) ἀρχεται δὲ (sc. epilepsy) ὥσπερ καὶ τᾶλλα νοσήματα κατὰ γένος. In saying μητρῶόν σφιν ἔστιν our author appears to express the belief that a female defect may be handed down from parent to offspring by matriherital transmission only, excluding the operation of atavism in the male line. This belief is hardly reconcilable with that of the author of *Περὶ διαίτης*, which assumes that male and female contributions are derived from both parents.

ΠΕΡΙ ΝΟΥΣΩΝ Δ

32 (7, 542 L.) ἀποφανέω δὲ ὅκως ἐν ἐκάστη τουτέων τῶν ἰδεῶν καὶ πλείω καὶ ἐλάσσω ἐν τῷ σώματι γίνεται, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου νοσέουσι, καὶ ὅτι αἱ νοῦσοι κρίνονται ἐν τῇσι περισσῇσιν ἡμέρησι, καὶ τίνες ἀρχαὶ τῶν νούσων εἰσὶ, καὶ ὁκοῖα αὐτέων ἐκάστη ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐργασμένη τὴν νοῦσον

ἐπάγει, καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ ῥίγος πυρετῶδες γίνεται, καὶ διὰ τί τὸ πῦρ ἐπιπίπτει μετ' αὐτό.

This passage is utterly corrupt, as is shown by comparison with c. 53 (7, 594 L.). In order to save space I will give it as I think it should be printed. The corrections here proposed were all found independently, when on comparing Ermerins I learned that he had anticipated me at five points.

ἀποφανέω δὲ ὅκως ἐκάστη τῶν ἰδεῶν καὶ πλείων καὶ ἐλάσσων ἐν τῷ σώματι γίνεται, καὶ ὑπ' ὅτου νοσέουσι, καὶ <δι> ὅτι αἱ νοῦσοι κρίνονται ἐν τῇσι περισσῇσιν ἡμέρησι, καὶ <αἱ> τινες <αἱ> ἀρχαὶ τῶν νοῦσων εἰσὶ, καὶ ὁκοῖα αὐτέων ἐκάστη ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐργασαμένη τὴν νοῦσον ἐπάγει, καὶ ὑπ' ὅτου τὸ ῥίγος τὸ πυρετῶδες γίνεται, καὶ διότι τὸ πῦρ ἐπεισπίπτει μετ' αὐτό.

Corresponding changes are to be made here and there in c. 53. They have for the most part been anticipated by Ermerins.

34 (7, 548 L.) ἀνάγκην οὖν τῷδε προσηγαγόμεν, ὅτι ἀπὸ τῶν βρωμάτων καὶ τῶν ποτῶν ἐς τὴν κοιλίην χωρέοντων ἔλκει τὸ σῶμα κατὰ τὰς πηγὰς, ὥς ὠνόμασα, ἡ ὁμοίη ἱκμὰς τὴν ὁμοίην διὰ φλεβῶν.

I would not alter the text, except that I should read διὰ <τῶν> φλεβῶν, because the process is general throughout the body. But Littré and Fuchs have erred in regard to the meaning of κατὰ τὰς πηγὰς, the former rendering "aux sources," the latter "in die Quellen." Ermerins also misses the true meaning of the text. Having discussed these πηγαί in my article *On Anaximander*, I may here confine myself to the remark that κατὰ τὰς πηγὰς here means "according to their respective reservoirs," anticipating the distributive expression which immediately follows, ἡ ὁμοίη τὴν ὁμοίην. Each reservoir, having its specific contents, attracts its own appropriate humor. This locution might be illustrated with scores of examples from the *Corpus*: one near at hand will serve *instar plurium*, c. 32 (7, 542 L.) κατὰ τοὺς τοκῆας, which Littré and Fuchs have not failed to understand.

35 (7, 550 L.) ἦν δὲ ἐς τὸ σῶμα ἀφίκεται, κείσέ οἱ μέμικται τῇ ἄλλῃ ἱκμάδι.

Here οἱ may be nothing more than a rather pointless reference to the patient, such as occurs not unfrequently in this treatise; but I

suspect that οἱ arose from ΘΙ written as a correction above CE in κείσε and that we should therefore write κείθι, as in c. 37 (7, 554 L.) κείθι δὲ μίσγεται τῇ ἄλλῃ ἱκμάδι, and in c. 50, quoted below. I find that Ermerins also reads κείθι.

50 (7, 582 L.) καὶ ἡ ταλαιπωρία δὲ τοιοῦτον ἐργάζεται· ὁκόταν γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι ταλαιπωρέωσιν, οἷσιν ἂν μάλιστα τοῦ αἵματος ταλαιπωρία ᾗ, κείθι στηρίζεται.

Here Ermerins has suggested τὸν for τοιοῦτον, which had occurred also to me. But there is probably another corruption in the sentence; for I think we should clearly read ὅθι for οἷσιν, corresponding to κείθι.

51 (7, 586 L.) πρὶν δὲαραχθῆναι οὐκ ἔχει ἐκχωρεῖν τὸ πλεῖον τοῦ ὑγροῦ, ἀλλ' ἄνω καὶ κάτω εἰλέεται μεμιγμένον τῷ ἄλλῳ ὑγρῷ· πάντα γὰρ πλήρεά ἐστιν· ἐν δὲ τῇαραχῇ κενοῦται· κενοῦται δὲ τι ἕτερον ἐτέρου μᾶλλον, καὶ τὸ πλεῖον ἐὼν χωρίον κατίσχει.

The last clause has made trouble. Littré renders, "et l'endroit qui est plein garde"; Ermerins, "quodque copia superat, loco continetur"; Fuchs, "und die angefüllte Stelle behält was sie hat." The rendering of Ermerins is of course impossible, those of Littré and Fuchs are hardly in keeping with the thought. It seems to me that πλεῖον (whether we read πλεῖον or πλέον) here is the same as in the first clause, being the comparative. It answers to μᾶλλον, and one may raise the question whether it is better to read ἐὼν or <κεν>εὼν. The author appears to mean that in the process of churning, which separates the humors, there arise empty receptacles of varying size, and the larger receptacle retains the diseased (ἄπεπτον, unmixed) humor.

52 (7, 590 L.) νῦν δὲ ἐρέω τὰ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ἣν ἀνεπιτήδεια γένηται φύντα ἐν τῷ σώματι, τίνα ἐργάζεται καὶ ὁκόταν κρατέῃ ἐν τῷ σώματι τοῦ ὑγροῦ.

It is obvious that φύντα (v.l. φύντα) is corrupt. The context clearly indicates what the writer intended; for he is speaking of the deleterious effects of cold on the system. We should doubtless read ψύχεα for φύντα. I should place a period after οὐρανοῦ, and a comma after ἐργάζεται.

55 (7, 600 L.) ὥσπερ ἐφ' ὕδατι μὴ καθαρῷ ταραχθέντι ἐν κύλικι ἢ ἐν χαλκῷ καὶ καταστάντι ὑποστάθμῃ ἄλις γίνεται ἐν τῷ μέσῳ, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῇ κύστει ἀπὸ τοῦ οὔρου, μὴ καθαροῦ ἐόντος· καὶ οὐκ ἐξουρέεται, ἅτε ἐν τῷ κοίλῳ ἐοῦσα, καὶ μάλιστα ἀλῆς γινομένη ὑπὸ ὀδύνης οὐ διέρχεται διὰ τῆς οὐρήσιος.

I do not think it likely that our author wrote ἄλις γίνεται and ἀλῆς γινομένη side by side: it should be either ἄλις or ἀλῆς in both clauses, probably the latter. In such matters our MSS. do not help us. Then, in view of the close parallelism in the comparison, it is hard to accept ἐφ' ὕδατι beside ἀπὸ τοῦ οὔρου. The dative prevents us from changing ἐπὶ to ἀπό, but ἐπὶ cannot be taken as referring to place, and it is unlikely that it means "in the case of." I think it probable that we should read ὥσπερ ὑφ' ὕδατι . . . ὑποστάθμῃ γίνεται, giving the same point of view at least as ἀπὸ τοῦ οὔρου. For ὑπὸ ὀδύνης E I J K have ὑπὸ δίνης, which seems certainly correct; for ὑπὸ ὀδύνης, *prae dolore*, is hardly in place. The reasons why the stone does not pass off have already been sufficiently expressed in ἅτε ἐν κοίλῳ ἐοῦσα, which refers to the bottom of the bladder, and in καὶ μάλιστα ἀλῆς γινομένη, which alludes to its solid massiveness; ὑπὸ ὀδύνης seems to be a deliberate "emendation" by one who knew the excruciating pains of the disease. But ὑπὸ δίνης is wanted to complete the sense of ἀλῆς γινομένη, for it is the revolution of the urine in the churning motion produced in the bladder that creates the solid mass of the stone. There is good evidence to prove that when a compound was stirred in a dish or cup the favorite method, in ancient times as now, was to produce a revolution in its contents. Heraclitus, fr. 125 Diels, says καὶ ὁ κυκεὼν δίσταται <μη>κινούμενος, and Theophrastus, *de Vertigine*, 9 sq., notes that this implies a δίνη. Hippocrates, speaking of the same disease of the bladder, Περὶ ἀέρων ὑδάτων τόπων, 9 (2, 38 L.) says ὁκόσων μὲν ἢ τε κοιλίῃ εὐροός τε καὶ ὑγιερῇ ἐστι καὶ ἡ κύστις μὴ πυρετώδης μηδὲ ὁ στόμαχος τῆς κύστιος συμπέφρακται λίην, οὔτοι μὲν διουρεῖσι ῥῆϊδίως, καὶ ἐν τῇ κύστει οὐδέν συστρέφεται. ὁκόσων δὲ ἂν ἡ κοιλίῃ πυρετώδης ᾖ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν κύστιν τωὐτό πάσχειν. ὁκόταν γὰρ θερμανθῇ μᾶλλον τῆς φύσιος, ἐφλέγμηνεν αὐτῆς ὁ στόμαχος. ὁκόταν δὲ ταῦτα πάθῃ, τὸ οὔρον οὐκ ἀφήσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐωυτῇ συνέφει καὶ συγκαίει. καὶ τὸ μὲν λεπτότατον αὐτοῦ ἀποκρίνεται καὶ τὸ καθαρώτατον διεῖ καὶ ἐξουρεῖται, τὸ δὲ παχύτατον καὶ θολωδέστατον συστρέφεται καὶ συμψη-

γννται. <καὶ> τὸ μὲν πρῶτον μικρόν, ἔπειτα δὲ μέζον γίνεται. κυλινδεύμενον γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ οὔρου, ὃ τι ἂν συνίστηται παχύ, συναρμόζει πρὸς ἑωυτὸ καὶ οὕτως αὖξεται τε καὶ πωροῦται. Here the reference to a *δίνη* is unmistakable. In *Περὶ φύσιος παιδίου* 17 (7, 496 sq. L.) the *διακόσμησις* of the embryo by the action of the *πνεῦμα* is described, and the process is illustrated by an experiment in which the experimenter inserts a tube into a bladder and then, introducing water and various solids, blows into the tube, producing a revolution of the contents. First there ensues a general mixture and then a segregation of like to like in the various solids, arranged in the order of their density, the heaviest at the center. The process agrees precisely with that described by Theophrastus, *de Vertigine*, 10, and with that assumed by the early cosmologists in the *διακόσμησις* of the universe. It was just such observations which led the philosophers to lay so much stress on the *δίνη* as the essential cosmic process.

ΠΕΡΙ ΠΑΡΘΕΝΙΩΝ

I (8, 466 L.) ἀρχή μοι τῆς ξυνθέσιος τῶν αἰειγενέων ἡτρικῆς· οὐ γὰρ δυνατόν τῶν νοουσημάτων τὴν φύσιν γνῶναι, ὃ πέρ ἐστι τῆς τέχνης ἐξευρεῖν, ἣν μὴ γνῶ τὴν ἐν τῷ ἀμερεῖ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐξ ἧς διεκρίθη.

Of the variants it is hardly necessary to speak; the text tradition is fairly clear, except that C has *νεηγενέων* for *αἰειγενέων* and *μέρει* for *ἀμερεῖ*, both of which readings are clearly wrong. Ermerins inserts <ἀπὸ> before τῶν αἰειγενέων and reads γνῶ τις αὐτὴν ἐν τῷ μέρει. With the exception of *τις*, no one will favor his additions. His rendering clearly shows that he had no notion of what the writer intended to say.

Littré (8, 527 sq.) has discussed this passage at length. Only one point that he makes is good, — to wit, that *ἡτρικῆς* cannot be taken as agreeing with *ξυνθέσιος*. He proposes to connect τῶν αἰειγενέων with *ξυνθέσιος*, which, as we shall presently see, is a mistake.

The first point to determine is the extent of the introductory clause. To do this one needs only to compare a number of such beginnings, which I collected in my essay *On Certain Fragments of the Pre-Socratics* (*Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, XLVIII), p. 732 sq. The following examples will suffice: *Περὶ τόπων τῶν κατὰ ἄνθρωπον*, 2 (6, 278 L.) *φύσις τοῦ σώματος, ἀρχή τοῦ ἐν ἡτρικῇ*

λόγου. Περὶ τέχνης, 4 (6, 6 L.) ἐστὶ μὲν οὖν μοι ἀρχὴ τοῦ λόγου, ἥ καὶ ὁμολογηθήσεται παρὰ πᾶσιν. Ion of Chios, fr. 1 (Diels, *Vorsokr.*³, I, 286, 24) ἀρχὴ δέ μοι τοῦ λόγου· πάντα τρία καὶ οὐδὲν πλέον ἢ ἔλασσον τούτων τῶν τριῶν. These parallels show that our author began thus: ἀρχὴ μοι τῆς ξυνθέσιος.

More difficult is the second clause τῶν αἰειγενέων ἱητρικῆς. That ἱητρικῆς = ἱητρικῆς τέχνης might indeed be readily guessed, but is made certain by the clause ὃ πέρ ἐστιν τῆς τέχνης ἐξευρεῖν; for the writer would not have said τῆς τέχνης if he had not previously stated of what art he was speaking. It is easy also to see that there is a lacuna in the clause, but he would be a rash man who attempted with perfect assurance to fill it. The parallels above cited predispose one to the belief that the lacuna is not long; for they suggest that the second clause was probably not much longer than the first and was quite as laconic. Perhaps he may have written τῶν αἰειγενέων <γνώσις τῆς> ἱητρικῆς or τῶν αἰειγενέων <φύσιν εἶδέναι τῆς> ἱητρικῆς. "It is the business of medicine to have a knowledge of the eternal." Such sentences are of course of frequent occurrence, as e. g. Arist. *Poet.* 1456^b 10 ἃ ἐστιν εἶδέναι τῆς ὑποκριτικῆς. Of course there are innumerable possibilities. Thus one thinks of Περὶ ἱητροῦ, 4 (9, 208 L.) ἐστὶ δὲ οἰκείη ἐπίδεσις τῆς ἱητρικῆς, which would justify one in adding οἰκείη or οἰκείον in the supplements above proposed.

But what are τὰ αἰειγενέα? That the phrase is equivalent to τὰ θεῖα is in itself probable and supported by Plato, *Symp.*, 206 E ὅτι αἰειγενές ἐστὶ καὶ ἀθάνατον ὡς θνητῷ ἢ γέννησις and *Legg.*, 773 E χρὴ τῆς αἰειγενοῦς (= ἀγήρω) φύσεως ἀντέχεσθαι τῷ παιδᾶς παιδῶν καταλείποντα αἰεὶ τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρετάς ἀνθ' αὐτοῦ παραδιδόναι. At the mention of τὰ θεῖα one thinks at once of the heavenly bodies, which the Greeks called τὰ θεῖα κατ' ἐξοχήν, cp. Plato, *Apol.*, 26 C sq., etc. If this were our author's meaning, we should have a parallel to Περὶ ἀέρων ὑδάτων τόπων, 2 (2, 14 L.). An even more striking parallel would be the noble passage in Arist., *Part. Animal.*, A 5, 644^b 22 sq. But we must not forget that our author has given a reason for asserting the claim of medicine to the science of τὰ θεῖα. "For," says he, "it is impossible to know the nature of diseases, which it is the business of medicine to discover, unless one know the nature of things in their primal state of aggregation, out of which they were segregated." It can

hardly be doubted that in τὴν ἐν τῷ ἄμερεϊ <φύσιν> he refers to what he has previously called τὰ αἰειγενέα. To me it seems certain that he refers to what we call the elements. We know that Empedocles spoke of them as "gods," giving to each a divine name, and calling them immortal, fr. 35, 14 Diels, αἰψα δὲ θνήτ' ἐφύοντο, τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατ' εἶναι, ζῶρά τε τὰ πρὶν ἄκρητα, διαλλάξαντα κελεύθους. By τὴν ἐν τῷ ἄμερεϊ <φύσιν> our author meant the same as if he had said τὴν ἄμερῃ φύσιν, a locution for which examples are given in Diels, *Vorsokr.*³, I, 309, 6 adnot., and in my essay *On Certain Fragments of the Pre-Socratics*, p. 729 sq. If he was really thinking of Empedocles, he probably had in mind the complete mixture of the elements in the σφαῖρος, out of which, by the action of Νεῖκος, the elements were segregated. He would then have regarded the σφαῖρος as absolutely, or at least as relatively to the present world, the beginning. He may, however, have had in mind the ἄκριτος (or ἄκρητος?) κόσμος of Περὶ ἐβδομάδων, 2. See Roscher, *Die hippokratische Schrift von der Siebenzahl*, pp. 6 and 131. In any case, it would appear certain that he was of the number of those whom the writer of Περὶ ἀρχαίης ιητρικῆς, 20 (1, 620 L.), so sharply assailed, λέγουσι δὲ τινες ιητροὶ καὶ σοφισταί, ὡς οὐκ εἴη δυνατὸς ιητρικὴν εἰδέναι ὅστις μὴ οἶδεν, ὃ τί ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὅπως ἐγένετο πρῶτον καὶ ὁπόθεν συνεπάγη ἐξ ἀρχῆς.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΝΑΤΟΜΗΣ

1 (8, 538 L.) νέφροι δὲ ὁμοιορυσμοί, τὴν χοροῖν δὲ ἐναλίγκιοι μήλοισιν· ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων ὀχετοὶ σκαληνοειδέες ἄκρην κορυφὴν κύστιος κεῖνται . . . καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀνὰ μέσον ἐντὸς φύσις ἐκοσμήθη.

There are, I believe, two corruptions in this passage. I do not understand ἄκρην κορυφὴν . . . κεῖνται, and ἄκρην seems to be unnecessary. I suspect that we should read ἄχρι ἐς τὴν κορυφὴν . . . τείνονται. Again, in the last clause, τὰ μὲν ἐξ . . . φύσις ἐκοσμήθη is, I think, impossible. Here C has ἐκόσμεν, doubtless a mistake for ἐκόσμησεν. But ἐκόσμησεν is clearly an ancient conjecture proposed to clear up a difficulty, which Ermerins tried to meet by writing φύσις ἐκοσμήθη. Neither remedy is satisfactory, because there is no call in the context for φύσις in any form. But this is not all. The phrase ἀνὰ μέσον ἐντὸς is highly suspicious. The remedy seems to be easy, for ἐντὸς

φύσις is obviously the seat of the difficulty, and we should read καὶ τὰ μὲν ἔξ ἀνὰ μέσον ἐντοσθίδια ἐκοσμήθη. The word ἐντοσθίδια elsewhere occurs but once, I believe, in Hippocrates, Περὶ ἀφόρων, 230 (8, 440 L.), though it is not so rare in later Greek.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΔΕΝΩΝ

Diels, *Über einen neuen Versuch, die Echtheit einiger Hippokratischen Schriften nachzuweisen*, p. 1153 sq., adduces evidence from the use of dual forms, from which he concludes that this brief treatise is an Alexandrine forgery. Various other arguments against its early date have at different times been advanced, drawn chiefly from its want of attestation and from certain points of its physiological teachings. Some of these considerations appear to me to be strongly in favor of Diels' view. I will add a few others which have not, to my knowledge, been hitherto urged. Diels draws attention to the form οὐάτοις and the straining after effect in δὺ' ἐστὸν κακία. To these examples let me add c. 17 (8, 574 L.) τοῖσι κυρίοις τοῦ σώματος, καρδίῃ, πνεύμονι and c. 7 (8, 562 L.) ἐπὴν δὲ ἀνὴ τὴν ἔλξιν, where τὴν ἔλξιν is equivalent to τὸ ἐλκόμενον, a usage without parallel in Hippocrates, but not unexampled in later Greek. (Cp. *θεραπείην*, Περὶ καρδίας, 3 (9, 82 L.), below p. 188.) In c. 9 (8, 564 L.) αὕτη πᾶσα ἀπαναισιμῶται ἰκέλη τῆς πρόσθεν, we might be inclined to propose τῇ ἔμπροσθεν, but the somewhat rare dative is probably only one more indication of the author's conscious archaizing. I am not sure that the use of *τόνος* in c. 15 (8, 570 L.) is not a Stoic reminiscence, which possibility receives a certain color of probability from the insistence on teleology of a sort not elsewhere represented in Hippocrates, but wholly in the manner of the Stoics and Galen. Compare c. 7 (8, 560 L.) *χρεῖη τοιῆδε κτλ.* c. 4 (8, 558 L.) *ἡ γὰρ φύσις ποιεῖ ἀδένας καὶ τρίχας· ἅμφω χρέος τωὺτὸ λαμβάνουσιν.* c. 8 (8, 562 L.) *τὰ δ' αὐτὰ οἱ δοκεῖ παρέχειν ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά.* c. 17 (8, 574 L.) *ἀγαθὰ δὲ ἔχουσι τοῖσιν ἔμπροσθεν ὅμοια.*

2 (8, 556 L.) *πονέουσι δὲ οὐ κάρτα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι, ἐπὴν πο-
νέωσι δέ, ἢ δι' ἰδίην νοῦσον· παῦρα δὲ καὶ τῷ σώματι ξυμπονέουσιν.*

That this passage is corrupt is obvious. The remedies proposed are unsatisfactory. I think it probable that we should read: *πονέουσι*

δὲ οὐ κάρτα <αὐταί>, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι, ἐπὴν πονέωσί γε, <ξυμπο-
νέουσι μάλλον> ἢ δι' ἰδίην νοῦσον· παῦρα δὲ καὶ τῷ <ἄλλῳ> σώματι ξυμπο-
νέουσιν. Here the rare poetical adverb παῦρα also deserved notice.

10 (8, 564 L.) ἡ κεφαλὴ καὶ αὕτη τὰς ἀδένas ἔχει, τὸν ἐγκέφαλον
ἵκελον ἀδένι· ἐγκέφαλος γὰρ καὶ λευκὸς καὶ ψαφαρός, ὅκως περ καὶ
ἀδένες, καὶ ταῦτ' ἀγαθὰ τῆσιν ἀδέσι ποιεῖ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐοῦσαν, διὰ τὰ
εἰρημένα μοι, τιμωρέων ὁ ἐγκέφαλος ἀποστερεῖ τὴν ὑγρασίην καὶ ἐπὶ
τὰς ἐσχατίας ἔξω ἀποστέλλει τὸ πλεόν ἀπὸ τῶν ῥοῶν.

Here we should read καὶ αὕτη, as Ermerins also has seen, and pos-
sibly τινὰς ἀδένας. Doubtless we should read also ὅκως περ καὶ <αἱ>
ἀδένες, and place a period or colon after ποιεῖ. After κεφαλὴν we must
supply <ὕγρην> and probably omit ἀπὸ before τῶν ῥοῶν. Our author
shares the word ἐσχατιή with the writer of *Περὶ καρδίας*, 4 (9, 82 L.).
The two treatises have other things also in common; see below,
p. 189, where reference will be made to our passage.

ΠΕΡΙ ΣΑΡΚΩΝ

1 (8, 584 L.) ἐγὼ τὰ μέχρι τοῦ λόγου τούτου κοινῇσι γνώμησι χρέομαι
ἐτέρων τε τῶν ἐμπροσθεν, ἀτὰρ καὶ ἐμεωυτοῦ· ἀναγκαίως γὰρ ἔχει κοινὴν
ἀρχὴν ὑποθέσθαι τῆσι γνώμησι βουλόμενον ξυνθεῖναι τὸν λόγον τόνδε περὶ
τῆς τέχνης τῆς ἱητρικῆς.

Editors and translators have been much troubled by the phrase
μέχρι τοῦ λόγου τούτου, some taking it to refer to writings antedating
Περὶ σαρκῶν, others, as *e. g.* Littré, regarding it as referring to the
preliminaries or introduction of the present treatise. Ermerins, tak-
ing the former view, goes so far as to change χρέομαι to ἐχρησάμην and
ἔχει to εἶχε. Doubtless Littré was influenced in arriving at his con-
clusion by the sentence with which c. 1 closes: νῦν δὲ ἀποφαίνομαι
αὐτὸς ἐμεωυτοῦ γνώμας; but this proves nothing. It must be allowed
that this expression is curious — so curious, in fact, that I am half
inclined to doubt whether it was written by the author of the treatise.
In the introductory sentence above quoted he says that he is em-
ploying notions which he holds in common with his predecessors. No
stretch of the imagination can make it seem probable that this common
stock of ideas is exhausted by the scant pronouncement of c. 1; and
in the discourse which follows it is obvious that our author is drawing

upon such a stock of current notions, both in the cosmology and physiology, and in the statements about the number seven. It is quite impossible for us with our meager knowledge of fifth century thought to distinguish his own contribution from the ideas that had become public property. In view of this situation I regard it as certain that the phrase in question means "so far forth as concerns the present treatise." This use of *μέχρι* is discussed by Vahlen, *Gesammelte Philologische Schriften*, I, p. 16 sq., and Bywater on Aristotle's *Poetics*, 1449^b 9.

For the need of laying a foundation for a discourse in opinions commonly accepted, compare *Περὶ τέχνης*, 4 (6, 6 L.) *ἔστι μὲν οὖν μοι ἀρχὴ τοῦ λόγου, ἥ καὶ ὁμολογῆσεται παρὰ πᾶσιν*, and Diogenes of Apollonia, fr. 1 Diels, *λόγου παντὸς ἀρχόμενον δοκεῖ μοι χρῆναι εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀναμφισβήτητον παρέχεσθαι*. This procedure is in the every-day practice of rhetorical discussion the analogue of the principle by which one starts in mathematics from axioms and in dialectic from hypotheses.

Ibid. *περὶ δὲ τῶν μετεώρων οὐδὲ δέομαι λέγειν, ἣν μὴ τοσοῦτον ἐς ἄνθρωπον ἀποδείξω καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα, ὅκοσα ἔφυ καὶ ἐγένετο, καὶ ὃ τι ψυχὴ ἐστίν, καὶ ὃ τι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, καὶ ὃ τι τὸ κάμνειν, καὶ ὃ τι τὸ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ὅθεν ἀποθνήσκει*.

In my *Περὶ Φύσεως*, p. 131, n. 197, I noted that we must read *οὐδὲν δέομαι* for *οὐδὲ δέομαι* and *ὅκως* for *ὅκοσα*. I did not then know that Ermerins had anticipated me in making the latter obvious correction. The corruption arose from the phrase *καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα* which appears strange in the context because no further attention is paid to the other animals. Above, p. 156 sq., I cited other examples of this practice of the early Greek scientists, which displays their wide horizon and at the same time their anthropocentric interest. For *οὐδὲν δέομαι*, "I don't want," see Shorey, *Class. Journ.*, II (1906-07), p. 171. There is, however, another correction to be made in our passage. We must read <ῆ> *ψυχὴ*, and place a colon after *τοσοῦτον*, which is followed by a natural asyndeton. For the use of *τὰ μετέωρα* here I would refer to my *Περὶ Φύσεως*, p. 131.

2 (8, 584 L.) *δοκέει δέ μοι ὁ καλούμεν θερμόν, ἀθάνατόν τε εἶναι καὶ νοέειν πάντα καὶ ὀρῆν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ εἰδέναι πάντα ἔοντα τε καὶ ἐσόμενα*.

τοῦτο οὖν τὸ πλεῖστον, ὅτε ἐταράχθη πάντα, ἐξεχώρησεν εἰς τὴν ἀνωτάτω περιφορὴν· καὶ ὀνομῆναί μοι αὐτὸ δοκεῖσιν οἱ παλαιοὶ αἰθέρα.

Ermerins is doubtless right in supplying <τὰ> before ἐόντα. Gossen in his article on Hippocrates in Pauly-Wissowa, VIII, 1838, says that our author knows the fire-theory of Heraclitus. This unintelligent remark is on a level with much else in his disappointing article. As a matter of fact one might use c. 2 as a text for a history of all Greek cosmological theories from Anaximander onwards. I propose, of course, to do nothing of the sort. The last clause, however, invites a few added remarks. One naturally thinks of Anaxagoras, who called fire by the name of αἰθήρ (Diels, *Vorsok.*², I, 307, 35). But Empedocles occasionally did the same (*ibid.*, p. 159, § 33). Indeed our author may have had no special philosopher in mind; for αἰθήρ, being essentially a poetic and popular word, was too vague to lend itself readily to classification in a scientific scheme and fell outside the four-fold category of the elements. It was used, doubtless with conscious reference to its etymological connection with αἶθω, now for πῦρ, and again as the equivalent of ἀήρ. In dealing with cosmology the certain test is its location, for the order of the elements in the cosmological schemes of the ancients is invariable: earth, water, air, fire.

Ibid. ἡ δευτέρα μοῖρα κάτωθεν, αὐτὴ καλέεται μὲν γῆ, ψυχρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ πούλῳ κινούν.

Ermerins again rightly writes ἡ δὲ δευτέρα. Whether the μὲν in αὐτὴ καλέεται μὲν γῆ does not call for a supplement such as <ἔστι δὲ> ψυχρὸν κτλ. is a fair question. In my essay *On Anaximander* (*Class. Philol.*, VII), p. 222, I suggested πούλῳ κεινόν for πούλῳ κινούν. I have no doubt that the proposal was essentially correct, but I should have gone a little farther and written πολύκενον. Any student of early Greek thought, and in particular of Περὶ σαρκῶν, must recognize at once that γῆ is not πούλῳ κινούν: fire, not earth, is the active element. Besides, πολύκενος was apparently a favorite word with the Atomists, and the next clause shows that it is required here: καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἐνὶ δὴ πούλῳ τοῦ θερμοῦ. The θερμόν is in the interstices and empty spaces of the γῆ πολύκενος. Cp. Gilbert, *Meteorol. Theorien des griechischen Altertums*, p. 287, n. 2.

3 (8, 586 L.) καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ ξηραίνουμένης τῆς γῆς, ταῦτα καταληφθέντα περὶ αὐτὰ ποιεῖ οἶον περ χιτῶνας.

Ermerins reads ταῦτα τὰ καταληφθέντα περὶ ἑωυτὰ σηπεδόνας ἐποίεε. Whether the change of tense was necessary may be doubted. Without knowing Ermerins' text I proposed αὐτὰ and οἶον περὶ in my *Antecedents of Greek Corpuscular Theories*, p. 137, n. 1. The vulgate reads οἶον περὶ, only one MS., K, reading οἶον περ, according to Littré. I still think οἶον περὶ the probable reading: cp. Plato, *Theaet.*, 201 E, ἐγὼ γὰρ αὖ ἐδόκουν ἀκούειν τινῶν ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρῶτα οἶον περὶ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς τε συγκείμεθα καὶ τὰλλα, λόγον οὐκ ἔχει. With our passage compare the cosmology of Diod. Sic., I, 7, especially 1-3: κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τῶν ὄλων σύστασιν μίαν ἔχειν ἰδέαν οὐρανόν τε καὶ γῆν, μεμιγμένης αὐτῶν τῆς φύσεως· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διαστάντων τῶν σωμάτων ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τὸν μὲν κόσμον περιλαβεῖν ἅπασαν τὴν ὀρωμένην ἐν αὐτῷ σύνταξιν, τὸν δὲ ἀέρα κινήσεως τυχεῖν συνεχοῦς, καὶ τὸ μὲν πυρῶδες αὐτοῦ πρὸς τοὺς μετεωροτάτους τόπους συνδραμεῖν, ἀνωφεροῦς οὐσης τῆς ταύτης φύσεως διὰ τὴν κουφότητα· ἀφ' ἧς αἰτίας τὸν μὲν ἥλιον καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν πλῆθος τῶν ἀστρων ἐναποληφθῆναι τῇ πάσῃ δίνῃ· τὸ δὲ ἱλυῶδες καὶ θολερὸν μετὰ τῆς τῶν ὑγρῶν συγκρίσεως ἐπὶ ταῦτ' καταστῆναι διὰ τὸ βάρος· εἰλούμενον δ' ἐν ἑαυτῷ συνεχῶς συστρεφόμενον ἐκ μὲν τῶν ὑγρῶν τὴν θάλατταν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν στερεμνιωτέρων ποιῆσαι τὴν γῆν πηλῶδη καὶ παντελῶς ἀπαλὴν. ταύτην δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τοῦ περὶ τὸν ἥλιον πυρὸς καταλάψαντος πῆξιν λαβεῖν, ἔπειτα διὰ τὴν θερμασίαν ἀναζυμουμένης τῆς ἐπιφανείας συνοιδῆσαι τινα τῶν ὑγρῶν κατὰ πολλοὺς τόπους, καὶ γενέσθαι περὶ αὐτὰ σηπεδόνας ὑμέσι λεπτοῖς περιεχομένας. This latter is probably the doctrine of Archelaus referred to by Plato, *Phaedo*, 96 B ἀρ' ἐπειδὴν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν (fire and water) σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβῃ, ὥς τινες ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῶα συντρέφεται; Burnet, *ad loc.*, refers σηπεδόνα λάβῃ to the formation of milk; but he is of course mistaken in this, as in taking συντρέφεται in the sense of 'being nourished.' Doubtless the union of the two conceptions in Epicurus (Lucretius, 5, 805 sq., Censorinus, 4, 9), which is not attested for earlier philosophers, suggested his interpretation.

Ibid. ὁκόσα δὲ ἐτύγχανε κολλωδέστερα ἔοντα καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ μετέχοντα, ταῦτα δὲ θερμαίνόμενα οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἐκκαυθῆναι, οὐδὲ μὴν τοῦ ὑγροῦ γενέσθαι.

Ermerins reads ταῦτα δὴ and οὐδὲ μὴν ὑγρά γενέσθαι. The latter reading is very improbable. I propose <ἀνε> τοῦ ὑγροῦ.

Ibid. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ἡ φάρυγξ καὶ ὁ στόμαχος καὶ ἡ γαστήρ καὶ τὰ ἔντερα ἐς τὸν ἀρχὸν κοῖλα ἐγένοντο· τοῦ γὰρ ψυχροῦ αἰεὶ θερμαινόμενου τὸ μὲν πέριξ ἐξωπτήθη ὅσον αὐτὸ κολλῶδες ἦν, καὶ ἐγένετο χιτῶν ὁ περὶ αὐτὸν μήνιγξ, τὸ δὲ ἐντὸς τοῦ ψυχροῦ, οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ οὔτε λιπαρὸν οὔτε κολλῶδες πουλὺ, διετάκη καὶ ἐγένετο ὑγρόν· κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ἡ κύστις, πουλὺ ψυχρὸν ἀπολειφθέν, τὸ πέριξ αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ θερμαινόμενον διελύθη καὶ ἐγένετο ὑγρόν· οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ οὔτε τοῦ λιπαροῦ οὔτε τοῦ κολλώδους· ὅσον δὲ περιῆν χιτῶν ἐγένετο, ἀτὰρ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα κοῖλα, τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον· ὅκου μὲν ἦν τοῦ κολλώδους πλεον ἢ τοῦ λιπαροῦ, χιτῶν μήνιγξ ἐγένετο.

Ermerins omits αὐτό (3), ὁ περὶ αὐτὸν μήνιγξ (4), τὸ πέριξ αὐτοῦ (6) and reads ἀποληφθέν for ἀπολειφθέν. Of these measures I approve of the last. For αὐτό I should read αὐτοῦ, for τὸ πέριξ αὐτοῦ, τὸ ἐντὸς αὐτοῦ, as the thought, and the parallel (4 sq.), seem to require. According to Foes some MSS. omit τὸ πέριξ; if this be true, it suggests that πέριξ was a mistaken conjecture introduced to fill a lacuna in the text. There is no need of πέριξ, since the notion occurs in the last clause, where it belongs, that is in περιῆν. The meaning is not, as Littré says, "ce qui resta de trop," but "that which surrounded it," as περιῆν stands in Thucyd., 7, 81. With regard to ὁ περὶ αὐτὸν μήνιγξ also Ermerins is in error; we need only to read ἐγένετο <ὁ> χιτῶν ὁ περὶ αὐτὸν μήνιγξ. Our author is merely referring back to his account of the origin of the envelops, discussed above. In the last clause of our section also we should read <ὁ> χιτῶν, unless a better collation of the MSS. shows that χιτῶν is to be omitted altogether. The article has to be restored also in c. 4 (8, 588 L.) καὶ διὰ τοῦτο <ὁ> ἐγκέφαλος, ὅτι ὀλίγιστον ἔχει τοῦ λιπαροῦ, τοῦ δὲ κολλώδους πλείστον, οὐ δύναται ἐκκαυθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ χιτῶνα μήνιγγα παχείην ἔλαβε. In the last clause χιτῶνα is not to be omitted with Ermerins. Littré correctly estimated its force. I incline to think that διελύθη (8), which occurs also just before our passage, is a corruption of διεχύθη, which is more suitable to the context and is supported by διετάκη (5) and by διαχέει and διαχεόμενον (p. 588, 10 and 16). Ermerins likewise places a full stop after κύστις (6). I

should use a colon. With this chapter compare *Περὶ διαίτης* A 9 sq. (6, 482 sq. L.).

4 (8, 588 L.) ὁ δὲ ἐγκέφαλός ἐστι μητρόπολις τοῦ ψυχροῦ καὶ τοῦ κολλώδους, τὸ δὲ θερμόν τοῦ λιπαροῦ μητρόπολις.

Ermerins saw the absurdity of this text, and sought to remedy it by reading ὁ δὲ μυελός τοῦ λιπαροῦ μητρόπολις. It is unlikely that the marrow, being widely distributed in the human frame, should be called a μητρόπολις; almost as unlikely as τὸ θερμόν. But there is another consideration which deserves to be noted: we can hardly dispense with τὸ θερμόν because τὸ θερμόν and τὸ λιπαρόν form a natural contrast to τὸ ψυχρόν καὶ τὸ κολλώδες. It is most likely therefore that we should read τοῦ δὲ θερμοῦ <καὶ> τοῦ λιπαροῦ . . . μητρόπολις. The question then arises, which organ would our author have been most likely to regard as the μητρόπολις of heat and moisture? For, as we shall presently see, τὸ λιπαρόν is regarded by him as a product of liquefaction under the influence of heat. Once the question is so stated, the answer appears almost inevitable: the heart. We should thus have to add <ἡ καρδίη> in the lacuna before μητρόπολις, for the heart was almost universally held to be the seat of the ἐμφυτον θερμόν. In my essay *On Anaximander* (*Class. Philol.*, VII), p. 219 sq., I illustrated the cosmic and microcosmic conception of the ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ, and there noted, p. 221, n. 1, the use of μητρόπολις in our passage. There can be no doubt that by μητρόπολις our author intends an ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ, and by τοῦ ψυχροῦ καὶ τοῦ κολλώδους he means chiefly the phlegm. Of the organs which ancient physiologists identify as ἀρχαὶ καὶ πηγαί of various humors (see *On Anaximander*, p. 220), our author mentions the brain (c. 3), the heart (cc. 5 and 6), the lungs (c. 7), and the liver (c. 8). This makes it clear that he had in mind the system of ἀρχαὶ καὶ πηγαί. In favor of the assumption that he meant to call the heart the μητρόπολις of the hot we may cite the following points: (a) In c. 5 he says καὶ πλείστον ἔχει τοῦ θερμοῦ ἢ καρδίη, ἥ ἢ κοίλη φλέψ, καὶ ταμεύει τὸ πνεῦμα. With regard to the πνεῦμα he says, c. 6, πνεῦμα ἢ καρδίη ἔχει θερμὴ ἐοῦσα μάλιστα τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. From c. 6 (8, 592 L.) and c. 13 (8, 600 L.) it is clear that he regards πνεῦμα as the vapor (ἀναθυμίασις) of the blood produced by the vital heat of the heart. (b) c. 6 καὶ τὸ θερμόν πλείστον ἐνὶ τῇσι φλεψὶ καὶ τῇ καρδίῃ and

ibid. τὸ δὲ παιδίον . . . ἔλκει τήν τε τροφήν καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τῇ καρδίῃ εἴσω· τοῦτο γὰρ θερμότατόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ παιδίῳ. It must be noted, however, that while the heart is especially concerned with τὸ θερμόν, it is not the sole seat of it: above, under (b), we have seen the veins mentioned also as the seat of the hot, and in c. 9 (8, 596 L.) he says τὸ δὲ θερμόν ἐν παντὶ τῷ σώματι. On the other hand, he says, c. 5, ἡ δὲ καρδίη πουλὺ τοῦ κολλώδεος καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ ἔχει. All this is calculated to confuse us, as indeed the statements proceed from the pen of one who may be a ready writer, but is not capable of expressing himself clearly. With regard to these negative instances one may take two points of view, either or both of which will probably answer the objections: First, the statement that τὸ θερμόν is in the veins and in fact in the whole body, does not imply the absence of a specific μητρόπολις of the θερμόν; it merely recognizes the fact, universally emphasized by the Hippocratics, that there exists a complete circulatory system by which the warm blood is carried (from the heart) to the outermost extremities and back again. In regard to his statement (c. 5) that the heart contains much of the κολλώδες and the ψυχρόν, the most probable answer seems to me, that he is speaking of the heart, not from the point of view of its physiological functioning, but from that of its original formation. The same distinction will probably be found to dispose of the liver as a possible τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ τοῦ λιπαροῦ μητρόπολις because of the statement in c. 8 (8, 594 L.) τὸ δὲ ἥπαρ ὧδε ξυνέστηκε· ξὺν τῷ θερμῷ πουλὺ τοῦ ὑγροῦ ἀποληφθὲν ἄνευ τοῦ κολλώδεος καὶ τοῦ λιπαροῦ, ἐκράτησε τὸ ψυχρόν τοῦ θερμοῦ, καὶ ἐπάγη.

To whom our author, if he was not himself the author of it, owed the figure of the μητρόπολις in the sense of the ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ, it is impossible to say. It seems to me not unlikely that he, or his source, influenced Plato, *Tim.* 70 A, to use the figure of the ἀκρόπολις for the head, although immediately afterwards the heart is described as a πηγὴ. On this figure of the ἀκρόπολις, see Fr. Boll, *Das Lebensalter*, p. 52, and Jaeger, *Nemesius von Emesa*, p. 21 sq. The closely related figure of the μητρόπολις seems to have had a similar career. Like all the various senses of ἀρχή, that of the ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ in time suffered catachresis and was worn threadbare. We meet it in Diodor. Sic., 1, 2, 2 εἰ γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἐν ἄδου μυθολογία τὴν ὑπόθεσιν πεπλασμένην ἔχουσα πολλὰ συμβάλλεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς εὐσέβειαν καὶ δικαιοσύνην, πῶς

μᾶλλον ὑποληπτέον τὴν προφήτιν τῆς ἀληθείας ἱστορίαν, τῆς ὅλης φιλοσοφίας οἷονεὶ μητρόπολιν οὔσαν, ἐπισκευάσαι δύνασθαι τὰ ἥθη μᾶλλον πρὸς καλοκάγαθίαν; Athenaeus, 104 A, in a merry mood says, εἰς ταῦτ' οὖν τις ἀποβλέπων . . . εἰκότως ἂν ἐπαινέσειε τὸν καλὸν Χρύσιππον, κατιδόντα ἀκριβῶς τὴν Ἐπικούρου φύσιν καὶ εἰπόντα μητρόπολιν εἶναι τῆς φιλοσοφίας αὐτοῦ τὴν Ἀγχεστράτου Γαστρολογίαν.

Having considered our author's ἀρχαὶ καὶ πηγαί in the physiological system, let us return for a moment to his cosmology in c. 2. There also he has ἀρχαὶ καὶ πηγαί, — to wit, his four χωρία, appropriated severally to (1) τὸ θερμόν ("the αἰθήρ of the ancients"), (2) γῆ, (3) ἡήρ, (4) ἡ τετάρτη (not definitely named, but doubtless water). Except in the case of (1) τὸ θερμόν, which has no other property assigned to it, each χωρίον is regarded as occupied by a pair of properties: (2) γῆ has ψυχρόν καὶ ξηρόν, (3) ἡήρ has θερμόν καὶ ὑγρόν, and (4) ἡ τετάρτη μοῖρα has ὑγρότατόν τε καὶ παχύτατον. Because of the agreement of (2) and (3) with Aristotle's description of earth and air, and the possibility if nothing more, that our author attributed not only heat but also dryness to his hot element, one might suspect that he was reproducing the doctrines of Aristotle, as Zeller, II, ii, 441, n. 2, asserted. But this would be a hasty inference. In Περὶ διαίτης A, 4 (6, 474 L.) we read, τούτων δὲ πρόσκειται ἐκατέρῳ τάδε· τῷ μὲν πυρὶ τὸ θερμόν καὶ ξηρόν, τῷ δὲ ὕδατι τὸ ψυχρόν καὶ ὑγρόν. Here, then, we have the other two elements described in "Aristotelian" terms, but by an author unquestionably antedating Aristotle. Zeller here, as elsewhere, displayed a profound ignorance of the Hippocratic writings, which may well be excused but must be constantly borne in mind in estimating the value of his conclusions.

Just what our author meant by saying that the τετάρτη μοῖρα, unquestionably water, was παχύτατον is a question that ought to be answered. Aristotle uses παχύς in reference to the elements in the sense of "coarse-grained," and Plato, *Tim.*, 45 C, 66 E, does likewise. But a moment's thought will show that this is not our author's meaning. His constant emphasis on the κολλῶδες and the πιαρόν suggests that he means "glutinous." Thus, c. 10 (8, 596 L.) he says, τὸ δὲ σίαλον, ὁκόσον τοῦ κολλώδους ὑγρότατον ἦν, τότε θερμαινόμενον παχύτερον ἐγένετο ὑγρόν ἑόν. The glutinative properties of water were indeed emphasized by Aristotle, *Gen. et Corr.* B 8, 335^a 2 τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ συνέχον,

and elsewhere; but Theophrastus (Diels, *Vorsokr.*³, I, 10, 21 τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὑγρᾶς φύσεώς ἐστι καὶ συνεκτικὸν πάντων) attributes the conception to Thales, doubtless in accordance with the interpretation of Aristotle, who must thus have recognized it as ancient. It occurs unquestionably in Empedocles, fr. 34 Diels ἀλφειτον ὕδατι κολλήσας; see also Diels on Empedocles, fr. 17, 19 and Plutarch, *De primo frig.*, 952 B.

4 (8, 588 L.) θερμαινόμενον γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον πάντων διαχεόμενον λιπαρὸν γίνεται.

Ermerins, because he had changed τὸ θερμόν in the foregoing sentence to ὁ μυελός, here continued his good offices by reading θερμαινόμενος . . . διαχεόμενος λιπαρός. But these changes are unnecessary and indefensible. There is one, however, in our sentence, which I regard as necessary; we must read πᾶν τὸ for πάντων.

5 (8, 590 L.) πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τοῖν φλεβοῖν.

In his essay *Über einen neuen Versuch, die Echtheit einiger Hippokratischen Schriften nachzuweisen* (Sitzungsb. der K. Pr. Akad., 1910), p. 1155, Diels mentions only one dual from Περὶ σαρκῶν — to wit, 17 (8, 604 L.) περὶ ταύταιν ταιν φλεβοῖν as occurring without variant. To judge from the editions of Littré and Ermerins, there are two others, — that above quoted, and that in c. 12 (8, 598 L.) τοῖν γράθοιν, both feminine nouns with masculine modifiers. This would put Περὶ σαρκῶν almost on a par with Περὶ ἀδένων.

9 (8, 596 L.) εἰ δὲ τις τοῦτο αἰεὶ ἀφαιρεῖ, ἄλλο δέρμα γίνοιτ' ἂν πρὸς τοῦ ψυχροῦ.

Ermerins is probably right in reading ἀφαιροῖ. I think we should clearly read ἄλλο <καὶ ἄλλο>, as Littré supplied <καὶ ἄλλοθι> after ἄλλοθι in c. 3 (8, 586 L.).

16 (8, 604 L.) καὶ ἐστι τροπὴ τῷ θερμῷ.

We should clearly read τροφή for τροπή. Cp. c. 6 (8, 592 L.) καὶ τροφή ἐστι τῷ θερμῷ τὸ ψυχρόν.

18 (8, 608 L.) ὡς ἀντηχῇ τὸ πνεῦμα . . . ὡς ἀντηχῶσι τῷ πνεύματι.

The vulg. readings ἀντέχῃ and ἀντέχωσι are clearly right, and we have to read ἔως ἂν instead of ὡς, as Ermerins also has seen.

19 (8, 612 L.) τὸ παιδίον ἐπτάμηνος γόνος γενόμενον, λόγῳ γεγένηται, καὶ ζῇ, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τοιοῦτον καὶ ἀριθμὸν ἀτρεκέα ἐς τὰς ἐβδομάδας.

The MSS. show ἐπτάμηνον γόνον γενόμενον. Littré, I think, erred in changing the gender of ἐπτάμηνον, although one must clearly write γόνος instead of γόνον; for the words mean "the seven-months foetus brought to the birth." There is a certain resemblance between this locution and γενόμενον θεραπείην, Περὶ καρδίης, 3 (9, 82 L.), for which see below, p. 188.

The use of λόγος here is interesting, as it clearly means a law statable in mathematical terms. The same expression recurs later, p. 614 καὶ ἐν ἐπτὰ ἔτεσιν ἐστὶ δὲ λόγῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἀτρεκέως δεκάδες ἐβδομάδων . . . τῆς δὲ φύσιος τὴν ἀνάγκην, διότι ἐν ἐπτὰ τούτων ἕκαστα διοικεῖται, ἐγὼ φράσω ἐν ἄλλοισιν. In this latter passage our author distinguishes between the mathematical law and the physical cause which brings events about in accordance with it. The same conception of λόγος is involved in Heraclitus, fr. 31 Diels, to whom our author may be indebted for it. But the physical experiments of the Pythagoreans, for example in connection with the relation of the notes composing an octave, necessarily involved it likewise. See Milhaud, *Les philosophes géomètres de la Grèce*, and Diels, *Wissenschaft und Technik bei den Hellenen* (*Neue Jahrbücher*, 1914), pp. 6 and 11.

ΠΡΟΠΗΤΙΚΟΝ Β

3 (9, 12 L.) ἀλλ' ὅμως πρόσθεν ἦν μὴ τὰ ἥθεα τῶν νοσημάτων τε καὶ τῶν ἀλγεόντων ἐκμάθη ὁ ἱητρός, οὐ χρὴ προλέγειν οὐδέν.

I think it is probable that we should read πρόσθεν ἢ [μὴ]. Cf. Περὶ εὐσχημοσύνης, 4 (9, 230 L.) πρόσθε μὲν ἢ διδαχθῇ, where Ermerins wrongly reads διδαχθῆναι; for Soph., *El.* 82, sufficiently proves the construction.

12 (9, 32 L.) τὰ τε γὰρ χωρία ὀνόματα ἔχοντα ταῦτά μέγα διαφέρει, καὶ οἱ οὗτοι τρόποι.

It seems obvious that we should read τόποι for τρόποι. The author means to say that different parts of the body may be called by the same name and may yet require different treatment, and diseases affecting them may take a different course. Thus finger and toe

(see c. 11, *sub finem*) bear the common name δάκτυλος, but an affection of the latter is attended with greater danger. In like manner diseases affecting the same part will differ both in different individuals differently constituted and in the same individual at different times; for, as our author proceeds to say, the condition of the same individual varies: at one time even a wound will cause no inflammation, at another time inflammation will set in without external provocation.

ΠΕΡΙ ΚΑΡΔΙΗΣ

3 (9, 82 L.) τὸν μὲν οὖν ἡέρα χρή, γενόμενον θεραπείην, ἀνάγκη ὀπίσω τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν ἐκβάλλειν ἔνθεν ἤγαγεν· τὸ δὲ ὑγρόν, τὸ μὲν εἰς τὸν κουλεὸν αὐτέης ἀποπτύει, τὸ δ' αὖ ξὺν τῷ ἡέρι θύραζε χωρέειν ἐῖ. ταύτη καὶ διαίρει τὸν οὐρανόν, ὁκόταν παλινδρομέη τὸ πνεῦμα· παλινδρομέει δὲ κατὰ δίκην· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀνθρώπου φύσις τροφή ταῦτα· κῶς γὰρ ἀνθρώπου τροφή ἄνεμος καὶ ὕδωρ τὰ ὠμά; ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τιμωρίη ξυγγενέος πάθης.

Ermerins saw that χρή and ἀνάγκη (*i. e.*, ἀνάγκη) were variants, and he therefore omitted the former. The use of θεραπείην here is similar to that of ἐλξιν in Περὶ ἀδένων, 7 (8, 562 L.) noted above, p. 177. Both words point to a later date. The doctrine expressed in the clause κῶς γὰρ ἀνθρώπου τροφή ἄνεμος καὶ ὕδωρ τὰ ὠμά; is not that of the Hippocratic writings, which regard breath as a form of τροφή: see my *Antecedents of Greek Corpuscular Theories*, p. 132 sq. In saying τὰ ὠμά our author obviously implies that ἄνεμος and ὕδωρ require πέψις preparatory to serving as τροφή. I will not say more about this now, because it is clear that the treatise Περὶ καρδίας belongs to the fourth century or later. For a sketch of Greek theories of digestion see my essay just cited, p. 143 sq. An interesting, but far from exhaustive study of the treatise Περὶ καρδίας is contained in Wellmann's *Fragmentsammlung der griechischen Ärzte*, I, ch. III, p. 94 sq.

Our passage possesses great interest for another reason. Who can read the words παλινδρομέει δὲ κατὰ δίκην . . . τιμωρίη ξυγγενέος πάθης and compare with them the passage in which Theophrastus states the fundamental doctrine of Anaximander (*Vorsokr.*³, I, 15, 26 sq.) ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσις ἐστι τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρεῶν·

διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν, without seeing at once the similarity, not to say the identity, of the conception and the point of view? I have repeatedly discussed the latter passage, and have, I think, conclusively shown that the traditional interpretation is false. Anaximander had in mind, not the periodic reabsorption of individual things in the Infinite, regarded as a metaphysical entity, but the seasonal alternation of the hot and the cold, — the hot (and the dry?) prevailing in summer, the cold (and the moist?) in winter. See *On Anaximander* (*Class. Philol.* VII), p. 233 sq., and *On Certain Fragments of the Pre-Socratics* (*Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, XLVIII), p. 684 sq. In our present passage we find a complete parallel in the microcosm to Anaximander's cosmic process. In Anaximander and in the author *Περὶ καρδίας* there is the same rectification, equalization, or compensation (ἀνίσωσις) of a disturbed balance. In Anaximander the cold of the winter avenges the heat of summer, as in *Περὶ καρδίας* the cold of the inhaled air avenges the ἐμφυτον θερμόν of the heart. The same thought recurs in the discussion of the lungs, c. 5 (9, 84 L.) περίβολον δὲ ἔχει παχύν, καὶ βόθρον ἐμβεβόθρωται τὸ εἶδος εἴκελον ὄλμω. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη καὶ τοῦ πνεύμονος <τὸ ἐνδυτον?> ἐνδύεται μετὰ προσηνείης, καὶ κολάζει τὴν ἀκρασίην τοῦ θερμοῦ περιβαλλομένη· ὁ γὰρ πνεύμων φύσει ψυχρός· ἀτὰρ καὶ ψυχόμενος τῇ εἰσπνοῇ. Another good parallel occurs in the closely related treatise *Περὶ ἀδένων*, 10 (8, 564 L.) τὴν κεφαλὴν <ὕγρην> ἑοῦσαν, διὰ τὰ εἰρημένα μοι, τιμωρέων ὁ ἐγκέφαλος ἀποστερέει τὴν ὑγρασίην κτλ. For this passage, see above, p. 178.

ΠΕΡΙ ΤΡΟΦΗΣ

2 (9, 98 L.) αὔξει δὲ καὶ ῥώννυσσι καὶ σαρκὸς καὶ ὁμοιοῦ καὶ ἀνομοιοῦ τὰ ἐν ἐκάστοισι κατὰ φύσιν τὴν ἐκάστου τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς δύναμιν. 3 ὁμοιοῦ δὲ ἐς <φύσιν καὶ> δύναμιν, ὁκόταν κρατέῃ μὲν ἢ ἐπεισιούσα, ἐπικρατέῃ δὲ ἢ προὑπάρχουσα.

Ermerins accepts Littré's addition <φύσιν καὶ>, and rightly reads ἐπικρατέτῃ in c. 3.

The interpretation of the text, here as elsewhere in *Περὶ τροφῆς*, is beset with much difficulty, which is in no way lessened by the existence of a voluminous commentary purporting to belong to Galen

(XV, 224 sq., Kühn). I had myself reached the conclusion that it was not genuine when I learned that Nelson had convinced himself of the fact, and that in consequence the Commentary was not to be included among the works of Galen in the new *Corpus Medicorum*. Galen himself displays scant historical intelligence, but the author of the Commentary on *Περὶ τροφῆς* is as wholly wanting in it as in the first rudiments of philological exegesis. Touching our passage we read (XV, 233 K) ἡ μὲν οὖν φύσις ὁμοιοῦ, ὅταν κρατῇ καὶ πέττη τὴν τροφήν τὴν ἐπεισιούσαν· καὶ δύναμις ἡ προϋπάρχουσα ἐπικρατεῖ καὶ κατεργάζεται καὶ ἄλλοιοῖ καὶ ὁμοιοῖ καὶ τὸ τέλος τρέφει. It is incredible that we should have to supply several different subjects in the short sentence. The subject is doubtless *τροφή* throughout. By *ὁμοιοῦ* our author probably means, not assimilation, as Pseudo-Galen thinks, but the maintenance of the *status quo ante*. Perhaps by *ἀνομοιοῦ* he means to change that status; but I suspect that he means *to restore the status quo ante*, deriving the verb from *ἀνά* + *ὁμοιοῦν*. We should thus have a complete parallel to *ἀνισοῦν*, which, though *ἄνισος* like *ἀνόμοιος* occurs, is derived not from *ἄνισος*, but from *ἀνά* + *ισοῦν*. This suggestion is the more probable because in Ionic *ῖσος* and *ὁμοιος* are often coupled or used interchangeably. In c. 2 Littré understands τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς δύναμιν as referring to the δύναμις *θρεπτική*, as Pseudo-Galen takes it. This, I believe, is an error: δύναμις here and generally in *Περὶ τροφῆς*, refers to the original properties of the food. Two things have an influence on the effect of food ingested into the system, — the constitution of the subject and the properties of the nutrient. In c. 3 I take ἐς δύναμιν to mean “to the extent of its power,” and therefore reject Littré’s <φύσιν καὶ>.

5 (9, 100 L.) ἀμανροῖ δὲ ἐκατέρας ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ μετὰ χρόνον ἡ ἐξωθεν συνεχῆς ἐπεισκριθεῖσα καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὸν χρόνον στερεμνίως πᾶσι τοῖσι μέλεσι διαπλεκεῖσα. 6. καὶ τὴν μὲν ἰδίην ἐξεβλάστησε· μεταβάλλει τε τὴν ἀρχαίαν, καὶ καταφέρεται· τρέφει δὲ πεττομένη· τὴν δὲ προτέρεν ἰδέην ἐξαλλάττει ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ τὰς προτέρας ἐξημαύρωσεν.

In c. 5 ἐν χρόνῳ and μετὰ χρόνον are probably variants, and I should omit καὶ μετὰ χρόνον. Pseudo-Galen has συνεχῶς, and I think it most probably the correct reading. Ermerins runs cc. 5 and 6 together omitting the period after διαπλεκεῖσα and the following καὶ. Our MSS. omit

μεταβάλλει τε . . . πεττομένη and ἰδέην ἐξαλλάττει, in both cases rightly. Littré has borrowed these additions from Pseudo-Galen. They belong to the same school as the Commentary, and reveal the influence of Aristotle's doctrine of πέψις. The form in which Aristotle received the doctrine of τροφή from the medical tradition, and the superficial alterations he made in it, in order to make it square with his metaphysical views, may be clearly seen by the discerning in *Gen. et Corr.* B 8. Omitting ἰδέην ἐξαλλάττει, the last clause becomes clear and intelligible; for τὴν προτέραν (sc. τροφήν) and τὰς προτέρας (sc. τροφὰς) refer to portions of food ingested on previous days, and the thought is brought into close parallelism with that of c.5. The presence of these false additions to the text found in the Commentaries constitutes an interesting problem. Galen several times charges older commentators with making unwarranted additions to the text. Perhaps they originated in paraphrase and commentary, which a later commentator mistook for a fuller text. All additions not supported by our best MSS. are suspicious, and not improbably some have found their way even into these.

12 (9, 102 L.) καὶ πάντων ἐς θερμασίην βλάπτει καὶ ὠφελεῖ· ἐς ψύξιν βλάπτει καὶ ὠφελεῖ· ἐς δύναμιν βλάπτει καὶ ὠφελεῖ.

In this passage καὶ πάντων has been variously construed and interpreted. Kühn attaches the words to the foregoing sentence, which is indefensible; Littré construes πάντων with θερμασίην, which is hardly better; Diels makes it depend on τροφή; and Ermerins says, "locus incertae lectionis." To me it seems most probable and most consonant with the style of the treatise, that we should read κατὰ πάντων and point with a colon after it; for I take the author to mean that the following statements apply to all food-stuffs. We should thus have an emphatic formulation of the author's doctrine of relativity: the action of foods depends wholly on the φύσις of the individual and on the καιρός.

23 (9, 106 L.) σύρροια μία, σύμπνοια μία, πάντα συμπαθέα· κατὰ μὲν οὐλομελίην πάντα, κατὰ μέρος δὲ τὰ ἐν ἐκάστῳ μέρει μέρεα πρὸς τὸ ἔργον.

This is the text of Diels, *Vorsokr.*³, I, 112, 7. Just what meaning he attaches to the words I cannot divine. The renderings of Littré,

Ermerins, and Fuchs are unsatisfactory. At the risk of going wrong, I will give my own interpretation. The author is here, I think, as elsewhere in this treatise (cp. cc. 1, 9, 17, 24), concerned with the moot question of the One and the Many. In c. 9 he saw in the unity of the vascular system, with its various ἀρχαὶ καὶ πηγαί, the answer to the problem in its bearing on physiology: One and Many are merely relative terms. This solution he here repeats in a different form, substituting the terms Whole and Part for One and Many. The vascular system (σύρροια), he says, is One; the respiratory system (σύμπνοια) is One. Though he does not elaborate it, he obviously holds the Hippocratic doctrine, according to which these two systems, as is shown by their coöperation in regulating the ἐμφυτον θερμόν, are One. All is one sympathetic system, in which everything that affects any part, affects the whole (πάντα συμπαθέα). Viewed in their totality the parts constitute a Whole: viewed piecemeal, that which is in the several organs, is Part: the terms Whole and Part are relative to function. The same conclusion is reached by the author of *Περὶ διαίτης* A, 15 (6, 490 L.) ἐκ τῶν ὅλων μέρηα διαιρεῖται καὶ ἐκ τῶν μερέων συντιθεμένων ὅλα γίνονται. If this interpretation is correct, we should set off πρὸς τὸ ἔργον by pointing with a colon after μέρηα. With cc. 23 and 28 compare [Arist.,] *Probl.*, A, 52, 865^b 18-37.

32 (9, 110 L.) δύναμις μίη καὶ οὐ μίη, ἥ πάντα ταῦτα καὶ τὰ ἑτεροῖα διοικέεται, ἡ μὲν ἐς ζωὴν ὅλου καὶ μέρους, ἡ δὲ ἐς αἴσθησιν ὅλου καὶ μέρους.

Nobody will defend μίη. But there is matter of greater importance here. Our best MS., A, omits ἡ μὲν to the final μέρους, — presumably an addition made, like the additions in c. 12, by some one under the influence of Aristotelian-Stoic conceptions; for δύναμις here means not “faculty,” as Littré renders it after Pseudo-Galen, but “quality” (of food). Whoever made the false addition, which is by way of interpretation, was doubtless misled by the term διοικέεται, which here, as in c. 10, refers to the physiological “economy” of nutrition. We should then obviously read ἥ πάντα ταῦτα καὶ [τὰ] ἑτεροῖα διοικεῖται, unless we are to read διακέεται, “are disposed” for διοικεῖται.

37 (9, 110 L.) περίοδοι ἐς πολλὰ σύμφωνοι, ἐς ἔμβρυον καὶ ἐς τὴν τούτου τροφήν· αὐτὶς δὲ ἄνω ῥέπει ἐς γάλα καὶ ἐς τροφήν βρέφους.

It is a commonplace among the Hippocratics that menstruation is allied to lactation, *e. g.* 'Επιδημιῶν B 17 (5, 118 L.) διὸ τὰ γάλακτα ἀδελφὰ τῶν ἐπιμηνίων. Περὶ φύσιος παιδίου, 30 (7, 536 L.) ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον συμβαίνει καὶ ἀγαλάκτους μᾶλλον εἶναι ταύτας τὰς γυναῖκας, τὰς ὀλίγα τὰ καταμήνια μεθίειςας. Littré and Fuchs, like earlier translators, have missed the meaning of σύμφωνοι, which (*cp. c. 40*) is roughly equivalent to συμφέρουσαι, or to ἀδελφαί, as in the first parallel above cited. For the general thought of our passage compare Περὶ φύσιος παιδίου, 30 (7, 534 L.) <δι>ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστι χρονιώτερον δέκα μηνῶν ἐν γαστρὶ ἔχειν ἐγὼ φράσω· ἡ τροφή καὶ ἡ αὔξις ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς μητρὸς κατιούσα οὐκέτι ἀρκέουσα τῷ παιδίῳ ἐστὶ κτλ. In accordance with this interpretation I should write our passage thus: περίοδοι ἐς πολλὰ σύμφωνοι· ἐς ἔμβρυον κάτεισι (*sc. τὰ καταμήνια*) καὶ ἐς τὴν τοῦτου τροφήν, αὗτις δὲ ἄνω ῥέπει ἐς γάλα καὶ ἐς τροφήν βρέφους.

51 (9, 118 L.) μῆνες στερεώτεροι δύστηκτοι <μᾶλλον> τῶν ἄλλων, παρέξ ὁστέου καὶ νεύρου.

Littré added μᾶλλον, in which he was followed by Ermerins. It seems clearly more probable that δύστηκτοι (or whatever form we here accept) is a gloss on στερεώτεροι, suggested by the close of the paragraph. With the excision of δύστηκτοι the need of μᾶλλον disappears. Only the ease of accounting for the loss of μᾶλλον could have recommended Littré's procedure.

ΠΕΡΙ ΟΨΙΟΣ

1 (9, 152 L.) αἱ ὄψεις αἱ διεφθαρμέναι, αὐτόματοι μὲν κυανίτιδες γιγνόμεναι, ἐξαπίνης γίνονται, καὶ ἐπειδὰν γένωνται, οὐκ ἔστιν ἴησις τοιαύτη.

It seems clear that we should read τοιαύτησιν for τοιαύτη, the ending having been lost before the following αἱ δέ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΙΗΤΡΟΤ

2 (9, 206 L.) τοὺς δὲ δίφρους ὁμαλοὺς εἶναι τοῖς ὕψεσι ὅτι μάλιστα, ὅπως κατ' αὐτοὺς ὦσιν.

This passage has taxed the intelligence of editors and translators. Littré renders: "Les sièges, autant que possible, seront de hauteur égale, afin que le médecin et le patient soient de niveau." Fuchs:

“Die Stühle seien an Höhe einander möglichst gleich, damit sie der Körperform der Patienten entsprechen.” In a note he adds: “Freilich kann *δίφρος* auch das scamnum aegrotorum, d. h. eine Krankenpritsche, bezeichnen.” Littré’s rendering is intelligible, but vague; whether the plural *κατ’ αὐτοὺς* led him to refer to the surgeon and the patient is not clear. One cannot refrain from smiling as one reads Fuchs’ translation. Ermerins was troubled by the plural *κατ’ αὐτούς*: had it been the singular, he says, he would have referred it unhesitatingly to the physician. Even so he asks whether that may not be the author’s meaning. I think it is, without a doubt. There is no reason why, in such general instructions, a plural should not occur even if a singular would have been appropriate. All but Fuchs appear to think only of chairs; but *δίφρος* has so many meanings that I do not hesitate to interpret it here as referring to the ancient equivalent, whatever that was, of the modern operating table. In considering the meaning of such a passage we must not forget the close similarity of *Περὶ ἱητροῦ* to *Κατ’ ἱητρεῖον*, to which probably it is much indebted. In the latter work we read c. 3 (3, 278 L.) *ὁ δρῶν, ἢ καθήμενος, ἢ ἐστεῶς, ξυμμέτρως πρὸς ἑωυτόν, πρὸς τὸ χειριζόμενον, πρὸς τὴν αὐγὴν*. Similarly in the description of the ‘bench of Hippocrates,’ *Περὶ ἄρθρων*, 72 (4, 296 L.) occurs the suggestion *ὥς μὴ ὑψηλοτέρῃ τοῦ καιροῦ ἢ μηχανήσῃς ἔη*. As we nowhere read of an adjustable mechanism it is obviously supposed that the tables will be specially constructed of a height to suit the practitioner who is to use them, and where several are to be used by the same physician they will of course be approximately of an even height.

4 (9, 208 L.) *ἔστι δὲ οἰκείη ἐπίδεσις τῆς ἱητρικῆς, ἀφ’ ἧς ὠφελεῖσθαι τὸν θεραπευόμενον <δεῖ>*.

Littré added <δεῖ>, which Ermerins rightly pronounces inept, and admitted *θεραπευόμενον* (Foes) for *θεραπεύοντα* of the MSS. With my present knowledge of the MS. tradition, I can suggest nothing better than *ἀφ’ ἧς ὠφελεῖν ἔστι τὸν θεραπεύοντα*, the clause offering the justification for the statement of the preceding. The meaning of the first clause has been strangely misconceived; for *τῆς ἱητρικῆς* depends on *οἰκείη* (Kühner-Gerth, I, 376, 4). “Bandaging,” says our author, “is a theme germane to the art of medicine, seeing that the practitioner is able thereby to afford relief.”

13 (9, 218 L.) περὶ δὲ καιρῶν, ὁκότε τούτοις ἐκάστοις χρηστέον ἐστί, καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ὡς χρή τῶν γεγραμμένων καταμανθάνειν, παραλέλειπται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐπεὶ πλεῖον προῆκται τῆς κατ' ἱητρικὴν ἐπιμελείας καὶ πόρρω τοῦ τῆς τέχνης ἤδη προεληλυθότος ἐστίν.

Littre took the second δὲ as equivalent to δῆ. I should prefer to read δῆ outright. Ermerins, besides other gratuitous changes, places τοῦ before, instead of after, πόρρω. I believe we need only to change τοῦ to που; cp. Plato, *Enthyphro*, 4 A οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι γε τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ πράξαι, ἀλλὰ πόρρω που ἤδη σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος.

ΠΕΡΙ ΕΤΣΧΗΜΟΣΤΝΗΣ

2 (9, 226 L.) πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ μὴ μετ' αἰσχροκερδεῖς καὶ ἀσχημοσύνης καλαί, ἥσι μέθοδός τις ἐοῦσα τεχνικὴ ἐργάζεται· ἀλλ' εἴ γε μή, μὴ πρὸς ἀναιτίην δημευταί. νέοι τε γὰρ αὐτέοισιν ἐμπίπτουσιν. ἀκμάζοντες δὲ δι' ἐντροπίνην ἰδρῶτας τίθενται βλέποντες· πρεσβῦται δὲ διὰ πικρίην νομοθεσίην τίθενται ἀναίρεσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. καὶ γὰρ ἀγορὴν ἐργαζόμενοι, οὗτοι μετὰ βανασίης ἀπατέοντες, καὶ ἐν πόλεσιν ἀνακυκλέοντες οἱ αὐτοί.

The MS. tradition here, as elsewhere in this treatise, is wretched. Littre supplied the second μὴ in the second sentence, and read δημευταί for δημευταί. In the last sentence he substituted οὗτοι for οὔτοι, and preferred ἀπατέοντες to the variant ἀπαιτέοντες. Ermerins adds <ἐν> before ἥσι, rejects Littre's μὴ, reads ἀναίδειαν δημεύονται for ἀναιτίην δημευταί, αὐτῆσιν for αὐτέοισι, and rejects Littre's οὗτοι, restoring οὔτοι. It is of course impossible to say what the author wrote. Perhaps the following text may be helpful to others as the best I can now offer: πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ μὴ μετ' αἰσχροκερδεῖς καὶ ἀσχημοσύνης καλαί, ἥσι μέθοδός τις ἐοῦσα τεχνικὴ ἐργασίη καλὴ ἐστίν. ἀλλ' εἴ γε μή, πρὸς ἀναιδείην δημευταί. νέοι τε γὰρ αὐτοὶ αὐτῆσιν ἐμπίπτουσιν· ἀκμάζοντες δὲ διεντροπίνην χρωτὸς τίθενται βλέποντες· πρεσβῦται δὲ διὰ πικρίην νομοθεσίην τίθενται ἀναίρεσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. οἱ γὰρ ἐν ἀγορῇ ἐργαζόμενοι οὗτοι καὶ μετὰ βανασίης ἀπαιτέοντες (sc. μισθόν), καὶ οἱ ἐν πόλεσιν ἀνακυκλέοντες, οἱ αὐτοί.

A few notes on this text may be in order. It is neither necessary nor desirable to justify all the suggestions contained in the proposed changes. It would seem not unnatural that the author had some-

how characterized νέοι, and we might have expected something like νέοι τε γὰρ ἄνοι ἔόντες αὐτοὶ αὐτῆσιν ἐμπίπτουσιν; but in so sketchy and ill-written or ill-preserved a treatise no one can feel any confidence that the author said what he appears to have had in mind. It will be noted that I propose διεντροπίην (or διεντροπήν) χρωτὸς for δι' ἐντροπίην ἰδρῶτας. This change appears to me fairly self-evident. Two obvious corruptions occur in the same sentence due at least in part to a misapprehension of the common periphrasis of a verbal noun with τίθεσθαι. The separation of διεντροπίην into two words was probably due to the influence of διὰ πικρίην. Between διεντροπίην and διεντροπήν, both being possible, I cannot make a final choice. The phrase is a periphrasis for χρῶς τρέπεται as νομοθεσίη (for νομοθεσίην) τίθενται ἀναίρεσιν is for νόμῳ (or νομοθεσίῃ) ἀναιροῦσι. In this passage one is involuntarily reminded of Plato, *Apol.*, 34 A B. The last sentence is well nigh desperate. The suggestions aim to give a possible rather than a probable reconstruction. I propose ἐν ἀγορῇ ἐργαζόμενοι, "plying their trade in the agora," instead of ἀγορὴν ἐ., as in Demosth., LVII, 31, and take <καὶ> μετὰ βανασίης ἀπαιτέοντες, "vulgarly exacting pay," with it, as completing the description of the quacks; and supply <οἱ> in the next clause, thinking it probable that our author means to identify the said quacks with the journeymen who, like the better known sophists, went from city to city in quest of dupes. Such quacks were distinguishable from great physicians like Democedes only by their methods and results; for the best physicians appear in the earlier days to have travelled widely in the practice of their profession. The Ἐπιδημῖαι in the *Corpus Hippocrateum* are "notes of foreign travel" made in the course of such journeys, and have no especial reference to epidemic diseases. The most successful among these journeymen received appointments as state physicians.

4 (9, 230 L.) ἡγεμονικώτατον μὲν οὖν τουτέων ἀπάντων τῶν προειρημένων ἢ φύσις· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τέχναισιν, ἣν προσῆ αὐτέοιςι τοῦτο, διὰ πάντων τουτέων πεπόρευνται τῶν προειρημένων. ἀδίδακτον γὰρ τὸ χρέος ἐν τε τῇ σοφίῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ· πρόσθε μὲν ἢ διδαχῇ, ἐς τὸ ἀρχὴν λαβεῖν ἢ φύσις κατερρήν καὶ κέχυται, ἢ δὲ σοφίῃ ἐς τὸ εἰδῆσαι τὰ ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς φύσιος ποιούμενα. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ἀμφοτέροισι τοῖσι λόγοισι

πολλοὶ κρατηθέντες οὐδαμῇ συναμφοτέροισιν ἐχρήσαντο τοῖσι πρήγμασι ἐς δεῖξιν· ἐπὶ οὖν τις αὐτέων ἐξετάζη τι πρὸς ἀληθείην τῶν ἐν ῥῆσει τιθεμένων, οὐδαμῇ τὰ πρὸς φύσιν αὐτέοισι χωρήσει. εὐρίσκονται γοῦν οὔτοι παραπλησίην ὁδὸν ἐκείνοισι πεπορευμένοι. διόπερ ἀπογυμνούμενοι τὴν πᾶσαν ἀμφιέννυνται κακίην καὶ ἀτιμίην. καλὸν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ διδασκέντος ἔργου λόγος· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ποιηθὲν τεχνικῶς ἐκ λόγου ἀννέχθη· τὸ δὲ ῥηθὲν τεχνικῶς, μὴ ποιηθὲν δέ, μεθόδου ἀτέχνου δεικτικὸν ἐγενήθη· τὸ γὰρ οἶσθαι μὲν, μὴ πρήσσειν δέ, ἀμαθίης καὶ ἀτεχνίης σημειὸν ἐστίν· οἷσις γὰρ μάλιστα ἐν ἱητρικῇ αἰτίην μὲν τοῖσι κεχρημένοισιν, ὀλεθρον δὲ τοῖσι χρεομένοισιν ἐπιφέρει· καὶ γὰρ ἦν ἑωυτοὺς ἐν λόγοισι πείσαντες οἰηθῶσιν εἰδέναι ἔργον τὸ ἐκ μαθήσιος, καθάπερ χρυσὸς φαῦλος ἐν πυρὶ κριθεὶς τοιοῦτους αὐτοὺς ἀπέδειξεν. καὶ τοι γε τοιαύτη ἡ πρόρρησις ἀπαρηγόρητος. ἥ σύνεσις ὁμογενής ἐστίν, εἰθὺ τὸ πέρας ἐδήλωσε γνῶσις· τῶν δ' ὁ χρόνος τὴν τέχνην εὐοδέα κατέστησεν, ἥ τοῖσι ἐς τὴν παραπλησίην οἶμον ἐμπίπτουσι τὰς ἀφορμὰς δήλους ἐποίησε.

Ermerins did not greatly modify this text, except that he declined to reconstruct the last sentence, beginning with καίτοι γε, which he gave in the vulg. because he could make nothing of it. I note the principal changes. 4: διδασκῆναι. 7: ἐν ἀμφοτέροισι. 8: ἐς ἐνδείξιν. 10: οἶμον for ὁδόν. 15: κεκτημένοισι, with Corais, for κεχρημένοισιν.

The text is undoubtedly corrupt, and Littré found its sense obscure. His résumé is wholly misleading, and his rendering, followed in the main by Fuchs, is impossible. Ilberg, *Studia Pseudippocratea*, p. 58 sq., confessed that it was difficult, and quite missed its meaning. Ermerins caught at least the general drift of the chapter. Parts of the text are desperate, and here and there I cannot follow the author; but the main outlines of his thought are intelligible, once one seizes the clew. The chapter deals with the problem of education and scientific practice. If one desires to understand it, I know of nothing better calculated to give the necessary historical setting of ideas than the admirable article by Professor Shorey, *Φύσις, Μελέτη, Ἐπιστήμη*, in the *Transactions of the Amer. Philol. Assn.*, XL (1909), pp. 185-201. Unfortunately Professor Shorey, like others who have dealt with the general theme, appears not to have known our chapter, or, misled by Littré's summary, to have passed it by without recognizing its contents.

Our author begins by emphasizing the fundamental importance of φύσις, — meaning natural aptitude, — for the study of medicine. This requirement is dwelt upon also Νόμος, 2 (4, 638 L.) *πρώτον μὲν οὖν πάντων δεῖ φύσιος· φύσιος γὰρ ἀντιπρησσοῦσης, κενὰ πάντα· φύσιος δὲ ἐς τὸ ἄριστον ὁδηγεούσης, διδασκαλὴ τέχνης γίνεται.* This aptitude is inborn, not bred by education: *ἀδίδακτον γὰρ τὸ χρεός (= τὸ χρῆμα, i. e. ἡ φύσις) ἐν τε τῇ σοφίῃ (= φιλοσοφίᾳ) καὶ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ.* Cp. *Περὶ τροφῆς*, 39 (9, 112 L.) *φύσις πάντων ἀδίδακτοι.* Because of the aphoristic style and a certain incoherence of thought, it is impossible to say just what φύσις in the latter passage means. Clearly we are, however, dealing with a catchword of the time which, like others of the sort, was susceptible of different applications. By the close of the fifth century, as I have elsewhere shown, φύσις, beginning to be distinctly personified, had come to be charged with a great wealth of meaning. The author of *Περὶ τροφῆς* may have had in mind rather the varying physical constitutions of men, which, independently of training, education, or volition, perform their natural functions. Cp. also Epicharmus (?), fr. 4, 6 Diels

*τὸ δὲ σοφὸν ἂ φύσις τόδ' οἶδεν ὥς ἔχει
μόνα· πεπαίδευται γὰρ αὐταντὰς ὕπο,*

and *Περὶ διαίτης* A, 15 (6, 490 L.) *ἡ φύσις αὐτομάτῃ ταῦτὰ ἐπίσταται.* Our author proceeds to say that without instruction natural endowment is too lax and undisciplined to make a beginning: *πρόσθε μὲν ἡ διδαχθῇ, ἐς τὸ ἀρχὴν λαβεῖν ἡ φύσις κατερρύνῃ καὶ κέχυται;* (possibly we should read *τέχνην λαβεῖν*, “acquire an art,” instead of *ἀρχὴν λαβεῖν*). Whereas understanding, bred of instruction, is equally incapable of really knowing what untaught nature does of itself: *ἡ δὲ σοφίῃ ἐς τὸ εἰδῆσαι τὰ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς φύσιος ποιούμενα.* Here the MSS. show *τῇ δὲ σοφίῃ.* One is tempted to read *τῇ δὲ σοφίῃ ἔστιν εἰδῆσαι*, “but philosophical instruction is capable of comprehending scientifically what nature does instinctively.” This would be an easy emendation, as *ἔστιν* might readily have been changed to *ἐς τὸ* because of the preceding *ἐς τὸ*, and the sentence would gain immensely by the change; but the following sentence appears to presuppose Littré’s text, which Ermerins also adopts. The next sentence has been obscured by the intrusion of *ἀμφοτέροις*, probably a misplaced variant for *συναμφοτέροις*;

and one is puzzled to know what to do with ἐς δεῖξιν. There is a variant ἐνδειξιν, which Ermerins has combined with the other into ἐς ἐνδειξιν. I suspect that our author wrote ἐν δείξεσιν, which was corrupted into ἐν δεῖξιν, whence the variants. Many, our author says, have been worsted in argument because they have not used, or had at their service, in their epideictic discourses (or prognostications? cp. πρόρρησις, below), both these necessary qualifications,—to wit, natural endowment and scientific instruction. This appears to be the author's meaning, though the sentence, even with the suggested changes, is not well constructed: καὶ γὰρ ἐν [ἀμφοτέροισι] τοῖσι λόγοισι πολλοὶ κρατηθέντες οὐδαμῇ συναμφοτέροισιν ἐχρήσαντο τοῖσι πρήγμασι ἐν δείξεσιν. While it is clearly hinted that the physician must possess both qualifications, our author has for the moment uppermost in his thought the need of scientific (theoretical) training as of first importance in disputations. In reading this passage one naturally thinks of the reference to such debates in *Περὶ φύσιος ἀνθρώπου*, I (6, 32 sq. L.). Our author proceeds: Consequently, when one examines any one of their statements in the light of theory, their native talent is of no avail: ἐπὴν οὖν τις αὐτέων ἐξετάσῃ τι πρὸς ἀληθείην τῶν ἐν ῥήσει τιθεμένων, οὐδαμῇ τὰ πρὸς φύσιν αὐτέοισι χωρήσει. One will note here the use of πρὸς ἀληθείην, which I have rendered "in the light of theory." I think there can be no doubt as to its meaning; for our author obviously refers to the test of truth which comes by the application of doctrine regarded as a rational system of relations. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.*, X, 9, 1179^b 23 similarly speaks of ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδασχὴ, and the author of *Παραγγέλαι*, who is probably to be identified with the author of our treatise, says c. 1 (9, 252 L.) ὑποληπτέον οὖν τὴν φύσιν (by which, unless we are to read τὴν αἴσθησιν, he probably means man's native powers, including his senses) ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ παντοίων πρηγμάτων κινήθηναί τε καὶ διδασχῆναι, βίης ὑπεούσης· ἡ δὲ διάνοια παρ' αὐτῆς λαβοῦσα, ὥς προείπον, ὕστερον εἰς ἀληθείην ἤγαγεν. Here again ἀληθείη seems to mean a rational system of relations, regarded as embodying the truth, which may serve as a body of doctrine. Those who have failed of such instruction, our author says, go quite as much astray as those who lack native endowment. Both are stripped of their pretensions and are clothed with dishonor; for theory (λόγος) must follow practice gained under proper instruction. He then adds:

πάν γὰρ τὸ ποιηθὲν τεχνικῶς ἐκ λόγου ἀνιήχθη. Here I find it difficult to believe that ἐκ λόγου is correct, unless, as seems not unlikely, we are to supply <ἐς λόγον> after it. In that case τὸ ποιηθὲν τεχνικῶς ἐκ λόγου would be roughly the equivalent of the preceding ἐκ τοῦ διδαχθέντος ἔργου (cp. also ἔργον τὸ ἐκ μαθήσιος, below), and we should require the addition of ἐς λόγον with ἀνιήχθη: "everything done under rational instruction in accordance with the laws of an art is referred to a rational principle." In the following I prefer to read κεκτημένοισιν with Corais, and to change ἀπέδειξεν to ἀπέδειξαν and αὐτοὺς to αὐτοῖς.

The last sentence of the chapter is perhaps past remedy. The best guess I can make is this: καίτοι γε τοιαύτη ἡ πρόρρησις ἀναπηγόρητος. ἡ σύνεσις ὁμογενής ἐστιν· εὐθὺς τὸ πέρας ἐμήνυσε γνῶσιν· ὧν δ' ὁ χρόνος τὴν τέχνην ἐναργέα κατέστησε, καὶ τοῖσιν ἐς τὴν παραπλησίην οἶμον ἐπίπτουσι τὰς ἀφορμὰς <εὐ> δήλους ἐποίησε. "And yet such a prognostication as this is indefensible. All wit is akin. Achievement straightway proves knowledge. Where time has made plain an art, it makes obvious even to those who fare by a different but similar way their proper points of departure." It will be noted that I propose ἀναπηγόρητος (= ἀναπολόγητος) for the unsuitable word ἀπαρηγόρητος; substitute εὐθὺς for εὐθὺ, and γνῶσιν for γνῶσις; and read ἐναργέα for Littré's εὐοδέα, καὶ, with Zwing., for ἡ, and εὐδήλους for δήλους. The MSS. have εὐαδέα and εὐώδεα. Littré's εὐοδέα is not found elsewhere and, as Ermerins remarks, we should have had εὐοδον; but ἐναργέα is to my mind in itself better and occurs in Παραγγελίαι, I (9, 252 L.) ἐξ ἐναργέος ἐφόδου. At best we have an unsatisfactory text.

5 (9, 232 L.) διὸ δεῖ ἀναλαβόντα τουτέων τῶν προειρημένων ἕκαστα, μετὰγειν τὴν σοφίην ἐς τὴν ἱητρικὴν καὶ τὴν ἱητρικὴν ἐς τὴν σοφίην. ἱητρός γὰρ φιλόσοφος ἰσόθεος.

Ermerins and others have pronounced this statement absurd. Be that as it may, it is more important to understand the feeling of our author than to indulge our own. In order to do so we need only to compare Arist., *De Respiratione*, 21, 480^b 22 περὶ δὲ ὑγείας καὶ νόσου οὐ μόνον ἐστὶν ἱατροῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ μέχρι τοῦ τὰς αἰτίας εἰπεῖν. ἡ δὲ διαφέρουσι καὶ ἡ διαφέροντα θεωροῦσιν, οὐ δεῖ λανθάνειν, ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε σύνορος ἡ πραγματεία μέχρι τινός ἐστι, μαρτυρεῖ τὸ γινόμενον· τῶν τε

γὰρ ἱατρῶν ὅσοι κομψοὶ ἢ περιέργοι, λέγουσί τι περὶ φύσεως καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐκεῖθεν ἀξιούσι λαμβάνειν, καὶ τῶν περὶ φύσεως πραγματευθέντων οἱ χαριέστατοι σχεδὸν τελευτῶσιν εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἱατρικὰς, and Arist., *De Sensu*, I, 436^a 17 φυσικοῦ δὲ καὶ περὶ ὑγιείας καὶ νόσου τὰς πρώτας ἰδεῖν ἀρχὰς· οὔτε γὰρ ὑγίειαν οὔτε νόσον οἶόν τε γίνεσθαι τοῖς ἐστερημένοις ζωῆς. διὸ σχεδὸν τῶν τε περὶ φύσεως οἱ πλεῖστοι καὶ τῶν ἱατρῶν οἱ φιλοσοφωτέως τὴν τέχνην μετιόντες, οἱ μὲν τελευτῶσιν εἰς τὰ περὶ ἱατρικῆς, οἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἄρχονται περὶ τῆς ἱατρικῆς. It must be evident that there is something wrong with the last sentence of the second passage. The first passage enables us to see clearly what Aristotle had in mind, but in spite of the close parallel I have thus far been unable to derive from it a satisfactory correction of the second. Probably there is a lacuna between ἄρχοντα and περὶ τῆς ἱατρικῆς. We have seen above (p. 156, sq.) instances of ἱατροὶ κομψοὶ ἢ περιέργοι who derived their principles from a general philosophy of nature. That philosophy is θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον ὄντως χρήμα is the opinion not only of the author of the Pseudo-Aristotelian *Περὶ κόσμου* (391^a 1), but also of Plato and Aristotle. That *Περὶ εὐσχημοσύνης* is a treatise of the Aristotelian or post-Aristotelian age is unquestionable; but such opinions were clearly held much earlier.

If one inquires just what could have led our author to call the physician a godlike philosopher, an answer not devoid of interest is suggested by the context. It is obvious that by a physician he means in this connection the ideal physician who, as we have seen, must in his person as in his preparation unite theory and practice. By a philosopher, in turn, our author intends of course the *φυσικός*, or philosopher of nature, and our quotations from Aristotle, as well as the numerous passages cited elsewhere in this article sufficiently prove the close association of ἱατρικὴ and φυσικὴ to the scientists of the time. If then the physician is singled out as a godlike philosopher, it is obviously in contrast to the *φυσικός*, and the natural assumption is that he is so distinguished just because, in the opinion of our author, he is able to accomplish results as well as construct theories. This the *φυσικός*, who was interested pre-eminently in τὰ μετέωρα, obviously could not do; for he was foredoomed to confine himself to theory. It will be recalled that, according to Xenophon, *Mem.*, I, I, 11, Socrates regarded the *φυσικός* as foolish for troubling

himself about such matters. Of especial interest in this connection are the words of Xenophon, *ibid.*, i, 1, 15 ἐσκόπει δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τάδε, ἄρ', ὥσπερ οἱ τάνθρώπεια μαθάνοντες ἡγούνται τοῦθ' ὃ τι ἂν μάθωσιν ἑαυτοῖς τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅτῳ ἂν βούλωνται ποιήσῃν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ θεῖα ζητοῦντες νομίζουσιν, ἐπειδὴν γνῶσιν αἷς ἀνάγκαις ἕκαστα γίγνεται, ποιήσῃν, ὅταν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀνέμους καὶ ὕδατα καὶ ὥρας καὶ ὅτου ἂν ἄλλου δέωνται τῶν τοιούτων, ἢ τοιούτον μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἐλπίζουσιν, ἀρκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς γνῶναι μόνον ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστα γίγνεται. In the heyday of dawning science, ancient and modern, extravagant hopes of its practical results were entertained, as by Empedocles, Descartes, and others. See my *Περὶ Φύσεως*, p. 126 sq. One might conclude that our author lived in the age of the ἐπίγονοι, when disillusionment had ensued. Yet even Aristotle had his dreams!

ΠΑΡΑΓΓΕΛΙΑΙ

2 (9, 252 L.) τῶν δ' ὡς λόγου μόνου ξυμπεραινόντων μὴ εἶη ἐπαύρασθαι, τῶν δὲ ὡς ἔργου ἐνδείξιος.

I cannot believe that the writer wrote ὡς: probably we should write ἐκ and ἐξ instead, or we should insert <ὄντος> after μόνου.

Ibid. (9, 254 L.) οὕτω γὰρ δοκέω τὴν ξύμπασαν τέχνην ἀναδειχθῆναι, διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἐκάστου τοῦ τέλους τηρηθῆναι καὶ ἐς ταῦτ' οὕτως ἐξυναλισθῆναι.

Here we must clearly write τὸ τέλος ("the issue") for τοῦ τέλους. Ermerins also reached the same conclusion.

Ibid. προσέχειν οὖν δεῖ περιπτώσει τῇ ὡς ἐπιτοπολύ, καὶ μετ' ὠφελίης καὶ ἡρεμαιοτήτος μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπαγγελίης καὶ ἀπολογίης τῆς μετὰ πρήξιας.

Here Ermerins writes τῇ περιπτώσει τῇ and μετ' ἀπρηξίης. Both changes may be justified, but they are unnecessary. As to περιπτώσει, I think it refers, like διὸ καὶ καθόλου δεῖ ἔχεσθαι τῶν γινομένων earlier in c. 2, to occurrences, and here specifically to what generally occurs in experience. The use of περίπτωσις here and in c. 1 (9, 252 L.) ξυγκαταινέω μὲν οὖν καὶ τὸν λογισμόν, ἥνπερ ἐκ περιπτώσιος ποιῆται τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ τὴν καταφορὴν ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων μεθοδεύη, is, I think, clear evidence of the late date of our treatise. Littré has referred to Diog. Laert., X, 32 for the Epicurean use of the term, and one

may find the word and its congeners frequently employed in Sextus Empiricus and in other late authors, always in a clearly defined epistemological sense. It is plain, however, that we do not have in our treatise the fully developed terminology of Epicurus, and we are perhaps not justified in dating it quite so late as that would require. In view of this fact it may not appear too fanciful if I suggest that the author of our treatise (and of *Περὶ εὐσχημοσύνης*) may be reproducing the views of Nausiphanes, from whose *Τρίπους* Epicurus is accused of having pilfered his *Κανών*, especially as he was clearly the first philosopher who formulated in detail the epistemological theory that starts with sensations, and was recognized as the forerunner of the empirical school in medicine.

There is one change which I would suggest in the text of our passage. Some MSS. read *ὠφελείης* instead of *ὠφελίης*, and I would propose *ἀφελείης*, which seems to suit the context better. One may defend *ὠφελίης*, however, as a reminiscence of *Περὶ ἄρθρων*, 44 (4, 188 L.) *αἰσχροὺν μέντοι καὶ ἐν πάσῃ τέχνῃ καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐν ἱητρικῇ πουλὺν ὄχλον καὶ πολλὴν ὄψιν καὶ πουλὺν λόγον παρασχόντα, ἔπειτα μηδὲν ὠφελῆσαι.*

4 (9, 256 L.) *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι οὖν οὐ δέῃ περὶ στάσιος μισθοῦ.*

Possibly *στάσιος* may be allowed to stand, in the sense of 'fixing,' 'determining,' but I suspect that the writer said *ἰήσιος* (*ιάσιος*) *μισθοῦ*.

7 (9, 260 L.) *ἐφ' οἷς ἂν ἱητρός ἀκμάζοι ὁμότεχνος καλεόμενος.*

This text, though supported by the MSS. and accepted by Ermerins, appears to me subject to grave suspicion. I have thought of various possibilities. First, one might change *ὁμότεχνος* to the accusative, making it the object of *καλεόμενος*, "Where a true physician would appear at his best in calling into consultation with him a brother physician." But the sentence seems to be a reminiscence of *Περὶ ἀρχαίης ἱητρικῆς*, 7 (1, 584 L.) *ὁ καλούμενος ἱητρός καὶ ὁμολογεομένως χειροτέχνης*. If this be true, the corruption is probably more serious, and it would be idle to attempt a restoration of the text.

SUMMARIES OF DISSERTATIONS FOR THE DEGREE
OF PH.D., 1913-14

HENRY T. SCHNITTKIND.— *De Praepositionis Sub Usu.*

IN this thesis I have examined all the Latin writers through Suetonius in order to determine the usage of the temporal *sub*. The result of my investigation is as follows:

The preposition *sub*, when used to denote time, with the Ablative, means

- (1) rarely, "a little before,"
- (2) most frequently, "in" or "at the time of,"
- (3) very rarely, "immediately after."

With the Accusative, it signifies

- (1) most frequently, "about,"
- (2) often, "a little before,"
- (3) not infrequently, "in" or "at the time of,"
- (4) not infrequently, "immediately after."

NOTE A. With the ablative, *sub* is not found in the sense of "a little before" in any prose writer before Suetonius.

NOTE B. With *sub* "in" with the ablative, very often, especially in the poets, the preposition is superfluous.

NOTE C. In the post-Augustan poets the temporal *sub* almost always takes the ablative.

NOTE D. "Sub rege" is not used in a temporal sense before Vergil.

NOTE E. In Tacitus, the younger Pliny, and Suetonius *sub* with the ablative denoting contemporaneity is almost always used with the name of an emperor or some similar word.

NOTE F. "Sub idem tempus" sometimes means "at the same time," but far more frequently, "almost at the same time."

NOTE G. When *sub* is used with the ablative, especially in poetry, an adjective is often appended to denote the condition or attendant circumstance. With the accusative, however, we find no such descriptive adjectives.

NOTE H. *Sub* with the ablative, particularly in those places where it means "a little before" or "immediately after," has often not only temporal, but also a causal meaning.

At the end of the thesis I have added an index including all the passages I have found in which the temporal *sub* is used.

OTIS JOHNSON TODD. — *Quo modo Aristophanes rem temporalem in fabulis suis tractaverit.*

This thesis will be printed in full in the next volume of these Studies.

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